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Abstract
The thesis seeks to explain change and stability in ‘civil service policy in Thailand between 
1980 and 1999, by focusing on two issue areas relating to public sector human resource 
management: civil service downsizing and civil service pension reform. The thesis departs 
from the institutionalist research tradition, which explains administrative change using the 
concept of ‘administrative reform capacity. It argues that the static view of reform capacity 
advocated by institutionalists including Knill’s ideal type constellations of administrative 
reform capacity needs to be re- conceptualised if it is to be analytically useful in accounting 
for variations in the trajectories and outcomes of civil service policy reform in Thailand 
across twenty-year period of this study and between case studies. To advance Knill’s concept, 
the thesis take into account the processual view of public management policy change to 
develop a more flexible institutional processualist theoretical compass. The thesis adopts an 
‘analytic narrative instrumental case study research design, which can accommodate 
inquiries from both institutional and processual research traditions.
Drawing on evidence from two narrative case studies, this thesis develops process 
understanding and explanations for the dynamics of civil service policy making by shedding 
light on the analytical components of reform process: agenda setting, alternative 
specification and decision making. It argues that a combination of institutional and 
processual factors shape these processes, which results in variations in trajectories and 
outcomes in different episodes within the two case studies. Based on the narrative evidence, 
the thesis re-interprets the three main elements of Knill’s concept of reform capacity -  
strength of executive leadership, entrenchment of administrative arrangement and political 
influence of the bureaucracy. It argues that for ‘reform capacity to explain public 
management policy change, the relationships between the three elements and between them 
and the dynamics contexts and situations faced by reformers need to be taken into account. 
The thesis elaborates two general approaches to civil service reform -  the techno- 
bureaucratic and the political -  and their dualities, which can be found in the principal 
reform actors, reform issues, reform process and mechanisms. It is the tensions between 
these elements and the reform context that affects the trajectories and outcomes of reform 
in Thailand - limited piecemeal public management policy change.
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A Note on Thai Names
In referring to Thais in the text, I use given names, as it is common among Thais to 
officially address other people as such. Most Thai and international readers alike are 
likely to be familiar with the first names of prominent figures such as Prime 
Ministers, and military and civilian leaders in the country. It is also a matter of 
convenience to address them by their given names since many Thais have a very long 
surname. However, I use surnames to refer to Thai authors on whose works I am 
drawing. In bibliographic references including footnotes, their surnames appear first, 
with a comma between surname and given name.
Parti
Researching 
Public Management Policy Change
Chapter 1 
Public Management Policy Change: 
A Theoretical and Methodological Compass
Overview
For more than half a century, successive Thai governments have battled against a rising tide 
of bureaucracy and bureaucratic inefficiency. Several largely unsuccessful attempts to reform 
the Gvil Service have been made since the 1950s. Despite the most recent more far-reaching 
reforms, over the period as a whole only limited change has been achieved. This thesis aims 
to explain why public management policy reform in Thailand has been incremental and only 
achieved limited, piecemeal change, and what explains the variation in reform trajectories 
and outcomes across the last two decades of the twentieth century, and across areas within 
public management policy. These are the empirical and historical questions which this thesis 
answers.
Public management policy change can be conceived as changes in government wide 
institutional rules and organisational routines, which aim to guide, motivate and control 
public service organisations (Barzelay, 2001).1 This covers the principal areas of government 
administration including expenditure planning and financial management, civil service and 
labour relations, procurement, organisation and method, as well as audit and evaluation. The 
term ‘civil service policy used in this thesis refers to a sub-domain of public management 
policy.
The thesis examines two cases of change within civil service policy in Thailand 
between 1980 and 1999, with particular focus on civil service human resource management 
(HRM). The first case involves downsizing the Gvil Service, which is defined in this thesis as 
deliberate measures that aim to control the expansion of and/or reduce the size of the Gvil 
Service. This involves such input-driven measures as containing the growth of the Gvil
1 Similar definitions of public management policy can be founded in Halligan (2002) who sees public 
management policy as the introduction of a range of reforms that affect most aspects of the 
functioning of a civil service or public sector or both; and in Pollitt and Bouchaert’s (2000) 
classification of ‘what trajectory for public management reform comprising components of reform 
such as personnel, finance, organisation and performance management.
3Service by way of employment freezing, reducing head counts and cutting personnel costs 
which have become popular tools for increasing efficiency in the civil service worldwide. It 
also involves a strategic approach dealing with the redefinition of the roles of the Gvil 
Service, which would lead to restructuring and increasing efficiency in the civil service.2 The 
second case is reforming Gvil Service pensions, which refers to the attempt to change the 
Gvil Service pension system and its administration with the aim of reducing state’s 
responsibility for providing pensions for retired government personnel and to improve the 
system and process of Gvil Service pension management.
Defining civil service downsizing and reforming civil service pensions as part of 
HRM is consistent with a functional approach to human resource management.3 
Furthermore, policy making for these two issues took place in the institutional venues 
dealing with HRM in the public sector. Functionally, this thesis follows Beer, Spector, 
Lawrence, Mills and Walton (1985) and defines HRM as subsuming four human resource 
policy areas: employee influence, human resource flow, reward systems and work systems. 
Downsizing is defined as part of HRM because it is an intentional set of HR activities usually 
involving reductions in personnel and the improvement of work processes,4 which is a 
particular strategy to increase organisational efficiency and productivity (Jones, 1998). Such a 
definition is directly concerned with human resource flow and work systems. Reforming civil 
service pensions falls under the province of ‘reward systems* as defined by the functional 
view of FIRM McGune (1997) argues that the development and adoption of a remuneration 
policy and pay package in which pensions are normally included involves people interface 
and organisational responsibility because it affects individuals with their ‘baggage’ of attitude, 
perceptions and willingness to co-operate or conform. Institutionally, downsizing the Thai
2 The definition of downsizing used in this thesis is similar to that of Me Court (2001) and practical 
definitions that can be found in the literature on public employment reform advocated by World 
Bank experts including Nunberg (1989). This is how the term is understood and used in the Thai 
Gvil Service.
3 For the functional view of HRM see also Storey (1995), Anthony, Perrewe and Kacmar (1996), 
Rosenbloom (1985) and Shafritz, Hyde and Rosenbloom (1981).
4 Many scholars explicitly define downsizing as part of strategic HRM Jones (1998) surveyed HR 
tools for downsizing including normal attrition, hiring freezes, transfers to other in-house positions 
or other agencies, buyouts and involuntary reductions in the workforce. Doherty (1997) argues that 
downsizing is an HRM challenge as organisations need to remain effective and efficienct in order to 
survive. The same view is shared by Hendry and Pettigrew (1992) who argue that HRM should 
operationally and strategically linked to such policy as downsizing which proactively address
4Gvil Service and reforming civil service pensions can also be defined as part of the HRM 
policy domain. As will be seen in chapter two, both reform initiatives were developed and 
implemented in civil service policy making institutions mainly within the Office of the Gvil 
Service Commission, and the Ministry of Finance, particularly its Comptroller General’s 
Department. These central co-ordinating agencies are the institutional venues where Gvil 
Service HRM policy are developed and managed. Because of their functional relevance and 
institutional locations, downsizing the civil service and reforming civil service pensions can 
be defined as part of HRM
This chapter aims to provide the theoretical compass for the thesis by reviewing the 
seminal literature related to public policy and public management change. It will discuss two 
major approaches, institutionalist and procesualist, which have been widely accepted and 
used to explain change in these areas. One of the most convincing institutionlist approaches 
is Knill’s concept of administrative reform capacity as an explanation for public management 
change. This will be examined critically and used as a theoretical platform for the thesis. 
Knill’s institutionalist view of reform capacity and a processualist approach will together 
form a conceptual ‘compass’ that guides the explanations for limited and incremental civil 
service policy change in Thailand. On the methodological side, the chapter develops an 
instrumental case study as a research design that is consistent with the chosen theoretical 
framework. The chapter ends with an outline of the structure of this thesis.
1.1 An Institutionalist View of Public (Management) Policy Change
One of the central institutionalist explanations for change in public policy and public 
management policy is what I term ‘reform capacity. This argument is widely accepted within 
the institutionalist tradition (Weaver and Rockman, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996; March and 
Olsen, 1989). It focuses on how institutional arrangements promote or constrain ‘reform 
capacity  ^- the opportunity or risk for public policy change in general and public management 
reform in particular. The term ‘reform capacity is conceived by scholars within 
institutionalism as ‘government capabilities’ and ‘administrative reform capacity. The two 
concepts are built upon the same idea that ‘institutions matter’ and that institutional
conditions for continuous change. The explicit relation between HRM and change at the strategic
5arrangements constrain opportunities for change and reform. Scholars who apply the 
concept of ‘government capability1 tend to examine how macro political institutions or 
‘architecture* affect the performance of government in various areas of public policy,5 while 
those who deal with public management reform capacity focus narrowly on how institutional 
arrangements provide an opportunity or risk for public management reform and 
administrative change. Although there is no marked conceptual difference between 
‘government capability* and ‘administrative reform capacity* they will be reviewed separately.
1.1.1 Government Capabilities and Public Policy Change
At the forefront of the ‘government capability* approach to public policy change are Weaver 
and Rockman (1993).6 Their general model of government capabilities addresses the 
question ‘what is it that enhances or detracts from a government’s ability to perform specific 
tasks?* Such ability usually involves innovating and imposing losses on the public sector. As 
the basic hypothesis is that political institutions shape the process through which decisions 
are made and implemented, and that these in turn influence government capabilities, the line 
of inquiry involves the examination of the effects of differences in institutional arrangements 
on governmental effectiveness, how differences in political institutions result in different 
government capabilities for innovating and imposing losses through public policy.
In short, according to this institutionalist line of research, government policymaking 
capabilities are influenced by basic structural differences. These differences pose institutional 
constraints that encourage or discourage certain types of attributes of decision making 
processes. These attributes enable or deter the emergence of policymaking capabilities that 
influence governments’ ability to make strategic policy choices that influence, but not 
necessarily determine, the policy outcome. Weaver and Rockman (1993) argue that treating 
‘government capability* as an explanatory variable enables a generalisation to be made about 
public policy change: ‘one can think of a government’s capabilities as a pattern of
level including workforce management is also founded in the work of Tyson (1995).
5 Good accounts on ‘institutions matter’ can be found in Weaver and Rockman (1993). Contributors 
to this volume examine the influence of institutions in various sectoral policies including energy, 
pensions, industry, trade, the environment, cleavage, military and nuclear weapons.
6 Despite the broad consensus that institutions matter, there is a wide variety of institutional theories 
with a greater or lesser degree of conceptual overlap which are part of a vigorous ongoing debate. 
For the most comprehensive account of institutional theory in political science see Peters (1999).
6performance across many policy areas over time. A government’s performance in innovating 
and imposing losses maybe more or less consistent across policy areas’.
The capabilities of Thai governments have been a subject of institutionalist inquiry 
over the last forty years. Two convincing arguments have emerged: the ‘bureaucratic polity* 
and ‘strong state hypotheses’ (Riggs, 1996; Girling, 1981; Laothamatas, 1992b and 1994; 
Siroros, 1985; Donner and Ramsay, 1993, 1999; Unger, 1998; and MacIntyre, 2003). The 
bureaucratic polity hypothesis accounts for Thai government capability by focusing on the 
structure of political decision making within Thai state. Riggs’ classic study (1966), which 
provided a platform for John Girling (1981), characterised the governance of the Thai state 
as a bureaucratic polity- a political system where power and prestige were located within the 
bureaucracy rather than in extra-bureaucratic forces or political parties under parliamentary 
rules. Riggs also pointed out the dispersal of overlapping government functions among 
several government departments and agencies, which weakened coherent policymaking and 
implementation but provided more employment opportunities for civil servants.
The most recent work on Thai government capabilities as related to the structure of 
policy decision making is by MacIntyre (2003) who analysed the impact of institutions on 
effective governance in four South-East Asian countries including Thailand. His thesis, 
which focuses on the degree of dispersal of decision-making power, is that likely patterns of 
governance are based on the institutional characteristics of the country’s political system, 
what he calls its ‘national political architecture’.7 MacIntyre identifies Thailand’s national 
political architecture as highly fragmented, which produces a pattern of debilitating policy 
rigidity. With multiple weak political parties and up to six parties in a governing coalition, 
there are a very high number of veto players; control over policy is dispersed to a ‘quite 
extraordinary level’. As a result policy responses are often severely delayed and diluted.
7 He argues that countries whose national political architecture produces highly centralised decision 
making structures are susceptible to very changeable patterns of policy management. Countries with a 
highly fragmented decision-making structure are susceptible to an inflexible or rigid pattern of policy 
making. The more power is institutionally fragmented among separate decision makers, the harder it 
is to reach agreement to alter the policy status quo. Fragmented power promotes policy stability and 
concentrated power promotes flexibility. National political architecture, which either severely 
centralises or severely fragments decision-making, is likely to produce seriously problematic patterns 
of governance. Using the concept of veto players, he argues that countries with multiple political 
parties and coalition government have a fragmented decision-making structure and that the number 
of political parties increases the degree of fragmentation.
7Thai government capability has also been explained by scholars who argue that 
Thailand can be identified as ‘strong state’ (Laothamatas, 1992b and 1994; Siroros, 1987; 
Donner and Ramsay, 1993, 1999).8 Using cases of macro-economic policymaking, the Thai 
state has been seen as autonomous, operational and effective in bringing about economic 
development and growth, a role that contributed to the creation of the ‘Asian economic 
miracle’ (Warr and Nidhiprabha, 1996; Siamwalla, 1997). Some academics extend the strong 
state hypothesis to explain how state actors predominate over social organisations in sectoral 
policy making processes including trade and industrial policies. Siroros (1985), for example, 
pointed out in her detailed study of automobile industry policy making that Thai bureaucrats 
form one of the most important pillars in a ‘triple alliance model of policy making process’; 
the other two pillars being domestic business and multinational companies. Similarly, Unger 
(1998) found the same pattern in his analysis of the financial and textile sectors as well as the 
development of heavy industry and transportation infrastructure in Thailand. He examined 
the impact of Thai social organisations on the country’s institutions and their political and 
economic outcomes and built his argument on the concept of ‘social capital’, which 
strengthened state capacity in policy making.
However, most recent scholars agree that the bureaucratic polity mode of 
governance and particularly the autonomy of bureaucratic actors in formulating public policy 
has been transformed since the 1980s into a more democratic mode where extra- 
bureaucratic forces have increasingly influenced public policy making. The recognition of 
non-bureaucratic forces can be traced back to the refined version of Rigg’s classic 
bureaucratic polity by Girling (1981) who studied political change in Thailand before Prem’s 
administration. Ramsay (1987) argues that the business and middle class have, since the 
1980s, shared political power and that the country’s governance has ‘moved beyond the 
bureaucratic polity’. A similar account has been provided by Suriyamongkol and Guyot 
(1986) and Suriyamongkol (1988) who argue that the governance of Thailand has changed 
fundamentally and the ‘free run of the bureaucracy has been checked and held at bay by a 
variety of newly developed as well as some older, extra-bureaucratic forces’.
8 For the concept of the ‘strong state’ see Migdal (1994). For the related concept of embedded 
autonomy see Evans (1995). Despite some controversy over its classification, Thailand has generally 
been classified as a ‘strong state’. For an alternative see the argument for the bifurcated nature of the 
Thai State in Pongsudthirak (2001).
8The transformation of the bureaucratic polity under conditions of competitive extra- 
bureaucratic forces can be clearly seen in economic and industrial policy making. 
Laothamatas (1992) in his seminal work on business associations argues that ‘Thailand has 
ceased to be a bureaucratic polity -  in the realm of economic matters at least. This is so 
because organised business has formed politically effective extra-bureacratic groups and the 
policy of the government is no longer determined solely by the bureaucratic elite’. 
Accordingly these organised business associations- the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the 
Thai Bankers Association and the Federation of Thai Industries -  are no longer just a tool 
for governments in implementing economic and industrial polices, but participate in and 
influence the policy making process. This led Laothamatas to argue that the political 
economy of Thailand has entered a new phase of ‘liberal corporatism’, which is characterised 
by a ‘high degree of autonomy and spontaneity, and by the central role of private groups in 
the creation and operation of their representative associations, as well as systems of 
government-group interest mediation’.
So far the bureacratic polity paradigm and its transformation since 1980s has been 
examined and most clearly seen in economic and industrial policy areas. While fully 
accepting the transition of governance mode, most writers and advocates of polity change in 
Thailand have reservations about whether such a transition has taken place in other policy 
areas, particularly those in which intra-bureaucratic forces remain intact and resilient and non 
bureacratic forces have not succeeded in penetrating a close knit policy-making structure. 
Yee (2003) has argued that examining different ‘issue areas’ other than economic and 
industrial issues can add more insight into changing governance modes across issue areas 
within the Thai political system, concluding that multiple and changing governance modes 
emerge across issue areas.9 Such policy areas may include military and security policy and 
civil service or public management policy. This thesis examines the public management 
policy issue area which has so far been missing from the scholarly debate about changing
9 Yee (2003) argues that democratisation has contributed to the emergence of multiple and changing 
governance modes across issue areas within political systems. Drawing on the existing literature on 
governance change in Thailand and looking at different issues areas ranging from military policy, 
macro economic policy, business policy to social policy, he argues that multiple and changing 
governance modes occured successively, cyclically and/or simultaneously across issue areas. Different 
modes of governance resulted from variations in the accessibility of different issue areas, different 
levels of political participation across issue areas and variations in policy penetration by 
global/transnational actors across issue areas.
9polity in Thailand. This provides an opportunity to investigate how the conservative intra- 
bureacratic forces of civil service policy institutions operated under conditions of 
democratisation and increasing opportunities and pressures for elected politicians to interfere 
in the Gvil Service, as will be seen in the narrative chapters. Placing the public management 
policy issue area against the backdrop of the democratisation process, albeit implicidy, can 
provide better understanding of the trajectories and outcomes of public management policy 
change between 1980 and 1999. Having reviewed the work on government capabilities, I will 
now examine how ‘public management reform capacity emerges in the institutionalist 
research tradition.
1.1.2 Public Management Reform Capacity
The institutionalist concept of ‘government capabilities’ for public policy change has been 
extended by public administration and public management scholars to explain public 
management and administrative reform (Pollitt and Boucksert, 2000; Hood, 2000a, 2000b, 
2001, 2002; Knill, 1999; Borwomwattana, 1994, 2000). Like those who advocate 
‘government capabilities’, some public administration and management scholars emphasise 
the influence of the institutional characteristics of existing political and administrative 
systems on public management change.
In their chapter “Many Houses: Types of Politico-Administrative Regime”, part of 
their comparative study of reforms in ten democratic OECD countries,10 based on studies of 
the structural, cultural and functional aspects of institutions, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) 
identify five key features of public administration systems that can differentiate the direction, 
focus and scope of public management reform. These different institutional features, which 
provide ‘administrative reform capacity7 include the state structure, the nature of the 
executive government, the relationship between ministers and mandarins, the administrative 
culture and the diversity of policy advice. From their study, Pollitt and Bouckaert comment 
that some regimes, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, are more open to public sector 
management change than others, such as Germany and the Scandinavian countries.
10 These countries are Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S.A
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Public management reform capacity can be seen as embedded in what has been 
called the ‘public service bargain’ [PSB] -  defined by Hood (2001) as ‘any explicit or implicit 
understanding between (senior) public servants and other actors in a political system over 
their duties and entitlements relating to responsibility, autonomy and political identity, and 
expressed in convention or formal law or a mixture of both’ (Hood, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 
2002)). According to Hood (2001), some types of bargain are ‘reform capacity rich’ and 
others have a ‘reform capacity deficit’. In this respect, public service reform in general can be 
explained in terms of the different types of public service bargain in the civil service status quo 
before reform because the type of bargain heavily shapes public service reform action or 
inaction.11 The variety of “structural patterns of reform can be explained in large part by the 
way that PSBs have varied historically, providing different jumping off points to the reform 
era.” (Hood, 2000 a).
The literature on ‘public management reform capacity* in Thailand is limited.12 
Bowomwathana (1994, 2000) has examined the impact of political institutions on Thai 
administrative reform efforts arguing that the characteristics of coalition governments which 
have governed Thailand for a long period should be taken into consideration when making
11 Hood, who has developed the concept of the ‘Public Service Bargain’ building on the strength of 
the ‘historical institutionalist’ and ‘strategic-interaction’approaches, distinguishes between three types 
of bargain, systemic, pragmatic and hybrid. In systemic bargains, public servants are trustees rather 
than agents acting for the collective good of the state and/or society and have autonomous status. In 
pragmatic bargains they are agents, their roles, duties and relationships the result of negotiation 
between elected politicians and the civil service. Hybrid bargains are mixtures of these two elements 
and vary considerably. Many bargains are hybrid, with different PSBs applying to different parts or 
levels of public service. A further variable is the number of parties or principals actors involved in the 
bargain. Hood shows that particular types of PSBs in which reform capacity is embedded provide 
opportunities and risks for public management reform. Pragmatic bargains are likely to be more 
readily changed than systemic ones. Hood’s ‘reform tortoises’, where reform is slow and limited, tend 
to be cases where the pre-existing PSB created low motive and/or low opportunity for politicians to 
remodel top-level bureaucratic structures whereas the ‘reform hares’ tended to have the opposite 
characteristics. Systemic PSBs offer less opportunity to politicians for civil service reform than 
pragmatic PSBs. Reform is still possible but more difficult. Pre-existing PSBs that give substantial 
opportunities for politicians to control senior bureaucratic appointments offer politicians lower 
motivation to change the system than those that traditionally restricted or eliminated politicians 
ability to shape the process. Reform risks arise from the ‘cheating opportunities’ possible within the 
type of public service bargain in existence and constrain reform capacity. These cheating risks 
increase in multi-party bargains, what Hood has called 'memgpa trois’:
12 The reform capacity of the Thai Gvil Service for public management policy change is 
understudied. Most studies have been derived from such sources as crude observations, sporadic 
criticism made by a few politicians and civil servants, and prescriptions from the international lending
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sense of administrative reform. Less has been said about the impact of coalition 
governments except that fragmented coalition governments tend to constrain the trajectories 
and outcomes of civil service reform, leading to public management policy stability rather 
than change. Central to Bowomwattana’s studies of civil service reform in Thailand is the 
influence of politician-bureaucrat relations on public management reform (Borwomwattana, 
1988,1996a, 1996b).13 He argues that administrative reform is an arena where politicians and 
bureaucrats compete to control the civil service through the mechanism of personnel 
appointments and transfers, and the creation of new government agencies. Administrative 
reform is therefore a political instrument for managing the relationship between politicians 
and bureaucrats.
The impact of politician-administrator relations on administrative reform trajectories 
and outcomes has been studied by Unger (2003) who explores ‘accountability reform’ in 
Thailand during the 1990s.14 He argues that state elites, characterised by a fusion of 
politicians and bureaucrats, played an active part in Thai politics and policy making with few 
demands from non-state groups for resources or accountability. Unger argues that ‘the 
country's agents were in fact its principals and bureaucrats were not merely policy executors. 
They managed intra-elites and policymaking. The fusion between the two groups inhibited 
their reform capacity and led reformers to bypass parties and politicians at the stage of 
reform enactment.
So far this chapter has provided the theoretical contours of an institiutionalist view 
of reform capacity, identified in general as ‘government capabilities* and specifically as 
‘public management reform capacity*. However, none of the institutionalist views of reform 
capacity reviewed above has developed an analytical concept that provides a general model 
for the systematic study of the impact of national administrative reform capacity on public 
management policy change that can be tested against the reality of civil service reform in 
countries other than Western European and Anglo-Saxon democracies.
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A systematic detailed case 
study has not yet been conducted.
13 Although Borwomwattana provides a good point of departure to study the politics of civil service 
reform in Thailand, most of his studies are broad and episodic observations.
14 Accountability reform is identified as a combination of managerial and transparency reform 
(Unger 2003).
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Pollitt and Boukaert (2000), even though their work is based on ten countries admit 
that ‘it would be difficult to generalise the impact of politico- administrative features on 
public management reform because these features and their relations operate in a complex 
way7. Hood’s public service bargain, despite being a promising concept for explaining 
structural opportunity for public service reform, is narrowly focused on specific patterns of 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. This is because the structural and 
institutional arrangements not ‘reform capacity* per se are the central concern of their work 
though they have interesting and important things to say about it, which can be related to 
reform capacity.
To move the discussion forward, I will now turn to one of the key contributors to 
the scholarly discussion of public management reform capacity, Christoph Knill. Knill’s 
conceptualisation of ‘administrative reform capacity* departs from other institutionalist views 
of reform capacity. Unlike other studies, which have sought to explain specific public 
management reforms in particular countries, Knill’s concept of ideal types serves as a means 
to understanding differences and similarities across actual administrative systems and can be 
used in the same way as Weber’s concept of rational bureaucracy. Knill follows Peters (1996) 
in using Weber’s logic to argue that ideal types have the virtue of providing a standard 
against which real world systems can be compared and potential differences explained. 
Classifying the countries under investigation using his ideal types provides a general 
comparative model, which can be applied to other bureaucracies. The next section will 
review Knill’s ideal type constellations of administrative reform capacity, which will be used 
as a basis for advancing the argument on the influence of public management reform 
capacity on public management policy change.
1.1.3 Knill’s Administrative Reform Capacity Ideals and Thailand Case as a Puzzle
The concept of administrative reform capacity, which has some degree of affinity with other 
institutionalists’ accounts of ‘government capabilities’ and ‘public management reform 
capacity* as reviewed above, has been developed and advanced by Knill (1999). He argues 
that the level of administrative reform capacity explains different patterns of administrative 
development. Knill proposes two ‘ideal type constellations’ of administrative reform 
capacity. These are autonomous adnimstrations where the capacity for administrative reform is 
low, with administrative change being restricted to incremental self-adaptations by the
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bureaucracy, and instrumental administrations with high potential for substantially changing 
existing administrative arrangements.
Knill identifies three categories, which determine reform capacity, a general capacity 
for executive leadership; the institutional entrenchment of administrative structures and 
procedures; and the influence of the bureaucracy on policymaking. The general reform 
capacity of executive leadership is associated with the political system, the government’s 
ability to enact reform and the strength of executive leadership. The degree of institutional 
entrenchment of administrative structures affects the ability to impose reform from above. 
The degree of entrenchment is determined by legal and formal requirements and the 
comprehensiveness and fragmentation of administrative structures. The influence of the 
bureaucracy on policy making is the extent to which administrative actors can shape policy 
formulation and implementation in their interests.
Using these categories Knill defines an autonomous bureaucracy as one where there is 
weak executive leadership, high institutional entrenchment of administrative structures and 
procedures, and a powerful influence on the formulation and implementation of policy. An 
instrumental bureaucracy faces strong executive leadership, is weakly entrenched and has 
limited influence on policy making. Autonomous administrations can hardly be changed 
from outside by deliberate political reform attempts, though they are not entirely immune 
from outside pressures. Limited reform capacity does not result in rigidity, but administrative 
change comes mainly from self-adaptation and takes place within existing traditions and 
principles. It tends to be incremental and patchy rather than radical and far reaching. 
Instrumental bureaucracies have a high potential for transformation from outside and 
fundamental change is more likely. The form and scope of change lies with political leaders 
rather than the administration.
Using Knill’s framework, Thailand can be characterised as an autonomous 
administration (Painter, 2004). The Thai Gvil Service closely fits Knill’s definition of a 
unified autonomous bureaucracy, a powerful, centralised bureaucracy that provided 
continuity of expertise and authority against a background of political instability. The Thai 
legal code, based on the French model, gives substantial legal authority and independence to 
permanent civil servants, resulting in a highly entrenched administrative structure. The 
autonomy of the Thai Gvil Service has been strengthened by relatively weak executive 
leadership caused by institutional weaknesses in the system of political control. The presence
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of multiple weak political parties and coalition governments with up to six parties disperses 
decision making widely. Furthermore, many governments lacked a clear programme and 
cabinet decisions tended to formalise decisions already taken elsewhere. Decision-making 
processes often reflected bureaucratic status demands in the form of large unmanageable 
committees. The presence of both senior civil servants and politicians on these committees 
reflected the high status and power of the bureaucracy in policy making. With these 
characteristics, according to Knill, Thailand has limited reform capacity.
If Knill’s ideal types of administrative reform capacity are correct, we would expect 
to see limited change and little non-incremental reform in Thai civil service policy. Public 
management policy change would largely come from self-adaptation and not be radical. On 
first examination Thailand seems to fit Knill’s pattern as there was a long period of stability 
rather than change in the Gvil Service human resource policy between 1980 and 1999. But 
on closer scrutiny, and especially if we consider public management reform in Thailand as a 
series of episodes involving discrete reform policy cycles, as this thesis proposes, Knill’s ideal 
types are not consistent with the historical evidence. In Thailand a long period of overall 
limited administrative change was punctuated by some episodes of more far-reaching 
change. There were also differences in trajectories and outcomes between two different sub- 
domains of Gvil Service human resource management policy namely downsizing the Gvil 
Service and Gvil Service pension reform. Such variety in civil service reform trajectories and 
outcomes in Thailand across the period of study and between cases is puzzling.
The Thai historical evidence suggests that it is difficult to use Knill’s ideal types to 
account for variations in the trajectories and outcomes of change over a long period of study 
and between two different sub-domains of Gvil Service human resource management. These 
difficulties raise two ‘intellectual problems’: how can we have both stability and change in 
Thai Gvil Service policy when Knill’s ideal types of autonomous and instrumental 
administrations provide a constant administrative reform capacity?; and how can the same 
reform capacity explain different trajectories and outcomes in two different sub-domains of 
Gvil Service human resource management policy? The intellectual problems arise because 
Knill’s reform capacity tends to be static. He does not seem to suggest that reform capacity 
changes.15 Nor does he consider how the inter-relationship between the three categories
15 As most institutionalists believe, institutions do change. Even Pollitt and Boukaert (2000) who 
adopt the static view of public management reform capacity in their analysis accepted that, ‘it would
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characterising his ideal types affects administrative reform capacity. Knill’s ideal type 
constellations, therefore, do not seem to apply, or at least apply fully, to the recent history of 
administrative reform in Thailand.
The theoretical problem embedded in Knill’s institutionalist ideal type administrative 
reform requires a search for a better causal understanding of public management reform. In 
the next section, I will examine an emerging but promising approach to explaining public 
management policy change, which helps overcoming Knill’s static view of administrative 
reform capacity. This approach views reform trajectories and outcomes from a dynamic 
processual approach, which I now turn to.
1.2 AProcessualist View of Public Management Policy Change
One of the central arguments of the processualist view of public (management) policy 
making is that policy [and organisational] choices are made collectively and shaped by the 
context of choice -  processes and wider organisational and institutional settings (Cyert and 
March, 1992; Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; Alison and Zelikow, 1999; Lindblom, 1990). 
Its focus is on the dynamic of choice making processes. This approach has strong roots in 
behavioural theory of organisational [and policy] choices, which are taken directly from the 
work of Cyert and March (1992). The influence of processual view of policy choices appears 
in seminal works in political science literature including Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) 
Alison and Zelikow (1999), Lindblom (1990), Kingdon (1995) and Buamgartner and Jones 
(1993).16
Recently, the processual approach has gained attention of public management 
scholars who investigate public management reform (Barzelay, 2003; Halligan, 2002, 
Campbell and Halligan, 1992). Many studies of the origins and outcomes of public 
management reform place considerable emphasis on ‘process variables’ -  they investigate the 
different sources of reform, the nature of responses of government and bureaucracies to
be misleading to think of politico-administrative systems as some kind of unchanging bedrock to 
which every reform must adapt itself or fail Every element of institutional features is subject to 
change, though at different speeds’.
16 See also the work of Hirschman (1963), March (1994) March and Olsen (1989), Feldman (1989a, 
1989b, 2000), Feldman and Pentlands (2003), Hall (1992), Hall and Taylor (1996), Perrow (1986) and 
Lane (1990)
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demand for transformation, and reform implementation. Drawing on process model of 
public policy change, the processual approach to public management reform seeks to obtain 
a process understanding of some or all aspects of public [management] policy making and 
change (Barzelay, 2003). While acknowledging that the seminal works in this area are 
extensive and some works are built on prior developments by others, and that so far there 
have been relatively few processual studies of Thailand,17 I will concentrate on examining 
Kingdon’s (1995) process model of public policymaking and change and the related work of 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), as well as Barzela/s extension of this model to analyse public 
management policy change since Kingdon and Barzelay form the backbone of analysis in 
this thesis.
Kingdon’s multiple stream models, which is essentially a modified ‘garbage can 
model’ of decision making and was built upon previous work of the behavioural school of 
politics,18 focuses on two parallel pre-decision processes: agenda setting and alternative
17 Works that share some but not all elements of a processual approach include those of Painter 
(2004), Bowomwattana (1996) and Brewer (2003). Painter (2004) has studied the origin and trajectory 
of administrative reforms in general in Thailand in the 1990s arguing that they evolved incrementally. 
Though comprehensive administrative reform was on the agenda of successive governments, their 
commitment was half-hearted. He regards senior officials in the central co-ordinating agencies as the 
main ‘reform champions’, but reform was slow and piecemeal as the bulk of the bureaucracy resisted 
change. Lack of control by politicians and resistance by the largely autonomous bureaucracy 
produced “stalled negotiated reform, verging on gridlock”. However, a combination of the Asian 
economic crisis, the new 1997 Constitution and the election victory of Thaksin Sinawatra’s Thai Rak 
Thai Party have given reform a new impetus. Attempts to explain the processes of structural reforms 
have been carried out by Bowomwathana (1996a, 1996b). He traced the processes of reform in 
Ministry of Education (MOE) and Office of the Secretariat of the Prime Minister (OSPM) against 
the backdrop of the competition between government politicians who wanted to create new 
organisations, and bureaucrats in the MOE, OSPM, and the Office of the Gvil Service Commission. 
Another broadly processualist explanation of Thai administrative reform is provided by Brewer 
(2003). He argues that in the 1990s Thailand appeared to undergo a paradigm shift that resulted in 
fundamental reform of the key institutions of state governance and substantially reformed public 
services. He enumerates the multi-causal explanations, mainly contextual factors, for such a 
transformation which was facilitated by changes within Thai society over the past decade.
18 Kingdon’s study of agenda setting in American politics was heavily influenced by the attention and 
search model explaining the decision making process in terms of the allocation of attention and 
search. March and Olsen (1989) and March (1994) argue that attention is a scarce resource and that 
decision making takes place when opportunities, choices, problems, solutions and people receive 
sustained attention from the top of the executive. Problems and solutions are often ambiguous, and 
alternatives, consequences and preferences tend to be incompletely known. An ‘ecology of attention’, 
who attends to what and when, needs to be incorporated in decision making analysis. Change is likely 
to occur when there is sufficient attention paid to the issue. But change is also determined by 
satisfying search rules. Once there has been sustained attention change is also determined by the 
nature of the search done to find a solution.
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specification. Agenda setting determines which issues or problems are dealt with by decision 
makers; alternative specification determines which solutions should be considered when 
decisions are to be made. Kingdon argues that there are three streams, problems, policy and 
politics and that when the three combine there is a window of opportunity in which policy 
change can take place.
Kingdon explains the public policy change process by modelling the temporal 
structure of policy issue through its ‘career progression* from the ‘systemic agenda’ to the 
‘government policy agenda’ and decisional agenda19. According to Kingdon, such 
progression usually occurs as the consequence of ‘focusing events’ such as natural disaster, 
epidemic, riot or a major shift in public mood. Such events help open a window of 
opportunity for major policy change by allowing the three streams of problems, politics and 
policy to converge moving the policy issue from the government policy agenda to the 
decisional agenda. Kingdon argues that in bringing all three streams together and enabling 
policy change to occur, policy entrepreneurs play an important role.
Gosely related to Kingdon’s model is the concept of punctuated equilibrium 
proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). This model theorises that long periods of policy 
stability are punctuated by abrupt changes when either the policy image or institutional 
venue changes. Policy image is defined as public perception of policy problems. Institution 
venue refers to the structure within which policy making takes place. The image venue 
interaction causes disequilibrium which leads to policy change. Unlike Kingdon’s streams 
model, Baumgartner and Jones’s model of agenda setting is developed primarily to explain 
major shifts in policy direction rather than discrete policy choices. Hence a major policy shift 
is normally the result of a flow of decisions rather than the discrete event (Barzelay, 2001). 
According to Baumgartner and Jones, change in policy direction can be described in terms 
of disequilibrium and partial equilibrium. In a disequilibrium situation, the potential for 
changes in policy direction is high and iioe versa in the partial equilibrium situation.
Building on the processual model of public policy making (Kingdon, 1995; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) and organisational learning (Levitt and March, 1988), Barzelay 
(2001) develops an explanatory framework for public management policy change that 
accounts for different reform outcomes between a group of ‘benchmark cases’, the U.K, 
Australia, and New Zealand, and other cases, Germany and Sweden. Barzela/s systematic
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comparative analysis of case evidence in the existing literature, in dialogue with his chosen 
theoretical ideas, allows him to generalise about public management policy change. He 
concludes that public management policy change is explained by a sequence of 
disequilibrium and partial equilibrium in the public management policymaking process. 
Disequilibrium results from such interlocking factors as a major change in problem 
definitions and a modification of policy subsystem, and from such contributory factors as 
impulses produced in the political stream and policy entrepreneur’s beliefs and opportunities. 
Partial equilibrium is explained by stability in the ‘policy subsystem, domain structure and 
stability in the issue image’.20
The processual view of public management policymaking and reform outside his 
benchmark cases has recently been further developed by Barzelay (2003) which can be 
claimed as the most codified process model of public management policy change produced 
so far. In explaining the process dynamic of public management policy making, Barzelay 
places Kingdon’s framework in a wider methodological context and has advanced a 
framework for explaining the trajectories and outcomes of public management policy change 
by emphasising the role of ‘mechanism’. His theoretical core, which is presented in his 
‘Theoretical Framework for Analysing Episodes of Public Management Policy Making’ 
(Barzelay, 2003) as part of the synthesis article in a symposium edition of the International 
Public Mamg&mnt Journal volume 6 (3), rests on the operation of causal (social) processes, 
mechanisms and context factors at work in the public policy making process. The 
characteristics and merit of this theoretical framework are best summarise in his own terms:
First it pursues the strategy of disaggregating policy making into component 
processes, while preparing the ground for insights into how agenda setting, 
alternative specification, and decision-making are dynamically linked. Second, the 
[Framework] sorts the vast number of oft-mentioned influences on policy making 
into two large categories: generic social processes and mechanisms on one hand, and 
process context factors on the other. Third the [Framework] incorporates the fine­
grained conceptual distinction between social processes and mechanisms.
19 Kingdon built the concepts on the work of Cobb and Elder (1983).
20 The meaning of these factors is elaborated by Barzelay (2001). Policy subsystem refers to the 
institutional venues where policymaking activities occur. Domain structure refers to the conceptual
19
Drawing upon a six-country analysis,21 Barzelay develops an analytical understanding 
of similarities and differences in public management policymaking processes using an explicit 
explanatory framework His explanations centre on ‘social mechanisms’, examples of which 
are, attribution of opportunity, certification, performance spirals, brokering, and other 
mechanisms based on the logic of appropriateness. These mechanisms operate in relation to 
‘institutional contexts’ and ‘contexts-in-motion’ through the flow of individual and collective 
effort. Barzela/s tentative conclusions about the agenda setting process are that the heads of 
government have a pivotal role in including public management policy issue on the 
government policy agenda, which usually takes place during the ‘honeymoon period’ of the 
government. Heads of government also influence the issue formulation process though their 
influence over this is somewhat muted compared with issue inclusion. Related to the agenda 
setting process is the status of the public management policy issue on the government 
agenda. Although the initial issue status is typically a political decision, it can decline or be 
enhanced over time depending on, for example, factors such as linkage to other policy issues 
on the government agenda, changes in political streams and the evolution of the alternative 
specification process.
In terms of the alternative specification process, Barzelay concludes that there is 
tremendous variation in the process both in terms of the intensity of the reform effort and 
the time scale of such effort. The degree of contact between top-level executives and the 
alternative specification process, affects issue status and momentum. High-ranking 
government officials may have modest influence on the details of the public management 
reform design, but can affect the momentum of the reform issue and the pace of specifying 
reform alternatives. When it comes to the decision making process, Barzelay’s explanations 
rests on whether reforming public management policy requires legislative change and 
whether political leaders are willing to invest effort and run the risks of the legislative process 
on the public management issue at hand.
organisation of public policy making which reflects beliefs about the interrelatedness of various 
policies. Issue image refers to the face of the issue or the dominant conception of the policy problem.
21 Germany, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, Thailand and U.S A
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1.3 Theoretical Compass and Principal Research Questions
Having reviewed the literature on both the institutionalist view of ‘administrative reform 
capacity and the processual view of public management policy change, I will now develop 
the theoretical compass for this thesis. My theoretical framework follows two strategies, 
which are compatible but so far have not yet integrated. The first strategy is to use Knill’s 
framework of administrative reform capacity but not apply it as a strict ‘law\ The second 
strategy is to follow Barzelay’s processual analysis of public management policy change. 
Bringing both conceptual strategies to analyse of civil service policy in Thailand should 
provide sufficiently full and theoretically relevant explanations to answer the thesis 
questions: What explains stability and (hang in Thai Chil Senice policy? What explains the vzriatim c f 
trajectories and outcomes within Chil Senice policy across doe last two decades cfthe twentieth century and 
across its sub-domains? It also helps overcome the historical puzzle established in section 1.1.3 
when the analysis only takes into account Knill’s institutionalist ideal types of administrative 
reform capacity. As Kingdon (1995) warns, institutions, actors and process make some 
reform outcomes possible and other outcomes unlikely and ‘scholars need to avoid opting 
for one or the other view, and to do more work on specifying the conditions under which 
and the way in which policy making works’.
In pursuing the first strategy of applying Knill’s framework, two central questions 
emerge: Why does Knill’s ideal types of administrative reform capacity apply in the historical 
case of Thai Gvil Service policy change, when it does apply? When Knill’s ideal types of 
administrative reform capacity does not fit with the historical Thai case, why not? Answering 
the second question requires the second strategy of processual analysis, which takes into 
account process, and context factors at work in the public management policymaking 
process, as well as the interplay of actors and their efforts in reform episodes. In this respect, 
unlike Knill, I consider ‘administrative reform capacity* against a theoretical backdrop of 
processual analysis, so that it is conceived as an emergent property of the ‘institution-in­
motion’ through which collective civil service reform choices are made. Redefining 
administrative reform capacity in a processual way leads to another crucial question which is 
instrumental in understanding stability and change in Thai Gvil Service policy: what makes 
‘reform capacity* change or fluctuate over the period of study?
Weaving together a dynamic process understanding of public management reform, 
and Knill’s institutionalist concept of ideal types can be called an ‘institutional processual’
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approach to public management policy change.22 I use the term ‘institutional processual’ 
analysis in this thesis to emphasise the importance of both institutions and processes in 
shaping the trajectories and outcomes of Gvil Service policy reform, rather than as a label 
for a new and different approach to understanding and explaining public management policy 
change. In this light the thesis will make explicit the dialectic interplay between institutional 
arrangements and the reform process via ‘public management reform capacity* -  the 
opportunity and risk for making public management policy. The contextual richness of the 
processualist explanation will be enhanced by the rigour and robustness of institutionalist 
explanations.
1.4 Researching Civil Service Policy Change in Thailand
As mentioned earlier, this thesis examines the evolution of a sub-domain of Thai public 
management policy namely civil service human resource management policy, which is 
characterised by a long period of stability punctuated by some episodes of more far-reaching 
change. It examines some of the most recent reform efforts between 1980, when the first 
significant change was introduced, and 1999, when more radical reform was introduced in 
the wake of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. This section provides the justification for the 
selection of Gvil Service downsizing and reforming Gvil Service pensions as the cases to be 
studied. It also develops a research design that is capable of providing insight into changes in 
these two sub-domains of Gvil Service policy in Thailand.
1.4.1 Case Selection
Gvil service human resource management policy change in Thailand between 1980 and 1999 
is represented in this thesis by two issue areas relating to civil service employment and 
welfare benefits: civil service downsizing and civil service pension reform.23 Both policy areas 
have evolved around striving for efficiency improvements resulting from the efficient use of
221 have borrowed the term from Barzelay (2004) who calls for a new label for attempts to develop 
insitututonal processual explanations. Unlike new (historical) instititutionalism, institutional 
processualism is a process oriented research programme that views politics as creative, intelligent and 
‘interpretive’ activities. It focuses on the dynamics of change by exploring and explaining how action 
and context aspects influence each other. It is interested in how structural and agency factors affect 
the reform process, its trajectories and outcomes.
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managerial resources: personnel and money. These two areas or ‘cases’ have been selected 
for their historical and analytical significance. Historically, reforming public sector human 
resource management is one of the most important areas of civil service reform and has 
been undertaken by most governments around the globe (MicGourt, 1998,2001; Dunsire and 
Hood, 1989; Peters, 1988; Nunberg, 1989). In Thailand downsizing in particular has been 
seen as the first and the most sustained government civil service reform initiative and has 
been on the agenda of successive governments since 1980s. This has led many practitioners, 
observers and Thai civil servants themselves to equate civil service reform with downsizing. 
The same phenomenon has been pointed out by Me Court (1998) in his study of downsizing 
in some African countries. The historical importance of the reform of Thai Civil Service 
pensions is its degree of its success. It has been widely seen as a success and has been praised 
for this by academic observers, reformers and politicians alike.
Analytically, the two cases have been selected because they exhibit different ‘reform 
outcomes* that allow comparisons between cases within the same policy domain of public 
management in a single country. Although the reform outcomes of the two cases can be 
classified as modest and limited in comparison with other civil service reform,24 there is 
variation between them. Comparatively between the Thai cases, the outcome of the policy 
on civil service downsizing is piecemeal in the sense that despite repeated efforts, downsizing 
policy initiatives have never been radical, nor have the resultant numbers of civil servants 
and government personnel, on average, radically decreased. In contrast, the outcome of civil 
service pension reform was greater change in the sense that it successfully introduced a new 
pension arrangement; a defined contribution element was added to the existing defined 
benefit pension system.
Another point of analytical interest arising from researching civil service downsizing 
and pension reform is their longevity over almost two decades from 1980 to 1999 in the case 
of downsizing and between 1992 and 1996 in the case of civil service pension reform.
23 For a definition of downsizing and pension reform see above in the overview.
24 Several Governments have undertaken radical public management reform which included 
downsizing and pensions. These include the U.K., New Zealand and some other OECD countries. 
With regard to downsizing for example, the UK government between 1979 and 1984 aimed to cut 
personnel from 732000 to 630000 (McCourt, 1998; Dunsire and Hood, 1989). The Thai experience 
of reforming Civil Service pensions by shifting to market-based and less state intervention can be 
seen in the experience of some OECD governments. See the accounts of pension reforms in the UK, 
USA, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Italy and Spain in Reynaud (2000).
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During these periods they went through multiple policy cycles. The longevity of the two 
reforms enables an examination of the evolution civil service policy change over a long 
period, which provides more precise general insight into public management policy change 
in Thailand than short and episodic studies.
1.4.2 Research Design: Analytic Narrative Instrumental Case Studies 
The research design of this thesis is largely framed by and congruent with an institutional 
processualist framework. Designing a research inquiry in the light of an ‘institutional 
processualist’ conceptual guide requires a combination of case study and narrative, which is 
defined in this thesis as an ‘analytic narrative instrumental case stud/. An analytic narrative 
instrumental case study combines two well-established and overlapping research traditions: 
processual analysis and instrumental case study. Such a design is appropriate because it can 
accommodate inquiries from both research traditions by demonstrating and explaining the 
impact of institutional arrangements and processual factors as well as the relationship 
between them, on public management policy change. Their symbiotic relationship is 
discussed below.
Processual analysis can be defined at its simplest as a sequence of events that 
describes how things change over time; “a sequence of individual and collective events, 
actions and activities unfolding over time in context” (Pettigrew, 1997). It emphasises the 
dynamic. Though agency is at the heart of processual analysis actions are embedded in 
contexts; both have to be considered. The interchange between agents and contexts takes 
place over time and is cumulative. Processual analysis goes beyond case histories to produce 
case studies that identify patterns in processes, mechanisms which shape patterns and 
underlying mechanisms, which drive processes.25
Pettigrew emphasises five key elements: embeddedness, temporal
interconnectedness, explanation of context and action, holistic explanations and linkage 
between the analysis of process and outcomes. Processes are deeply embedded in both the 
contexts that produce them and are produced by them, such as the economic, social and 
political environments as well as internal institutional contexts. In addition to understanding 
the sequence and flow of events across time, temporal interconnectedness considers the
25 This aspect of processual analysis shares some similarities with instrumental case study research 
design.
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influence of the past on the present and future. Context and action need to be examined 
together because they are “inseparably intertwined”. Together these three elements result in 
a holistic explanation. Identification of clear outcomes and building them into the research 
design focuses studies and enables the impact of variations in context and process on 
outcomes to be observed, thus fulfilling the aim of processual analysis to show 
understanding of “why and how outcomes are differently shaped by processes”.
Pettigrew's processual analysis is similar to that of Bennett and George, and Bates et 
al. Bennett and George (1997) who built on the work of historian Clayton Roberts, have 
discussed ‘process-tracing* as a method of explaining causal mechanisms. They make a 
distinction between process-tracing and historical narrative, arguing that process tracing adds 
an ‘analytical explanation* using theoretical variables identified in the research design to 
historical explanation. This idea is shared by Bates et al in their work on analytic narrative 
whose work has been described as a “bold new project [in social science history]” 
(Carpenter, 2000). Bates et al (1998) state that “theory linked to data is more powerful than 
either theory or data alone”. Their approach is narrative in that “it pays close attention to 
stories, accounts and context” and analytic “in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of 
reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation”. Even its critics acknowledge 
analytic narrative’s “usefulness of applying strategic theories to historical processes” and that 
in some cases “theoretical concepts can be effectively applied” (Skocpol 2000).
Bates et al argue that analytic narrative emphasises agency and choice and dynamic 
processes where there is an important temporal dimension, a processual element where there 
are sequences of decisions and events that need to be analysed to explain an outcome. 
Analytic narrative has value because it reconciles evidence and concepts. It draws evidence 
from the narrative and is analytical because it is theoretically informed; theory is embedded 
in the narrative” (Bates etal, 2000). In their recent reconsideration of analytic narrative Bates 
etal (2000) have called for it to be applied more widely, beyond the game theory they initially 
applied. It has been increasingly widely used. Macintyre has applied it using institutional 
theory in his study of south-east Asian poltiics. It has also be applied to economic theory to 
explain global patterns of economic growth (Rodrik, 2003).
Many scholars have demonstrated the merits of analytic narrative when used in an 
instrumental case study. The analytic narrative approach, as proposed by Bates (1998), 
Kingdon (1995), Allison and Zelikow (1999), Pettigrew (1997) seeks to explain the process
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of change in public management policy by using a dialogue between historical evidence and 
theoretical frameworks. Traditional historical narrative accounts have been valued for being 
‘description rich’,26 and taking into account context to make sense of an experienced studied. 
Analytic narrative, as well as having the advantages of historical narrative also provides 
causal explanations by identifying the causal processes in the experience studied.27
An analytic narrative is what Ragin (1987) would call a case. The case study is 
essentially a narrative-based account of a limited number of selected instances, which belong 
to a social or behavioural phenomenon as it occurs in its natural setting (Hakim, 1992; Yin, 
1994). Ragin (1987) supports the view that case oriented research using a narrative method is 
an appropriate and effective research method when the goal is to understand policy and 
organisational processes or change and is mainly concerned with instrumental case studies. 
He defines a case as an entity or experience studied to understand a historical phenomenon 
and the term ‘case outcome* as that which needs to be explained. Above all, he argues that 
cases must be treated and understood holistically and not used simply as data to test a 
hypothesis. Like Ragin, Stake (1995) identifies two types of case study design: intrinsic and 
instrumental.28 His instrumental case study is closely related to analytic narrative in the sense 
that it devises narrative to gain insight into the wider analytical questions. It can be argued 
from these methodological works that analytic case study designs are (analytic) narratives, 
though are not necessarily limited to them.
In short, this thesis adopts the analytic narrative instrumental case study as its 
research design. It employs analytic narrative as the mean for an instrumental case study to 
examine civil service human resource management policy change in Thailand in the light of 
an institutional processualist conceptual compass. Such a research design helps illustrate 
theoretical arguments that permit the construction of a limited generalisation on public
26 One of the inherent strengths of case study method is the ability to provide detailed analysis, or 
what Guba and Lincoln (1981) term ‘thick description’. This is vital for exploring complex themes or 
theoretical issues because the case study can potentially explore a wide array of scenarios and 
situations that are relevant to theoretical discussions.
27 Explanation building can grow out of simple narratives or more analytical case studies which 
attempt to reflect theoretically significant ideas (Yin, 1994). Derthick (1972) illustrates the way case 
analysis can be analysed to build ‘emergent explanations’.
28 Intrinsic case studies concern entities, have a single case where the research design is practically 
orientated, theory is used implicitly and narratives are thin; quantitative data is collected and analysed. 
Instrumental case studies concern processes, have comparative cases where the research design is 
scientifically orientated, theory is used explicitly and narratives are rich; qualitative data is collected 
and analysed.
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management policy change without engaging in any strict testing or falsifying of the theories 
that have been reviewed above. Moreover, the analytic narrative instrumental case study can 
facilitate comparisons between the two chosen cases in this thesis, as well as other studies. 
These comparisons will enable the thesis to make what Ragin calls a modest generalisation 
about historically defined phenomena or a limited historical generalisation. Yin (1994) terms 
this kind of generalisation that emerges from comparing two cases over time as an analytical 
as opposed to a statistical generalisation. As well as achieving instrumental value and limited 
generalisation, which are the primary aims of this thesis, the case studies on downsizing and 
pension reform have their own ‘intrinsic historical value’ in the sense that they provide a 
‘rich description’ of the evolution of civil service human resource management policy in 
Thailand over a long historical period. It is hoped that this kind of research design will 
facilitate an inquiry that will lead to a richer, fuller and more rigorous explanations about the 
Thai civil service in general and its public management policy change in particular.
1.5 Sources of Historical Evidence
The historical evidence used in this study consists mainly of archival material from the civil 
service, Thai newspaper reports and interviews with key personnel and are listed in 
Appendix 1. Archival material was the single most important source of information. It 
includes minutes of meetings of relevant reform committees, reform proposals, cabinet 
submissions, internal memos, reports, research papers and other documents. The databases 
of several newspapers were searched for reports on civil service reform issues.
Interviews with key personnel provided valuable complementary and supplementary 
material to the archive material. In this thesis key personnel are defined as those closely 
involved with or having ownership of the issues. They comprise two groups, members of 
various working committees on Gvil Service reform and other relevant officials. The most 
important of the first group were the secretaries of these committees because they had 
ownership of the issues and were well informed about decision-making because of their 
pivotal role on the committee. They serviced committees, and were responsible for 
researching and preparing materials and reform proposals, as well as usually writing the 
minutes. Most secretaries were senior members of central agencies of the civil service. All 
secretaries were asked to be interviewed and most agreed. Four secretaries of downsizing 
committees and three secretaries of pension reform committees representing each of the
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main central co-ordinating agencies involved were interviewed. They have provided the 
principal interview material used in this thesis. Other relevant officials, while not usually 
members of committees were often officials in the central agencies and directly involved 
with the reform issues. They researched, prepared and wrote the papers and materials 
submitted through the secretaries to the committees.
The decision to interview these key personnel was taken because of the nature of the 
decision making structure in the Thai Gvil Service, which is a closed system in which those 
outside the central agencies played a minimal role. This is reflected in the list of interviewees. 
No politicians were interviewed, except Abhisit Vejjajiva who served as a minister in the 
Prime Minister’s Office during Chaun’s second administration. In order to ensure balance in 
the range of evidence used, the official archival documents were used to present voices of 
politicians as well as civil servants.
A total of twenty-five individuals were interviewed. A list of individuals interviewed 
and the dates is contained in Appendix 2 for downsizing and Appendix 3 for pension 
reform. An semi-structured interview was used because it gave scope for wide ranging 
responses beyond the parameters of a tighdy structured interview questionnaire, producing 
‘thick descriptions’ and allowing fuller discussion of the context of reform. Gvil Service 
experience shows that in structured interview questionnaires civil servants tend to respond as 
representatives of their organisation not as individuals and to give the organisation’s view 
even if they personally disagree with it. Unstructured interviews suffer less from this 
problem. This format has enabled me to pursue issues in greater depth and bring out the 
‘real* issues or events rather than the ‘official’ ones.
In order to encourage participation and honest and insightful responses on what 
were sensitive and recent, or in the case of downsizing, current issues, anonymity was 
offered to interviewees. In this way valuable information that would not otherwise have been 
available was gathered. Interviews were usually recorded but when anonymity was offered 
written notes were made by the author. A number of the key personnel interviewed are 
quoted anonymously as well as byname.
After the author conducted the initial research he spent eighteen months working for 
the Office of the Gvil Service Commission (OCSQ. During this time he was able to interact 
with many officials who were involved with or had knowledge of downsizing policy and 
pension reform both in the OCSC and other central co-ordinating agencies. Supplementary
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information was collected from them and used to both complement and verify material from 
archives and interviews. This material is referred to as personal communication and the 
individuals concerned are listed in Appendixes 2 and 3.
1.6 Thesis structure
This thesis consists of four parts. Chapter 2 of Part I provides a background of the 
government system and institutional foundations for public management policy-making, and 
the political and economic development of Thailand between 1980 and 1999 during which 
the two reform experience took place. These are stable contexts and contexts in motions. 
Chapters on downsizing the civil service are in Part II and are structured around important 
“reform outcomes”, the deliberate policies or schemes to contain the size of the civil service. 
Chapter 3 deals with the emergence of an early attempt to downsize the civil service, which 
was become known by the Thai reformers as “the two per cent policy’. Chapter 4 examines 
a rationalisation programme and the adoption of a freeze on public sector employment in 
1991-2. Chapter 5 tracks the development of “measures to control the size of the civil 
service”, a mechanism used to curb the civil service size that was in place between 1992 and 
1995. Chapter 6 examines the continuity of downsizing policy through the head counting 
practices and the reinforcement of downsizing policy in the wake of Asian Financial crisis. 
Chapter 7 explores how the Thai government turned the Asian financial crisis into an 
opportunity for civil service reform in general and downsizing in particular.
Part III of this thesis deals with civil service pension reform. Chapter 8 examines the 
emergence of the civil service pension reform issue. Its progression is then further 
investigated in chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 9 deals with the process of specifying civil service 
pensions reform alternatives. Chapter 10 focuses on the decision making process of 
important design elements of civil service pensions which led to the development of a single 
unified reform proposal.
Part IV contains the conclusion, Chapter 11, which reflects on and is grounded in 
the historical and analytic narratives exhibited in Parts II and III. This chapter recalls the 
analysis of reform trajectories and outcomes from both case studies. General explanations 
for such trajectories and outcomes will be provided using an institutional processualist 
approach, engaging the thesis findings with the wider literature on public management
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reform in order to make a modest generalisation to contribute to the literature. The chapter 
ends with some limitations of the thesis and suggests opportunities for future research.
Chapter 2
The Institutional Foundations and Contexts 
For Public Management Policy Change in Thailand
Overview
The institutional settings and wider politico-economic environments within which civil 
service human resource management policy change between 1980 and 1999 took place need 
to be clearly identified. These form the contexts for public management policy change in 
Thailand. This thesis identifies two broad categories of contexts: firmly established 
institutional contexts and contexts-in-motion. The former is described in terms of structure 
of governance characterised by the system of power separation, as well as the structure of 
public policy decision-making institutions. The latter involves the political and economic 
developments which took place during two decades covered by this study.
The aim of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for examining the influence of 
institutional arrangements and contexts on the dynamic process of public personnel 
management policy change in Parts II and III. In so doing it familiarise readers with the 
governance and political economy of Thailand in which the institutional structure of civil 
service human resource management policy decision-making takes place. The final section 
of the chapter sketches the narrative history of Thai governance, giving particular attention 
to the time period covered in the case studies examined later in the thesis.
2.1 The Structure of Government: A Brief Review
Thailand is a unitary state and her sovereign power is shared between the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary. It is a constitutional monarchy with the king as Head of State, 
Upholder of Religion, and Head of the Thai Armed Forces. The monarch is above politics,1 
and HM Government headed by the Prime Minister is responsible for overall day-to-day 
administration and setting public policy. Since there is an abundance of material on the
1 The monarch’s formal powers include the issuing of royal decrees that are constitutional, 
declare martial law, declare war with a two-third majority in parliament and make treaties. 
Other royal prerogatives are ceremonial.
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governance of Thailand and its contexts,2 this section will concentrate on the institutional 
contexts of the executive branch within which civil service human resource management 
policy -downsizing the civil service and civil service pension reform— have been made and 
are likely to continue to be made. Less attention will be paid to the legislature and the 
judiciary because legislative and judicial processes did not play a large role in initiating public 
policy change and therefore are not the focus of this thesis, though some elements of the 
former are present in the case studies. In this review of the system of government both the 
formal structure of government and its operation will be discussed.
2.1.1 The Executive: The Prime Minister and the Cabinet
The prime minister and the cabinet play a crucial role in making public policy decisions 
including civil service management policies. The prime minister, who is typically the leader 
of the largest party in the ruling coalition, possesses institutional authority for making final 
decisions on matters of public policy.3 In this sense the Thai prime minister is more than 
primus inter pares among cabinet ministers. The Prime Minister’s Office is the institutional 
base for his authority, in the form of legal access and control in the bureaucracy (Wilson, 
1962). This includes control of strategic development policies and direction as well as 
managerial resources such as budgets and personnel through bureaucratic agencies within 
the Prime Minister’s Office. The institutional locus of these managerial resources will be 
reviewed separately below.
The Thai cabinet, which is chaired by the prime minister, is at the heart of 
government decision making. The prime minister appoints deputy prime ministers, ministers 
and deputy ministers, all of whom are members of the Council of Cabinet Ministers, the 
cabinet. It has the authority to specify both routine and strategic matters that would require 
its approval. As observed by Blanchard et al (1958), “[The cabinet] not only formulates 
legislative proposals but also makes frequent pronouncements on issues of the day. All 
important bills require its approval for passage through the legislature. Often the cabinet 
concerns itself with small matters that in other governments would be left to subordinates”.
2 For good accounts of political and economic development see Xuto (1987), Boonbongkam (1987), 
Samudavanija (1987), Laothamatas (1992, 1994), Warr (1993), Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) and 
Pongpaichit (1980,1982).
3 According to the 1997 Constitution the prime minister must be nominated by one fifth of the 
House of Representatives and receive the support of over half of both Houses of Parliament.
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In day-to-day routine operations, it acts as an administrative committee to which many 
decision must legally be submitted. Most cabinet decisions rely on information and analysis 
made available by ministries or departments. Painter (2004) has described the Thai cabinet as 
a “highly formalised, legalistic rubber stamp for decisions taken elsewhere”. However, in 
more strategic issues involving the allocation of resources, the cabinet also acts as arbitrator 
(Wilson, 1962).
Authorisation for issues to be deliberated in cabinet rests with the prime minister, 
deputy prime ministers and other ministers who are allowed to raise issues. Most issues are 
usually delegated to sub-committees, which filter, coordinate and make decisions on 
important policies such as economic and social issues. These sub-committees, such as the 
Council of Economic Ministers and the Social Affairs Committee, which are usually 
permanent but not established by law in the constitution, consist of relevant ministers and 
senior bureaucrats from ministries and the central co-ordinating agencies. The cabinet is 
serviced by the Cabinet Secretariat, an office within the Prime Minister’s Office, headed by 
the cabinet secretary one of whose responsibilities is to act as a gate keeper for strategic 
issues, though this role is constrained by the ability of cabinet ministers to raise issues.4
Ministerial portfolios are allocated among senior politicians from the parties in the 
governing coalition. All recent Thai governments have been coalition governments, even 
when the country was under authoritarian rule. This is because in the 1980s and 1990s 
political parties were too weak and too numerous to win a majority in elections. They lacked 
clear ideologies and policies and as a result personalities rather than parties tended to 
determine election results. Governing coalitions are usually formed by the largest party. 
Ministries are allocated according to the bargaining power of coalition parties based on the 
numbers of votes in parliament they bring to the government.5 In the allocation of ministries
4 The Cabinet Secretariat administers cabinet meetings by co-ordinating between the cabinet and the 
king, managing cabinet submissions, preparing agendas and minutes of meeting, monitoring the 
implementation of cabinet resolutions, co-ordinating the legislative drafting process, and publishing 
and distributing laws and the Royal Gazette.
5 Borwomwattana (2001) classifies ministerial portfolios according to their importance to politicians. 
Grade A ministries, the most important, are those that provide opportunities for ministers to exercise 
power and control over budgets and personnel as well as key policy areas from which they can 
extract rents. In disputed allocations senior politicians of the leading coalition party, usually the prime 
minister, may assume ministerial posts themselves or offer them to outsiders, non MPs. For example, 
the post of finance minister, which needs experience and technical expertise, is frequently given to 
technocrats and professionals.
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it is common to find the posts of minister and deputy minister shared between politicians of 
two or three different political parties. The more potential posts a ministry provides, the 
more likely it will be controlled by several parties. Within ministries, the minister has full 
control over the ministries’ jurisdictions and remits. “The ministry then becomes his 
constituency, and he represents it in the Cabinet. He fights for its budget, and he protects its 
employees. The success with which he does this depends upon his relative position within 
the ruling clique, although the best he can expect is a compromise with his fellow 
ministers” (Wilson, 1962). Ministers also have discretion over the allocation of departments 
within their ministries to their deputy ministers.6 Though ministers have full autonomy and 
normally operate without intervention from the prime minister, they often face intervention 
from their own party leaders who usually assume the posts of deputy prime ministers 
(Borwomwattana, 2001). These deputy prime ministers are usually responsible for 
overseeing ministries under the control of ministers from their own parties.
In consequence most policy decisions in the Thai government are made in the 
context of coalition cabinets. This context not only provides opportunities and risks for any 
policies, programmes, and projects that need cabinet approval, it also shapes the nature of 
the ‘public service bargain’ or relationship between politicians, who are government 
ministers, and senior bureaucrats. Such relationships contribute to both the day-to-day 
running of ministries and to strategic decision making on important issues.
2.1.2 The Legislature: The Houses of Parliament
Thailand has a bicameral legislature, the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
Parliament is the venue for enacting new legislation, approving emergency decrees and 
amending and repealing existing laws. Since 1997 members of both houses are elected.7 
Apart from legislative functions, parliament can check and control the government by way of 
reviewing and approving the government’s annual budget proposal, as well as initiating a 
vote of no confidence against government ministers. The House of Representatives appoints 
more than twenty select committees to scrutinise the government including, to name but a
6 The rule of departmental allocation is the same as that of ministerial posts. Ministers keep most 
potential grade A department for themselves and deputies ministers from their parties. Less 
important departments are offered to deputy ministers from other parties.
7 Under the 1992 Constitution the Senate was an appointed body. See below for a comparison of the 
1992 and 1997 constitutions.
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few, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Foreign Affairs and Banking and Finance. The speaker of 
the House of Representatives is also the president of the houses of parliament. The Senate 
plays checking and balancing roles in parliament. Apart from its legislative role, it also has 
the power to appoint members of the many independent committees specified by the 
Constitution.
Through the lens of veto power, MacIntyre (2003) argues that the Senate only has 
the power to delay rather than veto. Only the House of Representatives carries veto power 
as control of the House is fragmented due to the number of political parties which results in 
coalition government. In this sense all coalition parties in the House constitute veto players 
because they are all components of the majority necessary to pass legislation which results in 
a high degree of dispersal of decision-making authority (MacIntyre, 2003).
2.1.3 The Judiciary: The Courts
Though the Thai judiciary has no direct place in the structure of policy decision-making, it 
has recently begun to have some influence on it. The judiciary comprises three tiers of 
courts, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and Courts of First Instance, and operates 
with a relatively high degree of independence. With the appointment of independent 
Administrative Courts, the judiciary has interpreted government policy in response to 
individual cases. The establishment of the Administrative Court in 1996 has increased the 
judiciary's role in public policy making. Although the direct influence of the Administrative 
Court on public policy decision making has not yet been widely felt, in the past few years, 
the government and the Civil Sendee have been more careful when deciding on important 
issues affecting individual rights after some government agencies were sued by affected 
parties. The court is also popular among government personnel for resolving cases of alleged 
unfair treatment by their superiors. Since trade unions are not allowed in the Civil Service, 
the Administrative Court is seen as institution that protects their rights. The role of the 
Administrative Court in making public policy is expected to increase as its rulings set 
precedents for government agencies.
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2.2 The Gvil Service
In the Thai context, the ‘Gvil Service’ specifically refers to both civilian and military 
bureaucracies characterised by a traditional organisational pattern of ministries and 
departments. This thesis focuses mainly on the ‘Gvil Service’ in this sense. The foundation 
of the modem Thai Gvil Service system was laid a century ago by King Gilalongkom, Rama 
V. Modelled on the British and French civil services, the existing ‘medieval bureaucracy' was 
transformed into a professional civil service characterised by specialised ministries and 
departments where administrative powers were highly centralised, and hierarchies were 
complex. Gvil servants served the king, a tradition that continues to today. Thai civil 
servants still regard themselves servants and guardians of the state rather than the 
government of the day. In terms of Hood’s public service bargain, the Thai civil service is 
characterised by a ‘trustee bargain’ (Hood, 2000).
2.2.1 Levels of Administration in the Gvil Service
Thailand is a unitary state and the Thai administrative system, which is structured by 
legislation, is highly centralised. Most administrative powers are concentrated in central 
government. Central administration includes ministries, departments and other central 
coordinating agencies. Ministries are headed by ministers and deputy ministers who may or 
may not politicians. The operations of ministries are overseen by permanent secretaries or 
senior bureaucrats with the same rank Ministries are normally subdivided into departments, 
which are legal entities, whose powerful chiefs are ‘director generals*. While permanent 
secretaries have a broad overseeing responsibilities and normally co-ordinate departments, it 
is director generals who are legally and constitutionally responsible for carrying out 
departmental mandates, exercising departmental jurisdiction and are accountable to their 
political masters, ministers, the cabinet and parliament. Both permanent secretaries and 
director generals are in the senior bureaucratic cadre, the Senior Executive Service (SES). 
Departments are normally further subdivided into divisions and sections headed by division 
managers and section heads who are middle management in bureaucratic rank In short, the 
Thai Gvil Service has strong departmentalism.
The administrative system comprises three levels, central, provincial and local. 
Provincial administration, which can be seen as a regional arm of central administration, 
consists of provinces. A province comprises many districts and sub-districts and below them
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townships. Provinces are headed by provincial governors assisted by one or two deputy 
governors and an assistant governor. Although governors are at the top of provincial 
administration, their roles deal mainly with coordinating various ministries and departments 
located in provincial areas. They do not have full and direct authority over the functional and 
personnel management of officials belonging to departments other than the Ministry of 
Interior. Districts and sub-districts are managed by district chief officers who are assisted by 
district officers. These provincial and district officers are appointed, and their careers are 
centrally managed by the powerful Ministry of Interior.
The third level of state administration is local administration. It consists of various 
levels of self-governing bodies including Trovincial Administrative Organisations’, 
municipalities, sanitary districts, and ‘Sub-District Administrative Organisations’. Although 
these local administrations are elected, they rely heavily on the Department of Local 
Administration in the Ministry of Interior for fiscal assistance since the revenue they can 
raise locally is small. Hence the Ministry of Interior retains its influence over the forms, 
structure and management of these local bodies.8
Within these levels of administration power lies with central government. Line 
ministries have their own officials carrying out their responsibilities in provinces and at local 
level. These officials are outside the control of provincial governors. At the time of writing, 
the Thaksin government has attempted to empower and consolidate the authority of 
provincial governors, giving them more authority over the administration of provinces and 
the personnel management of officials working in the provinces. Some provincial governors 
have been selected to join a pilot scheme creating ‘provincial chief executives’.
2.2.2 The Gvil Service Structure
The structure and organisation of the Gvil Service is determined by legislation which 
provides frameworks for organising government functions and jurisdictions, administrative 
forms, structure and numbers as well as process within ministries, departments and divisions. 
The restructuring of ministries and departments, which is normally part of civil service 
reform efforts, requires legislative change. Over the past thirty years the number of 
government organisations, ministries and departments in Thailand has increased. Since this
8 See Samudavanija (1987)
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thesis is substantially about ‘downsizing the Gvil Service* it is appropriate at this stage to give 
an account of government structural proliferation and duplication.
A. Structural Proliferation
Between 1970 and 1978, when the economy was strong despite the adverse affects of the 
first oil shock in the early 1970s, the notion of ‘the bigger the Gvil Service, the better* 
seemed to encapsulate the attitude of civil servants. The government and its civil servants 
tended to believe that the sheer size of the Gvil Service mattered. If government 
departments were to function well, it was necessary for them to expand their agencies by 
increasing personnel and budgets, as well as establishing new administrative units. As Table
2.1 shows the size of the Gvil Service grew significantly between 1933 and 2000, especially 
from the late 1950s. Divisions and departments grew particularly rapidly.
Table 2.1 Numbers of Civilian Ministries, Departments and Divisions: 1933-2000
Year Ministries Departments Divisions
1933 7 45 143
1941 10 49 317
1957 12 90 550
1969 12 113 827
1979 13 131 1264
1992* 13 122 1665
1996 15 125 1874
2002** 20 139 n/a
Source: Data 1933-1979 is taken from Ghandarasom (1980). The rest is compiled by 
the author from the Government Organisation Acts 1992* and 2002**.
The proliferation of government agencies has been seen as a result of the 
development-led-growth policy of successive governments, leading to the rapid expansion of 
the Thai Gvil Service up to 1980. Many new departments and divisions established during
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the first and second national development plans were not based on job requirements that 
emerged from the new developmental environment; only six out of nineteen new 
departments and 210 out of 713 divisions established were the result of new task 
requirements (Chandarasom, 1980). Instead, bureaucrats in collaboration with politicians 
took the liberty ‘to expand their empires’ in the name of ‘development purposes’. They 
recruited more staff and created new posts by way of diversification of existing tasks, some 
of which were duplicated with similar kinds of jobs in other ministries. At a seminar held by 
the National Institute of Development Administration in 1969, participating senior civil 
servants spoke explicitly of the availability of more and more personnel and larger budgets: 
“Departments wanted unlimited expansion of their tasks which would lead to a budget 
increase, power, positions, and working facilities and new instruments. The increase in these 
resources would enable them to be self reliant and less dependent on other agencies.”9 This 
led to a ‘bureau maximising view’ of government growth.
B. Structural Duplication and Overlapping Jurisdictions
Although Thai public administration is organised around departments that are legal entities 
established by act of parliament, the boundaries between some departments are not always 
clearly drawn in the legislation. As a result, there are overlapping departmental 
responsibilities. This can be seen where different departments have initiated quite similar 
projects and competed for budgets. The overlap among Thai central departments is also the 
result of very broad government policies which has enabled more than one department to 
claim responsibility.
As a result of structural duplication and overlapping jurisdictions new policies, issues 
and problems require ‘co-operation’ from various departments and collective action. Hence 
most decisions are made in inter-departmental committees. As Samudhavanich (1987) 
observes, “The typical response to a new problem is to form a committee. The cabinet has a 
committee for every conceivable type of problem. Some committees exist on a permanent 
basis; others are formed for ad hoc purposes such as deciding on the location of a new 
highway’. Morell (1974) argues that senior civil servants support joint decision making in
9 Summary of Executive Seminar Programme Class 25-26, NIDA1969.
39
interdepartmental committees because they are sources of additional income since Ministry 
of Finance regulations provide for a special honorarium to be paid for attendance at 
committee meetings. For some senior bureaucrats, their meeting allowances in a month are 
much more than their monthly salaries. In this situation non-routine issues such as the 
reform agenda emerge and require collective action to solve problems. This type of overlap 
is demonstrated in the roles of both inter-departmental committees and those concerned 
with macro policy, such as the National Economic and Social Development Plans (NESDB 
Plans).
The central co-ordinating agencies, which are part of the problem, have realised that 
structural and jurisdictional overlapping needs to be reformed. NESDB Plans usually 
incorporate a chapter on ‘improving the efficiency of central agencies in co-ordinating and 
facilitating development projects*. Recently the Office of the Gvil Service Commission 
announced a policy to work in partnership with line ministries, departments and other 
central public personnel agencies to achieve greater co-ordination (OCSC Policy Pamphlet 
1998).
2.3 Managing Gvil Service Resources
In the Thai Gvil Service the three key functions of public sector management, personnel, 
finance and strategic direction, are carried out by ‘overhead agencies’. Central co-ordinating 
agencies are responsible for developing the country’s development framework, managing 
public finance and budgets and public personnel. The institutional locations for these 
functions are: the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB), the Office of the Gvil Service Commission (OCSQ, the Bureau of the Budget 
(BOB), and the Comptroller General’s Department [GGD] in the Ministry of Finance. In 
civil service pension reform and additional co-ordinating agency, the Fiscal Policy Office 
[FPO] was also involved. As depicted in Figure 2.1 these agencies form the structure of civil 
service management policy. A ‘gang of four’, the NESDB, FPO, BOB and the Bank of 
Thailand, the country’s independent central bank, are the principal economic policy making 
institutions. Gvil service management policy making is carried out by the OCSC, NESDB, 
GGD and BOB and sometimes the Prime Minister’s Secretariat Office. Supervision of these
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agencies is exercised by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry o f Finance: the former 
supervises the OCSC, NESDB and BOB, the latter the FPO and CGD.
Figure 2.1: The Structure of Public Policy Decision Making Institutions
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Office o f th e  C o u n se l of S ta te
Bank of Thailand
Office o f th e  Civil S erv ice  
C om m ission
The C om ptro ller G enera l’s  
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The Prim e M inister’s  
S ec re ta ria t Office
Office o f th e  N ational Econom ic 
an d  Social D evelopm ent
The F iscal Policy Office
The Cabinet
The Prime Minister’s 
Office
Ministry of Finance
Note: Organisational Hierarchy ..............  Supervision
The economic policy making institutions, the ‘Gang of Four’
  The Civil Service Management Policy Making institutions
Source: The author
The responsibilities o f these five principal central co-ordinating agencies are 
summarised in Table 2.2. The primary responsibility o f the NESDB is for strategic 
development planning. It formulates the country’s five-year development plans and co­
ordinates, monitors and evaluates their implementation. Recent plans have included 
measures related to civil service management and structure. The OCSC is responsible for 
research on civil service personnel administration and the training and welfare o f civil 
servants. The BOB provides the government with fiscal advice and is responsible for 
drawing up the annual budget. The CGD is the government accounting office. It is
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responsible for disbursing the budget and for civil servants’ pay and pensions. The FPO is 
principally concerned with providing the government with advice on fiscal matters, taxation, 
monetary policy, savings and investment. It should be noted that some of these co­
ordination agencies are also institutional actors in economic and other sectoral policy 
decision-making; the BOB, Bank of Thailand, NESDB and Ministry of Finance are required 
to work together to advise on fiscal policy.
Table 2.2: Responsibilities of the Central Co-ordinating Agencies
Agency Institutional Location Responsibilities
NESDB Office of the Prime Minister > Formulation of five year plans.
>  Recommendation of solutions to 
development problems.
> Co-ordination of implementation of plans.
>  Evaluation and monitoring of plans.
OCSC Office of the Prime Minister > Research on civil service personnel 
administration.
> Welfare policies for civil servants.
> Education and training of civil servants.
BOB Office of the Prime Minister > Advice on fiscal policy.
> Preparation and execution of annual 
budget.
> Evaluation of governmental agencies’ 
programmes.
CGD Ministry of Finance > Government accounting systems.
> Formulation of fiscal regulations.
> Management of Treasury reserve balance.
>  Disbursement of budget.
> Gvil servants pay and pensions.
FPO Ministry of Finance > Research and advice on fiscal, tax, 
monetary, financial, savings and 
investment and economic policies.
Source: Government websites ( www.thaiaov.qo.th).
The operations of these overhead central co-ordinating agencies affect both the 
performance of line ministries and departments and reform capacity. Hence there are some 
tensions and conflicts over resource allocation between central agencies and line ministries 
and departments. The criteria by which departments’ performances were assessed were how 
many staff they had and how much money they received from the government. By the same
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token, deficiency and sufficiency of personnel and financial resources were to blame if 
management failures occurred. The primary excuse was usually “We don’t have enough 
manpower or budget”. The following sections deal mainly with institutional actors involved 
in civil service human resource policy and management.
2.3.1 Managing Civil Service Personnel
The term ‘government personnel’ includes all officials and personnel working in the public 
sector, while ‘civil servants’ only refers to officials whose terms of employment, contracts 
and official status are specified in the Civil Service Act, and the equivalent acts for other 
occupational and professional services. Those who work in the Gvil Service but do not 
possess the official status specified by such acts are termed ‘government employees’. 
Employees who have tenure are called ‘permanent employees* and those who do not are 
‘temporary employees*. The aggregate term ‘civil service personnel’ in this thesis refers to 
both civil servants and employees.
A. Fragmented Public Personnel Policy and Management
Public personnel policy and management in the Thai Gvil Service is fragmented. ‘Gvil 
service personnel’ consist of eleven occupational and professional groups. Each group has its 
own ‘commission’, a high level committee responsible for personnel management. These 
central personnel commissions handle policy issues fundamental to management control: 
who can be hired, who can be fired, who is promoted, and how much each is paid. 
Historically, there was only one Gvil Service Commission responsible for the whole of 
public personnel management, but some occupational and professional groups argued for a 
more tailored approach that took into account their professional uniqueness. As a result, 
there was a multiplication of occupational and professional groups as shown in Table 2.3 
Separate occupational and professional services acts were promulgated with their own 
‘commissions’ independent from the Gvil Service Commission (CSQ.10 Each commission 
also has its own secretariat office tasked with the preparation and implementation of its own 
personnel policy.
10 The Thai Gvil Service Commission dates from 1928. The logic behind an independent Gvil 
Service Commission is that the implementation of public personnel policy should be removed from
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Table 2.3 Central Personnel Commissions
Commissions Established Years No. ofPersonnel %
Civil Service Commission 1928 372,700 30.71
Judicial Service Commission 1934 1,434 0.12
Teachers* Council Commission 1945 512/38 42.25
Universities* Officials Commission 1959 42,478 3.50
Public Prosecutors Service Gbmmission 1960 1,765 0.15
PruvindalAdministiatm 1966 5,647 0.47
MmicpalityCfGdak* Gbmniss^ 1973 31,134 2.57
Ban^^Mucpolitan Officials* Commission 1973 31,134 2.57
Legislative BodyCffirials* Gonimissoi 1975 653 0.06
District Sanitation Officials’ Gbmmissicn 1978 172/27 14.24
Police Qffiriak’GDmmssbn 1978 172,727 14.24
Total 1,213,214 100.00
Source: The Civil Service Commission Office. Numbers of personnel taken from 1996 
estimates.
The number of civil service personnel belonging to each commission signifies the 
opportunity and risk for the government to make and implement across the board public 
personnel policy reforms, since the affected commissions need to be consulted. These 
commissions in effect act as interest groups -within the public personnel policy domain. For 
example, anecdotal evidence shows that commissions responsible for high numbers of civil 
servants such as the Teachers* Council Commission have stronger negotiating power over 
pay and employment benefits than other commissions.
Despite the multiplicity of central personnel agencies, the Civil Service Commission 
(CSC), second only to the Teachers’ Council Commission in the number of personnel it is 
responsible for, is seen by the government as the leading central personnel commission. 
Unlike the other commissions, which tend to focus their responsibilities on their respective
the realm of electoral and partisan politics. An independent commission would ensure that public
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occupational and professional groups, the Gvil Service Commission plays a wider and more 
important role. The Gvil Service Act provides it with the right and responsibility to provide 
the cabinet with public personnel policy recommendations.11 Its leading role can be seen in 
the precedents it sets for public personnel policy and practices, most of which have been 
adopted voluntarily by the other commissions. These commissions may be forced to adopt 
important public personnel policies and practices developed by the Office of the Gvil 
Service Commission (OCSQ, its secretariat office, and enforced by cabinet resolutions. 
Downsizing policies and reform of civil service pensions are good examples of this. The 
OCSC has gained more experience and expertise than any other commission and has 
developed organisational capacity for making and implementing public personnel policy.
B. Civil Service Employment
Since 1980, the number of civilian civil service personnel has grown steadily. As shown in 
Figure 2.2, it increased from 1,032,800 in 1981 to almost 1,600,000 in 1999 when the period 
of the study ends. After a period of rapid growth until 1981 there has been slower growth 
but a continuous upward trend resulting in a fifty per cent increase in size. This has 
significantly increased public personnel costs and budgetary pressures. Figure 2.3 shows the 
growth rates of civil service staff by categories over the last two decades of the twentieth 
century with the average rate around three per cent per annum.
personnel administration was divorced from politics.
11 The Gvil Service Act is central to the management of the Gvil Service as it defines the rights and 
responsibilities of civil servants, as well as their public personnel administration system ranging from 
recruitment and selection, position classification, remuneration and career development, to 
performance management and disciplinary action. The legal framework for the management of the 
civil service between 1980 and 1999 was the Gvil Service Act of 1975 and its replacement the Gvil 
Service Act of 1992. The first Gvil Service Act of 1928 was the result of a bureaucratic 
modernisation effort. It introduced standardised pay scales, positions and career advancement, a 
unified disciplinary code and the Royal Service Commission to implement it. After the establishment 
of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, a new Gvil Service Act of 1933 introduced a rank classification 
system based on job evaluation and replaced the Royal Service Commission with the Gvil Service 
Commission (CSC). The Gvil Service Act of 1933 remained in force until 1954 with only minor 
amendments. Anew Gvil Service Act of 1954 lasted until 1975.
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Figure 2.2 Number  of Civil Service Personnel  1981-1999
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Expansion o f the civil service is regulated by a ‘manpower management process’, a 
bureaucratic procedure to control numbers o f personnel, positions and financial resources 
related to personnel as well as to ensure the efficient use o f civil service personnel. The 
process involves many o f the central government agencies responsible for managing 
personnel and financial resources including the NESDB, OCSC, BOB, as well as a dozen 
personnel agencies. When government agencies want to increase their staff they need to 
fulfil statutory requirements in relation to the nature o f the increased task and job burden. 
All requests for creating new positions resulting in an increase in civil service personnel are 
processed jointly by the OCSC and BOB. The OCSC analyses requests and classifies and 
assigns appropriate grades for new positions to ensure increases in personnel match the 
increasing job burden as prescribed in the position classification system. The creation o f new 
positions is also subject to the availability o f financial resources in the prospective annual 
budget since all positions in the Civil Service are financed by the government budget, a 
decision resting with the BOB. New positions or administrative units are only created when 
requests are approved by both. In most cases requests are approved resulting in uncontroled 
civil service expansion.
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The civil service manpower management process is weak and ineffective. Its 
manpower control mechanisms are fragmented, as no single agency has a direct mandate or 
jurisdiction over the determination of the size of the Gvil Service. It is also unco-ordinated. 
The NESDB, the OCSC and the BOB, each have their own different clearly defined 
purposes based on their professional and legal standards, and process requests for 
manpower increases separately. The process is further weakened by a lack of operational 
capacity in the central co-ordinating agencies. They recieve large numbers of requests and 
have other functions to perform. As a result requests are only crudely and slowly scrutinised. 
Frustration with the process causes politicans to bypass the system by using ‘special requests’ 
direct to the cabinet for manpower increases which are invariably approved without input 
from the central co-ordinating agencies. The result of this is steady and uncontrolled 
expansion in civil service numbers.
"Whether the Thai Gvil Service is too large or too expensive requires a comparative 
study. In terms of overall size based on numbers of personnel employed, the Thai public 
sector is not excessive. The Asian Development Bank (1999) estimated that in 1992, the Thai 
public sector accounted for only 15.4 percent of GNP which was lower than any other 
ASEAN countries. A long term review of civil service employment over the twenty-year 
period 1981-99 shown in Figure 2.4, indicates that the Thai Gvil Service employed on an 
average less than two point five civil servants per hundred population. In a comparative 
study of civil service capacity in five Southeast Asian countries and the OECD countries, 
Nunbeig (2002) concludes that all countries [including Thailand] have contained general 
government employment between 1980 and 1999 at fewer than three per cent of total 
population. Flowever, in terms of public sector employment distribution across levels of 
administrations, more than ninety percent of civil service personnel are employed by central 
government.12 A snapshot review in 1993 reveals that the ratio of central-local administration 
employment in Thailand was 12:1, while that of South Korea, Japan, the UK and USA were 
2:1,1:4,1:2 and 1:5 respectively.
12 Historically, the share of public employment in regional and local administration comprised little 
more than five per cent of total government employment. The share rfgnwrnrrpntexpprrhibp nmpntfystanrk 
atalxxtfifiBmpercentalihoighthegoveinment plans to increase the share to forty per cent in the next decade 
(Asian Development Bank, 1999).
48
F ig u r e  2.4 C iv il S e r v ic e  P e r s o n n e l  
as P e r c e n ta g e  o f  T o ta l P o p u la t io n , 1981-1999
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Source: Office of the Gvil Service Commission. Compiled by the author 
G  Problems of the Civil Service Workforce
The Thai Gvil Service faced three problems during the the 1980s and 1990s: an unbalanced 
age profile; low pay by comparison with the private sector, and increasing manpower loss, 
the so-called ‘brain drain’. As Table 2.4 shows, the age profile of the Thai Gvil Service was 
imbalanced with nearly sixty per cent aged between 31 and 45. On current trends as the 
workforce aged there would be a substantial future increase in pension costs. Until 1996 the 
Thai Gvil Service pension was a defined benefits scheme the full cost of which was bome by 
the government and paid from current personnel expenditure. The age profile of the Gvil 
Service had important implications for future personnel costs. The problem was already 
evident in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the number of retirees gradually increased 
(See Table 2.5).
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Table 2.4 The Aging Gvil Service: Number of Gvil Service Servants, 1990"'
Age Distribution Number of Civil Servants % of Sample
Below 20 86 021
21-25 2,096 5.10
26-30 5,463 1330
31-35 10,013 2438
36-40 8702 21.19
41-45 5,958 1431
46-50 4,172 10.16
51-55 3,027 7.37
56-60 1,443 3.51
Above 60 111 027
Total 41,071 100.00
Source: Office of the Gvil Service Commission
Note: * The survey was conducted in 1990 and samples were taken from four government 
agencies representing around five per cent of civilian workforce.
Table 2.5 Number of Retired Gvil Servants, 1988-92
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Officials and permanent employees 
Rate of Increase (%)
1798,422 1776,939
(1.2)
1,826,491
2.8
1,858,895
1.8
1,878,841
1.0
Pensioners 153786 159780 166,461 173341 179,009
Rate of Increase(%) - 3.9 42 4.1 33
Ratio of Pensioners to workers 8.6 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.5
Source: The Comptroller General’s Department, Ministry of Finance
Compared with the private sector Thai civil servants were poorly paid. This was 
implicitly recognised in the generous pensions and other allowances they were entitled to. 
Table 2.6 shows that the differences were most marked at middle and senior levels where 
private sector pay was on average fifty per cent higher in the middle ranks and almost 200
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per cent at the most senior. Low pay levels made it difficult for the Gvil Service to retain its 
more experienced and skilled staff, resulting in a ‘brain drain’. Figure 2.5 shows that in the 
mid 1980s voluntary resignations, though falling, were the main reason for leaving the civil 
service. It was widely accepted in the Gvil Service and by successive governments that the 
‘brain drain’ was a major problem.
Table 2.6 Comparison o f Private Sector and Civil Service Salaries in the early 1990s
Position Level Average Age
Private Sector Salary 
(Baht/month)
Civil Service Pay 
Schedule Mid-Point % Difference
7 38 49,192 17,165 186.6
6 36 28,032 14,090 99.0
5 33 17,433 11,355 53.5
4 30 15,186 9,109 652
3 31 8,097 7,480 8.2
2 28 6,671 5,935 11.5
1 30 5,038 4,675 7.8
Source: Private data  from T hailand M anagem ent Association (TMA) Survey; and the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission
Figure 2.5 Civil Service Manpower  
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2.3.2 Managing the Civil Service’s Financial Resources and Personnel Costs 
Budgets are one of the most important managerial resources and means used by the Thai 
government to control the Civil Service; personnel costs reduction was a major element of 
human resource policy. The Thai budget system is highly centralised and embodies a long­
standing set of arrangements, rules and procedures that enable governments to exert 
discipline on aggregate fiscal management. Line ministries and departments are granted little 
autonomy over their budgets. The budgetary process is managed by a ‘gang of four* central 
coordinating agencies, the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT). These agencies have considerable control over the budget process by 
controlling the level of overall annual spending and deficit. The powerful BOB performs two 
separate types of activities: budget preparation and budget administration or oversight. Once 
a budget is approved, the overhead system stays in business by monitoring and oversight. 
The disbursement of the budget is the remit of the Comptroller General’s Office (CGD) in 
the Ministry of Finance. Together with the BOB, the CGD exercises extensive control over 
departments’ annual expenditure by setting ceilings on seven major categories of public 
outlays such as wages and salaries, operation and maintenance. The ‘gang of four’, 
particularly the BOB and the NESDB, are able to encourage the efficient use of resources by 
line ministries and departments.
Fiscal discipline especially the public spending ceiling imposed by these budget 
bureaucracies is strictly observed. The formal budgetary rules set out a legal limit that in any 
particular year public borrowing cannot exceed twenty per cent of total public expenditure 
plus eighty percent of the amount earmarked for the repayment of domestic and external 
public debts. Although the cabinet may recommend changes in expenditure, such changes 
normally do not lead to changes in the aggregate ceiling. Even parliament’s Budget Scrutiny 
Select Committee, chaired by the finance minister and charged with scrutinising the 
government’s budget proposal, tends to focus on redistributing budget allocations between 
ministries rather than changing the spending ceiling. This is a result of a regulation that 
prohibits parliament from increasing the government’s proposed budget. After detailed 
scrutiny by the Budget Scrutiny Select Committee, it is almost mandatory for parliament to 
pass the budget.
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Although ministries and departments are required to submit budget reports on the 
implementation of projects and programmes, the BOB and other audit bodies such as the 
National Audit Office, do not have the capacity to evaluate their budget performance, nor 
the accuracy of the information submitted to them. Ex-ante budget allocations and ex-post 
expenditure are not systematically reconciled. Moreover, the priority of government 
expenditure is mainly capital and investment budgets. Recurrent and administrative budgets 
are set separately on an annual basis.
As will be seen in the in both the downsizing and pension reform case studies, it was 
the growth of personnel costs as a percentage of total annual expenditure that particularly 
concerned reformers in the overhead agencies and led to the imposition of streamlining 
measures. Figure 2.6 shows the unbalanced and sometimes reversed trajectory of growth of 
public personnel expenditure and annual budgets. Figure 2.7 indicates that the Thai Gvil 
Service has spent almost forty per cent of total annual expenditure on personnel costs, 
leaving the ‘development budget’ only sixty per cent.
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Source: Compiled by the author: Total Annual Budgets from the Bureau of the Budget.
Total public personnel costs are from the Comptroller General’s Department.
Though the public personnel costs of the Thai Civil Service are reasonable by 
international standards, they have been perceived as very high by Thai reformers. Using a 
conventional measure of head counts and personnel costs over a thirty-year period from 
1970 to 1999, shown in Figure 2.5, Nunbeig (2002) has concluded that although the wage 
bill has rise over the past ten years, the Thai Civil Service, along with those of other ASEAN 
neighbours, has ‘performed reasonable well’ in the sense that it can keep its personnel 
expenditure relatively low compared with the average of OECD countries.
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Figure 2.8: Government Wage Bill as Percentage o f GDP  
The ASEAN and Selected Countries, 1970-1999
Source: Nunberg (2002), Civil Service Quality after the Crisis, Asian Journal of 
Political Science, Volume 10 Number 2, (December 2002)
One category of personnel expenditure that concerned governments, particularly in the 
period 1980-93, is non-salary costs including civil service penion costs and civil servants 
allowances, both of which, shown in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, could be substantial. Pension costs 
more than doubled between 1988 and 1993. In addition, both civil servants and retirees were 
entitled to a wide range of special allowances, the cost of which also rose during this period.
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Table 2.7 Pensions and Allowances for Retired Civil Servants, 1988-93
Types of Benefits 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Pensions
( lump sum and monthly annuity^  
Rate of increase 
Other allowances
Rate of increase
6,377
627
7,263
13
323
20
8,652
19
401
24
10,071
16
508
26
11,938
18
628
23
14,786
24
833
33
Source: The Comptroller General’s Office, Ministry of Finance. Unit: Million Baht.
Table 2.8 Allowances for Civil Servants and Retirees
G vil Servants Pensioners (Retired G vil Servants)
Gvil Servants’ Allowance
1. Extra pay at Police Academy
2 Extra pay for vocational education teachers
3. Extra pay for government officials stationed aboard
4. Extra pay for Malaysian Language speakers
5. Extra pay for hazardous positions
6. Extra pay for hazardous work
7. Extra pay for hardship
8. Extra pay for living expenses in the South
Southern Thailand Working Expenses 
lRent
2. Representation for governors
3. Repair of official vehicles
4. Telephone service
5. Utilities for official residences
6. Subsistence allowance
7. Hotel expenses for travel within country
8. Gothing expenses for travelling abroad
9. Domestic help
10 Representation abroad 
11. Committee meeting
12 Reward expenses for examination committee
13. Reward expenses for officials
14. Other reward expenses
15. Special lecture expenses
16. Bribe expenses
17. Bounties
18. Food expenses for overtime
1 Extra pay for military and police operating in a combat 
zone
2Injury benefit for military and police
3. Consolation payment for civil servants and employees
4. Extra payment for death during employment
5. Regular pension
6. Special pension
7. Lump-sum pension
8. Survivors’ benefit
9. Extra payment in case of pensioner’s death
10. Education benefit for the children of pensioners
11. Medical care benefit for pensioners
Pensioners’ Allowances
1. Children’s Education
2. Fund for children
3. Fund for Medical Benefit
Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission
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2.3.3 Managing Strategic Plans and Direction
Strategic development planning in Thai Gvil Service management, particularly the allocation 
of resources, is framed by the middle-term national strategic development plan developed by 
the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) one of whose major 
remits is to prioritise government projects and programmes. The NESDB ensures that the 
budgetary requests of line ministries and departments are consistent with the objectives of 
the five year plan, which it prepares in consultation with the prime minister and a cabinet 
committee.
The NESDB was set up as a permanent planning agency to carry out economic 
studies and draw up national development plans in 1959 when the government became 
increasingly active in the economy. The establishment of the NESDB had economic and 
political implications. Economically, the underlying philosophy behind its national planning 
is market orientated and intended to promote the smooth operation of markets with 
minimum government intervention or control. Politically, the NESDB has helped to 
institutionalise the prime minister’s authority and control over the Gvil Service by providing 
government strategic priorities. The institutional location of the NESDB in the Prime 
Minister’s Office allows its ‘technocrats’ not only to exert their ideas on government policy, 
but also gain places on various national policy committees.
So far the NESDB has drawn up eight plans, each of which has its own focus and 
development strategies which have evolved to meet the changing needs of the economy. 
Table 2.9 summarises the NESDB plans implemented over the period 1980-99. Although 
the influence of the NESDB has fluctuated across regimes, it has created an institutional 
context that can both constrain and facilitate the management of the Gvil Service. 
Specifically its plans have become a policy frame of reference that every government agency 
has to observe, particularly when they want to acquire more resources for new projects and 
programmes. In this sense the NESDB has become a civil service human resource policy 
making institution.
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Table 2.9: National Economic and Social Development Plans 1976-2000
Plans /Years Focuses and Strategies Governments
The Fourth Plan 
1976-1980
Major restructuring of the economy to enable it to 
recover from the effects of the world economic 
recession.
Greater social awareness and economic 
readjustment.
Thanin
Kriangsak
Prem
The Fifth Plan 
1981-1985
Emphasis on the quality of growth rather the rate 
of growth and improvement of the quality of rural 
life.
Reforming the public development administration 
system to facilitate taprieccocrnic devdopmerc.
Prem
The Sixth Plan 
1986-1990
Addressing the economic problems the country 
faced in the mid 1980s.
Improving the administrative structure of the 
government to increase the role of the private 
sector.
Reducing the savings-investment gap.
Prem
Chatchai
The Seventh Plan 
1991-1995
Developing financial system and markets aiming to 
be a regional centre.
Increasing domestic savings.
Increasing private sector roles in delivering public 
services.
Law reform and improving public personnel 
management.
Chatchai 
Anand 
Chaun I
The Eighth Plan 
1996-2000
Emphasis on developing human resources and 
protecting the natural environment.
People centred development focusing on good 
governance, greater participation in policy 
formulation, bureaucratic responsibility.
Banham 
Chavalit 
Chaun II
Sources: Summarised from the NESDB Plans by the author.
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2.3.4 Managing Politician-Bureaucrat Relations
In addition to resource management, managing relations between government politicians 
and bureaucrats within the context of coalition governments need to be set out to better 
understand public management policy change in Thailand. The relationship between 
government politicians and civil servants in Thailand is shaped by formal and informal 
institutions. In principle, government politicians make policies which are informed by senior 
civil servants subject to political requests. Professional and technocratic bureaucrats in 
ministries, departments and the central co-ordinating agencies are supposed to provide 
ministers with informed sources of advice and best policy recommendations based on their 
expertise. In return, ministers reward, appoint, promote and transfer civil servants within the 
public personnel legal framework. Most Gvil Service Acts prevent political interference in 
civil service day-to-day management by only allowing ministers to appoint, promote and 
transfer the highest ranking civil servants, secretary generals of ministries.
However, the nature of coalition government and the pattern of allocating ministerial 
portfolios mentioned earlier affect the way the civil service operates. The web of control 
from multiple parties in one ministry makes it difficult for a ministry to have a coherent 
management style. Bureaucrats from different departments within a ministry which is 
controlled by politicians from different parties have difficulty keeping their ‘neutral 
competence* practice across the ministry. In this sense, bureaucrats in line ministries are 
normally ‘politicised’ and have to adjust themselves to different political masters who tend to 
have short periods in office due to the instability of coalition governments and the threat of 
a cabinet reshuffle. As a result, the government politicians tend to form their cliques with 
senior bureaucrats which further exacerbate an already fragmented bureaucracy. This leads to 
factionalism in the Gvil Service as Borwomwattana (2001) and Wilson, (1962) have 
observed.
The nature of coalition cabinet in general and multi-party political control of 
ministries in particular poses a threat to reform capacity in the sense that comprehensive 
reforms are difficult to initiate and implement. It is difficult for a ministry to initiate or carry 
out comprehensive reform programmes introduced by central coordinating agencies since 
any reform needs to be negotiated by different politicians and bureaucrats in different remits 
in the ministry. As a result, most successful policies are those that involve particular sectors.
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So far the ‘firmly established institutional context’ for civil service human resource 
management policy decision-making has been established. The three most important 
managerial elements, personnel, money and strategic direction, are managed by four 
overhead central co-ordination agencies, the OCSC, the BOB, the CGD and the NESDB, 
and they have become major actors in making and implementing Civil Service human 
resource management policy.
2.4 The Dynamics of Political and Economic Development, 1980-1999
This section outlines the ‘dynamic contexts’ of political and economic development within 
with those institutions operated during 1980 and 1999. As Thelen and Steinmo (1992) argue, 
the impact of institutions on political outcomes can change overtime in subtle ways in 
response to shifts in the broader socioeconomic or political context.
Between 1980 and 1999 Thailand experienced three types of political regime, quasi­
democracy, military authoritarianism and democracy. For much of the post war period 
Thailand was governed by a succession of military regimes. From the 1970s to the 1990s it 
went through a series of turbulent and sometimes violent cycles of authoritarian and 
democratic government that ultimately led to what seems to be the secure establishment of 
democracy. The 1973 student uprising led to the establishment of democratic government. 
Three years of unstable democratic government provoked the return of the military in 
October 1976. They created a quasi-democratic regime in 1978 that lasted until 1988. It was 
followed by three years of democracy from 1998 to 1991. A military coup in 1991 led to a 
brief period of authoritarian rule after which a fully democratic regime was established. 
Though there has been a succession of short-lived coalitions, democratic government has 
been sustained since 1992 and there have been no further military interventions. Between 
1979 and 1999 Thailand’s economy went from crisis to boom, and from boom to bust. 
Table 2.10 and 2.11 show the country's economic fundamentals in this period. The following 
sections provide a snapshot review of the politico-economic development in the last two 
decades of twentieth century.
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Table 2.10: Thailand, Selected Economic Fundamentals 1980-1990
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Populations
(Millions)
46.11 46.96 47.87 48.84 49.51 50.58 51.79 52.97 53.87 54.96 55.89
GDP Growth 
(%>
4.8 5.9 5.4 5.6 5.8 4.6 5.5 9.5 13.3 12.2 112
Consumer Price 
Index
42.6 48.0 50.5 52.4 52.8 54.1 55.1 56.5 58.7 61.8 65.5
Export 
(% Change)
21.31 7.8 -1.4 -7.4 15.9 -2.7 23.9 31.8 37.1 25.2 15.1
Import 
(% Change)
24.0 6.5 -152 21.4 0.0 -8.8 1.1 41.5 48.9 27.3 29.8
Trade Balance 
Gnent Axount
-2.8 -3.0 -1.6 -3.9 -2.9 -2.2 -0.5 -1.6 -3.9 -5.3 -9.8
Balance 
G n eit Accourt
-2.1 -2.6 -1.0 -2.9 -2.1 -1.5 0.3 -0.3 -1.5 -2.4 -7.1
Balance (% of 
GCF)
Balance of
-6.4 -7.4 -2.8 -73 -5.0 -3.9 0.7 -0.6 -2.4 -3.3 -8.3
Payments 
Grass Domestic
0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.9 2.5 4.0 3.8
Imestmert (GO) 
Gross Domestic
193.1 225.6 2232 276.1 291.2 298.4 293.3 3623 508.4 651.2 903.0
Savings (GDS) 
GDI-GDS Gaps
145.8 159.7 188.8 202.8 222.5 244.5 276.9 357.5 499.5 633.0 721.1
(Billion Baht) 
International 
Reserves
662.5 760.4 841.6 921.0 988.1 10565 1D3.4 12999 15995 18570 21833
(Billion $US) 
Total Debts
3.1 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.8 52 7.1 10.5 14.3
(Billion $US) 
Exchange Rates
8.7 11.1 122 14.0 15.7 17.5 18.3 20.0 21.1 22.9 29.3
(Baht: $US) 20.5 21.8 23.8 23.0 23.6 272 26.3 25.7 25.3 25.7 25.6
Source: Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board.
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Table 2.11: Thailand, Selected Economic Fundamentals 1991-1999
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Populations 57.03 57.62 58.44 59.24 5928 59.90 60.50 61.20 61.80
(Millions) 
GDP Growth 8.6 8.1 8.3 9.0 92 5.9 -1.4 -10.5 4.4
(%)
Consumer Price Index 692 72.1 74.5 78.2 82.8 87.6 92.5 100 100.3
Export 
(% Change) 23.6 13.8 13.4 22.1 24.8 -1.9 3.8 -6.8 7.4
Import 
(% Change) 15.6 6.1 12.3 18.4 31.9 0.6 -13.4 -33.8 16.9
Trade Balance -9.5 -7.9 -8.5 -8.7 -14.7 -16.1 -4.6 122 9.3
CunertAxourtB alanc e -7.4 -6.1 -6.1 -7.8 -12.2 -14.3 -3.1 14.3 12.5
CuctertAxourtBalance
(%cfGDP) -7.5 -5.5 -4.9 -5.4 -7.9 -7.9 -2.0 12.7 102
Balance of Payments 42 3.0 3.9 4.2 72 2.2 -10.6 1.7 4.6
Gross Domestic Investment 
(GO) 1073.9 1131.3 12662 1462.1 1742.8 m 9.o n/a n/a n/a
Gross Domestic Savings 
(GDS) 869.1 956.2 1081.5 1262.7 1462.1 1524.5 n/a n/a n/a
GDI-GDS Gaps (Billion 
Baht) 2506.6 2830.9 3170.3 3630.8 4188.9 45983 n/a n/a n/a
International Reserves 
(Billion $US) 18.4 21.2 25.4 30.3 37.0 38.7 27.0 29.5 34.8
Total Debts 
(Billion $US) 37.9 43.6 52.1 64.9 100.8 108.7 1093 105.1 95.1
Exchange Rates 
(Baht: $US) 25.5 25.4 25.3 252 24.9 25.3 31.4 41.4 37.8
Source: Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board.
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2.4.1 Semi-Democracy, Structural Adjustment and Recoveiy: Prem, 1980-88
The ‘quasi-democratic regime’ established by the 1978 constitution gave the appearance of 
democracy by establishing an elected lower chamber in parliament but ensured that it had 
limited powers. The military and senior bureaucracy retained power through the appointed 
upper chamber, the Senate, which controlled the appointment of the prime minister. The 
1978 constitution did not immediately provide stable government. After the 1979 election 
General Kraingsak was selected by the Senate to form a government. It proved unstable 
because it was dominated by Kraingsak’s confidants at the expense of elected 
representatives. When the government announced oil price increase in February 1980 it 
provoked widespread protest and a vote of no confidence in parliament. Kraingsak resigned 
and in March 1980 General Prem Tinsulanond was appointed prime minister.
General Prem, a respected army general who had served as defence minister in 
Kriangsak’s government, was not an elected MP but had the confidence of both the military 
and the main political parties. His regime was subsequently dubbed ‘Premocracy\ 
Throughout his period of office, he successfully managed to share power between the 
coalition parties, the military and the civil service. While the military and civilian bureaucracy 
controlled important policies through the powerful appointed Senate, Prem maintained his 
influence over the appointment of cabinet ministers particularly defence, finance and 
interior. These positions were at the heart of the Thai Gvil Service and strategically 
important to the stability of the government and the security of the country. Other 
portfolios were shared among MPs from coalition parties. Prem survived several political 
crises including attempted coups, cabinet reshuffles and elections.
Prem came to power facing a severe economic crisis caused by world wide recession 
and high oil prices. He carried out a series of far reaching reforms that laid the foundations 
for Thailand’s economic boom in the late 1980s. Economic policy was formulated by able 
technocrats who controlled the key economic bodies. Prem’s policies aimed to move the 
economy away from protectionism to an export-driven economy. A combination of 
exchange rate policy, significant devaluation of the baht which led to an increase in exports, 
tax and tariff reform, export promotion, and sectoral reform brought economic recovery. 
Manufacturing exports rose as did inward foreign investment. By 1988 Thailand’s economic 
growth was ahead of other Southeast Asian countries with an annual growth rate of nearly 
seven per cent.
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Prem’s ability to balance the interests of the military, the bureaucracy and the 
political parties enabled him to retain power for eight years, longer than most post war 
governments. This was period of stability, continuity, strong government and economic 
recovery. In 1988 Prem resigned rather than face a damaging personal scandal and vote of 
no confidence, though after the general election he was again offered the premiership which 
he declined.
2.4.2 Democracy and Economic Boom: Ghatchai, 1988-91
At his resignation Prem called for his successor to be chosen from elected representatives. 
His successor, Major General Chatchai Choonhawan, leader of the Chart Thai Party, led a 
fully democratic government, having won the 1988 election, the first prime minister to do so 
since 1976. Chatchai’s government, however, was relatively short-lived, lasting three years, 
and did not mark a long-term return to democracy. It was overthrown by a military coup in 
1991 partly precipitated by unacceptable levels of government corruption. Chatchai’s 
administration saw the most rapid economic growth in Thai history, though the boom was 
accompanied by widespread corruption.
Chatchai was the beneficiary of Prem’s economic reforms of the early 1980s. There 
was double digit economic growth for three successive years from 1988 to 1990. Exports, 
mainly manufacturing and the agribusiness sector rose by over twenty per cent a year, except 
in 1990. The boom was largely the result exchange rate policy, pegging the baht to a falling 
dollar, which resulted in a thirty per cent depreciation between 1986 and 1990, and strong 
inward investment. There was significant relocation of light manufacturing to Thailand from 
elsewhere in East Asia.
2.4.3 Military Authoritarianism, 1991-2
The February 1991 military coup was provoked by widespread protest at the scale of 
corruption in Chatchai’s government and his attempt to downgrade the political role of the 
military. The coup leaders, Generals Suchinda Kraprayoon and Sunthom Kongsompong, 
established the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKQ to run the country, installed an 
interim government led by Anand Panyarachun, and promised elections within six months. 
Anand, a former diplomat and businessman, was a widely respected figure. His government, 
like Prem’s, was made up of the military, technocrats and businessmen. It set about wide
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ranging economic reform and subsequently gained a reputation as an effective reforming 
government. Politically, however, it was less successful. The new 1991 constitution caused 
widespread opposition and the March 1992 elections, won by the pro-military ‘Devils’ 
coalition with the unelected Suchinda as its leader, led to a crisis in May. The brutal 
suppression of mass demonstrations by the army provoked a rare intervention by the king. 
This marked the failure of military rule. Anand was re-appointed in his second interim role, 
the army was quickly restructured and new elections were called. A new democratic 
government led by Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democrat Party, took office in September 
1992 after winning the election. So far the 1991-2 failure has proved to be the last direct 
military intervention in Thai politics.
High economic growth continued during the early 1990s though not at the 
exceptional rate of the late 1980s; there was a growth rate of eight per cent in 1991 and 1992. 
Anand, advised by technocrats, liberalised the economy beginning a three-year plan of 
liberalisation which continued under the Chuan government of 1992-5. Relaxing banking 
regulations and restructuring tariffs attracted increasing amounts of overseas investment.
2.4.4 Democratic Institutionalisation and Economic Bust: 1992 Onwards 
A longer period of democratic government has followed since the 1991-2 military regime, 
even though governments have tended to be short-lived unstable coalitions. The September 
1992 election was won by the Democrat Party led by Chuan, a former minister and 
committed democrat. His coalition government consisted of the ‘Angel’ anti-military parties. 
Though the Democrats promised social justice in their election manifesto the government 
achieved few reforms. Its greatest achievement was to provide a period of political stability 
after the crisis years of 1991-2 in which democracy was strengthened and economic growth 
promoted. Chuan’s government lasted for nearly three years, from September 1992 to July 
1995, a relatively long period for Thai governments of the 1990s. It was brought down by 
instability within the coalition, when the Palang Dharma Party withdrew accusing the 
government of corruption.
The 1995 election was won by the Chart Thai Party led by Banham Silpa-archa, 
known as ‘the walking ATM*. His coalition government lasted barely a year before it was 
forced out of office by a rising tide of corruption and political intrigue within the coalition. 
The 1996 election, called by Banham as a political manoeuvre against his coalition partners,
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was particularly corrupt with widespread vote buying in rural constituencies. It was won by 
his former coalition partner Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, leader of the New Aspiration Party. 
Chavalit’s government was a brief as Banham’s. He resigned in November 1997 
overwhelmed by the Asian economic crisis. While in office Chavalit promised political 
reform in response to the increasing public revulsion against the scale of corruption and 
frustration with unstable coalition government. Despite his half-hearted commitment there 
was radical political reform and a new constitution was drawn up in 1997. Selected features 
of the new Constitution are summarised in Table 2.12 below.
Table 2.12: Selected Features of the 1991 and 1997 Constitutions
1991 Constitution 1997 Constitution
• 393 MPs from multimember 
constituencies.
• 270 senators appointed by the king 
on the prime minister’s 
recommendation.
• Cabinet ministers can serve as MPs.
• No minimum education requirement 
for MPs.
• Elections controlled by the 
government through the Ministry of 
Interior.
• Votes counted at polling stations.
• Courts can order closure of media
• 400 MPs from single member 
constituencies plus another 100 MPs 
from party list.
• 200 senators directly elected.
• Cabinet ministers must relinquish 
their seats in parliament.
• MPs must have a university degree.
• Elections controlled by independent 
Election Commission.
• Vote counted centrally at Election 
Commission Office
• Press freedom is guaranteed.
Source: Summarised from the 1991 and 1997 Constitutions by the author.
The new constitution was intended to reduce corruption and increase the stability of 
coalition governments. Democracy was strengthened by making the senate an elected instead 
of an appointed body, allowing greater participation in local government, guaranteeing 
individual rights and political freedom and increasing government accountability.
In November 1997 Chavalit was replaced as prime minister by Chuan who formed a 
new coalition without having to call new elections. The second Chuan administration’s 
priority was to tackle the economic crisis. The International Monetary Fund was called in
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and strong but often unpopular measures were introduced. By 1999 there were signs of 
economic recovery. Chuan remained in office until 2000 when he was constitutionally bound 
to call new elections. The January 2001 elections were won by Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai 
Rak Thai Party, the first to be held using the new 1997 constitution.
Economically, strong growth continued during the mid 1990s. Growth rates 
remained high at eight per cent a year from 1992 to 1995. Export growth also continued, 
rising above twenty per cent in 1994 and 1995. High levels of inward investment, facilitated 
by the ongoing programme of financial liberalisation begun by the Anand government, 
contributed significantly to this prosperity. In 1996 the first signs of an impending crisis, a 
loss of competitiveness in international markets and a banking collapse, became evident. The 
country's economic problems were worsened by policy and political failures by the Banham 
and Chavalit governments. Exchange rate policy, the refusal to devalue or float the baht, 
undermined confidence in the economy, and deterred overseas inward investment. Political 
instability in the Banham and Chavalit coalitions prevented a decisive response to worsening 
economic conditions. Recognising this Chavalit brought in former prime minister Chatchai, 
as minister of Commerce and Amnauy as finance minister to build public confidence and 
win much needed credibility on the economic front. Amnuay accepted only on condition 
that he was given carte blanche to implement his own economic policies and the right to 
appoint his own team. His resignation in June 1997 was followed in July by the unleashing of 
the full force of the economic crisis when more than fifty financial institutions in difficulties 
were suspended and the baht was allowed to float. The government was forced to ask for 
assistance from the IMF.
In August 1997 the IMF put together a rescue package worth US$ 17 billion that 
required deep cuts in government spending, tight control of inflation and the opening up of 
financial institutions to foreign ownership. Chuan’s second administration had the political 
determination carry out the IMF package despite the high political cost. Interest rates were 
kept cripplingly high at twenty per cent to protect the baht. Unemployment doubled to over 
two million as struggling businesses shed workers and inflation reached ten per cent, nearly 
double the average before the crisis. By mid 1998 the economy had reached its nadir. Six 
months later there were signs of recovery as the baht stabilised and inflation and interest 
rates started to fall. In October 1999 Chuan was able to forgo US$ 4 billion of the IMF 
rescue package.
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Table 2.13: The Political and Economic Development Contexts
Prime Ministers Regime
Types
Coalition- 
led Party
Economic
Conditions
Episodes of Public 
Personnel Policy Reform
General Prem
Tmsulanond
(Marl980-Apr.l988)
Semi-
Democracy
From weak 
growth and 
structural 
adjustment to 
recovery
The Emergence of the 
Downsizing Issue. (Chapter3)
Maj. General
CharirajChocnhawan
(Apcl988-Fdxl991)
Democracy Chart Thai FimuecovaytD 
double digjt 
gowth
Paying Lip Service to Downsbirg 
(Chapter 3)
Mr Anand
Punyarachun
(ph.l991-Septl992)
Military-
authoritaria
nism
Military and 
technocrats
Stable growth Rationalising the Gvil Service 
(Chapter 4)
The Emergence of Gvil 
Service Pension Reform 
(Chapter8)
MrChaun Leekpai 
(Sept 1992-July 1995)
Democracy Democrats Stable growth Curbing the size of the 
Gvil Service (Chapter 5). 
Gvil Service Pension Reform 
Stalemate (Grapter 9)
Mr Banham Silapa- 
Archa
(July1995- Nov1996)
Democracy Chart Thai Frcmgrowth 
to the brink 
of crisis
Playing with Numbers: 
Downsizing (Chapter 6) 
Breaking the Service Pension 
Reform Logjams (Chapter 10)
GeneralChavalit 
Yongchaiyudth 
(Nbvl996-Nov. 1997)
Democracy NewAspnaticn Qjtbreakcfthe 
Asian ecxxranic 
crisis
Playing with Numbers: 
Downsizing (Chapter 6) 
Breaking the Gvil Service 
Pension Reform Logjam 
(Chapter 10)
MrChaun Leekpai 
Nov 1997-2000
Democracy Democrats Economic Accelerating Downsizing: 
Turning a Crisis into an 
Opportunity (Chapter 7)
Source: Compiled by the author.
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2.5 Conclusion: Situating Episodes within the Contexts
This chapter provides details of the institutional foundations for public policy decision 
making in Thailand, as well as the dynamic of political and economic developments between 
1980 and 1999. Together they provide a basis for examining the influence of ‘institutions’ 
and their interactions with ‘processes’ in producing change and stability in Thai Gvil Service 
human resource management policy between 1980 and 1999. The episodes within the two 
reform experiences, downsizing the civil service and reforming civil service pensions are 
situated within the politico-economic contexts as show in Table 2.13.
Part II
Downsizing the Thai Gvil Service
c We haw had a National (hwritteeonPM ic Sector Reformfor over 20 years.
But there is a joke that the idea c f cutting red tape is not neu; zw zww cutting it sidewzys 3
RtHon A bhisit Vejjajiut, 
M vmstercfdoeO^cfdxPmmM mster 
14th Jan. 1999
Chapter 3 
Containing Civil Service Growth:
The Emergence o f ‘Downsizing’ Policy, 1980-1991
Overview
At the beginning of the 1980s Thai Gvil Service personnel numbered approximately one million. 
The administrative budget, which included personnel costs such as wages and salaries, reached 
more than fifty-seven per cent of the total national annual budget, leaving less than forty three 
per cent available for developmental purposes. In the 1980s the administration of General Prem 
Tinsulanond started to address the problem of civil service growth and employed measures to 
contain the size of the Gvil Service. These important measures included the imposition of a two 
per cent per annum growth limit, and the introduction of manpower planning practice. The 
former, which was known in the Thai Gvil Service as the ‘two per cent policy* was compulsory 
and applied to the whole Gvil Service. The latter was a combination of changes in civil service 
manpower planning practices including the introduction of a voluntary three-year manpower 
plan for ministries and departments. This was the first time that the issue of downsizing and 
wide ranging civil service reform reached the government agenda. The two per cent policy was 
the first attempt to control the size of the Gvil Service and reversed a thirty-year trend of 
unlimited Gvil Service expansion. Under Giatchai (1988-91) downsizing had a lower priority 
and only lip service was paid to it.
This chapter seeks to explain why the issue of downsizing1 emerged for the first time on 
the government agenda during Prem’s administration, how it evolved and why its status 
fluctuated during the period 1980-91. The chapter will also examine why civil service reform was 
defined as excessive growth in size on the specialised agendas of the central co-ordinating 
agencies. It will also consider why downsizing had a higher status during Prem’s government 
than Giatchai’s and why the issue survived despite a change in the institutional arrangements for 
decision making. This chapter is divided into two consecutive periods related to the governments 
in power. The first period covers the eight years of the premiership of General Prem Tinsulanod 
from 1980 to 1988 and the second period the democratically elected but briefer government of 
Major General Chatchai Choonhawan from 1988 to 1991.
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3.1 The Emergence of the Gvil Service Reform Issue
The issue of ‘Gvil Service reform’ gained the attention of both government politicians and 
bureaucratic reformers after General Prem Tinsulanond became prime minister in March 1980.2 
Like most Thai prime ministers before the 1990s, Prem’s initial interest in the civil service issue 
was an attempt to control and maintain his influence over the bureaucracy, particularly the three 
most important portfolios: Defence, Finance and Interior. But Prem also came to office with a 
reform agenda -  albeit a broad and vague one. In his inaugural address to the National 
Legislative Council, as parliament was then known, on 28 March 1980, Prem made an hour-long 
speech a small part of which set out his administrative policy and outlined remedies for current 
civil service problems. The problems he identified, bureaucratic inefficiency, overlapping 
jurisdictions and responsibilities and the duplication of functions, were frequently complained of 
by both the general public and public administration academics. Prem’s administrative policy 
aimed “to reform the Gvil Service and increase its efficiency, to delegate and decentralise 
administrative power to regional agencies, to reorganise its structure in order to solve the 
problem of the overlap and duplication of duties, and to promote the autonomy of local 
administration.**3
The prime minister’s administrative policy statement was not only motivated by the 
broad public perception of civil service inefficiency, but also the need to adjust the Gvil Service 
in order to cope with the global economic turbulence of the early 1980s. As an oil importer and 
with an economy closely tied to international markets, Thailand was seriously affected by the 
global economic downturn that began the year before Prem came to power. Between 1979 and 
1980, the Thai economy was hit by the second international oil price rise shock and the price of 
farm products slumped. The 1979 annual GNP growth rate fell significantly. The oil crisis had 
major adverse effects and resulted in a high current account deficit and low international 
reserves. When General Prem came to power in March 1980, the ratio of current account deficit 
to GNP had risen to an average of 7 per cent, from 4.2 between 1976 and 1978. The inflation 
rate rose from 6.7 per cent to more than 9 per cent.
Prem’s first month in office was spent restructuring the country’s economy as the major 
macro economic indicators deteriorated. In response to the economic pressures, Prem’s 
government sought outside advice from international bodies, namely the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which had been in close contact with the government since the late 1979 advising
1 See the definition o f downsizing in chapter one.
2 See a brief political development o f this period in chapter two.
3 Prem’s policy statement to parliament 28 March 1980.
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on policies to cope with the economic turbulence. The previous government had already decided 
to seek assistance from the World Bank (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1991).
In February and March 1980 a World Bank mission visited Thailand to evaluate the 
economic situation and discuss policy responses that would put the Thai economy back on track 
and offer long-term growth prospects. The Bank’s analysis, set out in its subsequent report to the 
government, indicated that the pressing problems of inflation, foreign borrowing and budget 
deficits were only partly due to external factors, the global economic turmoil. Internal problems, 
particularly the previous government’s policies to intervene and distort market forces, were also 
responsible. The World Bank’s recommendations included major reforms in the areas of 
resources allocation in the public sector, monetary policy, energy policy, industrial policy, and 
agricultural policy. These recommendations were accepted by Prem’s government as senior 
bureaucrats in the National Board of Economic and Social Development (NESDB) in whom 
Prem confided and on whose advice concerning economic and social policies he relied 
throughout his tenure, shared the same policy stance as the Bank. They agreed with the Bank’s 
policy advice to rely on exports as a way to reduce trade deficits, and advised that most of its 
recommendations should be implemented. As a result, between the late 1979 and the autumn of 
1980, Thailand implemented the Word Bank’s recommendations unilaterally.
However, the unconditional unilateral implementation of World Bank’s 
recommendations was not sufficient to take Thailand out of the economic hardship. Six months 
later, in the autumn of 1980, General Prem’s government decided to formulate a structural 
adjustment programme, and to initiate negotiations for a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) 
from the World Bank. During the formulation of the first Letter of Development Policy (LDP) 
for a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL), the economic policy making agencies particularly the 
NESDB, Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand took the view that the country’s primary 
aim was to solve the problem of 'rising ament account deficits'. They proposed in the LDP that the 
strategies earlier recommended by the World Bank’s mission geared towards export promotion 
would help the country reduce the current account deficit (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991; 
Muscat, 1994).
The process of formulating and negotiating the structural adjustment loan took almost a 
year and a half during which officials in the economic policy making agencies and the Bank’s 
officials worked closely together. They came up with reform strategies, some of which were such 
radical reform measures as restructuring personal and corporate income tax, the reform of 
general tariffs, the establishment of export processing zones, and the reform and restructuring of 
the Customs Department. In February 1982, the World Bank agreed with Thailand’s proposal
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for a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL-1) not only on the grounds of necessity, but also because 
of the country’s commitment to its conditions, which had already been unilaterally implemented 
since the onset of the crisis (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991). The determination of Prem’s 
government to solve economic problems, which was one of the key success factors for adjusting 
the economy structurally, also led to the approval of a second LDP for SAL (II), almost a year 
later, on 7 March 1983.
The issue of ‘civil service reform’ appeared as a minor condition for both SAL 
agreements but in different ways and with different degrees of emphasis. Gvil service reform 
was referred to in the loan conditions as ‘improving public sector management and institutional 
development*. In the SAL-I, the issue of Gvil Service reform was included by the NESDB as 
part of wider economic measures. The specific proposal was to restructure the government 
economic agencies including the Gistoms Department whose operation affected the flow and 
costs of imports and exports. In a more general but less detailed measure, the first SAL 
stipulated “the Prime Minister’s Office would initiate studies of the organisation, management 
and remuneration of the Gvil Service during the fiscal year 1982.**4
The issue of ‘civil service reform’ was emphasised more in the second SAL (1983) 
however. After the world economy worsened in the years 1982-1983, the proposed economic 
reform strategies were more austere and the public sector was required to adjust itself 
substantially as the government was forced to be more stringent in its fiscal policy. The issue of 
‘civil service reform’, which fell under the heading of ‘improving public sector management and 
institutional development’, focused more on effective administration and the efficient use of 
public finance resources.5 These included such ‘institutional development measures* as fiscal 
management reform by improving revenue collection and administration, increasing capacity for 
budget projection, and reducing the ceiling of annual public borrowing from overseas by 
approximately fourteen per cent from US$ 2400 millions to US$ 2060 millions. The longer-term 
measures included the privatisation of public enterprises and foreign debts (Mosley, Harrigan 
and Toye, 1991). To increase institutional capacity more widely than in fiscal management, the 
SAL-II also emphasised ‘the need to study the organisation, remuneration and personnel 
administration of the Gvil Service, and identify weaknesses in the government machinery in 
departmental reorganisation procedures and process’.6
By the end of the fiscal year 1983, the issue of civil service reform, also described as 
‘improving public sector management and institutional development’, became part of the
4 LDP 4 February 1982.
s LDP, 7 March 1983
6 LDP 7 March 1983.
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government economic structural adjustment programme and a minor condition for both SAL-1 
and SA U I. Incorporated within the loan conditions were no more than two sentences related 
to the broad issue of public sector management. Despite the low priority of the issue, these 
minor conditions became the genesis of civil service reform in Thailand, and set course for the 
reform in subsequent decades.
3.2 Formulating the Civil Service Reform Issue
The issue of civil service reform, despite its low priority as a minor and indirect condition for the 
structural adjustment loans, received government attention outside but closely related to the 
realm of the Structural Adjustment Programme. As Prem’s administrative policy statement to 
parliament in late March 1980 was announced against a background of austerity measures, it was 
mainly concerned with how government ministries and departments would be efficiently 
administered.
To deliver his promise on administrative improvement, on 21 May 1980, Prem set up the 
Gvil Service and State Administration Reform Committee (CSARQ. The CSARC was an ad hoc 
high profile committee under the chairmanship of the deputy prime minister.7 As Prem 
recognised and relied very much on the advice of leading civil servants, the so called 
‘technocrats’ in the central government co-ordinating agencies,8 and university experts, its 
members were mainly drawn from these two communities. University scholars in the areas of 
administrative law, political science and public administration and senior officials represented 
central coordinating agencies with civil service management related responsibilities, including the 
OCSQ the Comptroller General’s Department (CGD), the NESDB, and the BOB were 
appointed.
The CSARC was primarily tasked with reforming the Gvil Service. Unlike the Prime 
Minister’s Consultative Committee on Public Administration and Administrative Orders
7 During his eight years in power, Prem appointed three different deputy prime ministers as chairmen 
following cabinet reshuffles. These included the leader of a main coalition party, and two of Prem’s 
advisers. However, there is no evidence that changes in chairmanship affected the work of the CSARC
8 Most of these influential agencies were within the jurisdiction of the Office of the Prime Minister with 
the exception of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of Thailand (BOT). They gave advice on 
relevant matters and were important in General Prem’s decision making. As well as the secretary of the 
office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) who also served as the 
chairman of the Prime Minister’s Economic Consultative Committee, the secretary of the Office of the 
Gvil Service Commission (OCSQ and the director of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) also played 
important parts in the prime minister’s policy on matters related to civil service human resources and 
budgets. See chapter two for more details.
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appointed by previous prime ministers to ‘screen administrative issues’ prior to decision making,9 
the CSARC was required to perform a new function. It was to “reform the Gvil Service” by 
“examining Gvil Service problems, suggesting solutions, and overseeing the reform process.”10 
The CSARC was not merely a consultative committee; it was equipped with “the discretion to 
summon civil servants or individuals, and organisations for information.”11 This made the 
CSARC the first civil service reform committee in modem Thai administrative history.
3.2.1 Defining the Bureaucratic Inefficiency Issue
The broad issue of ‘civil service reform* used in the prime minister’s address to parliament in 
March 1980 was redefined by members of the CSARC at their first meeting on 5 June. Since it 
was the first time that such a committee was required to make civil service reform proposals, the 
CSARCs members spent most of the session debating the problems of the Gvil Service.12 
"Without any information about civil service reform before the session, they broadly agreed that 
Prem’s speech to parliament should be the basis for civil service reform.
Reformulating civil service reform as ‘improving Gvil Service efficiency* was put forward 
at the CSARC meeting by representatives from central co-ordinating agencies, namely the OCSC 
and the BOB. Supported by research and statistics, the OCSC showed a pattern of sustained 
expansion, especially from the late 1950s when the Gvil Service was used as a machine for social 
and economic development.13 In pointed out that in the early phases of implementing NESDB 
plans, government agencies had proliferated and the number of civil service personnel surged. 
Between 1969 to 1979, the number of departments increased from 113 to 131, and the number 
of divisions rocketed from 827 to 1264. In this same period, the number of government officials 
increased from 434,000 to 788,000, an expansion rate of seven per cent per annum, while 
population growth was only 2.2 per cent per year. In addition the number of permanent 
employees increased from 93,000 to 190,000 and that of temporary employees rose from 80,000 
to 315,000.
9 It had been a tradition of Thai government since the early 1960s, that prime ministers, appointed a high 
profile consultative committee to advice on civil service issues and general administration. These were 
usually called the ‘Prims Minister's Gjnsultatke Committee on PuUic Adrmustradon ard Administrative Orders’. 
The chairman was usually a deputy prime minister, or in some cases the prime minister’s most trusted 
men. Experts in law, public administration, and political science were usually appointed as committee 
members. Its functions were to screen critical issues related to civil service administration and suggest 
courses of action. This kind of committee was usually ad hoc and short-lived, disbanding when the prime 
minister left office.
10 Prime Ministerial Order 80,21 May 1980.
11 Ibid.
12 Minute o f Meeting, the CSARC, 5 June 1980.
13 See chapter 2 for the discussion of this.
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The increase in the number of government personnel had a major impact on the 
government budget. The BOB pointed out to the CSARCs members that personnel costs were 
too high as wages and salaries, which made up 16 per cent (4,156 million Baht) of the total 
Government budget (22,000 million Baht) in 1973, increased to 20 percent in 1980. If other 
welfare payments and allowances were included, it made up to 40 per cent of the total annual 
budget. According to the BOB, this reduced the investment budget, which was considered vital 
for development programmes.
At the CSARC meeting on 5 June 1980, the issue of civil service efficiency was narrowly 
defined as the excessive growth of civil service employment and the proliferation of government 
administrative units. Members of the CSARC, particularly university academics who formed the 
majority of the committee, accepted the evidence provided by the OCSC and the BOB, and 
concluded that the number of civil servants was growing faster than the population as a whole 
and that public personnel costs amounted to nearly forty per cent of the total government 
budget. The figures provided by the OCSC and the BOB reflected the widely held opinions of 
Thai society and public administration academics who had long highlighted the problem of 
bureaucratic expansion in the Thai Civil Service.14 Members of the CSRAC concluded that the 
Gvil Service had expanded uncontrollably and this ‘obesity of the Gvil Service, was to blame for 
civil service inefficiency.15 It was at this meeting that the issue of the size of the Gvil Service was 
formally addressed for the first time and became a crucial issue for civil service reform attempts 
in subsequent periods.
By the end of 1980, the issue of civil service reform was included in the policy agenda of 
Prem government as a result of two factors. The first was Prem’s general concerns over the 
administrative problems, and the second was the economic crisis facing his government. The 
conditions set by the World Bank for assistance in solving the economic crisis required civil 
service reform although it appeared only as a small element in the World Bank’s Structural 
Adjustment Programme. Budgetary constraints on government spending, of which civil service 
personnel costs made up about twenty per cent, reinforced growing concern about the growth of 
the Gvil Service. By 1980 there was a well established trend of unchecked Gvil Service growth 
because the mechanisms for controlling civil service size were fragmented, uncoordinated and 
lacked capacity.
14 Academic interest in Civil Service expansion can be found in Chadarasom (1980). See chapter two for Civil 
Service growth statistics.
15 Ibid.
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3.3 Formulating a G vil Service Reform Proposal: Containing Gvil Service 
Growth
Less than three weeks after the CSARC had agreed on the problem of civil service efficiency, the 
central co-ordinating agencies with personnel and financial related responsibilities, led by the 
OCSQ recommended to the CSARCs chairman that a !'Proposal for Rfom ing the Cvul Serrioe 
Orgtrusation and Staffing should be formulated to restructure the Gvil Service organisation and 
improve its human resource management. On 23 June 1980, only a month after the CSARC had 
been established, its chairman, Praman, accepted their recommendation and appointed two sub­
committees to develop reform proposals to improve civil service efficiency in line with the 
problems the CSARC had identified.
The two subcommittees were the Sub-Committee on Structure and Organisation 
Reform and the Sub-Committee on Gvil Service Personnel Administration Reform. The first, 
chaired by a leading public administration academic, Professor Amom Raksasat, was to look into 
ways of increasing civil service efficiency and create savings. Its assigned task was to review the 
system of public administration and civil service structure, as well as to suggest ways to reform, 
combine, create, abolish, diversify, regroup and privatise civil service functions. The second, 
chaired by a senior bureaucrat in the Prime Minister’s Office, Choochart Pramuanpol, was tasked 
with reviewing the civil service human resource management system. This sub-committee was 
required to recommend improvements in the public personnel system that would enable civil 
servants to serve the public better. Specifically it was to look at such personnel issues as career 
management, fringe benefits, merit protection, competency and quality development, as well as 
ethical issues. Members of the Sub-G)mmittee on Structure and Organisation Reform were 
exclusively academics and civil servants, while those of the Sub-Committee on Gvil Service 
Personnel Administration Reform were mainly representatives from central personnel agencies.
In formulating 1Proposal for Rfom ing the Civl Serdce Orgirnsatim and Staffing, the CSARC 
and its two sub-committees relied heavily on the central co-ordinating agencies, particularly the 
OCSC and the BOB, especially because the CSARC was ad hoc in nature, it did not have its own 
office, staff or budget. The administration and policy making of the two sub-committees, which 
carried out the actual operation of the CSARQ was substantially influenced by these two 
agencies. A senior BOB official was appointed to serve as secretary of the Sub-Committee on 
Structure and Organisation Reform and a senior OCSC official was appointed servicing secretary 
to the Sub-Committee on Gvil Service Personnel Administration Reform.
The two subcommittees of the CSARC spent six months between June and December 
1980 jointly developing a proposal. During this period of study, research and debate, the OCSC
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and the BOB provided members of the subcommittees, which they served with information 
related to the proliferation of government administrative units and rising wages and salaries. 
These two agencies not only provided relevant information to but also drafted reform proposals 
for the CSARC In effect, the agendas of the CSARC subcommittees were effectively controlled 
by the two central co-ordinating agencies, the BOB and the OCSC The next sections examine 
how alternatives for controlling the Civil Service growth were specified by the CSARC
3.3.1 Specifying Alternatives for Controlling Civil Service Growth
In specifying solutions for controlling what they termed ‘obesity*, unchecked growth in size and 
the consequent problems, the OCSQ the BOB, and the NESDB one of whose responsibilities 
was to approve requests for increasing personnel and establishing new administrative units, 
proposed to their sub-committees that ‘manpower management process* needed to be improved. 
The OCSC and the BOB raised the issue that excessive increases in Civil Service personnel, the 
surge in personnel costs and proliferation of government administrative units were the result of 
weak and ineffective manpower management processes.16
The Sub-Committee on Structure and Organisation Reform attacked the proliferation of 
“administrative divisions**, which its research showed had grown from 827 divisions in 1969 to 
1264 in 1979, an increase of more than fifty per cent. Regarded by the subcommittee as a serious 
problem, a large proportion of these newly established divisions functioned as “auxiliary or staff 
divisions’*, rather than “line divisions** responsible for service delivery. This contributed to the 
imbalance between the number of line and staff functions in the Civil Service. From 1957 to 
1979, as the subcommittee’s study showed, auxiliary and staff divisions grew faster than the line 
divisions because most units wanted, for example, their own research and development and 
inspections units. This resulted in the duplication of responsibility within the same department 
or ministry. Accordingly the numbers of division directors and middle managers increased 
substantially and unnecessarily. Expansion by setting up new divisions was a common practice 
for government ministries and departments when they needed to increase their personnel or 
budgets since the process was the least complicated. It did not involve the deliberation of 
parliament, only cabinet approval was required, which was invariably given. The cabinet tended 
to act as a rubber stamp accepting ministerial requests for new divisions.
In early December 1980, Sub-Committee on Structure and Organisation Reform and 
Sub-Committee on Civil Service Personnel Administration Reform completed their studies and 
submitted to the CSARC their Proposal for Rfom ing tbe Cvril Senioe Orgmisation and Staffing. The
16 See Appendix IV for the details o f manpower management processes.
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aim of this proposal was to contain the size of the Gvil Service as a remedy for the ‘obesity 
problem* that had been identified by the CSARC It also called for a smaller, but more efficient 
Gvil Service. In this respect, downsizing the Gvil Service naturally became a reform solution for 
members of the two subcommittees. Although the term downsizing was problematic because it 
encompassed many sub-categories ranging from laying-off personnel to privatisation, it allowed 
the OCSC and the BOB to formulate a ‘working definition’ in accordance with their own 
respective responsibilities and jurisdictions. To downsize, therefore, meant to reduce the number 
of government personnel and to cut budgets, as the size of the Gvil Service was largely 
determined by these personnel and financial resources.
This proposal comprised two reform plans. The first plan included measures to control 
the proliferation of civil service administrative units. The second plan focused on staffing and 
manpower management and control. These plans, masterminded by the OCSC and the BOB 
respectively, equipped the CSARC with recommendations to make to the cabinet on the issue of 
establishing new government units and increasing civil service personnel. In making such 
recommendations, “the CSARC would send budget analysts [from the BOB] and personnel 
analysts [from the OCSC] to critically review the needs and rationales of ministries and 
departments to expand their organisational structures and increase their staff.**17
If adopted by the full committee and the cabinet the proposal would also reinforce the 
mandate of the OCSC and the BOB. It stated, “The OCSC and the BOB would be the agencies 
representing the government in the review and monitoring of manpower utilisation and budget 
execution to make sure that these resources were channelled to the achievement of government 
projects and policies.**18 The proposal called for immediate action to curb the expansion of the 
Gvil Service. It included delaying the employment of new staff, and the establishment of new 
administrative units* with immediate effect from 1 October 1980 onwards. Thus, vacancies, 
which had not been funded by the BOB, would be frozen. Only a few exceptions could be made 
such as the admission of government-sponsored graduates. On the personnel expenditure side, 
line departments would not be allowed to redirect budget surpluses from other projects or 
different budget categories to fund new employment.
A. Controlling the proliferation of administrative structures
In terms of streamlining civil service structures in the longer term, the Sub-Committee on 
Structure and Organisation Reform recommended new and tighter conditions for structuring 
and organising administrative units. Essentially, new establishments would only be allowed if
17 CSARC Memo to cabinet, 23 December 1980.
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they aimed to carry out new task requirements with a clearly defined scope. This measure aimed 
to prevent even more overlapping and the duplication of functions among administrative 
entities. To discourage the establishment of new divisions, the Sub-Committee on Structure and 
Organisation Reform proposed “the establishment of new divisions was to be subject to review 
and initial approval by the CSARC before a final decision was made by the cabinet. Ministries 
and departments would not be allowed to set up new divisions at will.”19 The subcommittee also 
recommended the expansion of services in or to local administration, stating “restructuring 
administrative units in regional administrations should be a priority if they would increase public 
service delivery to people effectively. Expansion should not be undertaken for the benefit of civil 
servants.”20
B. Controlling the increase in personnel number the ‘Two Per Cent Policy*
To contain the number of government personnel, the Sub-Committee on Civil Service Personnel 
Administration Reform proposed the imposition of a growth limit on the Civil Service by putting 
a ceiling on civil service employment. Accordingly, increases in government personnel would not 
be allowed beyond two per cent per year. This control target became widely known as the 'twoper 
oentpdk/ .  Instead of new employment, the subcommittee required ministries and departments to 
make maximum use of their existing human resources by way of personnel reassignment and 
redeployment. Reassignment and reallocation of personnel from over-staffed units to 
understaffed units within the same ministries was encouraged. It also recommended 
management techniques, such as management by objectives (MBO) and Zero Based Budgeting, 
as means to help line ministries and departments align their manpower with their missions and 
government policies and programmes.
The secretary of the Sub-Committee on Civil Service Personnel Administration Reform, 
a representative of the OCSQ persuaded the sub-committee as a whole that successful 
containment of civil service size required effective “manpower planning”. As a result the 
subcommittee proposed that the approval of requests for new staff or units should be made in 
aggregate terms by the CSARQ removing the uncoordinated practice of approving request by 
request by the BOB and the OCSC However, as one OCSC personnel analyst put it, “the 
CSARCs decisions would still very much rely on the information and results of job analysis
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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performed by us. The CSARC in fact acted as a buffer between the OCSQ the BOB and line 
ministries and departments.”21
The proposal of Sub-Committee on Civil Service Personnel Administration Reform 
considered that staffing and manpower management was the responsibility of line ministries and 
departments, while the government through the CSARC would oversee civil service manpower 
in holistic terms, not agency by agency. Controlling civil service manpower in holistic terms 
would enable the CSARC to make decisions on re-allocating personnel among different 
organisations across the Civil Service without being constrained by department boundaries. As 
the CSARC would oversee macro-service wide manpower, ministries and departments would be 
allowed to manage their own personnel flexibly.
To achieve flexible manpower management at the ministerial level, the subcommittee 
suggested that every ministry should set up a “Ministerial Manpower Development Committee” 
(MDQ to review its human resources and oversee the implementation of the CSARCs 
‘Proposal for Reforming Civil Service Organisation and Staffing*. The MDC was to consider 
whether its ministry was under-staffed or over-staffed in comparison with output and personnel 
operating costs. They were then to report their manpower status to the cabinet with the consent 
of line ministers. Manpower reports were to be approved by the cabinet before being 
implemented by ministries themselves. The CSARQ however, was to provide some technical 
assistance if requested. The MDC was supposed to develop a framework for revising overall 
manpower every five years along the same lines as the NESDB plan. This was to ensure that 
manpower was aligned with national policies and plans. Ministerial MDGs were to consist of 
representatives of the office of permanent secretary and departments within the ministry. 
Representatives from the OCSC or relevant central personnel agencies, the NESDB, the GGD, 
and the BOB were also to be present.
Apart from focusing on controlling number of personnel and attempt to streamline the 
Civil Service, the two subcommittees also considered additional alternatives, which could 
contribute to curbing the growth of the government workforce. They suggested contracting out 
some unskilled labour jobs including cleaning, driving, gardening and security services was 
mentioned, albeit this was not the main focus of their attention. The CSARC argued, “This 
[contracting out] would reduce the need to recruit new civil servants or employees. All 
government agencies were encouraged to contract out to the private sector as long as it would 
not threaten their performances.”22
21 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
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3.4 Approving and Readjusting the ‘Proposal for Reforming the Civil 
Service Organisation and Staffing’
Members of the CSARC agreed unanimously with the ‘Proposal for Reforming the Civil Service 
Organisation and Staffing* jointly written by the two sub-committees and submitted it to the 
cabinet on 23 December 1980. Only two days later, on 25 December 1980, Prem’s cabinet 
convened to consider, among other things, the CSARCs proposal. The presence in the cabinet 
meeting of the prime minister, who set up and supported the CSARC, and the deputy prime 
minister chairman of the CSARC, helped secure the approval process. The cabinet agreed and 
approved the ‘Proposal for Reforming Civil Service Organisation and Staffing*. The CSARCs 
proposal became a Cabinet Resolution dated 25 December 1980 with immediate effect for 
implementation across the Civil Service.
Six months later, in June 1981, there had been no reduction in demands for manpower 
increases. This created operational problems for both the OCSCs personnel analysts and the 
BOB’s budget analysts whose jobs dealt with the analysis of manpower requests. The OCSC and 
the BOB agreed that the manpower management process should be adjusted further since 
approving requests year by year, as currently practised, was time consuming, wasting financial 
resources and undermined the government’s development plans. At a Civil Service Commission 
meeting in June 1981, the OCSC put forward a proposal to introduce a “three year manpower 
plan" for the Gvil Service. According to this proposal, line departments would be required to 
formulate manpower plans based on their projected needs for more personnel in the next three 
years, and on the utilisation of current manpower. The three-year manpower plan should reflect 
the future missions and tasks, which was in correspondence with the NESDB plan. The BOB 
also agreed with the OCSCs proposal that it would approve funding for employment in 
advance, in accordance with departments' three-year manpower plans.
Despite the effort of the OCSC and the BOB to impose effective control over the 
growth of civil service manpower, the cabinet ruled in their meeting in July 1981 that the 
development and implementation of departmental three-year manpower plan would be 
voluntary, not compulsory.23 As an OCSCs official reported, “What we could do from 1981 was 
to assist line departments in formulating the agency’s three year manpower plans. We provided 
them with a concept of manpower planning and tools such as the department’s personnel 
information system. It’s was not compulsory for them to do so, though.”24
22 CSARC Memo to cabinet, 23 December 1980.
23 Cabinet Resolution, 20 July 1981
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The attempt of the OCSC and the BOB to develop an effective measure to control the 
growth of the Gvil Service continued as line ministries and departments still requested more 
than two per cent increases for new staff. After three years implementing the “two percent 
policy’ the OCSCs statistics for 1984 showed that number of civil servants and employees had 
not been reduced. Officials from both the OCSC and the BOB believed that most departments 
used a loophole in the CSARCs proposal to request more staff beyond the target ceiling of two 
per cent by claiming increasing workloads. Some departments, through their ministers, bypassed 
the CSARC by making requests for more staff or new administrative units direct to the cabinet. 
This convinced the OCSC and the BOB that the CSARCs authority needed be consolidated and 
strengthened, and that the manpower approval procedure should be standardised.
On 1 February 1984, the cabinet agreed with a CSARC proposal that all requests for 
increasing personnel more than two per cent limit must be first submitted to be screened by the 
ministerial MDG The CSARC was authorised by the cabinet to approve manpower requests 
only after they had been approved by MDGs. This revised measure remained in place until early 
1988 when Prem, facing renewed political pressure both from within and outside his coalition 
government and the prospect of exposure in a personal scandal, stepped down from office.
The eight-year period of Prem’s administration allowed the issue of civil service reform 
in general, and the measures to control the civil service growth in particular to emerge and 
progress, although litde was achieved. An OCSC official reflected in hindsight, “It was the first 
and the most concrete and measurable policy to control the growth of the Gvil Service. No 
matter how ineffective it was, it remained in General Prem’s policy platform for eight years and 
all of us [civil servants] were familiar with it.”25 The next section examines the issue of civil 
service policy under a shorter period of prime minister Chatchai Choonhawan, who succeed 
Prem in 1988.
3.5 Chatchai’s Civil Service Policy 1988-91
Following his victory in the 1988 general election Chatchai was inaugurated as the new prime 
minister on 4 August 1988 and held office until February 1991. During this period Thailand 
witnessed a fully-fledged but short-lived parliamentary democracy for which there was a growing 
public demand, especially among the urban middle class. Chatchai was the first elected MP to be 
prime minister since 1976. His party Chat Thai had a strong tie with industrialists while their
24 Personal communication, OCSC official.
25 Interview, Head of Manpower Planning Unit, OCSC
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coalition partner the Democrats has close relations with financiers. A total of thirty-three of the 
forty-five cabinet ministers who served Chatchai had a background in one kind of business or 
another. Business influence during Chatchai period was prominent.26
3.5.1 Controlling the Growth of the Civil Service: Paying Lip Service
Chatchai’s attention to civil service policy was not constrained by poor economic conditions as 
Prem’s was. In the late 1980s, as Chatchai assumed office, the economic restructuring 
undertaken by Prem bore fruit. Chatchai’s government presided over a period of the fastest 
economic growth in Thai economic history which was marked by double-digit growth. Between 
1988 and 1991, the government avoided budget deficits and created surpluses in four 
consecutive years.
Lacking a public finance imperative, the government was not under the pressure to 
control the size of the Gvil Service. As Chatchai’s government preferred expansion to cuts, 
neither the size of the Gvil Service nor the increase in the number of civil servants was seen as 
problematic. Rather than continuing the austerity programme in the public sector initiated by 
Prem’s administration, Chatchai implemented policies that were popular among civil servants 
and government personnel. These policies included the improvement of civil service salaries and 
welfare benefits. A few months after taking office, in November 1988, Chatchai increased civil 
service salaries and allowances for all occupational groups.
Despite the government preference for expansion, Chatchai reinstated the Gvil Service 
and Administrative Reform Committee (CSARC) on 14 September 1988 on the 
recommendation of the OCSC through the Gvil Service Commission (CSQ over which he 
presided as a chairman. Chatchai put deputy prime minister Pong Sarasin at the CSARCs helm, 
while keeping eighteen members of the previous committee. The reinstatement of the CSARC 
enabled the OCSC and the BOB still to control the committee agenda through its joint 
secretariat. The Cabinet Resolution dated 25 December 1980 on Reforming the Gvil Service 
Organisation and Staffing' including the two per cent policy also officially remained in force. In 
practice, the CSARC under Chatchai, as an OCSCs official observed, “was inactive and its 
reinstatement was seen as “an administrative symbol and ritual. The committee had no real 
political support.”27
26 It was blamed for the widespread presence of “money politics” and corruption as political leaders 
exploited economic prosperity for personal gain. Many multibillion Baht public works projects were 
adopted without careful scrutiny, and it was widely believed that bribes, corruption and irregularities were 
involved. This led the media to dub Chatchai’s administration the “buffet cabinet”. Corruption 
allegations undermined the popularity and legitimacy of the government.
27 Personal communication, OCSC official.
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3.5.2 Improving Civil Service Delivery: Bureaucratic Realisation of Political Issues
The issue of improving civil service delivery emerged as an important element of civil service 
reform in September 1988 when the new CSARC was appointed. The stated responsibility of the 
new CSARC, apart from enforcing the cabinet resolution on limiting the growth of the Civil 
Service, was to recommend ways ‘to improve efficiency in civil service management, to review 
and make policy recommendations for improving bureaucratic rules and laws that restricted the 
Civil Service’s ability, as well as to manage and deliver public service effectively.28
Recognising that Chatchai’s government emphasised the role of the private sector in 
driving the economy, as expressed in Chatchai’s vision of ‘letting the private sector lead’, the 
OCSC adjusted its civil service reform strategy effectively, aiming to shift the role of the Civil 
Service from an operator in the economy to a facilitator. Any civil service reform in this period 
‘had to be geared towards the improvement of public services’29 The OCSC proposed to the 
prime minister that a high profile committee needed be appointed to facilitate and solve 
bureaucratic problems that prevented effective and efficient public service delivery. This 
committee was to review the performance of ministries and departments in delivering their 
services. It would also deal with the setdement of disputes and complaints originating from the 
civil service delivery process.
On 23 May 1989, Chatchai, welcoming the OCSC initiative, appointed the Committee on 
Gvil Service Delivery (GCSD) to improve public service provision to citizens by government 
organisations including the Gvil Service, ministries and departments as well as public enterprises. 
This reform effort would facilitate the improvement of government service, which would benefit 
the business sector and ordinary people. Chatchai appointed a minister in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, Meechai Ruchubhan, to head the committee. It had twelve other members of whom nine 
were senior bureaucrats from ministries providing direct services to citizens and three 
representatives from the private sector. The deputy secretary general of the OCSC served as the 
committee secretary. The committee set up another three subcommittees to deal with such issues 
as departmental delivery performance review and assessment, the setdement of citizen’s 
complaints, and training and development of service delivery. Although these subcommittees 
were chaired by senior bureaucrats represented in the Committee on Gvil Service Delivery, all 
had OCSC officials as members and secretaries. The OCSC in effect, controlled the way in 
which the Committee on Gvil Service Delivery operated.
The Operation of the CCSD did not meet Chatchai’s government’s expectations to make 
the Gvil Service delivery more flexible and effective. It was expected to ‘remove the unnecessary
28 Cabinet Resolution, 14 September 1988.
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personnel and budgetary obstacles imposed by the OCSQ the BOB and the NESDB in 
establishing new administrative units*.30 The government wanted flexibility in creating and 
abolishing administrative units because in a competitive economic environment. It wanted to be 
able to restructure and reorganisation the civil service so that it could respond promptly to the 
changing environment. An ability to do so would increase the government’s capability to achieve 
its strategic development goals. As the CCSD, which was controlled by the OCSQ focused on 
the margin of administrative process improvement rather than structural reform, it was not be 
able to deliver what Chatchai’s government required - more power to change the administrative 
structure of the Civil Service without the constraints of bureaucratic legislation and regulations.31
To achieve more structural reform, Chatchai appointed an ad hoc Committee on 
Restructuring and Reorganisation of Ministries and Departments on 4 July 1990. This ad hoc 
committee had a higher profile than the CSARC since the prime minister himself was its head, 
with a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office, Boonua Prasertsuwan appointed a deputy 
chairman. Senior bureaucrats from central co-ordinating agencies including the PMSO’s 
secretary general, the OCSCs secretary general, the cabinet secretary, the director general of the 
Bureau of the Budget and two academics in public administration were given places on it. Unlike 
previous civil service reform committees, the servicing secretaries of this committee were 
Chatchai’s own men, two members of the Prime Minister’s advisory team known as the “Barm 
Pitsanuloke”, Borwomsak Uwanno and Surakiat Sathirathai, both leading law academics. 
However, their secretariat work was assisted by representatives from the OCSQ the BOB and 
the GGD and the NESDB. Because the committee was very high profile and ‘its members 
including the prime minister were normally occupied by other more pressing problems, they 
hardly met and no reform proposal was made’.32
Even so, the government attempt to overhaul the civil service structure continued 
without any active reform effort from central co-ordinating agencies. Early in 1991, Chatchai 
appointed a personal advisory team called the “Prime Minister’s Administrative Advisory Team” 
led by a bureaucrat turned businessman, Anand Panyarachun. This team was supposed to deal 
with a broader picture of civil service reform than the CSARC Its focus ranged from changing 
administrative procedures to redefining public sector activities. The ultimate aim, as an OCSC 
official said, ‘was to facilitate businesses and citizens dealings with the Civil Service, as well as to
29 Personal communication, OCSC official.
30 Cabinet Resolution, 23 May 1989
31 Personal communication, OCSC official.
32 Ibid.
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look for opportunities to privatise public enterprises’.33 The appointment of the Anand led 
‘Prime Minister’s Administrative Advisory Team’ led the government to disband the CSARC as 
the new advisory committee was supposed to perform the same function. However, the new 
team did not produce any policy initiatives concerning civil service reform before Chatchai’s 
government was overthrown by a military coup in February 1991.
3.6 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Civil Service Policy Making
This chapter seeks to explain why the issue of downsizing emerged for the first time on the 
government policy agenda in 1980 during Prem’s administration, how it evolved and why its 
status fluctuated during the period 1980-91. This concluding section explains why Prem’s 
administration adopted the ‘two per cent policy as a solution for uncontrolled growth of the 
Civil Service, and why Chatchai preferred expansion and making the Civil Service more 
responsive by adopting the improvement of civil service delivery as his reform choices. Using the 
narrative, this section provides understanding to how different institutional and processual 
contexts affected the definition of civil service reform issues and the adoption of corresponding 
reform choices. To achieve this, this section looks closely at the civil service policy making 
process: agenda setting, alternative specification and decision making, and how these component 
processes affect the outcomes of civil service policymaking in both periods.
3.6.1 Agenda Setting
In terms of agenda setting, the issue of civil service reform reached Prem and Chatchai 
governments’ policy agendas mainly as a result of the changing contexts of the economic 
environment, which affected the salience of the issue - how it was perceived by the government 
of the day. The economic crisis in the late 1979 put strong pressure on Prem’s government to 
adjust the economy structurally leading to the adoption of an austerity programme that lasted 
until the late 1980s. The austerity programme, as required by the conditions for SAL-I and S AL­
II led to the adjustment of the public sector through ‘improving public sector management and 
institutional development’. In this way, the inclusion of the civil service reform issue on Prem’s 
policy agenda was the result of reformers’ perception that the issue needed to be technically 
linked to wider economic measures.
The presence of the issue of civil service reform on Prem’s policy agenda was also due to 
its salience - how important the issue was perceived by the government. Outside the realm of
33 Interview, anonymous OCSC official
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economic policy making, particularly the formulation of the Structural Adjustment Programme, 
the issue of civil service reform also gained the attention of prime minister Prem because it was 
included in his ‘administrative policy statement to parliament in March 1980. The statement was 
made against the backdrop of the economic adjustment process initiated at the end of 1979. In 
this sense, the salience of civil service reform issue as addressed by the prime minister and its 
technical link to the wider economic adjustment programme reserved policy space on Prem’s 
government policy agenda.
Despite its inclusion in the wider and more important and pressing economic adjustment 
programme, the status of the civil service issue can be said low as it was not central to solve the 
pressing economic crisis. However, the issue was given higher status outside the realm of 
economic policy making when the CSARC was established to deliver Prem’s administrative 
policy address to parliament. With a deputy prime minister as head of the committee, the 
CSARC was high profile as was its sponsoring issue. The different status of the issue at the same 
time can be explained by how the issue was perceived by reformers in different policy making 
structures. In the economic policy making arena, whose participants included the NESDB and 
Minsitry of Finance, the issue of civil service reform was subordinate to the economic 
adjustment issue. Its contribution to the improvement of the economy was seen as indirect. In 
contrast, in the civil service policy-making arena where the central co-ordinating agencies with 
civil service policy related jurisdictions were involved, the issue of civil service reform gained 
higher status.
The dynamics of the economic situation also affected how the issue of civil service 
reform was formulated. The civil service reform issue under the economic austerity programme 
during Prem’s administration was dealt with as a remedy for bureaucratic inefficiency. The 
economic recovery at the end of 1980s dispelled the pressing demand for austerity from 
Chatchai’s policy agenda. But the economic boom at the beginning of 1990s also created a need 
for a new policy to respond to the competitive environment in order to maintain economic 
growth. Under economic recovery and boom, the issue of civil service reform with particular 
reference to controlling the growth of the Civil Service was not seen by the government as a 
priority.
Formulating civil service reform issues involves the manipulation of issue definitions and 
images. The issue of civil service reform was defined differently under the Prem and Chatchai 
administrations. Under Prem, when the government faced economic hardship, the civil service 
reform issue was defined as the problem of excessive civil service growth characterised by 
unchecked increases in civil service employment and the uncontrolled proliferation of the
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government structure and administrative units. This definition and the image of ‘bureaucratic 
obesity1 were maintained under Chatchai but a new definition and image was also formulated 
when the economic situation had improved. The civil service reform issue was defined as 
‘improving civil service deliver/.
Hie issue and problem definition was also shaped by the institutional location of 
reformers and how these reformers appropriated the dynamics of the economic situation that 
evolved during the period 1980-91. During the Prem period, when senior bureaucrats and 
technocrats in the central co-ordinating agencies were given a high degree of autonomy in 
formulating public policy, the civil service issue was processed in the high profile CSARC The 
issue was defined as bureaucratic inefficiency caused by excessive growth primarily because 
Prem’s administrative policy statement reflected general public concern over the effectiveness of 
public administration as well as the need to respond to the structural adjustment programme that 
required the Civil Service to be rationalised. In the Chatchai period, the definition of civil 
service reform as improving bureaucratic efficiency by controlling the size of the Civil Service 
was sustained but a new competing issue definition also emerged and was ‘incubated’ in the 
CCSD and Chatchai’s other committee.
The inclusion of Civil Service reform issue in and its status on governments’ policy 
agenda was due mainly to it ‘internal salience’, the ‘institutional venue’ where the issue was 
processed and the dynamics of the economic situation during which civil service policy making 
took place. The three factors interacted in a dialectic way. The salience of the civil service reform 
issue -  its perceived importance - can be affected by the pressing demand from the economic 
context, and depends on which policy making venue the issue is processed. Both the demand 
from the economic context and the institutional venue influenced the status and image of the 
civil service reform issue on the government policy agenda. It is the combination of these factors 
that explains the emergence and progression of the civil service reform issue as well as its 
fluctuating status over the period of 1980-1991. The next section explains the interrelated 
processes of alternative specification and decision-making.
3.6.2 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
This section addresses the question asked at the outset: why controlling civil service growth by 
imposing a two per cent per annum growth limit and introducing manpower planning practices 
became policy solutions during Prem’s administration but gained only lip service from Chatchai’s 
government. As the range of civil service reform alternatives is largely determined by how the 
issue is defined in the agenda setting process, only two sets of solutions for civil service reform
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were developed. The first set of alternatives was a response to the problem of bureaucratic 
overgrowth, the second set of solutions was consistent with the emerging issue of improving 
public service quality during the Chatchai period.
On first examination, the civil service reform alternatives can be seen as how reformers 
in Prem and Chartchai’s governments responded to the situations they are facing. The narrative 
in this chapter provides a case in point. The reform choices made by Prem and Chatchai’s 
governments were shaped by the development of the economic situation of the country. Prem’s 
structural adjustment programme allowed the stringent measures to streamline the Civil Service 
to be adopted. The same reform choice was not wholeheartedly advocated by Chatchai as the 
economic situation improved greatly. A new competing reform alternative of improving civil 
service delivery advocated by the government emerged because they did not have the imperative 
of public finance constraints and an austerity programme.
The development of the economic situation during Chatchai may bring a new reform 
alternative of improving service quality into the light, but measures to control civil service 
growth, the two per cent policy was maintained and the CSARC was reinstated. Maintaining civil 
service policy inherited from Prem was the result of two factors. First, the CSARC had made 
itself more than a policy advice consultative committee by engaging itself in the implementation 
and enforcement of the ‘two per cent policy’. It became part of the manpower management 
process that was instrumental in fulfilling the organisational mandates of its dominant members, 
the OCSC and the BOB. In this sense, the CSARC became an indispensable committee for 
controlling the growth of the Civil Service. Second, senior bureaucrats from central co­
ordinating agencies who were members of CSARC were also members of the CSC where the 
decision to sustain the two per cent policy and to reinstate its originator took place. It can be said 
that these members wanted to maintain their status quo.
Controlling such venues can also facilitate the adoption of one reform alternative over 
others. The presence of two reform choices during Chatchai’s administration can be seen as a 
result of the competition to control civil service policy-making venues. Controlling such venues 
affected the reform process and how reform choices would be made. This episode saw a struggle 
by the CSARC to control the course of civil service reform. Leading members of the CSARC, 
particularly the OCSQ tried to maintain the momentum of its reform issue by initiating a new 
Committee on Civil Service Delivery in the hope that its ‘ownership’ over the civil service reform 
issue would be maintained. They failed to do so, however, since the CCSD did not deliver as 
much as the government wanted: the removal of unnecessary personnel and financial rules that 
prevented flexibility in establishing and abolishing administrative units which would facilitate
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effective civil service delivery. The government reform agenda was, in fact, in conflict with the 
bureaucratic reformers as they considered the government’s reform ideas as leading to the 
proliferation of administrative units, which only served political purposes. Restructuring the Gvil 
Service was seen by politicians as a means of bypassing the restriction of the two per cent policy 
and its adoption marked the supremacy of politicians over civil servants.
On the politician’s part, the episode saw an attempt to organise the institutional venue 
for the emerging issue of improving service delivery by Giatchai’s government. It created an ad 
hoc Committee on Restructuring and Reorganisation of Ministries and Departments, which was 
controlled by his personal political and economic advisory team ‘Bann Pitsanuloke’,34 and 
chaired by the prime minister himself. The government’s sustained effort to control the civil 
service reform issue can also be seen in the appointment of the Prime Minister’s Administrative 
Advisory Team whose responsibility superseded the previous reform committee, the CSARC, 
leading to its disbandment. Although it seems that the Chatchai government was successful in 
turning the image of the civil service reform issue around from controlling the growth of the 
Gvil Service to improving civil service delivery, no real policy choice was made due to the 
committee’s lack of administrative capacity. In the words of an OCSC official, “it did not 
develop significant reform proposals.”35
This chapter provides understanding of the trajectories and outcomes of civil service 
policy making in Thailand between 1980 and 1991. It takes into account the how the dynamic 
contexts of economic conditions and the institutional bases of reformers in the government, or 
the Gvil Service, affected the ways in which the civil service reform issue was defined and placed 
on the governments’ policy agenda. It also explains how and why Prem and Chatchai’s 
governments made different reform choices, controlling civil service growth or improving civil 
service delivery. The interaction of these institutional and processual factors constrained the pace 
and rate of civil service reform in the sense that change in manpower management practice was 
piecemeal leading to the unsuccessful implementation of the two per cent policy. Having had a 
break put on it, albeit an ineffective one, during Prem regime, the number of civil servants 
during Chatchai’s period grew by 3.14% and 2.23 % in 1990 and 1991 respectively. With regards
34 During Giatchai’s administration the role of the central co-ordination agencies declined since the prime 
minister relied on his political and economic advisory team known as Team Bann Pitsanuloke.The team 
comprised Chatchai’s inner circle of academics and businessmen whose views sometimes contrasted with 
those of civil servants who had once been regarded as the real policymakers. The rise of prime minister’s 
personal advisors affected the government’s priorities since Team Bann Pitsanuloke was behind most 
prime ministerial and cabinet decisions. They set the direction of government policies. During Chatchai’s 
period, the government paid more attention to domestic and international economic policy than to the 
civil service related policies.
35 Personal communication, OCSC official.
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to the Chatchai government’s reform effort, no concrete choice of reform was made although 
the government successfully turned the issue image towards its own end.
Chapter 4 
Rationalising the Civil Service: 
Freezing Civil Service Employment, 1991-1992
Overview
This chapter examines the process of civil service policy change under the interim 
government of Anand Punyarachun between 1991 and 1992. This period is historically 
significant because it was one of the most important civil service reform efforts in the 
history of modem Thai administrative reform. Despite the short life of the government, 
civil service policy during this period underwent considerable change. The outcome of 
Anand’s civil service reform was a series of proposals related to civil service 
improvement, the most important of which was an employment freeze. Other reform 
initiatives included a medium term ‘Plan for Improving the Gvil Service System and 
Public Personnel Management* and the amendment of civil service related acts of 
parliament. These initiatives entailed changes in rules, routines and the practice of human 
resources management in particular. In this period the ‘two per cent policy*, which had 
been an instrument for curtailing the size of the civil service since the 1980s, was 
terminated. The Gvil Service and Administrative Reform Committee (CSARC), the 
architect of the two per cent policy, which had served as an administrative reform 
policymaking body since General Prem’s government, was not re-appointed.
This chapter seeks to explain why Anand’s government was able to develop 
major civil service reform policies, programmes, and plans, which represent a significant 
departure of historical importance from the two previous administrations. The chapter 
traces the trajectory of the civil service reform issues and provides explanations of the 
following questions: “How and why did the organisation of the interim government 
affect the civil service policy making subsystem and hence the civil service reform 
process?” “Why did the issue of bureaucratic inefficiency and civil service growth remain 
on the government agenda despite the emergence of equally pressing issue of anti­
corruption?, and How were these issues processed and progressed?
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4.1 Establishing an interim government
Gvil service reform in this period took place in the aftermath of major political upheaval. 
In March 1991 a military coup, abrogated the constitution, dismissed Giatchai’s elected 
government, and established the temporary National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) as 
the supreme ‘guardian* of the country.1 The coup leaders also dissolved parliament and 
replaced it with an appointed ‘National Legislative Council’, whose members mainly 
comprised current and retired civil servants and military officers
Initially the NPKC did not face widespread public opposition, mainly because it 
raised expectations that rampant corruption in the government and Gvil Service could 
be eliminated. Indeed, the urban middle class rendered some support, hoping that ‘old 
fashioned politics’ dominated by provincial politicians could eventually be improved, if 
not replaced, by new-style professional politicians favoured by the military and general 
public. Some foreign government agencies such as the U.S. Trade representatives also 
praised the coup as a way to clean up the rotten system of government and 
administration (Christensen and Siamwalla, 1993).
The broadly positive public response was a double-edged sword for the NPKG 
On the one hand, it legitimised the coup and facilitated a smooth transition of power. 
On the other hand, it compelled the NPKC to deliver what the general public was 
expecting, ‘clean and democratic’ government. This expectation included demands for a 
fresh election from some pro-democratic groups including veteran political activists and 
academics that opposed the undemocratic means of a coup. The NPKC responded to 
this pressure by installing an interim government immediately after the coup as the first 
move to secure public support. They chose Anand Panyarachun, a bureaucrat turned 
businessman, to lead the government.2
The NPKC gave Anand considerable power, although not a completely free 
hand, to form an interim government. Anand appointed his cabinet mainly from civilian 
bureaucrats, but ensured that some strategic posts such as minister of the interior and 
minister of defence were secured for the NPKCs leaders. However, most military 
leaders who were members of the NPKC declined offers of ministerial posts in the hope 
of avoiding the allegation that they had staged the coup for their own benefit.
1 See chapter 2. The NPKC also claimed they were protecting the monarchy from a group of 
disaffected officers. Some observers’ claimed that it was caused by Chatchai’s intervention in 
internal military affairs.
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4.2 Reforming the civil service: The Emerging and Recumng Issues.
The new government created an opportunity for civil service reform. The civil service 
reform agenda grew out of Anand’s initial manoeuvrings to establish a policy and 
political agenda direction for his government. It was built around two administrative 
issues: corruption and rationalisation. Immediately after taking office in March 1991, 
Anand worked towards the NPKC’s mandates, one of which was to curb corruption, 
which was widely considered to have got out of control during Chatchai’s 
administration. Among the initial measures he adopted was to order the anti­
corruption agency to investigate new allegations of corruption. Many politicians in 
Chatchai’s cabinet and some high level civil servants were accused of ‘unusual 
wealth’ had their assets frozen unless they demonstrated legitimate sources for it. 
Some of the accused were put on trial and civil servants who were allegedly involved 
also faced disciplinary procedures.
The ‘anti-corruption issue* came to dominate the interim government’s agenda 
partly because the cabinet needed to be responsive to the NPKC, whose early promise of 
eradicating corruption raised public expectations. The prime minister promoted the issue 
himself by speaking publicly about a ‘clean and transparent civil service’. His remarks 
were echoed and amplified in the mass media, which in turn reinforced the public mood. 
Although public attention on the anti-corruption issue remained high after the interim 
government assumed office, the new government was unable to make quick progress 
against corruption. It failed to prove that the accused were guilty of corruption, due 
mainly to the scarcity of evidence and the exploitation of legal loopholes. Faced with the 
prospect of lengthy and ineffective trials, Anand realised that the NPKC’s promise on 
anti-corruption were not easily delivered.3 In addition the short-term nature of his 
government would prevent him from solving the corruption problem before the general 
election promised by the coup leaders and scheduled for March 1992.
Abandoning the anti-corruption issue in the midst of high public expectation 
might not only trigger public discontent, but might also upset the NPKC to whom his 
government was accountable. Consequently, Anand decided that the issue should be 
kept on the government agenda, and that the government would endorse any legal
2 Anand was a diplomat and later permanent secretary of foreign affairs. He was forced by the 
military to resign because of his pro-China policy and subsequently joined the Saha Union 
Group, a textile conglomerate.
3 It was widely assumed that only an insignificant proportion of corruption cases were found 
guilty, only small fish got hooked.
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processes pursued by relevant agencies such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the 
police. Anand judged that it would be politically unwise to tone down the significance of 
anti-corruption issues. By keeping them on its agenda, the government maintained 
popular support for being ‘tough on corruption’ and having a ‘clean’ and ‘transparent 
image’.
The prime minister’s interest in corruption issues proved fleeting in the face of 
other problems that directly affected the operation of his government. The most 
important problem was the emerging issue of budget constraint, which prompted the 
second administrative issue, rationalisation. On 2 April 1991, less than a month after its 
formation, Anand’s cabinet convened to consider the government expenditure plan 
proposed by the Ministry of Finance for the fiscal year 1991.4 At this meeting, Anand 
informed the cabinet that the government faced tight budget restrictions with a spending 
limit of 460,400 million baht, a reduction on previous years during which there had been 
incremental increases in the budget.5 This expenditure plan was designed to balance the 
budget and introduce tax cuts intended to stimulate a competitive advantage, as well as 
to decentralise taxing powers to local authorities. The resulting decrease in tax revenues 
required tight spending limits. If the proposed expenditure plan was approved, Anand 
told the cabinet, government agencies had to be streamlined in order to reduce 
government outlays. As streamlining itself was not an easy task and the government 
could face bureaucratic resistance, to overcome potential resistance Anand insisted that 
the issue was unavoidable and argued that it could be a means of improving the 
notoriously low level of civil service salaries. He blamed over-manning in the Gvil 
Service for the failure to raise salaries, and pointed out to the cabinet ministers at the 
meeting that:
The fast growing Gvil Service has not only increased public personnel costs, but
has also decreased the government’s ability to improve civil service salaries and
welfare benefits to the same level as the private sector. Uncompetitive salaries
have contributed to the brain drain problem in the Gvil Service.6
The urgent need to streamline the Gvil Service came naturally to the prime minister as a 
solution to the reduced budget; civil service costs were about forty per cent of total
4 The Thai Government fiscal year starts on 1 October and ends on 30 September in the 
subsequent year.
5 The exchange rate during this time was 25 baht per dollar.
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government spending. Streamlining, as Anand went on, would enable the government to 
improve civil service salaries and welfare benefits allowing civil servants to live a decent 
life. It could also be a way of reducing corruption in the Gvil Service.
This new concern with wider civil service reform put a break on the dynamics of 
corruption issues on the prime minister’s agenda. However, this reform would also help 
solve the corruption issue. Anand kept both ‘anti-corruption issues* and ‘bureaucratic 
inefficiency issues* on his government’s agenda, albeit he started to see the former 
problem as less pressing than the latter.
Anand’s concern over bureaucratic inefficiency, therefore, formed a large part of 
the Cabinet Resolution dated 2 April 1991. At this cabinet meeting he made explicit that 
the growing size of the Gvil Service contributed to inefficiency in the public sector, a 
view that most academics and reformers in the Gvil Service held. Anand proposed his 
solution and the cabinet agreed that immediate action was to be taken “to freeze Civil 
Service employment between fiscal year 1991 and 1992”. In practice, this Cabinet 
Resolution, which offered stringent measures, simultaneously put an end to the ‘two per 
cent policy* that had been used to limit the growth of the Gvil Service since Prem’s 
administration. Anand asserted that during his interim government:
An increase in government personnel would not be allowed, and the proposed 
increase in the number of civil servants and employees, which had already been 
approved through the three-year manpower plans, was also to be frozen.7
At the 2 April meeting Anand also laid out broad ideas about how government 
agencies were to deal with manpower problems that might arise during the course of 
implementing this resolution. He suggested that allocating or transferring personnel from 
over-staffed departments or projects, to understaffed ones, was a potential solution. 
Another simple-minded but logical solution he offered was the partial privatisation of 
government work. Drawing on his background experience as a diplomat and permanent 
secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was strongly convinced that both 
permanent and temporary personnel in embassies and diplomatic missions around the 
world could be substantially reduced.
The prime minister’s views were shared by his cabinet. They generated extensive 
discussion, which expanded to include the issue of ‘employment termination*. The
6 Grcular letter from the Cabinet Secretariat dated 15 April 1991.
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cabinet, many of whose members had pursued careers in the Gvil Service, felt that the 
ongoing retirement system, which guaranteed life long employment, should be 
redesigned to enable the government to get rid of unwanted and inefficient staff easily. 
They also called for the introduction of an ‘early retirement programme*.8 The cabinet, 
with Anand’s agreement, maintained that the problem of bureaucratic inefficiency could 
not be solved unless the civil service policymaking and implementation machine was 
reformed. Anand, as a result, assigned his deputy prime minister, Meechai Ru-chubhan, 
in co-operation with the finance minister, to review the roles and responsibilities of the 
Gvil Service Commission (CSQ and its secretariat office, the OCSC
So far, Anand was successful in keeping both the ‘anti-corruption’ issue and 
‘bureaucratic inefficiency* issue on his government agenda. The attempt to deal with 
both issues was evident in his first policy statement delivered to the National Legislative 
Council on 4 April 1991, two days after his budget meeting and a month after the coup. 
In the statement Anand outlined how his government would handle the
multidimensional problems of the Gvil Service. Incorporated in his speech was a policy
that would make his government accountable for the political mandate dictated by the 
NPKC which would secure public support: “the promotion and exercise of preventive 
measures to suppress all forms of corrupt practices, as well as to punish the corrupt 
officials severely*.
Although the prime minister added the ‘anti-corruption’ issue in his civil service 
policy, a large part of his administrative policy was still built around the problem of civil 
service growth and other problems related to public personnel administration:
... The government was to develop a system that would limit the number of civil 
servants and government employees, and increase Gvil Service salaries, as well as 
to improve welfare benefits. The new work system would also be laid out to 
facilitate efficiency, which would result from the improvement of morale...9
Anand went on to call for administrative processes, which he claimed
contributed to civil service growth and inefficiency problems, to be redesigned. Thus, the 
processes, which involved personnel, budgeting and planning, were to be improved to 
increase the speed and efficiency of governmental working practice and the effectiveness
7 Ibid.
8 The thesis deals with this issue as part of downsizing the Gvil Service.
9 Prime Ministerial address to the National Legislative Council 4 April 1991.
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of the provision of services to the people. To achieve this, Anand announced that 
information technology was to be used widely in government agencies.
Another issue related to the inefficiency problem involved excessive bureaucratic 
rules and laws. The prime minister saw legal reform as another remedy for ‘bureaucratic 
illnesses’. According to his speech, administrative laws and procedures related to public 
personnel administration were to be amended. The aims of legal reform were threefold. 
First, personnel and financial powers were to be decentralised to both lower rank 
decision makers, and regional and local administrations. Second, bureaucratic red tape 
was to be cut and the problem of overlapping jurisdictions caused by legal ambiguity was 
to be solved. Third, outdated laws were to be reformed in accordance with the dynamics 
of the socio-economic development of the country.
4.2.1 Reorganizing and politicizing the Civil Service policy machine
The prime minister’s shift of attention to the issue of corruption during his first few 
months in office resulted in the discontinuity of civil service manpower policy and its 
policy community. As has been mentioned, the ‘two per cent policy’, which had been an 
instrument for curtailing the size of the Gvil Service since the 1980s, was terminated and 
the Gvil Service and Administrative Reform Committee (CSARQ, its architect, which 
had served as an administrative reform policy making body since General Prem’s 
government, was not re-appointed.
During his term in office Anand did not depend much on inter-departmental 
committees to inform his decisions. The sense of urgency caused by the short-lived 
nature of an interim government forced him to deal directly with the individual central 
co-ordinating agencies responsible for particular aspects of civil service management. In 
this period central government agencies provided him with ‘routine action channels* for 
formulating and managing civil service policy. These channels included the Gvil Service 
Commission and its servicing secretariat, the Office of the Gvil Service Commission 
(OCSQ. The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and the Comptroller General’s Office (CGD) 
were also employed. Although these public personnel and public finance agencies were 
closely related in terms of their routine functions and operation, the OCSC was the lead 
organisation and at the centre of civil service policy making during Anand’s 
administration because of its proximity to key members of the cabinet namely the prime 
minister and one of his deputies.
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The prime minister’s ‘attention’ to the civil service issue could normally be seen 
by the amount of time he allocated to civil service related committees. In spite of the 
strategic importance of the CSC and its secretariat office, Anand did not chair the CSC 
himself but assigned the job to his deputy prime minister Meechai, whose knowledge of 
administrative law assured him that the reform of the civil service policy machine 
discussed at cabinet on 2 April 1991 would be carried out effectively. Meechai was given 
a free hand in dealing with civil service issues: he served as the chairman of the CSC and 
oversaw the operation of the OCSC But to accomplish what the government declared in 
the National Legislative Assembly, with regard to the civil service issue, Meechai saw the 
need to get the full co-operation from the OCSCs top executives in elaborating the 
government’s ideas. Gaining senior civil servants’ co-operation needed some 
intervention, which resulted in a brief conflict between the OCSCs chief and its political 
master.
In late March 1991, one month after Meechai was put in charge of the Civil 
Service, it appeared that the secretary general of the OCSQ Samran Thavarayus was not 
his favourite administrator. Meechai then transferred Samran whose remaining time in 
office was only 4-5 months, to an inactive advisory position in the Prime Minister’s 
Office. When announced, the move triggered some criticism from civil servants, and the 
media spoke of the return of old fashioned patron -  client conflict. Concern that this 
conflict could destroy the Civil Service’s trust in the government led the prime minister 
to intervene. Anand, who also claimed to have experienced unfair treatment while 
permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, used a television interview to 
defend his deputy’s decision:
... The Gvil Service and state administration needs and relies on the OCSQ to 
start with. And the OSSCs secretary general (Samran) is a good person but he 
has 3-4 months left before his retirement. It was on this ground that the deputy 
prime minister Meechai, who oversees the OCSQ wanted to transfer him, since 
he saw the need to implement the Gvil Service reform and improvement project 
swifdy. Samran’s short tenure could undermine the continuity of the project.
Thus, appointing him as an advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office did not 
degrade his position since it is the same PC level as the OCSCs secretary general 
It is understandable that he is upset.10
10 Anand (1992).
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Although Meechai got on well with the higher echelons of the OCSQ he did not 
choose any of them to replace Samran. Instead, he advised the prime minister to appoint 
Professor Wijit Srisa-am, permanent secretary of the Ministry of University Affairs, as 
acting secretary general of the OCSC Wijit emerged as the Meechai’s first choice because 
of his past achievements. Apart from his experience as a senior bureaucrat, Wijit was 
seen as the most successful education administrator in Thailand. He served as rector of 
many universities before being promoted to head the Ministry of University Affairs. 
Throughout his career, he was energetically and creatively involved in the development 
and innovation in education. His image was clean and professional. His past 
achievements, leadership, commitment, vision and enthusiasm that attracted Meechai.
In the Thai Civil Service, inter-ministerial transfer and promotion was considered 
unusual during democratic regimes since the ‘standard operating procedure’ required that 
promotion to a higher position was normally reserved for qualified candidates ‘from 
within’ the individual ministry. However, Wijit’s appointment helped the Meechai ward 
off the possible allegation of patronage in personnel practice that would have arisen if he 
had replaced the ousted Secretary General with one of the deputies at the OCSC whom 
he favoured.
Realising this was a politically motivated appointment, Wijit who still kept his 
post in the Ministry of University Affairs, made clear to the prime minister and his 
deputy that he would not accept any effort to make him permanent secretary general of 
the OCSC His intention was clear when he declared that he would not intervene in the 
routine administration of the OCSQ and that deputy secretary-generals would run its 
day-to-day operations. He also delegated all administrative routines in the Ministry of 
University Affairs. The only mandate Wijit had to achieve was to realise the prime 
minister’s policy statement concerning the 'efficiency and transparency c f the Civil Seruoc.
Wide ranging civil service reform reached the agenda of Anand’s government 
because of his commitment to the NPKC anti-corruption pledge and his personal 
interest in the issue and clean, transparent and efficient government. Initially anti- 
corruption was the priority but this was replaced by other reform issues, particularly 
downsizing, partly as a result of difficulties implementing anti-corruption measures and 
partly as a result of budgetary constraints. The political circumstances of the 
appointment of his government as a temporary administration with extensive powers 
also contributed by giving a sense of urgency and the means to carryout reform. Political
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control of the Gvil Service reform policy machine was quickly achieved by the 
appointment of Wijit as secretary general of the OCSC.
4.3 Formulating the “G vil Service Reform and Development Project”
When he took office at the beginning of April 1991 Wijit already had clear mandates 
from the government: to freeze civil service employment and to reform the civil service 
system. Freezing the number of civil servants and government employees in the fiscal 
years 1991 and 1992, initiated by the cabinet resolution dated 2 April, was seen by Wijit 
as urgent. He was also asked by the prime minister and deputy prime minister to develop 
a plan to overhaul the Gvil Service system. These mandates were known as part of the 
‘Civil Service Reform and Development Project (Project) ’ aiming to turn the Prime Minister’s 
policy speech into concrete measures.
Since the prime minister did not appoint a Gvil Service Reform Committee to 
work on the detail of reform proposals, as his predecessors had, the whole task was 
placed on Wijit’s shoulders. In working out the detail of the Project, Wijit formed a small 
Working Group on 29 April 1991. This group comprised exclusively high-level officials 
from the OCSC including the deputies and assistant secretary general. The BOB and the 
GGD which were normally present on Gvil Service related interdepartmental 
committees were not invited. As a senior official on the Working Group said: “It was our 
[OCSC] business, not theirs.”11 The absence of representatives from the other central co­
ordinating agencies in this preparation stage allowed OCSCs officials to shape the 
content and direction of the Project at will.
Although the OCSCs Working Group announced that the Project aimed ‘to 
modernise the Gvil Service, and to improve its efficiency, as well as the quality and 
standard of personnel within the Gvil Service the subjects they discussed were mainly 
public personnel issues. These ranged from restructuring the Gvil Service to shortening 
and speeding up work procedures, and from recruiting and promoting personnel to 
improving the civil service incentive system.12
While personnel issues related to the prime minister’s concern over ‘bureaucratic 
inefficiency’ were widely discussed, the issue of anti-corruption and civil service 
transparency, which were also part of his policy statement, were rarely mentioned. It was
11 Interview, anonymous OCSC official
12 Interview, Theerayuth Lorlertratana, OCSC
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at this stage that the anti-corruption issue was effectively pulled off the government 
agenda. Theerayudth Lorlertrat, a former deputy secretary general of the OCSC and a 
member of the Working Group not only described the situation as a matter of “where 
you stand is where you sit”, but also as a matter of “do-able”.13 In other words, the 
OCSC did not have direct jurisdiction over anti-corruption issues and they lacked 
expertise on how to handle them. The Project, according to the OCSQ contained both a 
short-term, immediate response and long-term reform strategies.
4.3.1 Freezing Civil Service employment and re-deploying staff
The short-term response was the freeze on civil service employment. Wijit had no 
difficulty in communicating the government policy on employment freezing and re­
deployment to the OCSCs top officials since controlling civil service growth had been 
their main manpower policy since Prem’s government. The OCSCs Working Group not 
only welcomed government policy but also enthusiastically pushed it further convincing 
Wijit that although the employment freezing and re-deployment policy applied only to 
‘ordinary civil servants and government employees’ under the personnel jurisdiction of 
the CSQ it should be extended to cover all government agencies under the control of 
other central personnel agencies as well. The OCSCs Working Group also suggested 
that this policy could be effectively enforced if the OCSC were to have decisive power 
on requests for staff increases.
In the CSC meeting on 20 May 1991, Wijit raised the concerns of his Working 
Group and received full support from the chairman, Meechai. The CSC on that occasion, 
therefore, agreed that, “for the purpose of effective control over Civil Service growth, 
other central personnel agencies should adopt the employment freezing and re­
deployment policy as well”. But those central personnel agencies would abide by this 
policy only if the cabinet ordered them to comply. Meechai, therefore, raised this issue 
in cabinet on 4 June 1991 and got approval with strong backing from the prime minister. 
The OCSC was successful in increasing its control over this aspect of manpower policy 
and consequently other central co-ordinating agencies lost their grip on increases in their 
staff.
The OCSC with the cabinet’s approval further encroached on the jurisdiction of 
other central personnel agencies by reserving decisions on exemption from the Cabinet 
Resolution on employment. The cabinet decided on 30 July 1991, that government
13 Ibid.
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agencies in real need of manpower increases, after attempting all possible alternatives of 
re-deployment must refer their ‘unavoidable need for staff increase’ to the CSC The 
CSC would then inform the cabinet where unavoidable requests could be authorised.
Changing personnel jurisdiction related to ‘employment freezing and re­
deployment strategy* led to further changes in the structure of the CSC and its routines. 
On 9 September 1991, the CSC established a ‘special sub-committee on staff increases* 
or the Special SubComrittee to perform new tasks emerging from this newly acquired 
authority. According to a personnel analyst involved in the request approval process, the 
OCSCs analysts were exclusively responsible for this task:
In practice, when government agencies [outside the jurisdiction of the CSC] 
requested exemption from the Cabinet Resolution [on employment freezing and 
re-deployment policies] to employ new staff for the fiscal years 1991 and 1992, 
they had to send their requests to the CSC, and we [the OCSC] would analyse 
those requests and submit our opinion to the Special SubComrrktee to approve. 
However, if the requests came from agencies under the CSC, the Subcommittee on 
Positions and Salaries, which was formally part of the CSC, would still be 
responsible for analysing them.14
To standardise the approval procedure for ‘unavoidable need’ manpower 
increases, the Special Subcommittee met on 8 October 1991 and agreed on the definition 
of the term ‘unavoidable need’ to be used as a guideline for the approval of such 
requests. According to the ‘Guidelinefor approud cfumwidable needs for manpower increase\ the 
Special SubCommittee would approve if the requests involved: “(a) tasks that were specified 
by government policy, or assigned by the cabinet to fulfil legal requirements, and their 
budgets were already approved. Failure to perform these tasks could cause damage to the 
government and Civil Service, (b) tasks that could not be privatised or contracted out to 
private companies, (c) tasks recently equipped with new machinery or technologies that 
needed more personnel to perform them, (d) tasks that resulted from establishing new 
units, divisions or departments, and (e) tasks that emerged from the increase in 
government functions involving tax collection and health service provision.”15 By the 
end of 1991 when this guideline was implemented, the ‘procedure for special request to 
increase staff for more than two per cent* was automatically cancelled.
14 Interview, Laddawan Tantithaguranonda, OCSC
15 Minutes of meeting of Special Sub-Committee, 8 October 1991 (5/2534).
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Since the OCSC got increasingly involved in the personnel request process of
other central personnel agencies, it proposed that personnel analysts from the OCSC
should be available to advise on how to effectively implement the policy on manpower 
freezing and re-deployment. By so doing, the OCSC offered ministries technical 
assistance involving, for instance, the techniques and methods of staff re-deployment and 
re-prioritisation of tasks. The aim of this assistance was to ensure that ministries 
maximised their existing staff before requesting more personnel.
The last aspect of procedural changes involved the report and monitoring system 
The OCSC required that permanent secretaries of ministries undertaking staff
reallocation or re-deployment, send their report to the OCSC within seven days of the 
ministries* Manpower Development Committees (MDQ approval of their re-deployment 
proposals. Tight control over the reporting system would enable the OCSC to monitor 
civil service manpower status effectively.
To make sure every ministry understood the policy on employment freezing and 
re-deployment and consequently abided by the same rules, the OCSC translated the two- 
page Cabinet Resolution into a thirty-four-page handbook. This provided detailed 
reasons for making staff re-deployment the first solution for staff shortages. It also 
contained procedures that ministries had to follow if they were to increase their staff. 
Handbooks were sent to every ministry on 21 May 1991.
After distributing the procedural handbook Wijit organised a meeting between 
the OCSCs top officials and heads of personnel divisions from all ministries on 31 May
1991. The aim of this meeting was to gain assurance that the policy message had got 
across to all ministries and that ‘implemented’ understood the new procedures. Wijit 
spelled out, in his opening session, the need for exercising tighter control over 
bureaucratic growth by reiterating the prime minister’s remarks:
Although the ‘two per cent policy* provides a framework for limiting growth, the 
Civil Service is still growing. If growth continues, it will be beyond the 
government’s capacity to improve civil service salaries and welfare benefits to the 
same level as the private sector. The only way the government would be able to 
do so is to delay new employment.16
At this session Wijit suggested that ministries could avoid new hiring by four 
methods: “First, to prioritise and then selectively eliminate those unnecessary jobs.
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Second, to simplify work processes and methods to reduce number of personnel needed 
to perform tasks. Third, to bring technology such as computers and other forms of 
information technology into government offices. Fourth, to privatise the jobs that private 
companies could probably perform better. These included cleaning, security and vehicle 
service and maintenance... ”17 He closed his opening statement by emphasising the role 
of the OCSC as the lead organisation responsible for executing this policy, but he also 
pledged immediate action from ministries:
‘Manpower allocation and re-deployment both within and between departments 
and ministries was an urgent measure, and it had to be implemented in such a 
manner according to the cabinet’s will Failing to do so would damage the Gvil 
Service’.18
The discussion at the meeting was dominated by details of the new procedure. 
The OCSC team also stood firm in a Question and Answer session. At the end of the 
meeting, Wilas Singhawisai, deputy secretary general and the OCSCs permanent 
secretary, admitted that this policy was not easy to implement: “Successful 
implementation had both arts and science elements. Leadership was so important that 
departments’ executives had to be very decisive on their own manpower issues.”19
4.3.2 Formulating a medium term plan for Civil Service reform
As well as its short-term measure, the employment freeze, the government aimed to 
improving the ‘Gvil Service system’, which was a longer-term project. “Improving the 
Gvil Service System” was one of Anand’s policies in his speech to the National 
Legislative Council on 4 April 1991. It became the most important mandate that Wijit 
was determined to achieve on becoming secretary general of the OCSC The point of 
departure for this reform project was to specify the direction of civil service reform and 
then to get cabinet agreement in principle. This was known among the OCSCs staff as 
Project Guideline. Theerayudth Lorlertrat, one of the OCSCs deputy secretary-generals on 
the Working Group, told how they went about formulating the Project Gidddim:
16 Minutes of meeting 31 May 1991.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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First, we extracted the government’s policy statement concerning public service 
improvement and broke it down into categories of issues in order to make it 
manageable and easy to consider appropriate solutions. Then we established 
working measures to achieve the improvement of the specified issues. These 
measures were precisely defined, and the methods or ‘how to’ were described.
Lastly, we specified activities that needed to be carried out.’20
This Guideline, as the same official recalled, was “developed from two combined 
sources: the prime minister’s policy aspiration, and the OCSCs ideas of improving public 
personnel functions aiming to consolidate the public personnel authorities.”21 Wijit 
accepted this Guideline from the outset as he saw it would enable him to achieve the 
prime minister’s mandate. Including the OCSCs own agenda in a large part of the 
Guideline would also please his senior officials carrying out the project.
Wijit and his Working Group managed to complete the Project Guideline within six 
weeks and it was published as a twenty-one-page booklet. It was composed of seven civil 
service policies, thirteen administrative issues, thirty-two measures and 109 ‘how to’ 
activities. In mid June 1991, the OCSC submitted it to the cabinet. Again, with the full 
backing from the prime minister and deputy prime minister Meechai, the cabinet 
approved the Guideline and its proposed reform direction.
But approval of the Project Guideline was only a stepping-stone for the OCSC to 
achieve its reform agenda. To ensure that the crucial issues of consolidating fragmented 
personnel jurisdiction, downsizing the Civil Service and improving Civil Service salaries 
and welfare benefits were realised, the OCSCs Working Group saw the need to strictly 
control the process of translating the Project Guideline into actionable plans.
A. Formulating the Plan for Improving the Civil Service System and Public 
Personnel Management
As we have seen, the development of the civil service reform Project Guideline was 
exclusively the brainchild of the OCSCs senior officials, and other personnel related 
agencies were excluded from the process. After the cabinet endorsed the Guideline,, the 
OCSC immediately set up another ten Working Groups comprising seventy-three middle 
and high-ranking officials drawn mainly from related divisions within the OCSC These
20 Interview Theerayudth Lorlertrat, OCSC
21 Ibid. The OCSC always opposed the diversification of central personnel agencies but failed to 
stop it. Some public administration academics in Thailand also called for their unification.
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working groups were asked to study and propose ways in which the Gvil Service could 
be improved. The OCSC also set a deadline of November 1991 for completion. It hoped 
that the cabinet would approve the reform proposal by the end of the year.
The tasks of these working groups were framed by the Guideline, which reflected 
the division of labour within the OCSC In effect, they were instructed to formulate 
reform proposals in such narrow but important areas as the role and responsibilities of 
the CSC and the OCSQ the organisation and staffing of the Gvil Service; the salary and 
welfare benefits system; the training and development system; the decentralisation of 
public personnel management; and the revision of the Gvil Service Act. The target areas 
for reform were well defined.
In formulating the ‘Plan for Improving the Gvil Service, three main issues were 
considered, measures for controlling civil service growth, improving administrative 
processes and improvements in personnel management. For members of the OCSCs 
working group, the most pressing problem was the excessive growth of the Gvil Service, 
though its size was not unduly large by Southeast Asian standards.22 In 1992 the Thai 
Gvil Service had approximately 1.2m employees, roughly two per cent of the total 
population. Improving the Gvil Service, for them, initially involved making the Gvil 
Service smaller or downsizing. The unanimous acceptance of ‘problem definition’ as well 
as their substantive knowledge of the issue directed the attention of the OCSCs working 
group to Gvil Service manpower policy, the first area they sought to reform. As one 
personnel analyst who later became head of the manpower planning unit put it:
We are familiar with the issue and problem [of Gvil Service growth]. We have 
information about the number of civil servants and employees, their position 
levels, and the increase in government structures. No doubt, that is to say, the 
OCSC already has the motivation to deal with this issue. And the transition to 
Anand’s administration opened up the opportunity for us to rigorously control 
Gvil Service growth.”23
By applying their ‘knowledge of organisational procedure* of Gvil Service 
manpower policy, the OCSC dominated working groups effectively. The limited policy 
alternatives they discussed were: how to control the proliferation of administrative
22 In 1992 Thailand’s public sector accounted for only 15.4 percent of GNP, lower than any 
other ASEAN country. Its Gvil Service size was broadly similar to Singapore, Korea, Indonesia 
and the Philippines, and less than Vietnam and Malaysia (Asian Development Bank 1999).
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structures, and numbers of civil servants and government employees. The working 
groups decided that one of the solutions to the problem of staff increases was to freeze 
Gvil Service recruitment, which was the short-term measure that Anand had introduced 
during his first months in office.
Since freezing civil service employment was the most decisive policy that the 
Thai government had ever made in this area, these working groups agreed that Anand’s 
initiative was to be continued for another five years: “throughout the period of the 
Seventh NESDB Plan starting from fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 1997, the government 
would not employ more civil servants or employees.”24 These working groups also 
suggested, “Manpower reallocation and redeployment should be attempted as the first 
alternative to recruitment.”25
In order to implement their recommendations effectively, the working group 
demanded that every government department reported the expected vacancies from 
retirement one year in advance to the CSC and related central personnel agencies. These 
central agencies, in turn, would examine and decide if the vacancies were to be filled, or 
to be allocated to understaffed units. The CSC, as it members argued in meetings, were 
to make decisions in relation to the task requirements of those government agencies.
As far as the diversification of administrative units was concerned, the OCSCs 
working group proposed that no new administrative units should be set up during the 
next five years between 1992-1997. However, the OCSCs desire to prevent the 
establishment of new administrative units at all levels was prevented by existing 
legislation related to state administration. As a result, the working group put forward the 
proposal that “ establishing any new ‘division’ would not allowed throughout the fiscal 
years 1992-1997 ”26
Another issue discussed by the OCSCs working group was exemptions. Despite 
the frustration caused by ‘policy loopholes’ that had contributed to the failure to 
implement reform in the past, the working groups acknowledged that the cabinet was to 
decide if the “unavoidable needs for employing new staff” requested by government 
agencies was to be approved. However, the OCSC insisted firmly “it was to be the only
23 Interview, Jarinee Iam-sa-ard, OCSC personnel analyst and head of manpower planning unit.
24 OCSC cabinet submission.
23 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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central personnel agency that advised the cabinet. Other personnel agencies wishing to 
be exempt from this restriction needed to submit such requests to the OCSC”27
Effective curbing of civil service growth depended largely on the available 
manpower information. The Working Group raised the problem that this information 
was scattered among various government agencies: “If manpower information and its 
reporting was to be used as crucial tool for controlling the increase in government 
personnel and for effective manpower planning, a manpower information centre had to 
be created.”28
While controlling the manpower information and its reporting could have meant 
a symbolic victory over other agencies, the OCSCs working groups were well aware that 
other central coordinating agencies, namely the GGD had equally significant information 
on the number of personnel and their costs. As much as the OCSC wanted to centralise 
the reporting system, it could not do so at will. As a result, the working group suggested 
that: “the OCSC and the CGD jointly were to be the centre for reviewing civil service 
manpower status, and analysing manpower utilisation and public personnel costs.”29 
They were also required to produce a yearly report for the cabinet.
Although the OCSC could not monopolise manpower information, the working 
groups agreed that the OCSC was to play a decisive role in determining and controlling 
the overall number of government personnel at the macro-level. Its immediate task, as 
the Working Group suggested, was to work closely with the NESDB to forecast and 
formulate a civil service manpower plan for the fiscal years 1992 -  1996. It was for this 
task that the OCSC claimed that a ‘Manpower Information Centre* needed to be 
established under its umbrella, and that it was to provide ministries and departments with 
its standards and practice for manpower planning.
The OCSCs working groups also discussed early retirement as a means of 
encouraging civil servants and government employees to leave voluntarily so as to 
downsize the Gvil Service. This solution, previously discussed in the cabinet meeting on 
2 April 1991, was strongly advocated by both the OCSC and the ministry of finance. 
However, since the idea was new to the Thai government it needed more careful 
thought. The working group therefore suggested that the OCSC and the CGD should 
work closely with related central personnel agencies to “study and formulate an ‘Early
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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Retirement Project’ aiming to reduce the number of civil servants”. It took more than 
five years for this project to move off the drawing board.
Although the ‘Plan for improving the Gvil Service system and public personnel 
management’ consisted mainly of measures for controlling civil service growth other 
measures were also incorporated. As a former civil servant and executive in the private 
sector, Anand announced from the beginning that bureaucratic red tape was to be cut. 
Apart from advocating the notion of “transparency” that had become prominent 
previously, but later on faded on his agenda, Anand was well known for his “efficient 
approach to management”. The prime minister’s reputation was then translated into 
tangible actions by the OCSCs Working Group. They defined the “concentration of 
decision making power” at the top of departments and ministries as a potential source of 
bureaucratic red tape, and hence reduced administrative efficiency. They called for the 
delegation of decision making to lower levels. Another recommendation involved 
shortening the decision making process: “Any approval process needed to be redesigned 
in order that there were no more than two levels of filtering before issues reached 
decision makers.”30 To achieve this the working group agreed that the OCSC was “to 
systematise and standardise the decision allocation system for the whole Gvil Service.”31
As the prime objective of restructuring work processes was to improve public 
service delivery, the OCSC Working Group encouraged office automation by every 
government agency. Since this project contained both technical and managerial aspects, 
the working group suggested that the OCSC, BOB and the ministry of finance jointly 
conduct the feasibility study.
Among measures included in the Plan for Improving the Gvil Service System 
and Public Personnel Management, issues involving personnel management processes 
were broadly recommended. The reason for this was given by one OCSC official as “a 
move to delegate personnel power at the operational level to line agencies and other 
central personnel agencies.”32 The OCSCs Working Group enumerated ways to improve 
recruitment, selection and appointment processes. They did not suggest anything other 
than “calling for every central personnel agency to improve what they had already been 
doing.”33 But strategically incorporated within this section of the proposal was a clause
30 Ibid.
Ibid.
32 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
33 Interview, anonymous OCSC personnel analyst.
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that gave the OCSC the leading role in improving ‘the employment termination system* 
to enable the removal of under-performing civil servants and employees.34.
The last and most abstract part of the proposed reform plans involved training, 
development and maintaining the merit system. The working groups emphasized that 
training and development was to be considered as investment in human resources and 
that the OCSC was to be the centre for developing and improving training programmes. 
They also called for stricter disciplinary action, the promotion of public service ethics 
and maintaining the honour of a civil service career.
In October 1991, no more than four months after the reform project started, the 
OCSCs Working Group completed their draft proposal. During that period, the OCSCs 
acting Secretary General, Wijit showed strong leadership and commitment to the 
process. As one of the OCSCs senior officials reported: “He was well informed and 
regularly met with working groups to review the progress many times a week, including 
on weekends and after office hours.”35
The downsizing reform outcome of the policy making process was an 
employment freeze, the ‘Plan for Improving the Civil Service System and Public 
Personnel Management*, initially as a short term measure but quickly adopted for the 
medium term  It was the result of strong political direction in the policy making process 
by Wijit and Meechai and the commitment of civil servants in the OCSC Both 
politicians and the OCSC shared a common interest in and strong commitment to 
controlling civil service growth, at the expense of the other central co-ordinating agencies 
and line ministries. The OCSC was able to enhance its power and status by securing tight 
control over manpower policy in the reform proposal.
4.4 Approving the Plan for Improving the G vil Service System
Since the draft proposal involved issues that could be controversial among the general 
public and civil servants in particular, the OCSC needed support to ensure the draft 
proposal was acceptable to all parties involved. To gain acceptance, the OCSC organised 
a two-day seminar at Pattaya on 19-20 October 1991. High-ranking bureaucrats from 
every ministry and central government agencies, and academics and experts on the Civil 
Service and public personnel management were invited. The aim was to make a final
34 OCSC cabinet submission.
35 Interview, Theerayudth Lorlertrat, OCSC
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review before submitting the draft proposal to the cabinet. Deputy prime minister, 
Meechai, chairman of the CSC, presided over this two-day forum.
During the seminar, participants discussed many points and eventually agreed in 
principle with the OCSCs draft proposal. Consequently, the OCSC did not make any 
major changes to the draft and successfully secured its own reform direction, especially 
on employment freezing.
Another form of political support came from the prime minister himself. 
Although Anand was not present at the seminar, he was closely informed about the 
reform project. But the critical moment, as the then deputy secretary general called ‘the 
opening of a window of opportunity*, was on 2 December 1991 when the prime minister 
visited the OCSC Wijit and his deputies took the opportunity during the lunch meeting 
between the prime minister and the OCSCs senior officials to brief Anand on the 
progress of the draft proposal. Anand was said to be satisfied with what was told.36
Having gained support from both civil servants and leading politicians, the 
OCSC was confident enough to submit the Reform Proposal to the cabinet for 
consideration. Without any hurdles, it gained approval on 7 January 1992. On 10 January 
1992, the cabinet’s Secretariat Office then circulated a formal Cabinet Resolution on 
‘Measures to Improve the Civil Service System and Public Personnel Management’ to 
ministries, central agencies, and public personnel agencies. As the resolution was an 
executive order, all government agencies were obliged to abide by it.
The ‘Resolution on Improving the Gvil Service System’ not only represented the 
fruit of the OCSCs effort over the past year, but also signalled the time for changing its 
leadership. Wijit, who had promised to return to his former post after completing the 
Rtform Project, kept his promise by requesting Anand to transfer him back to his former 
role as permanent secretary of the Ministry of University Affairs. He resumed his old 
post on 3 February 1992, and the cabinet then appointed Wilas Singahavisai, an OCSC 
deputy secretary general as the OCSCs general secretary.
Wilas’s path to the top of the OCSC might well have been smooth, but the path 
of implementing Cabinet Resolution on Improving the Gvil Service System, a pet project 
jointly shaped by him when he was in the OCSCs Working Group, was not.
36 Ibid.
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4.5 Reformulating the Cabinet Resolution
A few months after the circulation of the ‘Cabinet Resolution on Improving the Civil 
Service System* to all government agencies, it emerged that some agencies faced 
difficulties in implementing it. These difficulties stemmed mainly from the employment 
freezing and redeployment measures, an issue the OCSC wished to have a firm grip on. 
The action came from both central co-ordinating agencies with overlapping personnel 
jurisdictions and from some line ministries.
The problem first came from the BOB, which claimed that the Cabinet 
Resolution undermined its authority over public personnel management. In its memo 
dated 4 June 1992, the BOB reiterated its jurisdiction over and responsibility for hiring 
and firing “government permanent employees.”37 But in the Cabinet Resolution based 
on the OCSCs proposal, their responsibility was shifted and reassigned to the OCSC 
The BOB wanted the cabinet to reassure it that its authority over this employment was 
not encroached on, and the Cabinet Secretariat to clarify its concern and inform 
government agencies accordingly.
A month after the BOB’s reaction, the University Affairs Minister wrote to the 
Cabinet Secretary in his capacity as chairman of the University Personnel Commission. 
In his letter dated 27 July 1992, he opposed what other central personnel agencies had 
accepted, the OCSCs increased role in filtering requests for employing more staff. He 
wrote:
The Ministry of University Affairs has been very prudent in increasing 
personnel. The University Personnel Commission (UPC) had only approved 
requests that had real needs in order that we had enough staff to deal with our 
responsibilities. The Cabinet Resolution on Improving the Gvil Service System 
by allotting to the CSC the authority to double check requests, has complicated 
the process and caused repetition since both the UPC and the BOB had already 
approved requests. This ran against the policy on cutting red tape and shortening 
work procedures that the government also wants to promote.38
This led the University Affairs Minister to ask the cabinet to review the Resolution and 
reconsider if “the double check process conducted by the CSC could be lifted.”39
37 See chapter 2 for types of personnel in the Thai Gvil Service.
38 Ministry of University Affairs letter to the Cabinet Secretariat Office, 27 July 1992.
3,9 Ibid.
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Another problem of implementation, also brought up by the Ministry of 
University Affairs, was that the nature of its ministry was different from other 
government agencies, and that the Resolution on employment freezing could not be 
realistically applied. The minister therefore requested that the Resolution on employment 
freezing was not imposed on universities.40
Upon receiving counter arguments from the BOB and the UPC, the cabinet 
secretary asked the OCSC to draw up a response for the cabinet. The OCSC made clear 
its intention in its cabinet submission dated 6 August 1992 that “the need for the CSC to 
double check staff requests was a response to the failure to control manpower increases 
in the past.”41 It argued that within a short period of implementation, the new practices 
had proved effective, although stricter control was still needed:
The cabinet had assigned the OCSC with the power to filter requests for real and 
unavoidable recruiting, in order to control civil service growth effectively. In the 
past fiscal year (1991-1992), the OCSC received 5241 such requests, but only 
3217 of them or 61.38 % were approved. The rest were scrapped. 42
The OCSC went on to aigue for double-checking by pointing out other central 
personnel agencies, which were, in practice, not effective enough in controlling their 
personnel increases and filtering requests. As a result, government agencies always asked 
for exemptions. However, the OCSC responded to the remarks of the BOB and the 
UPC positively.
The OCSC agreed that the BOB should resume the role of controlling requests 
for increasing “government permanent employees”. It also took the UPCs point about 
cutting administrative red tape further by suggesting that “the cabinet should allot power 
on this matter to central personnel agencies”, a move which reduced the cabinet’s power 
to approve requests for recruitment. It said: “To simplify the decision making process 
and relieve the cabinet’s burden, government agencies do not need to submit requests 
already approved by their central personnel agencies to the cabinet.”43 The OCSC also 
supported this because by doing so government agencies and central personnel agencies 
would be motivated by a sense of self-responsibility.
40 In the Cabinet Resolution, requests for increasing teaching and research staff in competitive 
areas were allowed.
41 OCSC letter to the Cabinet Secretariat Office, 6 August 1992.
« Ibid.
« Ibid.
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There were two points, however, that the OCSC insisted upon. First, although it 
agreed that “the policy on employment freezing and re-deployment was not to apply to 
medical personnel, as well as teaching and research staff in universities, administrative 
personnel working in universities were to comply with the Resolution.” Second, it 
insisted that “at the end of every fiscal year, other central personnel agencies must report 
to the OCSC numbers of requests for unavoidable recruitment requirements approved 
and any re-deployment cases. The aim of this was to monitor, analyse and evaluate 
manpower management from a macro perspective. It was also the OCSCs responsibility 
to report on manpower utilisation in the Gvil Service to the cabinet”.44
When the cabinet met on 8 September 1992, they approved the OCSCs 
submission. To reinforce this, a cabinet ruling generated two changes in manpower 
practices. First, central personnel agencies were successful in preventing the OCSCs 
attempt to encroach their jurisdiction. This resulted from the fact that the cabinet and 
the OCSC allotted them power over the approval of requests for unavoidable needs to 
increase personnel. Second, when such responsibility was handed back to other central 
personnel agencies the Special Sub-Cotrmssion, set up as part of the CSC to consider 
special requests from other central personnel agencies, was disbanded.
The resolution on Improving the Gvil Service System' was the last of its kind 
before the general election was held in March 1992. But before Anand handed over to 
the new elected government, which was expected to be inaugurated in May 1992, he 
managed to amend the Gvil Service Act, 1975. This was one of the most important 
events in the history of reform in the Thai Gvil Service.
At the decision making stage there was a ‘turf war’ between the OCSC and other 
central co-ordinating agencies and line departments over control of manpower. The 
OCSC was forced to make concessions by the cabinet and allow them control over 
‘unavoidable needs’ increases in personnel. Ironically though the employment freeze was 
in part the result of political control of the policy making process one of the 
consequences of it was that the cabinet specifically and politicians in general lost their 
power to control the increase in civil service staff.
44 Ibid.
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4.6 Amending the G vil Service Act (1975) and Related Acts
Most of the issues incorporated in the Plan for Inproring the Ciril Serrice System, as we have 
seen, were carried out by Cabinet Resolutions and Prime Minister’s Orders. Since most 
of those issues involved changes in the executive branch, the cabinet reserved the right 
to change or cancel these resolutions or orders as they wished. However, some issues, 
which the OCSCs Working Group had suggested, required changes in legislation 
concerning the jurisdiction of government agencies. This kind of change normally 
needed parliamentary approval.
The idea of reforming civil service legislation was familiar to OCSC officials.45 
When Wijit was appointed as acting secretary general in April 1991, he was told by his 
senior bureaucrats that: “If the civil service reform project was to be carried out 
effectively and yield good results, the OCSC needed to be empowered.”46 The reform- 
minded acting general secretary was convinced by the OCSCs senior officials that the 
Reform Project, which was his most important mandate, would not achieve its intended 
aims unless civil service legislation was reformed.
In persuading Wijit of the need for legal reform the OCSCs senior officials 
related the issue of civil service employment freezing, high on the prime minister’s 
agenda, to the need for legislative amendments. They claimed that “failure to control the 
proliferation of administrative units resulted from the fact that central agencies had no 
clear legal responsibility to carry out administrative restructuring, despite that fact, the 
OCSC had to deal with the consequence of the Gvil Service’s overgrowth.”47
The two acts the OCSCs officials wanted to see amended were the Organisation 
of State Administration Act (1932) and the Gvil Service Act (1975). These provided the 
legal basis for organising and structuring government institutions, as well as managing 
public personnel. According to the OCSC, changing some articles of these acts to 
increase its jurisdiction would be essential for effective civil service reform.'
Wijit agreed with the OCSC on this on the grounds that it was consistent with 
government policy. One of Anand’s strategies was to cut down bureaucratic red tape and 
inefficiency. As he declared to the National Legislative Council on 4 April 1991, there 
was a need to reform outdated legislation. Wijit also believed that his immediate boss 
Meechai who was also involved government-wide legal reform would lend full support.
45 The Gvil Service Act had had minor amendments in the past.
46 Personal communication, OCSC officials.
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4.6.1 Amending the State Administration Act (1932)
The OCSC and the BOB used the amendment of the Organisation of State 
Administration Act and the Gvil Service Act as a tool for strengthening the power of the 
Gvil Service in general, and for expanding their domains over civil service policy and 
public personnel management. In the past, neither the BOB nor the OCSC had direct 
responsibility over the establishment of new government agencies above divisional level. 
If the government wanted to set up new departments or ministries, the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat Office initiated the administrative procedure. This involved seeking the 
OCSCs and the BOB’s opinions in relation to personnel and budgetary matters 
respectively. In contrast to the earlier period when the Prime Minister’s Administrative 
Reform Committee existed and played a crucial role in providing advice for the cabinet, 
there was no reform committee in 1991-1992.
The need to control the burgeoning of governmental organisations led the 
OCSCs senior bureaucrats on Wijit’s Working Group to assert that increasing the 
OCSCs role by having more say on the issue of setting up new ministries or departments 
would increase their capacity to deal with the problem of civil service growth and to 
position itself as the true guardian of the Gvil Service and merit system
To make the amendment acceptable to the cabinet, the OCSCs Working Group 
formed alliances with the BOB, which shared the same interest in controlling 
bureaucratic diversification. OCSCs officials raised the issue in May 1991. They 
encouraged representatives from the BOB who were invited to discuss this particular 
issue to join them in changing the Organisation of State Administration Act (1932). They 
agreed that it needed to be amended in order that the OCSC and the BOB had the legal 
right to advise the cabinet directly on the issue of restructuring governmental 
organisation. One of the OCSC officials saw this as logical move since both agencies 
were involved in controlling human and financial resources.48
After agreeing on the proposed changes, the OCSCs Working Group started 
drafting the amended bill. After working closely with deputy prime minister Meechai in 
the drafting process, their proposals for the new bill were fully endorsed and the cabinet 
agreed to proceed with the deliberation process in the National Legislative Assembly. On 
6 March 1992, the Assembly passed the new Organisation of State Administration Act 
(1991) in which Article 7 stipulated that the OCSC and the BOB had the duty to advise 
the cabinet on the structural design of government departments. The new act not only
47 Ibid.
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re-emphasized the role of the OCSC in providing necessary manpower and the BOB in 
allocating budgets, but ultimately also provided considerable administrative power for 
both agencies to inform cabinet decisions. After working closely with line departments, 
the OCSC and the BOB would submit their opinions to the cabinet for approval
4.6.2 Amending the Civil Service Act (1975)
The Civil Service Act (1975) was a major source of the OCSCs jurisdiction. It provided 
the legal basis for all aspects of personnel management in the public sector. Amending 
the Gvil Service Act therefore was another important activity that the OCSCs Working 
Group aimed to achieve as part of their reform project.
The OCSCs Working Group began reviewing the act in April 1991. As the single 
central agency responsible for implementing this Act, the OCSCs Working Group could 
propose changes to their own advantage without involving other central agencies. Their 
aim was, reported one OCSC official, “to expand our authority over the management of 
the Gvil Service, and reduce political influence over the appointment of senior 
bureaucrats.**49 To expand its authority, the OCSCs senior officials wanted to 
incorporate in the act that their office should oversee the whole issue of civil service 
management. This, according to an OCSCs deputy secretary general, would shift the 
OCSCs role from performing personnel administration at the operational level as they 
had in the past, to performing an advisory role on wider civil service policy issues for the 
whole Gvil Service. They also proposed that the scope of the new act was expanded to 
include all kinds of government civilian personnel regardless of their respective central 
personnel agencies.
During the drafting process, the OCSCs Working Group was concerned to 
ensure that particularly important issues such as human resources planning and structural 
and procedural reforms across governmental organisations were subject to the OCSCs 
jurisdiction. This placed the OCSC at the gateway to the cabinet. As a result, the OCSC 
was to be the single agency to advise the cabinet and the prime minister on all issues 
related to the management of the Gvil Service.
The OCSC not only attempted to expand its jurisdiction, but also to increase its 
responsibility within the Gvil Service as a whole, by reducing politicians’ power to 
appoint senior civil servants. It claimed that civil servants especially those in senior ranks 
had long suffered from unfair treatment by their political masters. According to article 44
48 Interview, anonymous OCSC official
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of the Gvil Service Act (1975), ministers could appoint or transfer permanent secretaries 
of ministries, director generals and deputy director generals of departments. The OCSC 
echoed the opinion of the majority of civil servants that political interference in the 
neutrality of the bureaucracy was a serious problem.
Political interference over the appointment and transfer of senior bureaucrats, 
according to the OCSCs Working Group, should be reduced by limiting ministers’ 
powers of appointment to the most senior posts in ministries, permanent secretaries and 
secretary-generals only. Permanent secretaries were to have their own managerial right to 
appoint or transfer their own staff. This suggestion was to make permanent secretaries 
accountable to ministers on the one hand, but also to increase power of the former and 
was seen by the Working Group as a way to insulate civil servants from ill-intentioned 
politicians. These changes appeared in article 25 of the bill.
After months of drafting, the cabinet agreed to the draft legislation at a meeting 
in July 1991. The bill was then sent to await the approval of the National Legislative 
Council where hundreds of other bills were in a queue. Eventually the Assembly passed 
the new Gvil Service Act (1992) on 6 March 1992 and it became effective on 1 April 
1992 when Thai civil servants were celebrating the 64th Gvil Service Day. The new 
formal jurisdiction acquired from these two amended acts prompted many senior OCSC 
officials including Theerayuth, then deputy secretary general, to claim that “all matters 
regarding administrative and structural reform [establishing new departments] were the 
sole responsibility of the OCSC”50
The legislative stage of Anand’s civil service reform policy was a triumph for the 
Gvil Service in its struggle with politicians. The State Administration Act (1991) and the 
Gvil Service Act (1992) strengthened the Gvil Service in general and the central co­
ordinating agencies in particular, especially the OCSC Together these acts reinforced the 
Thai Gvil Service’s position as an ‘autonomous’ bureaucracy with a ‘systemic public 
service bargain’.
49 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
50 Interview, Theerayudth Lorlertrat, OCSC Borwomwattana (1994), secretary of the SADC in 
the mid 1990s, noted that some senior OCSC officials showed strong resistance to the creation 
of the Administrative Reform Committee, an alternative source of advice to the Prime Minister 
on administrative reform. Borwomwattana also recorded the first test case of Gvil Service power 
the Ministry of Industry in January 1993. The secretary general of the Industry Ministry exercised 
the power conferred on him by the new Gvil Service Act by refusing to remove the director 
general of the Department of Mineral Resources who was in conflict with the Industry Minister. 
The only way the minister could remove him was to ask the cabinet to transfer the secretary 
general to an inactive post and replace him with his own candidate.
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4.7 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Civil Service Policy Making
This chapter provide a narrative of rationalisation of the Thai Gvil Service during 1991-
1992. It traces the trajectory and outcome of civil service policy making under Anand’s 
authoritarian government. The trajectory and outcome of civil service policy making in 
this period is historically significant because it was one of the most important civil service 
reform efforts in the history of modem Thai administrative reform. Despite the short life 
of the government, civil service policy during this period underwent considerable change. 
Such change included major civil service reform policies, programmes and plans as ‘Plan 
for Improving the Gvil Service System and Public Personnel Management*.
To gain insight into the civil service policymaking process in this period, this 
concluding section elaborates explanations for the development of the reform trajectory 
and outcome by making a dialogue between the narrative evidence and the institutional 
and processual conceptual compass. In this light the analytical components of public 
policy process, agenda setting, alternative specification and decision making, will be re­
capitulated.
4.7.1 Agenda Setting
The civil service reform issue gained political attention and was included on the 
government’s policy agenda from the outset of the interim government established by 
the military coup leaders. Immediately after Anand assumed office as prime minister, the 
civil service reform issue was formulated solely in terms of the creation of clean and 
transparent government with the ultimate aim to deter and punish corruption. However, 
a few months later, another civil service reform issue emerged: the rationalisation of civil 
service management with particular focus on the improvement of public personnel 
management. In this period, both issues of government transparency and bureaucratic 
rationalisation attained high status on Anand’s government agenda during an intense 
nine-month period of civil service policymaking process.
The civil service reform issue was included on Anand’s government agenda was a 
result of the political dynamics of organising the interim government by the NPKG It 
can be said that the 1991 coup and the establishment of an interim government opened 
up a ‘window of opportunity* for civil service reform issues in general (Kingdon, 1984) 
and hence its high status and salience. The explanation of the high status of the 
‘transparency issue’ reflects the fact that the issue was the coup’s principal justification. 
Such justification helped retain its inclusion and status on the agenda even when the
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‘rationalisation the Gvil Service issue’ was emerged due to a new development, tight 
budget restrictions. The issue also gained high political attention and hence its high status 
on Anand’s policy agenda.
The co-existence of these two civil service reform issues with equally high status 
can be explained by the characteristics of the issues themselves as well as how Anand’s 
government appropriated the imperatives of the situation facing his government. With 
regards to the first explanation, the issues of civil service rationalisation and ‘anti­
corruption* were ‘non-contradictory* which allowed them to have their own ‘issue 
careers’. Since these issues were to process in different ‘policy venues’ (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993), the rationalisation issue in the civil service policy subsystem and the 
corruption issue in the legal enforcement agencies including the Anti-Corruption Bureau, 
the Attorney General, the police and the courts, there was no ‘bottleneck of attention* 
(Simon, 1985). As a result, the two issues co-existed.
The co-existence of the ‘transparency issue* and the ‘rationalisation issue’ is also 
explained by the way in which prime minister Anand appropriated the dynamics of the 
situations he faced and how he responded to them. Such situations included the 
realisation of the coup’s rationales and the emergence of new fiscal problems. After a few 
months attempting to ‘clean up’ corrupt politicians and civil servants, Anand foresaw a 
gloomy situation resulting from lengthy, complicated and ineffective legal processes and 
eventually came to the view that fighting corruption would be futile.51 However, the 
incorporation of the new ‘rationalisation issue’, which was perceived by Anand as equally 
important on his policy agenda, did not result in a status change of the ‘corruption issue* 
due to its issue salience. Together, both issues made the status of civil service reform 
high in this short authoritarian period.
51 At the Round-Table Discussion of Harvard Club Thailand, on 5 September 1991, Anand 
showed his disappointment with the legal processes: 1 couldn’t remember how many ministers, 
permanent secretaries, directors, or military officers were found guilty of corruption and got 
punished. I thought less than ten. We have never had a legal or administrative structure to 
investigate and punish corrupt officials. In addition, if there are still bribe givers and receivers, 
and if we still respect rich people notwithstanding their sources of wealth, whatever legal or 
administrative structure we create would not solve the corruption problem. I am sad. I have no 
further answer... ’ Anand also brushed the issue aside when asked if he had any plan to promote 
transparency “I don’t want people to think that the transparency policy belongs only to this 
government. Policy regarding public transparency must be embedded in every government. We 
need to establish some framework to work towards this aim... Even if we have this, my 
government and I are not in a position to impose any anti-corruption measures that can change 
the minds of those who are inclined to be corrupt.”
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Before proceeding to discuss the dynamics process of alternative specification 
and decision making, the ‘images’ of civil service reform issues need to be considered 
since the narrative indicates that ‘issue images’ shaped reform choices. The appropriation 
of the pressing problem of realising the ‘anti-corruption issue* and the emerging issue of 
fiscal restriction gave rise to two issue images: clean and transparent government and 
bureaucratic efficiency. As discussed above, the first image was politically driven and 
shaped; the second image was formulated by the central co-ordinating agencies especially 
the OCSC As a people and organisation centred central agency, its role, missions and 
jurisdictions concerning efficient civil service management and good manpower 
management practice played a crucial part in formulating the issue image. Translating the 
government’s problems with budget constraints into an ‘efficiency image* can be seen as 
the OCSCs aspiration to realise its own jurisdictions one of which was curtailing the 
growth of the Civil Service which had not been achieved despite the enforcement of the 
two per cent policy since Prem’s administration in early 1980. By putting forward the 
definition and image of reform this way, the civil service reform alternatives were 
expanded greatly from Anand’s initial rhetoric of efficiency improvement, the private 
management recipe that Anand tried to bring to the Gvil Service.
4.7.2 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
The narrative of Anand’s civil service reform reveals that the pace and rate at which the 
proposal for reforming the Gvil Service was developed was fast resulting in the effective 
development of major reform plans including ‘Plan for Improving the Gvil Service 
System and Public Personnel Management’ within nine months. The fast process of 
alternative specification in this episode helped maintain the momentum of the civil 
service reform issue and its possibility that the issue would be adopted in the decision 
making process. This section explains in the light of an institutional and processual 
analysis how and why reform choices of improving bureaucratic efficiency and 
containing the growth of the Gvil Service were adopted and why the alternative 
specification process progressed in a fast manner.
The reform choice of improving bureaucratic efficiency and the fast paced 
process of developing the ‘Plan for Improving the Gvil Service System and Public 
Personnel Management* within nine months can be attributed to the certification of 
reform agents and the intensity of their reform effort. The bureaucratic efficiency 
improvement issue was assigned to the OCSC with a clear political message of the prime
124
minister’s reform aspiration. The process was carefully crafted by certifying (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly, 2001) principal reformers including Deputy Prime Minister Meechai 
and the choice of the newly appointed OCSCs secretary general, Professor Wijit. In this 
sense, Anand utilised the usual ‘action channels’ such as the CSC and its secretariat the 
OCSC for making and implementing civil service policy.
The certification of the OCSC as the main reform agency shaped the reform 
choices leading to the adoption of a rationalisation programme. Rationalising the Civil 
Service became a quick reform choice because of the combined impact of the perceived 
need to respond to the short term situation of budget constraint, as well as the fulfilling 
the agency’s role of managing civil service manpower. Its role was largely built on the 
prudent fiscal tradition of the Thai government implemented since the early 1900s and 
long been advocated by the central co-ordinating agencies including the OCSC, the BOB 
and the CGD. Certifying the OCSC helped invoke and adopt programmatic reform 
choices embedded in the role and routines of managing the Civil Service and its 
manpower.52 Although adopting the OCSCs programmatic reform choices limited the 
possibility of adopting other reform alternatives, it explains the fast paced development 
of the ‘Plan for Improving the Gvil Service System and Public Personnel Management’ 
as a solution for reform, which had been embedded in the OCSCs routines and standard 
procedures.
The reform pace during Anand’s period can also be explained by the intensity of 
the certified reformers’ efforts. The certified reform actors served as main reform agents 
for the prime minister in the civil service policy domain. They were committed to their 
assignment and engaging themselves in the development of reform proposal process. As 
the narrative shows, this intensity was evident in the design process in the frequent and 
lengthy meetings between responsible bureaucrats in the OCSC and its acting secretary 
general Wijit, a political choice. In addition, Wijit and his deputies maintained the 
momentum of reform alternative specification process by organising multiple meetings 
where work in progress was discussed with Deputy Prime Minister Meechai, and a 
culminating event where Prime Minister Anand was briefed in detail by bureaucrat
52 Bureaucratic routines are ways of organising and performing work in the Gvil Service. They 
are patterns of behaviour that are constrained by rules, roles and resources. Embedded within 
bureaucratic routines is both substantive and procedural knowledge about human resources 
management and organisation of the Gvil Service. This knowledge promptly specifies the OCSC 
with the role of taking care of the human resources issue in the Gvil Service. For the general 
concept of routines see Allison (1999) and Cyert and March (1963) on standard operating 
procedures; March and Simon (1993) on performance programmes; and Nelson and Winter 
(1982) on organisational routines.
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reformers in the OCSC The successful maintenance of process momentum by timely 
feedback contributed to the completion of a major reform proposal in the specified time 
frame, which was successfully adopted by Anand’s government as the government, was 
the main reform sponsor.
By tracing the alternative specification and the adoption of ‘Plan for Improving 
the Civil Sendee System and Public Personnel Management’, the narrative reveals the 
effective performance of certified reformers on both the government and the Gvil 
Service sides. These reformers can be considered as ‘reform entrepreneurs’ as they 
invested their resources and energy to influence the civil service reform proposals. In 
effect, they shaped the reform trajectory and outcome of civil service reform during 
Anand’s administration by promoting the reform issue, manipulating the issue 
formulation process and organising the reform alternative specification process. The 
narrative reveals that at least two types of entrepreneurs existed: ‘political and 
administrative entrepreneurs’.53 Anand and Meechai played an entrepreneurial role in the 
pre-decisional stage of civil service reform by promoting reform issues and images of 
anti-corruption and efficiency improvement as well intervening in organising and 
certifying reform actors can be described as ‘political entrepreneurs*. Wijit and senior 
bureaucrats in the OCSC played important roles in translating political aspirations into a 
reform proposal. They exploited the opportunity by expanding and realising the broad 
but ambiguous bureaucratic efficiency issue with their own advocacy of ‘downsizing 
related programmes and improving related human resources management practices’ and 
can be dubbed as bureaucratic entrepreneurs.54
The dynamics of civil service policy making under Anand’s administration, 
especially the rationalisation of the Gvil Service, operated against a background of
53 Administrative entrepreneur is defined as the holder of an office in the Gvil Service who is 
instrumental in the promotion, adoption and implementation of new combinations of policy, 
process and organisational innovations. Political entrepreneur is defined as the holder of an 
office in government or a politician certified by the government who is instrumental in 
promotion, adoption and implementation of new combinations of policy, process and 
organisational innovations. The distinction is analytically useful since, in large measure, different 
types of entrepreneurs contributed to different processes of Gvil Service reform.
54 They can also be called ‘issue entrepreneurs’ as they were mainly involved the facilitation of the 
issue translation process (Eyestone, 1987). Campbell (1989) points out that issue sponsorship in 
most cases is taken on by agencies and most policy entrepreneurs are bureaucrats. Identifying 
individual bureaucratic entrepreneurs in the reform narrative of the Thai case is problematic as 
entrepreneurial functions were often filled collectively. It would therefore be best to refer to an 
‘institutional entrepreneur’. See Tabb (1995) for the concept of institutional entrepreneur. 
Agencies that play entrepreneurial roles are therefore called ‘entrepreneurial agencies’ (Brintnall, 
1979).
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competition to control the Gvil Service by the government and the Gvil Service, albeit 
implicit competition. In this competition, Anand’s government was successful in 
reorganising the civil service policymaking structure by changing and certifying leading 
reform actors, which resulted in the successful development of the ‘Plan for Improving 
the Gvil Service System and Public Personnel Management*. This plan represented 
Anand’s administrative policy after the corruption issue was left with high status but 
without much intervention and action. On the bureaucrat reformers* side, the OCSC was 
successful in creating routines in manpower planning and reporting practices, which 
would be instrumental in controlling the growth of the Gvil Service, and hence reducing 
personnel costs. It also successful in institutionalising and increasing bureaucratic powers 
by amending the Gvil Service Act that provided the rules of engagement between the 
two. Such success resulted in an increase in the capacity for making and implementing 
civil service policies. Although the narrative and the discussion above gives credit to both 
political and bureaucratic entrepreneurs in moving civil service policy forward, in this 
episode it seems that bureaucrats won the ‘reform battle’ by shifting away decisions for 
reform from politicians.
Chapter 5 
Curbing the Size of the Civil Service: 
Administrative Reform as an Alternative to Political Reform, 1992-95
Overview
At the end of military rule in 1992 democratic governance was resumed when Chaun 
Leekpai, leader of the Democrat Party, won the general election in September 1992 and 
formed a coalition government.1 Gvil Service reform under Chaun’s government 
between 1992 and 1995 was characterised by the coexistence of two policies a broad 
effort to ‘democratise civil service administration’ and specific ‘changes in human 
resource management policy’. The outcome of the former effort was a reform package 
aiming to reform the state administration in line with democratic principles. These 
included restructuring the Gvil Service, improving its performance and service quality, 
decentralising administrative powers to regional and local administrations and promoting 
public-private partnerships in social and economic development. The outcome of the 
latter included the ‘Measures to Control the Size of the Gvil Service* aiming to downsize 
Gvil Service personnel. The measures included the prevention line ministries and 
departments from recruiting new staff by imposing complicated personnel rules, as well 
as an effort to institutionalise manpower policy and planning in the Gvil Service.
The primary aim of this chapter is to trace the development of civil service 
reform trajectories and outcomes under Chaun’s government. It seeks to explain why, 
despite the government’s comprehensive effort to ‘democratise the civil service 
administration’, downsizing, specifically the ‘Measures to Control the Size of the Gvil 
Service*, was the only sustained reform effort resulting in piecemeal and incremental 
public management reform during the period? How and why did the two issues, 
democratising and downsizing, coexist?, and why the former was short lived and the 
latter sustained?
5.1 Reforming the G vil Service: Getting On Chaun’s Government Agenda
On becoming prime minister on 23 September 1992, Chaun received a warm welcome 
from the public since his coalition government marked a return to democratic
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government.2 Like most elected civilian prime ministers who had not pursued careers in 
it, Chaun strove to control the civil service policy making machine himself, to make sure 
that the bureaucracy would carry out his government’s policies. Immediately on taking 
office he took the helm of the civil service policymaking machine, the Gvil Service 
Commission.3 As he subsequently explained:
I have agreed to be chairman of the Gvil Service Commission and devote my 
time to attend its meetings once a month because I wish to see government 
policy achieve its intended consequence. Although politicians, for the most 
part, determine and announce policies, it is civil servants who are the 
government’s means to achieve them. They [civil servants] are leaders and the 
most important coordinators of policy implementation. I therefore give 
importance to both civil servants and the civil service system.4
Chaun saw that presiding over the CSC meetings was a direct way of communicating 
with senior bureaucrats: “Not all, but several permanent secretaries are members of CSC, 
and I could hopefully use this [CSC] meeting to communicate what the government 
needs and wants to them. I hope the government’s policy will get across if they convey 
my message to their own staff.”5
Chaun’s policy on the Gvil Service was first spelled out on 21 October 1992 in 
his policy statement to parliament. Like previous prime ministers, Chaun made a broad 
statement that would appease and appeal to civil servants, stating that he wished “To 
improve Gvil Service remuneration and welfare benefits, and restructure ministries and 
departments in accordance with socio-economic change, especially economic growth.”6 
By incorporating Gvil Service related issues into the government policy statement, the 
CSC could secure Chaun’s interest in civil service policy. However, a specific Gvil 
Service reform initiative was not yet ready to be put forward. Although the CSCs
1 See chapter 2 for an account of political developments in this period.
2 Giaun’s decision to allocate most ministerial posts to politicians on the basis of their 
capabilities and experience rather than their political influence despite pressures from coalition 
parties met public expectations. The invitation to well known technocrats such as the banker 
Tharin Nimmanhemin, to head the strategically important ministry of finance gave the public 
confidence that Giaun’s government would be politically and economically competent. There 
was a general air of jubilation during the ‘honeymoon period’ of Giaun’s government.
3 See chapter 2 for the composition of the CSC The prime minister or assigned deputy prime 
minister is the only politician who, according to the Gvil Service Act, is a member of the CSC
4 Giaun’s speech to the annual meeting of Gvil Service Administrators 21 January 1993.
s Ibid.
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members occasionally discussed broad issues of civil service reform, when such 
discussions took place, they were predominantly about the issue of salary adjustment, a 
feel good issue but a difficult one to realise.
At its first meeting after the election of the new government on 26 October 1992 
he CSCs members were cautious about pressing the government further on salary 
adjustments partly because of the hostile criticism they had received from both 
politicians and the general public after the Anand government had raised salaries in 
19927 Members were reminded by Wilas Singha-Wisai, the new OCSC secretary general, 
that these latest Gvil Service salary increases led “many people to cast serious doubt on 
whether civil servants were worth these rewards [salary increases].”8 The point was 
shared by the prime minister who agreed that improving civil service efficiency must be 
their first priority since it would provide a basis for other reforms of civil service welfare 
benefits, particularly future salary increases. Without improving civil service efficiency, he 
argued, increasing civil service salaries would not be justifiable. The new OCSC secretary 
general expressed concern about a reform effort that only aimed to continue gradual 
increases in civil service efficiency which had appeared in most previous reform 
proposals. For Wilas efficiency could only be increased if the role and scope of public 
sector as a whole was redefined. He also had radical views on changing the roles of the 
CSC and the OCSC Publishing his views on this issue in a daily newspaper, Wilas 
stated,
In the past we focused on the control of government agencies. We centralised 
public personnel management power. We have played the role of watchdog of 
the merit system and behaved like a policeman trying to catch villains. Our new 
role now, as I envision it, is to advise, assist, consult, and encourage government 
agencies to manage their own internal personnel affairs.9
At the CSC meeting in October 1992, Chaun agreed with Wilas s idea that civil 
service reform had to be viewed in the context of overall public sector reform.10 Despite 
a broad agreement on civil service efficiency improvement, the term “efficiency”, as 
conceived by the CSC, was broad and open to different interpretations. While the prime
6 Chaun’s policy statement to parliament 21 October 1992 .
7 Anand’s cabinet made further increases in civil service salaries conditional on pension reform.
8 Simachokedee, 1998.
9 Ibid.
10 Minutes CSC meeting 26 October 1992.
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minister spoke of “letting the private sector do the job if they perform it better and more 
efficiently than us [the Gvil Service]”, the OCSCs chief focused on the way the CSC and 
the OCSC worked in relation to other government agencies and departments: “the CSC 
and the OCSC were to work in close co-operation with other government agencies in 
order to restructure the Gvil Service organisation, to shorten work processes, to focus on 
core tasks and to privatise peripheral activities.”11
However, during the first months of Chaun’s government, the CSCs operation 
under his chairmanship was routine. It was occupied with approving and filtering public 
personnel issues before their submission to the cabinet. The CSC was unable to agree on 
common ground for developing a specific civil service reform proposal. As a result 
neither the CSC nor the OCSC produced any specific civil service reform proposals.
The issue of civil service reform got on Chaun’s government agenda in late 1992 
almost automatically primarily a result of the prime minister’s attempt to control the civil 
service policy-making institutions. Chaun’s eagerness to involve himself in the CSC also 
reflected his often criticized ‘rule-based decision making style’ which resulted in a high 
degree of dependency on the advice of senior civil servants. The underlying reform idea 
of ‘improving efficiency’ emerged as a rationale for reforming the Gvil Service. This 
reform rationale reflected the routines and jurisdictions of the central co-ordinating 
agencies, including the OCSC, and was a recurrence of reforms previously attempted by 
the Prem and Anand governments. However, no specific civil service reform proposal -  
the ‘how to do* of reform, was put forward, thereby delaying the rate at which civil 
service reform could be carried out. The widow of reform opportunity usually open 
during government honeymoon periods was not seized by the CSC This slow response 
to the government’s policy statement provided an opportunity for players outside the 
usual Gvil Service policy circle to take advantage of another available channel -  the ad 
hoc reform committee -  to put forward their own reform projects to achieve their 
political ends.
5.2 Democratising CM Service Administration: Politicians’ Issues
In November 1992, before the CSC had drawn up any specific civil service reform 
proposals, the PMSO, the prime minister’s political arm whose chief was a political 
appointee and under the direct supervision of prime minister, proposed that the prime 
minister should appoint a State Administration Development Committee (SADQ to
11 Ibid.
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carry out civil service reform tasks as declared in parliament by the government. This 
reform committee was also to be responsible for developing a civil service reform 
package that aimed ‘to improve the efficiency of state administration in accordance with 
democratic principles’. The PMSO’s hoped that the appointment of the SADC would 
reduce the growing pressure for democratic reform.
'With the return of democracy in 1992 social activists, academics, NGOs and the 
media expected Chaun’s government to seize the chance to press for further political 
reform to strengthen democracy now that the military had stepped back from politics. 
Their demands for more democratic and transparent governance included the reduction 
of the power of the unelected Senate, and the decentralisation of administrative powers 
to local government and grass-root communities. On the transparency front, they 
pressed for a mechanism to create and maintain non-corrupt government. Such radical 
changes required major amendments to the 1991 Constitution, an issue that the 
Democratic Party and its ‘angel’ allies had promised during the election campaign.12
The PMSO’s proposal to set up the SADC was formally approved by the prime 
minister on 20 November 1992 because Chaun was convinced that it would be a channel 
to deliver the Democrat Party’s election campaign promises13 He also appointed Banyat 
Bantadthan, a deputy prime minister and Democrat Party chairman, to head this 
coirmittee.14 Its aim, following the PMSO’s suggestion, was to advise the government 
on issues related to civil service reform, and to improve the efficiency of state 
adninistration in accordance with democratic principles. The SADC aimed to achieve 
the improvement of the Civil Service’s potential for social and economic development.15
The PMSO broke with the ‘reformrfrom-within’ idea widely held by central 
coordinating agencies making clear that civil service reform was now a political project 
and its success depended largely on political support. Having taken the initiative, the 
PMSO both selected members of the SADC and set the agenda for the committee. 
Unlke previous reform committees, the SADCs members consisted mainly of 
poliicians and academics. Although representatives from the central co-ordinating 
agencies were included, they did not serve as the secretary of SADC, a strategic position 
they had held on previous reform committees. Instead, the deputy prime minister and
12 Se chapter 2 table 2.6 for details of the 1991 Constitution.
13 Prme Ministerial Order 247/1992 dated 20 November 1992.
14 Appointing a deputy prime minister to chair a Civil Service reform committee was another
tradiion Chaun observed.
15 Prme Ministerial Order 247/1992 dated 20 November 1992.
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the PMSO’s secretary general proposed Bhidya Borwomwatta, a professor of public 
administration at Chulalongkom University, take up this important position.
Having been invited by two senior government politicians, Bhidya accepted the 
appointment attracted by the opportunity to turn himself from “a university lecturer to 
an influential practitioner in Government House.**16 Ideologically, he shared the 
government’s view that “if civil service reform was to be successful, politicians must take 
the lead.**17 Hence he advocated the government’s plan to set up a politically controlled 
SADG
Reforming the Gvil Service has to be carried out by politicians through special 
bodies. It cannot be done by civil servants themselves. While central agencies 
with civil service related responsibilities should perform supporting roles for 
politicians, the decision to reform the Gvil Service must be made by politicians 
particularly the prime minister.18
The appointment of the SADC by Chaun’s government shifted influence over 
Civil Service issues from central co-ordinating agencies, the OCSC, the BOB and the 
CGD, to politicians and confined the central co-ordinating agencies to their routine 
functions rather than reform and innovations. Some of their officials saw the SADC as 
a “political project, rather than administrative reform as usual” and were reluctant to 
participate fully in i t .19 This led the SADC to develop its own organisational capacity 
to undertake the tasks that had been assigned by the government.
5.2.1 Institutionalising Politicians’ Reform Process
In January 1993 the prime minister issued an order to establish a secretariat office for 
the SADC as a response to its operational problems. Although SADC had gained high 
status as a high profile state reform committee, its mandate to develop a ‘Reform 
Paclage for Democratising the Civil Service Administration’ could not be easily 
achieved. As an ad hoc committee whose members were mainly drawn from outside 
the Civil Service, the SADC did not have sufficient administrative resources including 
staff budget, and offices to undertake the reform of state administration. The SADC’s
16 Bcwomwattana, 1995.
17 Personal communication, Bhidya, SADG
w Ibd.
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members realised that their work would be more effective if  a secretariat office was 
set up as part of the Prime Minister’s Office. Its aim was to facilitate their work and 
co-ordinate the civil service reform effort.
On 4 January 1993 the Prime Minister issued an order to establish a Secretariat 
Office for SADC, and Bhidya, the SADCs secretary, was assigned to head it. The 
SADCs secretariat office -  the first of its kind in the history of the Thai administrative 
reform -  was supposed to be “the co-ordinating centre for the study, analysis and 
monitoring of the implementation of policy generated by the SADG”20 Its other 
mandates included reporting to and advising the prime minister and cabinet on the 
problems, policies, strategies and measures concerning change in the Civil Service and 
state administration. To facilitate the SADCs work, the prime minister equipped its 
chairman with powers to summon representatives from any government agency to 
provide information and advice.
Immediately after the establishment of the secretariat office at the beginning of 
January 1993, deputy prime minister Banyat set up eight sub-committees to facilitate the 
work of SADC, each of which was responsible for specific reform projects. All of these 
projects aimed to deliver the government’s election promises. In fact, the idea for 
reforming state administration came directly from the prime minister. Deputy prime 
minister Banyat, the SADC chairman, had taken members to meet him on 23 December 
1992, a month before the secretariat office was created. At this meeting Chaun told the 
members of the SADC that they should concentrate on six issues: the reorganisation of 
ministries in accordance with socio-economic expansion; the improvement of civil 
servants’ performance to provide better services to people; the development and training 
of civil servants and the improvement of their morale; the decentralisation of 
administrative powers on budget management, environmental management, education 
and health services, to regional and local administrations; the empowerment of local 
administration by promoting elected councils at all levels; and the promotion of public- 
private partnerships in social and economic development.21 The issues the prime 
minister asked the SADC to consider were geared towards the delivery of campaign 
promises rather than mere administrative improvement. Of the eight sub-committees, 
four were seen by the government as the most important and vital for democratic 
reform, and were headed by ministers in the Prime Minister’s Office. The four sub-
19 Interview, anonymous former deputy general secretary OCSC
20 Prime Ministerial Order 1/2536 dated 4 January 2536.
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committees were tasked with mandates to reform public personnel administration, 
establish an Administrative Court, improve the public service delivery system and reform 
Prime Ministerial Orders.
Although the SADC exercised a firm grip by appointing senior politicians to 
head the sub-committees, which were essential to deliver the government’s election 
promises, it allowed senior bureaucrats from central co-ordinating agencies to steer two 
subcommittees whose tasks needed specialised knowledge. The OCSCs secretary 
general was assigned to head the Sub-Committee on Civil Service Re-organisation and 
the secretary general of the Council of State, the government’s legal officer, chaired the 
Sub-Committee on Drafting the Administrative Court Procedure Bill.22 The SADC also 
allowed leading academics to head the Sub-Committee on Decentralising Administrative 
Powers and the Sub-Committee on Public-Private Partnership23 The former was 
generally perceived as a difficult task prone to resistance from civil servants. The later 
needed a mediator from outside government to forge relationships between the public 
and private sectors prior to privatisation.
5.2.2 Developing a Reform Package for Democratising Civil Service Management
From its inception in November 1992, the SADC and its sub-committees were involved 
in studies for its identified projects and made at least nine important proposals to reform 
state administration. The aim was to produce a reform package to democratise civil 
service administration based on four democratic principles, open government, 
accountability, decentralisation, and efficient provision of public services. The package 
included proposals for establishing an administrative court, managing and regulating 
official data, improving the Anti-Corruption Bill, decentralising administrative powers, 
improving civil and public service and public enterprises, reforming local administration, 
restructuring and improving the efficiency of the Police Department, restructuring the 
Attorney General’s Administration, and drafting Prime Ministerial Rules on public- 
private partnerships. These proposals shared the same aim of making the country’s 
governance more democratic, responding to the reform direction laid down by Chaun.
Despite its high status and endorsement from government politicians, which 
made its proposals acceptable, the SADC could not sustain its role. Although it derived 
its authority from a Prime Ministerial Order, and had a budget and working office, it still
21 Bowomwattana, 1995.
22 This agency is responsible for drafting government legislation.
23 Professor Vijit Sri-Saam and Professor Kamol Tong-Thammachart.
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could not cope with the operational and political problems it faced, mainly because it did 
not have sufficient qualified staff to deal with the reform process. As the SADCs 
secretary, Bhidya, recalled: ‘We didn’t have our own staff. Most of them were on 
secondment from central co-ordinating agencies such as the OCSC and the BOB. 
Representatives from these two agencies were asked to act as my assistants*.24
Since most of SADC’s proposals to democratise the Civil Service required 
legislative change, their fate depended on the government’s determination to push 
them through parliament, a lengthy process. However, Chaun’s government 
downgraded reform of the constitution and shifted its status from the public agenda to 
the governmental specialised agenda of the SADC and processed it in a closed circle 
of politicians and experts. The government was temporarily able to divert public 
demands for constitutional amendment by avoiding open public political debate and 
claiming that action had already been taken. Only one of the SADCs proposals, on 
local administration reform, completed its passage through parliament; the 
democratisation and decentralisation of local administration was part of the 
government’s wider political reform agenda. The rest ended up as cabinet resolutions and 
were not implemented, though as an OCSCs officials who participated in the SADC 
observed this was “a starting point for subsequent reforms”.25
It can be concluded at this stage that the politically dominated SADC was 
successful in setting the reform agenda and proposing reform alternatives. The SADC 
influenced how the issue of civil service reform developed in at least two ways. Firstly, it 
broke the “Gvil Service policy monopoly” and became “policyowner” by taking the role 
of setting the reform agenda away from bureaucrats in central government agencies. To 
secure this position, the SADC sought to increase its “policy making capacity” and 
successfully received both political and financial support from the Prime Minister’s 
Office. The establishment of the SADCs secretariat office was the result of such 
support. Secondly, in terms of generating alternative reform proposals, the SADC 
expanded the notion of Gvil Service reform, which had been narrowly defined by 
previous reform committees as efficiency improvement to include wider aspects of 
reform. Consequently, the civil service reform issue was high on the political agenda.
In the short run, this enabled Chaun’s government to steer the course of state 
administration reform towards its own political objectives which were seen by the
24 Interview, Bhidya, SADC
25 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
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general public as part of the government’s attempt to reform democracy at the macro­
political level. In effect it can be seen that the Gvil Service policy proposed by the SADC 
was partly a spill over of the constitutional and political reform movements. However, 
implementing these proposals required parliamentary approval and the delay in the 
legislative process provided an opportunity for central agencies to restore their positions 
as owners of civil service policy. Hence, the SADCs victory in setting the reform agenda 
was challenged by the traditional civil service policymaking machine namely the CSC
5.3 Downsizing the G vil Service: Bureaucrats’ Issues
In January 1993, almost three months after the SADC was appointed, the OCSC started 
to promote the “downsizing issue” again. At a CSC meeting on 27 January 1993, the 
OCSC brought to the attention of CSC members that “bureaucratic inefficiency* was the 
result of Gvil Service overgrowth. It also argued that previous policies and measures to 
control civil service growth were not effective enough mainly because line ministries and 
departments neither understood nor took the policy seriously. This, as the OCSC 
concluded, led to a policy failure and a serious effort to downsize the Gvil Service was 
needed.26
5.3.1 Developing Measures to Control the Size of the Civil Service
At the January CSC meeting the OCSC called for tougher controls over the growing size 
of the Gvil Service by proposing ‘Measures to control the size of the Gvil Service*. The 
measure aimed to increase civil service efficiency by controlling public personnel costs.27 
The OCSC successfully convinced the CSC, whose members mainly comprised civil 
servants, that by doing so, civil service salaries could be increased. This measure had two 
components. The first involved controlling the increase in total public personnel costs 
without reducing average annual pay increases and maintaining salary levels. To achieve 
this, the OCSC proposed that ‘reducing head counts’ by limiting the number of 
government staff, which had been introduced by Prem’s administration, should be
26 The Bureau of Research and Development within the OCSC carried out a survey on the 
manpower re-deployment practices introduced by Anand’s government just a month before 
Chaun took office. They found that most of heads of personnel administration in line ministries 
knew of the policy but many neither agreed with it or understood it. They also reported that 
most respondents faced implementation difficulties because senior officials in line ministries did 
not support the policy.
27 Minutes of CSC Meeting 1/2536,1 February 1993.
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complemented by controlling public personnel costs. Controlling both numbers of 
personnel and their costs would be a yardstick for assessing the efficient use of civil 
service manpower.
The second component was to encourage line ministries and departments to 
maximise the utilisation of their manpower. This could be achieved if line departments 
changed the way in which they managed manpower. According to the OCSCs proposal, 
government ministries and departments needed to concentrate more on quality rather 
than quantity in Civil Service human resources. Government agencies would be 
encouraged to utilise their existing personnel efficiently, rather than simply to acquire 
more staff to meet their manpower requirements; existing regulations made the transfer 
of staff from one position to another difficult. The OCSC believed that if these two 
measures were achieved, the size of the Gvil Service would be reduced substantially and 
hence its efficiency would be increased.
Convinced by the OCSC, members of the CSC finally accepted the ‘Measures to 
control the size of the Gvil Service’. On 1 February 1993 the OCSC submitted its 
proposal to the cabinet but had to wait until May until it was scheduled for discussion. In 
cabinet it faced hurdles as there was a reluctance to accept it. At the cabinet meeting on 
11 May 1993, many ministers raised concerns over the proposal fearing that line 
ministries and departments might object. Their objections stemmed from two 
controversial measures contained in the submission:
Firstly, from 1 February 1994, government agencies would not be allowed to 
recruit more staff except to replace retired civil servants. It was estimated that 
between 1994 and 1996, only 16,000 new staff would be replaced. Secondly, 
government agencies would be required to abolish their entrylevel positions or 
any other position if needed to ensure the number of new appointments was 
equal to the numbers of retirees.28
Prime Minister Chaun, though he agreed with the need to downsize the Gvil Service, 
was cautious about the OCSC’s proposal. He feared that it might create an ‘uneasy 
feeling* among senior bureaucrats who favoured continuing the pattern of staff increases. 
Chaun also cast doubt about the implementation of these measures, which might face 
bureaucratic resistance. After discussing these points of great concern in the meeting, the
28 OCSC cabinet submission, 27 January 1993.
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cabinet ruled that it would reconsider the OCSCs proposal if it gained the support of 
senior bureaucrats after a series of ‘bureaucrat hearings, had been held.29
At the 11 May 1993 cabinet meeting deputy prime minister Banyat, the SADC 
chairman, suggested, and the cabinet agreed, that the opinion of the SADC, the most 
visible civil service reform committee at that time, should be sought first. In an attempt 
to increase the SADCs role in this issue, he proposed that the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat Office (PMSO), which provided political and financial support for the SADC, 
should be responsible for reviewing the OCSCs proposal and reporting back to the 
cabinet. Eventually the cabinet assigned both the OCSC and the PMSO to review the 
OCSC measures. This was to ensure that senior bureaucrats rendered full cooperation if 
the measures were to be implemented.
Involving the PMSO and the SADC in reviewing the OCSCs proposal 
unavoidably caused delays since the OCSC could not proceed by itself in its own 
direction. On 28 June 1993, the PMSO organised a meeting with permanent secretaries 
of all ministries and invited the prime minister to chair the session in which problems 
that could arise from implementing the OCSC measures were extensively discussed. 
Despite their wish to increase their influence over the downsizing issue, the SADC and 
the PMSO left the issue ‘on hold’ since it was not the agency’s priority or part of their 
jurisdiction. Almost three and a half months later on 14 October 1993, the PMSO, which 
was responsible for gathering the opinions at the meeting of permanent secretaries, 
concluded, in line with the cabinet’s stance, that strict control over manpower would 
cause some discontent among senior bureaucrats despite the need to curb public 
personnel costs. Banyat, chairman of the SADC, then formally informed the OCSC of 
the PMSO’s recommendations that it should revise and relax its proposal to avoid this 
problem before resubmitting to the cabinet.
On receiving these recommendations, the OCSC agreed that the replacement 
rules for vacant posts from retirement should be relaxed as it needed to get a quick 
solution to downsizing in place. In its revised proposal, the OCSC agreed that the 
replacement of vacancies must not exceed the number of retirees during 1994 -1996. It 
also suggested a voluntary measure, urging ministries and departments to redeploy their 
existing staff by allocating personnel from low priority to high priority tasks. The OCSC 
also offered to transfer its personnel authority to line ministries and departments if 
personnel redeployment was deterred by central personnel rules and regulations. As with
29 Minutes of cabinet meeting, 11 May 1993.
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the previous proposal, the OCSC also encouraged government agencies to identify jobs 
that could be privatised.
Before resubmitting the revised proposal to the Cabinet, prime minister Chaun 
wanted to ensure full bureaucratic support and demanded a second meeting with 
permanent secretaries. Following this the OCSC then held a meeting on 13 December 
1993 to make final revisions. Since the proposal was a compromise on the original 
version, and the prime minister was present at the meeting, all permanent secretaries 
agreed with the revised proposal. In its revised submission, which was then sent to the 
Cabinet on 27 January 1994, the OCSC reported: ‘most permanent secretaries agreed 
with these measures’.
The Cabinet approved the revised “Measures to Control the Size of the Gvil 
Service” at its meeting on 8 February 1994. The most important measure was that 
“government agencies would not be allowed to employ new civil servants except to 
replace retirees”.30 However, it encouraged government ministries and departments to re­
deploy their personnel by allocating them to high priority jobs so that manpower waste 
in low priority jobs could be eliminated. Identifying jobs that could be privatised was 
another supporting measure suggested by the OCSC. This revised measure replaced the 
Plan for Improving the Gvil Service System and Public Personnel Management issued by 
Anand’s government.
In short, the ‘Measures to Control the Size of the Gvil Service’ was an outcome 
of the OCSCs attempt to regain its “Gvil Service policy territory” after the SADC was 
certified by the government to be the lead committee for State Administration Reform. 
After almost two years of dormancy dealing with routine personnel management, the 
OCSC through the CSC was able to pursue its interest in improving civil service human 
resource management, though its proposed downsizing measures were more relaxed than 
originally intended. By adjusting its reform proposal through the course of negotiation 
with the government and SADC, the OCSC was able to move the policy forward. Since 
the downsizing issue involved a service wide operation, the OCSCs influence over 
personnel management policy of other central personnel agencies was expanded.31
30 Cabinet Resolution, 8 February 1994.
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5.3.2 Institutionalising Gvil Service Manpower Policy and Management
Competing for and maintaining political attention towards civil service policy required a 
concerted effort by the central agencies with related personnel jurisdiction, as well as 
political backing. While the OCSC proposals were being revised in the second half of 
1993 the CSC decided that the OCSC should invite the other central agencies, the 
Comptroller General’s Department (CGD), the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), and the 
National Board of Economic and Social Development (NESDB) to meet and consider 
activities that would support and promote the new manpower policy and measures and 
thereby strengthen its own manpower policy. At a meeting in July 1993 they came up 
with a proposal ‘to form a formal body which would be responsible for the enforcement 
of manpower control policy’. They also discussed the wider issue of ‘downsizing the Gvil 
Service’. At the macro level, representatives shared the view of the OCSC and the 
NESDB that the role of the Gvil Service needed to be redefined if the functions of the 
state were to be expanded, reduced or privatised. Identifying the role of the state would 
lead to the reallocation of civil service human resources from overstaffed to understaffed 
functions. They also proposed establishing an incentive scheme to support the 
government’s privatisation programmes to promote the role of the private sector in 
public service provision.
The July 1993 meeting provided an opportunity for representatives from central 
coordinating agencies, especially the OCSC, the BOB and the CGD to reiterate the 
administrative reform alternatives they had been advocating. These included the 
introduction of new technology to replace manpower, shortening work process and 
reducing the time of service delivery, and decentralising manpower management to the 
local authorities closest to the points of service delivery. It also proposed to study and 
develop a medium term plan to downsizing the Gvil Service by introducing an early 
retirement scheme that would allow flexible employment termination but retain capable 
and competent officials.
The group submitted their recommendations to support the successful 
implementation of the Measure to Control the Size of the Gvil Service*, each of which 
was linked to the policies of the central co-ordinating agencies, to the prime minister on 
14 July 1993. The most important measure was to establish a high profile committee to 
oversee the policy, which would sustain the formal status of civil service human resource 
management policy on the government agenda. To make this committee comparable to
31 All central personnel agencies were required to abide by the G binet Resolution of 8 February
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the SADC, the OCSC suggested that prime minister himself or one of his deputies 
should lead it, since the policy covered all types of government personnel.
The prime minister passed these recommendations to SADC, which was 
currently in charge of overall administrative reform. The SADC saw that the OCSC 
proposal overlapped with its own mandate and was unwilling to see ‘another civil service 
reform committee’ run by civil servants. The recommendations therefore went back and 
forth between the OCSC and the SADC for almost a year. Eventually, in May 1994, the 
OCSCs secretary general, who chaired the SADC subcommittee on the reform of public 
personnel administration, successfully argued that the OCSCs recommendations were 
compatible with and complemented SADCs mandate and convinced it to accept the 
new committee.
On 19 May 1994 the Prime Minister signed the order to set up the Gvil Service 
Manpower Policy Committee (CSMPQ, the first of its kind. However, on accepting the 
OCSCs proposal, ‘SADC still regarded the newly proposed Gvil Service Manpower 
Policy Committee (CSMPQ as an inferior committee.’32 The tension between the two 
committees was mediated by the presence of some individuals on both committees. 
Deputy prime minister Banyat, the SADC chairman, was appointed a chairman of the 
CSMPG At the CSMPCs first meeting on 5 July 1994, Banyat reiterated that downsizing 
was part of the government reform programme. The government, as a consequence, saw 
the downsizing issue as equally important as the other reform issues dealt with by S ADG
Controlling the growth of Gvil Service Manpower was one of the most 
important issues, which formed part of the government’s attempt to reform the 
public sector [currently undertaken by SADC]. Members of the CSMPC should 
be reminded that it was an honour [for them] to carry out this rather difficult 
task33
The CSMPC was designed to be a working committee in which details of 
manpower management were discussed, and problems and disputes over increases in the 
number of civil servants and government employees were resolved. The committee was 
also more diverse in terms of its membership than the SADG Apart from senior 
bureaucrats representing central government agencies, who were allies of the OCSC,
1994.
32 Interview, anonymous official, OCSC.
33 Minutes of CSMPC meeting 5 July 1994.
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other members were drawn mostly from other parts of the bureaucracy including those 
who represented other personnel agencies.34 In addition, for the first time personnel and 
management experts from the private sector were appointed members of a committee 
involving the Civil Service. These experts were nominated to the CSMPC by the deputy 
secretary general of the OCSC, Tipavadee Meksawan.
The CSMPC was high profile because it was headed by a deputy prime minister. 
Central co-ordinating agencies also regarded it as an important committee through which 
their mandates or pet projects could be realised. They agreed that, unlike previous reform 
committees, a joint secretariat comprised mainly of senior bureaucrats representing 
central coordinating agencies should be created. The secretariat was staffed mainly by 
senior officials, among them the OCSCs deputy secretary general, the BOB’s deputy 
director, the NESDB’s deputy secretary general and the GCD’s deputy director general. 
Most of them had already worked closely together, for example the OCSCs deputy 
secretary general, Tipavadee, worked closely with her opposite number in the GCD.
Though the CSMPC was scheduled to meet once a month to consider requests 
for increases in manpower by government agencies, full committee meetings were not 
often held. During Chaim’s administration the full CSMPC only convened twice, on 5 
July 1994 and 9 February 1995. Deputy prime minister Banyat chaired both sessions. 
Time constraints forced members of the secretariat team to meet regularly outside formal 
sessions to discuss the approval of personnel requests. From the beginning the CSMPC 
did not function well, which led the OCSC to take over its operations. Despite good 
working relations between its members, the joint secretariat tended to deal with issues 
concerning their own agencies; the OCSC with ‘civil servants’, the BOB and the GCD 
with ‘government employees’ and the NESDB with ‘policy priorities’. None of these 
agencies, apart from the OCSC, had a sense of full ownership over the whole downsizing 
policy. Another problem stemmed from the lack of full time personnel. As an ad hoc 
working committee, the CSMPC did not have their own staff to process requests and the 
secretariat members found themselves overloaded with manpower requests. This led to 
the OCSCs deputy secretary general, Ms. Tipavadee, becoming involved in solving 
operational and administrative problems, which helped increase the role of the OCSC 
within the CSMPC .35
34 See chapter 2 Table 2.3.
35 Interview, Ms Tipavadee, OCSC She was a downsizing advocate whose career dealt mainly 
with manpower planning as head of the Manpower Planning Division and Director of the 
Bureau of Personnel Research and Development.
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The increase in the OCSCs role in civil service manpower planning and 
management was noted by Chet Boonpratuang, director of National Human Resources 
Planning Bureau of the NESDB who served as a joint secretary. Chet confirmed the 
leading role of the OCSC in the CSMPC and the decline of his agency’s involvement in 
public sector human resource planning:
In 1970s and 1980s the NESDB had played the leading role in the manpower 
planning of the country of which the Gvil Service was a part. But recently, its 
role has been reduced because the OCSC has developed enough capability to 
deal with the manpower planning process. Importantly, the OCSC was directly 
responsible for the management of public sector workforce. As a result, we [the 
NESDB] dealt mainly with research including the determination of civil service 
growth in relation to the GDP and total employment, the changing role of the 
pubic sector and so on... ’36
To solve the administrative and operational problems of the CSMPQ Tipavadee 
assigned the Director of the Bureau of Organisation and Position Classification of the 
OCSQ whose job was to specify positions and organisational structure, to oversee the 
request approval process and facilitate the CSMPG Some five staff from this bureau 
worked full time screening manpower requests. To overcome the strict division of 
responsibility, which prevented joint efforts, the OCSC proposed that joint decisions 
were taken on manpower requests. The OCSC in effect laid down the rules of the 
CSMPCs operation. An OCSC member of the secretariat team pointed out that:
We [the OCSC] called and administered the CSMPC meetings. We would 
propose decisions for requests, case by case. So we laid down criteria for 
approving requests and spent a lot of time convincing other members of the 
CSMPC.’*
A major part of the effort to institutionalise the Gvil Service manpower policy 
and planning was communication. The OCSC was responsible for getting line ministries, 
departments and other central personnel commissions to understand and comply with 
the ‘Measures to Control the Size of the Gvil Service’. The OCSC published a ‘Question
36 Interview, Chet Boonpartuang, director of National Human Resource Planning Division, the 
NESDB.
37 Interview, Laddawan Tantithavarangkura, personnel analyst CSMPC secretariat.
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and Answer Manual’ aimed to clarify the rationale behind this policy and provide 
guidelines for implementing the measures. Personnel administration divisions in line 
ministries and central personnel agencies were direcdy informed. However, the 50-page 
manual avoided using the term downsizing explicitly. It emphasised instead ‘the 
importance of efficient manpower utilisation and the allocation of manpower from lower 
priority to higher priority areas of administration.’38 To ensure the policy message got 
through to all government agencies, the CSMPC agreed that a public relations campaign 
should be launched. A sub-committee for public relations was then set up and a senior 
NESDB official from the joint secretariat team was appointed to head it. Its mandate 
was ‘to convince all government departments and agencies not to request the 
replacement of vacancies resulting from retirement.’39
At the CSMPC’s first meeting, the joint secretaries raised their concern over the 
effectiveness of this policy as they were still receiving a steady increase in manpower 
requests. Since this policy was to be enforced across the whole civil service, they 
suggested that political support in all ministries and departments was the key to success 
and had to be secured. Deputy prime minister Banyat therefore agreed to inform all 
ministers with portfolios to ensure that their ministries followed this policy strictly. At 
the same time, the CSMPC secretariat reassured them by sending reminders that central 
public personnel agencies shared the same understanding.
The emergence of the CSMPC was the result of a win-win negotiation between 
reform minded politicians and senior civil servants. On the one hand, it increased and 
further institutionalised the role of bureaucrats in central government agencies in civil 
service human resource management policymaking and implementation. On the other 
hand, the CSMPC could coexist with SADC and became another government 
mechanism to reform state administration.40
In short, the central coordinating agencies led by the OCSC were successful in 
placing the issue of civil service human resource management policy on Chaun’s 
government agenda. Its reform proposal, ‘Measures to Control the Size of the Civil 
Service’ was geared towards downsizing the Civil Service and was and seen by the 
government as part of wider state administration reform currently being undertaken by
38 Manual on Measures to Control the Size of the Civil Service: Explaining the Cabinet 
Resolution. OCSC, June 1994.
39 Minutes CSMPC meeting 5 July 1994.
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SADC. The institutionalisation of civil service manpower policy and planning through 
the creation of the CSMPC was a real triumph for the OCSC as the committee played 
an important part in making and implementing civil service human resource 
management policy in the future.
5.4 Enforcing and Adjusting the Measures to Control the Size of the Gvil Service
Although this thesis does not aim to deal with the implementation of civil service human 
resource management policy, problems arising from enforcing the policy had an impact 
on future civil service policy-making processes. The rest of this chapter looks at the 
policy enforcement effort as part of the policy reformulation process.
The CSMPC became “the negotiation forum between senior bureaucrats from 
ministries and departments arguing for staff increases and representatives from central 
agencies with personnel jurisdictions who wanted to curb civil service growth and 
control public personnel expenditure.’41 This created conflict between line ministries and 
central coordinating agencies. The latter were largely seen by the former as ‘a group of 
control freaks* masterminding a downsizing plot.42 Despite the public relations 
campaign, the CSMPC found itself in trouble with its manpower policy. By October 
1994, only eight months after the enforcement of the Measure to Control the Size of the 
Civil Service, the CSMPC had been inundated with almost 100,000 requests for new 
positions, while fewer than 3,000 positions had been abolished. This raised doubts about 
the effectiveness of the manpower control policy specifically and the credibility of the 
CSMPC in general.
The CSMPCs attempt to prevent increases in manpower requests created 
tensions with line ministries and departments. The first major challenges came from 
Ministry of University Affairs (MUA) and the Revenue Department in the Ministry of 
Finance. The MUA argued that it replacing retired teaching personnel with new recruits 
in scarce subjects was unavoidable. Since a shortage of lecturers and professors would 
prevent it meeting its commitment to produce graduates, it demanded that the regulation 
on the replacement of retirement vacancies should not be applied to teaching personnel. 
However, it suggested a compromise solution: ‘it would eliminate administrative posts in
40 Most of members of CSMPCs joint secretariat team interviewed saw little link between their 
policies and those of SADC, while SADCs members believed that the CSMPC was their 
‘technical committee’ dealing with the details of their reform agendas.
41 Interview, anonymous CSMPC member.
42 Personal communication, Bowomwattana.
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favour of teaching posts, if that would satisfy the ‘head-counting rule* imposed by the 
CSMPC43 The CSMPC at its second meeting on 9 February 1995 barely argued against 
this and allowed the MUA to proceed with its compromise proposal. The Revenue 
Department also voiced discomfort with the personnel control measures. It pointed out 
that the government’s plan to collect more tax would be jeopardized if its vacancies from 
retirement were not filled According to the Revenue Department about 180 new tax 
officers were needed to meet the government’s ambitious target to increase tax revenue. 
It argued that, despite its effort to reprioritise and reorganise its jobs, vacancies arising 
from retirement had to be filled.
Another obstacle to the success of the manpower control policy was the ongoing 
supply of recruits from government’s training institutions for the police, and health and 
education services. Together they added about 20,000 personnel annually to the Civil 
Service. This total made it impossible to freeze the number of civil servants and 
government employees at the 1 January 1994 level, which was treated as a base year. The 
CSMPC responded that these training institutions needed to plan to reduce their 
production over three years. By the end of the fiscal year 2000, they were to have scaled 
down their numbers to twenty-five per cent of the current level.
A related issue was the ratio of health and teaching personnel working in the 
public and private sectors. The CSMPC put forward the NESDB*s case that ‘eighty per 
cent of health personnel belonged to the Civil Service and their wages and salaries made 
up eighty-eight of the health service budget’.44 Likewise, ‘ninety per cent of teachers 
worked in state schools but relative to neighbouring countries, their productivity was 
lower.*45 The CSMPC strongly urged both the Health and Education ministries to reduce 
their roles by allowing private companies to operate in these areas. The CSMPC also 
criticised the Police Department for the steady increase in police force numbers without 
considering its real needs46 They suggested that these agencies should improve their 
own productivity with reference to international benchmark standards as a means of fully 
using their manpower. Above all, the CSMPC wanted to see some parts of the health, 
education and police services privatised or contracted out to private operators.
43 Minutes of CSMPC meeting 5 July 1995.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Subsequently the Police Department was reorganised and placed at arms length from the 
Ministry of Interior. "While there is some evidence that the CSMPCs comment contributed partly 
to this, I regard it as sectoral reform and it is not included in this thesis.
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The problems the CSMPC faced and the reactions of the affected ministries and 
departments, however, provided an opportunity for the OCSQ the BOB, the NESDB 
and the CGD to widen the scope of their responsibilities and strengthen their agencies* 
mandates. In August 1995, the CSMPC supported a proposal from these agencies to set 
up two subcommittees. The first, the subcommittee on public sector manpower 
planning*, was charged with the study, analysis, and development of manpower indicators 
and benchmarks, that would be used as tools for making the Civil Service leaner and 
smaller.*47 Representatives from NESDB and the OCSC in the CSMPCs secretariat team 
were co-secretaries and a representative from the private sector who advocated a leaner 
administration, was chairman. The second sub-committee was responsible for 
promoting contracting out to the private service.48 This subcommittee involved mainly 
agencies with finance-related jurisdiction including the CGD of the MOF and the BOB, 
because contracting out jobs in the public services usually required the relaxation of 
government’s financial and budgetary rules. To highlight the importance of their 
initiative, these central government agencies emphasised the link between privatisation, 
which they supported, and a redefinition of the state’s functions: ‘what the state should 
and should not do. What the state should not do should be left to the private sector*. The 
operation of these two subcommittees was financed by the BOB, which allocated them a 
three million Baht budget.
The reaction of line ministries and departments led the CSMPC to redefine its 
‘Measures to Control the Size of the Civil Service* by relaxing its personnel and financial 
rules and regulations. Line ministries and departments had criticised the OCSC and other 
central public personnel agencies for creating complicated personnel rules, which made it 
difficult for them to manage their staff efficiently. The complexity of the personnel rules 
threatened the effective implementation of the ‘Measures’. At the CSMPC meeting on 5 
July 1994, members urged the OCSC to decentralise and transfer their personnel power 
to line ministries and departments. They saw this as the key to the successful 
accomplishment of the CSMPCs policy. The OCSC had no choice but to agree:
To support the CSMPCs policy and measures, the Manpower Development 
Committee of individual ministries (MDQ should have full power over the 
creation and elimination of positions, the appointment, promotion and
47 Minutes of CSMPC meeting 5 July 1995.
48 The idea of contracting out public services had been around since Prem’s administration but 
was not taken up by ministries and was largely considered a failure.
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transfer, as well as the re-deployment of their own personnel lower than G  
Level 8. This would enable flexibility in manpower utilisation and allocation 
within and between ministries and departments.49
Though it lost some of its power over personnel policy, the OCSC retained its 
status as the personnel information gatekeeper by taking control of the development of 
the public sector personnel database. It called for support on this from the CSMPQ 
warning that without a proper personnel database, human resource planning in the 
public sector would not be successful. The OCSC was willing to take on this major task 
because, as the OCSCs deputy secretary general put it, ‘it would help us to develop 
further our Department Personnel Information System (DPIS) project, making it more 
thorough, more accurate and more current to help establish government manpower 
planning policy and management’.50 The CSMPC eventually endorsed the OCSCs DPIS 
project and this helped maintain and strengthen the status of the OCSC as the controller 
of manpower information, which was essential for effective manpower utilisation and 
successful public sector human resource planning.
5.5 The Failure of G vil Service Reform as a Substitute for Political Reform
Just as widespread demands for political reform enabled civil service reform and 
downsizing to get on the agenda of Chaun’s government in 1992 as a diversionary tactic 
the same demands halted the progress of reform by bringing down the government three 
years later.
Chaun’s civil service reform and downsizing efforts came to an abrupt end with 
the collapse of his government in May 1995 when the largest coalition party, the Palang- 
dhama Party, withdrew its support. Chaun failed to convince MPs and defend his 
government in a parliamentary vote of confidence and decided to dissolve parliament. 
Snap elections were announced on 2 July 1995. The immediate cause of the withdrawal 
of the Pakng-dhama Party was a corruption scandal in the government land reform 
programme. However, the underlying cause was the government’s failure to satisfy the 
growing pressure for far reaching political reform. The strength of public pressure for 
reform led parliament to set up the Democracy Development Committee. By April 1995
49 OCSC memo to central public personnel agencies 11 August 1995
50 Interview, Theerayuth Lorlertart, OCSC The DPIS Project was a pet project of the OCSC.
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it had drawn up a detailed programme of radical constitutional reform, which was later 
implemented in the 1997 Constitution.51 Chaun’s failure to respond to this contributed to 
the collapse of his government.
From its formation in September 1992 Chaun’s coalition had been fragile and 
under pressure to introduce wide ranging political reform.52 Initially his government tried 
to tone down the pressure for macro political reform. This strategy worked well during 
his honeymoon period as the government could show that steps had been taken to 
democratise elements of civil service administration through the establishment of the 
SADC However, by 1995 reliance on the SADC as a substitute for macro political 
reform was no longer sufficient to shield the government from the widespread pressure 
across Thai society for effective democratic reform.
5.6 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Gvil Service Policy Making
This chapter has provided a narrative of civil service reform under the democratically 
elected Chaun government between 1992 and 1995. Civil service reform was 
characterised by two related issues of ‘democratising the civil service administration’ and 
‘downsizing the Civil Service’ through the ‘Measures to Control the Size of the Civil 
Service’. This section explains why the two issues became Chaun’s government civil 
service reform choices and how they contributed to the trajectory and outcome of civil 
service reform in this period in general. Like previous chapters, this section puts the 
analytical components of civil service policymaking process under close scrutiny. It will 
examine how institutional and processual factors shaped the choices for civil service 
reform through the process of agenda setting, alternative specification and decision­
making.
5.6.1 Agenda Setting
The issue of civil service reform was included in Chaun’s administrative policy at the 
beginning of his administration in September 1992. It reached a high status on his 
government policy agenda partly because of his personal interest in the issue of Gvil 
Service management and control. He was willing to serve as head and spend time with 
members of the Gvil Service Commission, a remit that he could have pass over to one of
51 See chapter 2 Table 2.6.
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his deputy prime ministers. The high status of civil service reform issue was also due to 
other institutional and contextual factors, the effects of which can be traced in the 
process of issue formulation.
Like the Chatchai period, the civil service reform issue under Chaun between 
1992 and 1995 has two ‘faces’ or two ‘dimensions’ promoted by two competing civil 
service policy-making subsystems. The first issue, which represents continuity in civil 
service policy from Prem’s government, is ‘downsizing the Civil Service* advocated by 
the central co-ordinating agencies led by the OCSG The second issue, representing a 
new reform effort, is ‘democratising the civil service administration* advocated by the 
PMSO. The different faces of civil service reform was the result of different 
interpretation of civil service reform issues by different ‘issue sponsors* resulting in 
different policy images. It is the change of ‘policy image* that disrupted the continuity of 
civil service policy, which initially focus on improving bureaucratic efficiency through the 
pmdent management of resources.
During Prem’s administration, the changing ‘face’ of civil service reform issues 
was the result of contextual changes, and the way in which reformers appropriated such 
changes through particular courses of action when a widow of opportunity for civil 
service reform opened. Under Chuan a window of opportunity for civil service reform 
policy opened in the existing civil service policy making venue, but the opportunity was 
not promptly seized by the CSC due to changes in the reform ideas of its key members. 
The newly appointed secretary general of the OCSC preferred rethinking of the role of 
the Gvil Service to a ‘ready made’ proposal for improving efficiency in the Gvil Service. 
As ‘rethinking’ a new issue image took time, the CSC failed to influence the definition of 
the reform issue, which normally shaped choices of civil service reform by the 
government. This inaction during the honeymoon period of Chaun’s government was 
also due to the perceived possible public criticism, which prevented CSC members from 
raising other reform issues, particularly those associated with increasing Gvil Service 
salaries. The bureaucrat reformers in effect failed to influence the course of civil service 
policy.
The failure to seize the window of opportunity for civil service reform by 
bureaucrat reformers provided a chance for government politicians to propose and 
introduce a new dimension to civil service reform: democratising the civil service 
administration. This new dimension of reform was incubated within the high profile
52 Two other parties, the Social Action Party and the New Aspiration Party, left the coalition
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politically backed State Administration Development Committee (SADQ, which was 
controlled by the PMSO. The new issue image introduced by government politicians was 
due mainly to the political situation of Chaun’s government. As the democratic successor 
to a military coup backed administration, Chaun’s government was under pressure from 
the electorate to undertake major political reform including amendment of the country’s 
constitution. Adopting the policy image of democratising the Civil Service could satisfy 
the government’s commitment to political reform.
In sum, the civil service reform issue was interpreted differently by government 
politicians and bureaucratic reformers due to the situations they faced. Taking advantage 
of the widow of opportunity during its honeymoon period, Chaun’s government 
politicians could place the new dimension of civil service reform, which immediately 
gained greater political attention and support than the issue of the established civil 
service policy-making agencies. From the outset of Chaun’s administration, the status of 
other reform issues was lower than democratising the Civil Service.
5.6.2 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
The process of specifying civil service reform alternatives during the Chaun 
administration can be seen in the operation of two competing civil service policy making 
institutional venues: the newly created SADC and the CSC Their operation shows how 
these ‘policy subsystems’ shaped the reform choices adopted by Chaun’s government 
and how their operation in the context of political developments led Chaun’s 
government to adopt two reform alternatives: democratising the Civil Service and 
controlling the size of the Gvil Service.
The creation of SADC brought change in civil service policy through a new 
reform image underlined by democratic principles, which displaced the long-standing 
civil service policy advocated by bureaucrats in central coordinating agencies. While the 
well established CSCs reform stance was organised around efficiency improvement and 
downsizing ideas which, was an ‘inside out view of change’, the newly established SADC 
took an ‘outside in approach’ by looking for new problems and solutions from the 
dynamics of political context surrounding and putting pressure on the government. 
Different approaches, which were characterised by different policy images as mention 
earlier, offered different choices of civil service reform as shown in the narrative. The 
different reform choices offered by the newly established SADC in late 1992 can be seen
during the course of Giuan’s administration.
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as Chaun’s government’s effort to break the monopoly of civil service policy of the 
bureaucrat reformers.
The dynamics of specifying and deciding civil service reform proposals were 
constrained by the dynamics of the ‘reform battleground’ - a site where government 
politicians and bureaucratic reformers in central co-ordinating agencies competed with 
each other to control the reform process. During its first year in office, Chaun’s 
government won this reform battle because government politicians could ‘match their 
political problem of pressure for amending the country’s constitution with the solution 
of democratising the civil service administration’. Specifically the creation of SADC as a 
vehicle for delivering some elements of political reform and constitutional amendment 
helped the government to water down the pressing demands for constitutional 
amendments by adopting piecemeal reform of state administration as a ‘camouflage’. 
This was a ‘killing two birds with one stone’ strategy.
Although the operation of the SADC upset the equilibrium of civil service policy, 
the pace and rate of developing and realising the reform programme to democratise the 
Gvil Service was constrained by its lack of administrative resources and capacity. This 
constraint resulted in the SADC only providing rough guidelines and proposals for 
reforms in the form of cabinet resolutions, most of which were not implemented since 
they needed parliamentary approval. When the pressure for radical reform of the 
constitution mounted in 1995, the SADC failed to be an effective machine for 
democratic reform.
The dynamics of the adoption of civil service reform alternatives within the 
established civil service policy-making institution provides a different picture. When the 
window of opportunity for reforming civil service policy was opened during Chaun’s 
honeymoon period, the opportunity was not promptly seized. As mentioned earlier, a 
‘ready made* proposal for improving efficiency in the Gvil Service was not put forward 
as it had usually been in the past, leading to the failure to re-establish a reform image. 
The window of opportunity passed and they lost the civil service reform territory to the 
PMSO, the sponsor of the SADQ before regaining it soon afterwards.
The OCSCs successful reclaiming of civil service reform ownership was due to 
the SADCs failure, which resulted from a lack of capacity. The CSC as a civil service 
policy-making subsystem was reactivated and the reform issue emphasizing bureaucratic 
efficiency improvement and downsizing was revived. Its reform choice ‘Measure to 
Control the Size of the Gvil Service’ was prompdy developed but its adoption by the
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cabinet was not without a struggle. Competition between the politically backed SADC 
and bureaucrat reformers was once again re-activated as the former was brought in by 
the cabinet to scrutinise the CSCs proposal which feared creating tension in the 
implementation process.
Understanding the process of specifying and deciding on the civil service reform 
proposals requires an account of reformers entrepreneurial actions. In a very broad 
sense, both the political agency of the PMSO and the bureaucratic agency of the OCSC, 
as collective entities, performed entrepreneurial roles at different periods. The 
entrepreneurial role of government politicians through the PMSO can be clearly seen at 
the beginning of Chaun’s administration when bureaucrat reformers were still indecisive 
with their reform initiatives. Responding promptly to the government’s major concern 
with constitutional reform, government politicians successfully seized the opportunity, 
manipulated the new face of the reform issue and moved the reform programme 
forward, even though their effort was not sustained and ultimately failed in the face of 
strong pressure for effective political reform.
Other key aspects of the decision making process is why Chaun’s government 
adopted both reform issues, democratising the Civil Service and controlling the size of 
the Gvil Service and why the government’s reform effort to ‘democratise the civil 
service’, amounted to only piecemeal change in civil service human resource 
management policy. The coexistence of two reform issues was a direct consequence of 
the existence of two institutional venues, the SADC and the bureaucratic dominated 
CSMPQ with different conceptions of reform problems and proposed solutions. Each 
committee had a different reform capacity, which affected its effectiveness in developing 
concrete reform proposals that could be realised. As the narrative shows, the 
bureaucratic dominated reform committee, the CSMPQ was better equipped with 
administrative and technical expertise than the SADQ which possessed more political 
capital and support.
The co-existence of reform choices, as the narrative indicates, can also be seen as 
the joint ownership of the civil service reform process by government politicians and 
bureaucrat reformers. Competition over the ownership of the two policy venues was 
mediated by the structure of their common membership. Both the SADC and the 
CSMPQ the reform committee that regulated the manpower management process, were 
chaired by the same deputy prime minister, and both comprised members representing 
central co-ordinating agencies who played key roles in providing technical and
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administrative support to both committees. With the same chairperson and shared 
membership, the two reform issues co-existed.
The co-existence of SADC and the CSMPC helped expand the scope of civil 
service reform in Thailand by introducing a new issue image and corresponding choices 
of reform solution. Competition for the ownership of the reform process, can on the one 
hand restrain the direction of civil service reform since there is no unified direction and 
no reform monopoly. On the other hand, it maintained the momentum and high status 
of civil service reform issues, generally defined, on the government agenda. The retention 
and maintenance of such issues in turn helped institutionalise civil service reform and 
created ‘reform capacity* -  opportunities for both government politicians and bureaucrat 
reformers to pursue their reform objectives and approaches.
This episode also saw the central co-ordinating agencies, particulariy the OCSC 
and its senior bureaucrats, defend civil service reform policy from encroachment by 
politicians. The OCSC in this sense can be regarded as ‘an institutional entrepreneur’. By 
initiating the ‘joint secretary system’ as a framework for making decisions within the Gvil 
Service Manpower Policy Committee, the OCSC successfully mobilised support from its 
allies, the central co-ordinating agencies with financial and personnel responsibilities, and 
from the private sector. The OCSC was an institutional entrepreneur because it invested 
resources and time, assigning its staff to work full time to serve the CSMPC It also took 
risks by giving up some of its authority over public personnel management, particularly 
the appointment of certain levels of civil servants, to ministries and departments, in 
exchange for the possible successful achievement of its manpower control policy. This 
‘trade off’ can be best described as an entrepreneurial act.
This chapter has provided a narrative of civil service reform in Thailand on the 
one hand, and recounted the development of the measure to control the size of the Gvil 
Service on the other. It provides explanations for the co-existence of the political issue of 
democratising the Gvil Service and bureaucrat reformers’ issue of downsizing and why 
the political strategy to substitute political reform for administrative reform failed. In the 
light of the institutional and processual analysis, the chapter accounts for the impact of 
the situation of pressing demand for constitutional reform and institutional structures, 
the venues for civil service reform, on the choices of reform adopted by Giaun’s 
government.
Chapter 6
‘Playing with numbers’: Downsizing 1995-1997
Overview
This chapter provides an account of the civil service downsizing effort made by two 
governments, namely Banham’s from July 1995 to November 1996 and Chavalit’s from 
November 1996 to November 1997. Though both Banham and Chavalit had their own 
wider civil service reform agendas and drew up ambitious reform programmes, downsizing 
policy in this period is largely characterised by continuity. Banham’s programme, set out in 
his decree ‘Improving Service Quality for Citizens’, sought to improve the quality of civil 
service provision. Chavalit’s ‘Master Plan for Reforming the Public Sector’, the first 
comprehensive reform programme of the Thai civil service, aimed to increase civil service 
efficiency through stringent streamlining policies and by setting an ambitious staff reduction 
target, a twenty per cent reduction in government personnel within ten years. However, both 
programmes remained unrealised, whereas the measures used to control the size of the civil 
service inherited from Chaun’s first government [1992-5] continued to be implemented. The 
‘numbers game’ continued, counting heads to cut personnel costs, as did the resulting 
tensions over downsizing between central government agencies on the one hand and 
politicians and line ministries on the other.
The primary aim of this chapter is to explain how and why the Banham and Chavalit 
governments allowed the policy inherited from Chaun’s government to continue. It also 
tracks the processes in which new visions for the civil service workforce and more stringent 
downsizing policies were drawn up. These downsizing policies will be examined against the 
background of the wider civil service reform agenda and political and economic 
developments. The period 1995 to 1997 was one of relative political instability and 
worsening economic conditions, which culminated in a major regional crisis. Both 
governments were short lived and Chavalit’s in particular had to face the full force of the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997.
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6.1 Inadvertent Downsizing: The Banham Eta, 1995-1996
Banham’s adoption of the previous Chuan government’s measures to control the size of the 
civil service was inadvertent. In late July 1995, after only a month in office Banham’s 
government had not yet had time to pay attention to the issue of civil service reform in 
general. However, Banham was keen to get involved in controlling the civil service 
particularly at the higher levels. After taking office, although he delegated much of the prime 
ministerial remits to his deputies, he reserved the chair of the CSC for himself. His motive, 
like that of most of his predecessors, “was to ensure the prime minister could influence 
public personnel policy and the appointment and promotion of senior civil servants to 
strategic posts”. 1 Influencing CSC decisions on such important matters meant the 
government could ensure senior bureaucrats of their own choice to carry out the 
government’s policies.
As the new government took office without any clear ideas on civil service reform, it 
was receptive to programmes put forward by the central government agencies with 
personnel related jurisdiction. While the prime minister and government politicians were 
primarily interested in the immediate issues of promotion and appointment of senior 
bureaucrats, the task of introducing civil service reform was left to the CSCs secretariat and 
reform-minded officials in the OCSC Because the government needed to include civil 
service reform in its policy address to parliament, a “ready-made reform prescription” 
already drawn up by the OCSC was incorporated into Banham’s administrative policy 
statement. On 26 July 1995 Banham announced in parliament that his government would 
undertake comprehensive civil service reform:
First, the government will modernise the central, regional and local 
administrations by means of restructuring ministries, departments and 
government offices. We will increase public sector efficiency by 
downsizing the Gvil Service, improving bureaucratic processes and 
eliminating duplication in jurisdictions and responsibilities. Secondly, the 
government will decentralise power to local people and encourage them to 
participate in solving local problems. Thirdly, this government will
1 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
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introduce local elections at all levels, and lay down steps and procedures to 
decentralise administrative power to local administrations. The government 
aims to distribute income to local areas. Lastly, bureaucratic corruption will 
be eliminated, and anti-corruption personnel will be trained to increase 
their capacity to perform their duties effectively.2
The government’s administrative policy was normally followed by the appointment 
of a national civil service reform committee that would propose reform measures and 
oversee the reform process. However, the ad hoc State Administration Development 
Committee (SADQ set up by the previous government was disbanded with the departure of 
Chaun and the head of the Prime Minister’s Secretary’s Office [PMSO], its architect. The 
new head of the PMSO, a senior government politician, did not suggest either reinstating the 
old committee or appointing a new one, as he did not consider reforming the civil service his 
main responsibility. The PMSO was mainly occupied with political reform. In this early 
transitional period, therefore, matters related to civil service management and reform were 
returned to the usual central government agencies with personnel and budget management 
related jurisdictions, namely the OCSC, the BOB and the CGD.
6.1.1 Regaining reform authority but losing control over the downsizing issue: 
Appointing the CSRC
Under Chaun’s administration, the PMSO, headed by a politician, played the leading role in 
reforming the civil service. But the PMSO from the beginning of Banham’s period was pre­
occupied with the task of political reform and the amendment of the constitution. The 
retreat of the PMSO from an active role in reforming the civil service prompted civil 
servants, in particular the OCSC to reclaim their civil service reform territory, which had 
been lost to the PMSO during Chaun’s administration. This territory became embedded in 
the new national reform committee set up to modernise the civil service and improve its 
efficiency. As the prime minister had addressed parliament on the issue a special committee 
was needed to implement reforms. Three months after the new prime minister took office, 
the OCSC proposed the appointment of a new Civil Service Reform Committee (CSRQ “to
2 Banham’s Administrative Policy Statement to parliament 26 July 1995.
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study, analyse, advice, and formulate strategies as well as measures for reforming civil service 
management”.3
Prime minister Banham approved the OCSCs proposal to set up a new committee 
and on 28 September 1995 the Civil Service Reform Committee (CSRC) was established by 
prime ministerial order. The OCSC specified the areas of administrative reform that the new 
CSRC would deal with. Though the CSRCs mandates were derived from and reflected 
Banham’s administrative policy statement to parliament, the OCSC identified only a limited 
range of reforms to create an efficient and smaller civil service. The first reform area to 
contribute to the downsizing of the Civil Service involved restructuring ministries and 
departments. This followed the redefinition of the state’s mission and the regrouping of 
government businesses. “The Gvil Service could be smaller if it did only what it was 
supposed to do, and left what it was not supposed to do, or what it did not perform well, to 
the private sector. This can help slim down the civil service.”4 Together with structural 
reform, the OCSC also programmed the CSRC to improve work processes and human 
resource management in the public sector. The third mandate was reform of the laws 
related to public personnel management, budget management and procurement. The last 
mandate was to improve Gvil Service remuneration, which would be contingent on 
successful downsizing. Gvil servants would receive greater remuneration, including better 
salaries and other benefits, if they were more productive and implemented government 
policies successfully. Four working committees were established to carry out these reform 
tasks. These were working committees on Restructuring the Gvil Service and Public 
Enterprises, Developing Managerial and Administrative Systems, Reforming Public 
Personnel Administration, and Decentralising and Delegating Administrative Powers.
Somboon Rahong, chairman of Giart Thai party and a deputy prime minister, was 
appointed to head the CSRG Two other senior party members, Pokin Palakula and 
Giumpon Silpa-Archa, were appointed deputy chairmen. Pokin, a law lecturer and a close 
aide of Banham, was rewarded with a ministerial post in the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Giumpon, Banham’s brother, was a political scientist and Giart Thai party strategist with a 
special interest in political reform. Several leading public administration academics were 
appointed to the CSRC It was serviced by the OCSC and one of its deputy secretary
3 OCSC memorandum to Prime Minister’s Office 2 September 1995.
159
generals, Suparat Chotikayam, was appointed its secretary. Like most interdepartmental 
reform committees, representatives from the NESDB, the BOB and the CGD were also 
included.
However, the CSRC did not operate as the OCSC intended. Its political members 
wanted the CSRC to be an instrument of the government’s political reform projects, namely 
the amendment of the constitution. Political reform was a major election promise of Chart 
Thai Party.5 The CSRC deputy chair, Chumpon, who represented the liberal wing of the 
party, had been a leading figure in the movement for democratic reform after the 1991 coup 
and campaigned for substantial constitutional change in 1993-1994.6 He was responsible for 
including political reform in the party's election campaign strategy. To the CSRCs political 
leaders, amending the country’s constitution was more pressing for the government than 
downsizing and administrative improvement. They convinced its members that any civil 
service reform proposal needed to contribute to the delivery of political reform promises. As 
a result, the CSRCs reform direction shifted to the improvement of democratic governance, 
which aimed to increase citizens’ and customers’ satisfaction with government services in 
terms of speed, accuracy and equality, accountability and transparency.
The OCSC representatives, fearful of losing their grip on the reform direction, 
suggested that these democratic governance reform principles could be achieved if line 
ministries and departments reformed their own operations and improved their performance 
and efficiency. The OCSC wanted to change laws that prevented government agencies from 
working efficiently. It blamed the State Organisation and Administration Act (1991), which 
set out civil service administrative processes and structures, as the root of administrative 
problems. Reforming this law, the OCSC argued, would enable flexibility in civil service 
management, facilitate the decentralisation of administrative powers including personnel and
4 Prime Ministerial Order, 28 September 1995.
5 During the general election campaign there was strong pressure for political and constitutional 
reform fuelled by the failure of the Chaun government to address the issue. Banham’s Chart Thai 
Party promised to implement the political reform package proposed by the Democracy Development 
Committee, though most political parties distanced themselves from it because it was difficult to 
carry out. The Chart Thai Party’s commitment to political reform was seen by its opponents as a 
strategy for wining the urban vote. A medium sized rural based party based in central Thailand, it 
sought support from cities, particularly Bangkok.
6 See Connors (1999).
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budgets to local administrations, and improve the way public organisations delivered their 
services to citizens.
The OCSC also attempted to keep the attention of the CSRCs members on their 
own reform agenda by disseminating new but often untested proposals on a range of 
administrative issues such as restructuring government units, best practice for improving 
efficiency and streamlining the Civil Service.7 Most issues directly related to democratic 
governance reform, which were of greatest concern to the leaders of the CSRC, were not 
discussed. The political members of the CSRC and some of its academic members, who had 
experience serving on previous reform committees, were worried that the government would 
waste its time making only limited piecemeal changes suggested by the OCSC This would 
undermine the government’s effort to fulfil its political reform mandate. For them, the 
democratic elements of governance deserved their own space.
6.1.2 Shifting focus away from downsizing: Appointing the ISQC
Banham was more interested in expanding and improving public services to citizens than 
downsizing and service streamlining. Like most provincial politicians, he preferred 
bureaucratic expansion, which would increase public services, rather than cuts. Expanding 
public services and thus increasing the number of officials would help him gain the support 
of government officials in rural areas, the power base of the parties in the government 
coalition. Expanding public services, putting more personnel into government units and 
spending larger budgets on popular projects were also part of the Chart Thai Party's 
mandate to deliver better services to citizens, and hence empower them. Banham’s idea was 
re-emphasised when he requested a meeting with ministers and their permanent secretaries 
on 4 August 1995. Banham portrayed his government as one that served needs of the 
people.
As the country has expanded economically and socially, the need for 
public services followed. I want to stress that departments and agencies 
that are directly responsible for providing services to people must 
improve their capability to deliver a better quality of service in a fair, 
equal and transparent manner. We must change our administrative idea
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from governing the people to servicing the people and from 
commanding governance to civic governance.8
After only a few meetings, at which OCSC administrative issues had been discussed 
but not concrete proposals democratic governance reforms, the political leaders of the 
CSRC its political leaders realised that it would not serve as an effective vehicle to implement 
Banham’s political reform promises. They decided that a new effort for democratic 
governance reform needed to be initiated with the PMSO, whose chief was a member of the 
CSRC, responsible for the issue. Following their request, in November 1995 the PMSO 
proposed that the prime minister establish a new Committee on Improving Service Quality 
to Citizens (ISQC). He agreed and appointed Pokin Balakul, a minister in the PMSO who 
had already served as a deputy chair of the CSRQ as chairman. The secretary general of the 
PMSO was appointed secretary of the ISQG Unlike the CSRQ most members of the ISQC 
were reform-minded academics who specialised in public administration. Executives and 
management professionals from the private sector were also appointed. However, 
representatives from the OCSQ the BOB and the GGD also secured places on the ISQC 
because these agencies would be needed to implement reform initiatives.
Working in a separate committee with a clear direction and political mandate, the 
ISQC was able to focus its working agenda on the improvement and delivery of better 
public services to citizens. The ISQC worked intensively and quickly. It sought examples of 
‘best practice’ on improving ‘customer service’ from countries that had undergone reform. 
The UK’s Citizen’s Charter was studied and analysed together with Vice President Al Gore’s 
‘Reinventing the U.S. Federal Government’ programme, and the reforms of the Australian 
and New Zealand governments. The academics private sector representatives on the ISQC 
played and important part in this process. Within two months, in January 1996, the ISQC 
had formulated and agreed a proposal.
The proposal contained two key features. First, it encouraged government 
departments and agencies dealing directly with “customers” to establish a one-stop service. 
The ISQC also enumerated strategies and guidelines for improving service quality, which 
were based on such principles as the empowerment of frontline managers, transparency and
7 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
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accountability in the operation of government agencies, citizens’ participation in service 
provision, and competition between service providers. The second feature of the ISQCs 
proposal was the government’s declaration that 1996 was to be the ‘Year of Serving Gtizens’ 
by the Gvil Sendee. This aimed to promote and encourage government agencies to serve 
their users with speed, transparency and responsiveness, equality and efficiency. Increasing 
customer satisfaction and quality of life is a comer stone of this government’.9
In March 1996 the ISQCs proposal, ‘Improving Service Quality to Gtizens’, was 
presented to the cabinet by the minister for the Prime Minister’s Office, who was also its 
chairman. The proposal was approved by the cabinet on 19 March 1996 and became the 
Prime Minister’s Decree on Improving Service Quality for Gtizens. The decree gave the 
ISQC authority to decide if administrative processes in line ministries and departments were 
conducive to the provision of quality services, propose improvements. However, such 
decisions required input from the central co-ordinating agencies, the BOB, the OCSC and 
the OGD because the operation of the ISQC was constrained by complex laws and 
regulations on personnel, budgets and procurement which prevented line departments and 
ministries from carrying out the ISQC decree. Line ministries and departments and agencies 
found it difficult to improve work processes to improve service quality and started to see the 
ISQC decree as an added burden. At this point, the central agencies, the OCSC, the BOB 
and the CGD became involved to help solve practical problems. These central agencies were 
tasked to look into the technicalities of laws, rules and regulations that restricted 
departments and ministries and suggest changes.
The active involvement of the central agencies, particularly the OCSC, in the 
implementation process led them to re-assert that improving the efficiency of departments 
and ministries formed the core of civil service reform. In this regard, the OCSC used its 
expertise on organisation and management, which the PMSO did not possess, to increase its 
role in consulting and facilitating line ministries, departments and agencies to carry out their 
process improvements. The OCSC claimed that the ISQC Decree could not be realised 
without its assistance. In addition to acting as a consultancy, in 1996 the OCSC published 
and distributed to all government agencies a series of self-improvement “manuals for 
improving service quality for citizens”. The aim of these manuals was to encourage and
8 Banham’s Administrative Policy Address to ministers and permanent secretaries 4 August 1995.
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provided guidelines for government agencies to modernise themselves. It covered such 
techniques as restructuring and reinventing agencies, analysing activities and work process, 
benchmarking, carrying out stakeholder analysis, surveying customer satisfaction, developing 
strategic visions and missions, and prioritising and solving problems. The OCSC was 
successful in linking its efficiency driven reform idea with the political initiative on reforming 
democratic governance in the Gvil Service through improving service delivery. For the 
OCSC, improving service delivery required internal efficiency improvements. Its role became 
prominent as the indispensable driver in Banham’s reform effort.
In short, government politicians were successful in formulating the Prime Ministerial 
Decree on ‘Improving Service Quality for Gtizens’, which was in line with the government’s 
attempt to empower people as part of its political reform mandate. The PMSO which acted 
as the political agent, also enjoyed support from Banham’s government as it was granted the 
authority to monitor how government departments and agencies delivered their services.
6.1.3 Engaging the downsizing process and dialogue
While the CSRC was being established as a high-level committee for civil service reform, the 
OCSC continued to exercise tight control over increases in government personnel. When 
Banham assumed office in July 1995, the Chuan government’s measure to control the size of 
the civil service, a ban on recruiting new staff except to replace retirees enforced by the Gvil 
Service Manpower Committee (CSMPC), was already in place. Although the change in 
government brought a new chairman to the CSMPC, the routine procedure for approving 
requests from ministries and departments for increasing personnel was continued by the 
interim CSMPC secretariat, made up of representatives from the OCSC, the BOB, the CGD 
and the NESDB.
Despite addressing the issue of modernising the civil service, Banham was reluctant 
to adopt the OCSCs policy on limiting civil service growth and reducing civil service staff. 
His cabinet ministers and their permanent secretaries told him that their ministries needed 
more staff rather than fewer and that the downsizing policy could backfire on the 
government; hence his reluctance to adopt the downsizing policy.10
9 Cabinet Resolution 19 March 1996.
10 Interview, aanonymous OCSC official.
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In the absence of a clear prime ministerial policy on downsizing, at the first meeting 
of the Gvil Service Commission (CSQ in August 1995, the OCSC secretary general asked 
the prime minister if he wanted to continue with the Chaun government’s measures. Despite 
his reluctance, due to his political preference for civil service expansion and pressure to 
increasing staff from ministers, Banham could not argue against the fact that public 
personnel costs, as the OCSCs secretary general pointed out, were still increasing. He 
allowed the downsizing policy to continue, as long as staff shortages did not result. Banham 
also expressed concern over the failure of the policy in the past, stating that: “As far as I 
know cabinet ministers, permanent secretaries and director generals of most government 
departments are not aware of this policy or do not understand it. If it is to be successfully 
implemented, their co-operation and agreement would be the key success factor”.11
Banham’s interest and involvement in downsizing policy increased after cabinet 
ministers complained about staff shortages in their ministries. Most complaints were about 
the rejection of requests for increases in personnel by the interim CSMPC, run by the OCSC 
and its allies. The rejections were the result of the CSMPCs strict application of the criteria 
for increases in personnel. Ministers, secretary-generals and director generals, whose requests 
had been rejected, always raised the issue in cabinet and with the prime minister personally. 
At his August 1995 meeting with ministers and permanent secretaries he had said “If 
problems related to personnel, budget and law cannot be solved within your departments, 
please report them to the cabinet so that solutions can be found”.12 Ministers and permanent 
secretaries also claimed that downsizing ran counter to drive to improve service delivery 
outlined at the August meeting.
Pressure also came from members of the governing Chart Thai Party, particularly 
from the education minister whose request for increasing teacher numbers was only partially 
approved by the cabinet. In September 1995 the Ministry of Education made a request for a 
huge increase in personnel, an additional eighty-four new teaching posts, 5,669 replacements 
for retirements, and an additional fifty per cent increase above retirement replacements in 
subsequent years.13 Such a request obviously ran against the downsizing policy and the 
CSMPC could only allow the replacement of vacancies resulting from staff retirement in the
11 Minutes CSC meeting, August 1995.
12 Banham’s policy address to ministers and permanent secretaries 4 August 1995.
13 Ministry of Education Cabinet Submission, 15 September 1995.
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last year. The education minister argued that partial approval would interrupt the operation 
of his ministry and could aggravate the problem of teacher shortages in rural areas. He 
specifically attacked the measure to control the size of the civil service blaming it for 
preventing the recruitment of more teaching staff for schools. Banham could not ignore 
these complaints because “teachers in provincial and district areas were one of the 
occupational groups from which substantial support [for the Chat Thai Party] could be 
mobilised”.14
The combined pressure of cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats forced the 
* government to address the issue of controlling civil service growth. Two months later, on 
10 October 1995, Banham issued a prime ministerial order to appoint a new CSMPC to 
oversee and monitor the implementation of the ‘Measure to control the size of the civil 
service’.15 Most members of this new committee were re-appointed from the old CSMPC 
except deputy prime minister Amnuay Veerawan who was appointed to lead the committee. 
Amnuay was a technocrat and member of the New Aspiration Party, part of the government 
coalition. As a banker and former permanent secretary in the Finance Ministry, Amnauy was 
familiar with the way the Civil Service was managed and how to deal with representatives 
from the central co-ordinating agencies. Appealing to his experience as an executive in the 
private sector, the OCSC and its central agencies allies found it easy to convince him that 
their downsizing effort was a way to improve efficiency. However, Amnuay realised that the 
government would face a backlash from ministries and departments whose manpower 
requests had been turned down by the CSMPC As he warned members of the CSMPC in 
his first meeting:
At early cabinet meetings after Chart Thai Party formed a coalition government, 
many ministers opposed and attacked the downsizing policy. I suspected that 
these ministers got reports from their permanent secretaries. We had a fierce, 
heated argument. I had to explain to them that increasing personnel was not the 
only solution to the problems in their ministries.16
14 Interview, anonymous CSMPC official.
15 Prime Ministerial Order 22/2538,10 October 1995.
16 Annuay closing remarks at National Conference on manpower policy 16 June 1996.
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Although the CSMPC had survived the change of government, it ceased functioning 
as a public personnel policy machine. Most of the issues related to civil service reform were 
taken up by the recently appointed CSRC The CSMPC therefore refocused its mission and 
scope mainly on the approval of manpower requests. In effect, the OCSC, and the BOB 
could exercise their strict streamlining measures by deciding whether departments’ requests 
for personnel increases would be approved. The tasks of the CSMPC became operational 
and routine. They were carried out by three subcommittees appointed the following year on 
23 January 1996: manpower planning, reviewing the roles of the civil service and 
outsourcing, and public relations. They were headed by senior officials from the central 
government agencies and each consisted of between ten and fifteen members, comprising 
academics and representatives from different occupational groups in the civil service. 
Representatives from the OCSC, the CGD, the BOB and the NESDB controlled the 
subcommittees through their joint secretariat positions.
Although the prime minister was convinced by the CSMPC that the policy to control 
manpower increases should continue in order to keep personnel costs below forty per cent 
of the government budget, he was dissatisfied with the strict and sometimes non-negotiable 
way the CSMPC operated. At the meeting of the CSMPC on 8 November 1995, Amnuay 
expressed Banham’s worry that the downsizing policy could backfire on the government. He 
proposed that the OCSC should organise a conference on the issue for the cabinet, 
permanent secretaries of every ministry, and director generals of all departments. This 
conference, according to Amunay, would “provide an important opportunity to make key 
people from line ministries aware of and understand the need for and rationale of the 
downsizing policy as well convince them to accept it. The success of the downsizing policy 
depends very much on the cooperation of these people, particularly the director generals of 
departments who implement it”.17
Continuing pressure from cabinet ministers led to high-level interventions by both 
Amnuay and Banham himself, for fear of losing the support of senior civil servants in line 
ministries. On 29 December 1995, Amnauy invited all permanent secretaries, who were 
regarded as the key people in making downsizing successful, to attend a ‘buy-in’ briefing at 
GoYemment House. At the meeting Amnuay and representatives from the CSMPC,
17 Mnutes of CSMPC meeting 8 November 1995.
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including the OCSC, the BOB and the CGD, made a plea for all departments and ministries 
to co-operate in the implementation of downsizing measures. The permanent secretaries 
were told, “It was inevitable that the government would exercise strict control over 
manpower increases as public personnel costs had been surging.”18
Complaints from cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats from line ministries were 
seen as a high stake issue for Banham. Three and a half months after Amnuay met the 
permanent secretaries, Banham announced that he himself would chair the CSMPC meeting 
on 10 April 1996 because he wanted to learn more about the process of approving 
manpower requests. At the meeting he claimed that ministers and their senior officials were 
not satisfied with the way in which requests were approved.
The CSMPC regularly sent reports to the CSC of which I am a chairman. I also 
received complaints from many departments that there have been staff 
shortages in their departments making it difficult for them to carry out 
government policies. This is of course because their requests for filling vacant 
positions resulting from retirements as well as requests for employing new 
personnel were often turned down, or have not yet been decided by the 
CSMPC19
Banham also made harsh comments on the CSMPCs methods of operation, 
reflecting his frustration with the downsizing policy. He first requested that, although 
downsizing was inevitable, the CSMPC should reconsider its ‘universal approach’ of 
enforcing this policy across the board and take into account the differing conditions in and 
specific needs of individual departments. He wanted the criteria for approving the 
employment of new staff to be responsive to the needs of individual departments. The 
presence of the prime minister at the CSMPCs meeting encouraged representatives from 
departments making requests for personnel increases to press their claims more vigorously. 
“As a result, 1523 vacant posts resulting from retirement, which should have been scrapped 
at that meeting were allowed to be refilled and 2490 new posts were created”.20
18 Interview, Anonymous OCSC official, interview.
19 Minutes of CSMPC meeting 10 April 1996.
20 OCSC Memorandum 22 April 1996.
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At the meeting on 10 April 1996, Banham also urged the CSMPC to speed up the 
approval process and to communicate more with departments. In response to his comments, 
Tipavadi, who represented the OCSC in the CSMPC, argued that the CSMPC should have 
comprehensive approval authority. The policy provided some leeway for ministries and 
departments that had a real need for staff increases and allowed them to submit ‘special 
requests. As a result most requests were classified by departments as ‘special requests’ and 
were referred to the cabinet for a final decision. Tipavadi successfully convinced members of 
the CSMPC to support her argument that to shorten the approval process, the final decision 
for all cases should rest with the chairman of the CSMPC, who would in turn inform the 
cabinet of decisions.
On 7 May 1996, two weeks after the prime minister had attended the CSMPCs 
meeting, Amnuay was able to convince his cabinet colleagues that “downsizing policy, 
namely the ‘Measure to control the size of the civil service’, would continue in force, and the 
vacant posts from staff retirement must be aborted”.21 In order to speed up the operation 
and approval process, “the CSMPC would have comprehensive power to approve all 
requests for personnel increases from departments and agencies. The cabinet would only be 
informed of decisions made by the CSMPC or its chairman”.22 Although most cabinet 
members were convinced by Amnua/s case, Banham was still concerned about how fully 
senior bureaucrats understood the policy and practice of controlling the growth of civil 
service staff. As he had promised sufficient resources for carrying out the government 
policies, downsizing must not create staff shortages in line departments. He requested a 
conference of senior bureaucrats and ministers, first suggested by Amnuay in November 
1995, which should be held as soon as possible. As the conference needed to be held 
urgently, Banham instructed the PMSO, which was present at the CSMPC meeting, to 
organise it conjunction with the OCSC
The conference on downsizing policy was an important opportunity for both the 
government and the CSMPC The government intended to use it as a listening process: “The 
downsizing policy might be modified if not cancelled if the majority of senior bureaucrats 
disagreed with it, and the government would be able to discard it” 23 The involvement of the
21 Cabinet Resolution 7 May 1996.
22 Ibid.
23 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
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PMSO by the prime minister was, according to one OCSC official, “encouraging them [the 
PMSO] to increase their role in the downsizing policy because they were expected to sum up 
the report and make a policy recommendation at the end of the conference. Their report 
could reverse our downsizing policy”24 On the other hand, the OCSC and the CSMPC saw 
the conference as a potential venue for them to allow civil servants to participate in 
“brainstorming sessions aiming to make civil servants understand and co-operate” 25
The national conference on civil service manpower policy took place on 15-16 June 
1996 at a resort hotel in Pattaya, where almost 600 participants including the prime minister, 
cabinet ministers, senior politicians, senior bureaucrats, including permanent secretaries and 
department director generals, civil servants representing every occupational group, academics 
and the media convened. It provided an opportunity for both the government and central 
government agencies represented on the CSMPC to mobilise support from government 
personnel. The government could convey its message to civil servants and the public that 
downsizing was instrumental for improving civil service remuneration. In his opening 
speech, initially drafted by the OCSC, Banham saw increasing public personnel expenditure 
as the root cause of poor civil service salaries, which could be solved by downsizing 
measures.
My government and I are concerned about low civil service salaries, especially 
those of junior grades, which are insufficient to cover their costs of living and 
maintain a good quality of life. The government intends to raise civil service 
salaries and other welfare benefits to a more appropriate level. If we [civil 
servants] can stop the growth of the number of government staff and public 
personnel costs, it would be possible to improve civil service remuneration.26
The national conference also aimed to show that the government was fair and open- 
minded in allowing civil servants to have their say on downsizing policy. Lacking 
understanding of downsizing policy, according to Banham, contributed to confusion in the 
implementation of measures to control the size of the civil service at ministerial and 
departmental levels. He hinted that the OCSC should take the opportunity to fix the alleged
24 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
25 Ibid.
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“lack of communication with line ministries and departments”.27 Banham re-emphasized the 
problem saying:
Some government agencies are not even aware this policy exists. They don’t 
know how to make a request for replacing vacancies [from retirement]. If their 
requests are rejected, they do not know why or what to do next. Some 
departments have told me that they submitted requests two years ago but 
nobody knows where they are now. I want you to hear all the details from the 
OCSC and we would also like to know your opinion on this policy.28
The central government agencies on the CSMPC also had an opportunity to 
convince politicians and civil servants of their downsizing policy. Amnuay and senior 
bureaucrats from the agencies, including the OCSCs deputy chief, the NESDB secretary 
general and BOB director and a senior official from the GGD, presented their visions for 
civil service manpower policy. Deputy Prime Minister Amnuay convinced participants that 
downsizing, which had been proved elsewhere, could be successful in Thailand. He 
particularly referred to the downsizing of the American Federal Gvil Service, which had 
reduced staff by ten per cent. Reforming, reinventing, re-engineering and restructuring which 
had been successfully used to downsize the American public services, was the heart of his 
civil service reform effort.29
At the conference, the four central government agencies, the OCSC, the BOB, the 
OGD and the NESDB, co-operated and expressed a strong commitment to streamlining. 
The OCSC, which took the lead in the conference, claimed that a survey it had conducted 
prior to the conference showed that eighty per cent of government personnel agreed with 
the downsizing policy However, it made some concessions proposing that the CSMPC 
might customise the enforcement of the policy to the needs of individual government 
departments or occupational groups. The BOB and the CGD played supporting roles 
confining their presentations to the issue of outsourcing, which at that time had not
26 Banham’s address to the conference on Public Sector Manpower Policy 15 June 1996.
27 Interview, Chalerm Sriphadoong, OCSC deputy secretary general.
28 Banham’s address to the conference on Public Sector Manpower Policy 15 June 1996.
29 Ammnuay, keynote speech, Pattaya conference, ‘The future role of the civil service and its 
workforce’, 15 June 1996.
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progressed much because of the complexity of civil service financial regulations. The 
NESDB focused more on the macro-level of national manpower planning, widening the 
scope of the issue of civil service downsizing. For the NESDB, downsizing the civil service 
could be achieved if the state redefined and minimised its role.
As the conference was also meant to be a listening process and dialogue between 
policy makers and ‘implemented’, participants were divided into four groups. Each group 
was asked to discuss and provide opinions on issues pre-selected by the OCSC to ensure 
there would not be any direct attacks on the policy by participants.30 The result of the 
conference was predictable, a diplomatically expressed agreement in principle with the 
policy. The general response of participants was: “The principle of downsizing is agreed, but 
it would be difficult to implement unless more practical and flexible solutions were 
provided”.31 Participants also suggested ways in which the civil service and its workforce 
should be managed in the year 2020: “We needed a more efficient and smaller civil service. It 
must not be rule bound. Administrative procedures must be simplified. Goals and targets 
must be clear and above all responsive to citizens’ needs.”32
Representatives from line ministries and departments and the private sector were 
encouraged to voice their opinions and have a dialogue to ‘let off steam’ about the problems 
of down sizing. While recognising the need for downsizing, many bureaucrats from 
departments that had experienced staff cuts called for a more customised approach. A senior 
bureaucrat from the Ministry of Education called the downsizing policy “unrealistic and 
should be adjusted to departmental environments, conditions and realities”.33 Another 
attacked the OCSG “The conflict, misunderstanding and rows over downsizing policy were 
the result of a lack of proper communication”.34 The chief of the Irrigation Department 
mentioned “the rigid and universal approach to downsizing” arguing for more autonomy for
30 Topics for discussion included suitability of downsizing policy, problems of implementing 
downsizing measures, the reduction of the role of the state and outsourcing, the development of 
success criteria for assessing workforce utilisation, and visions towards civil service workforce in the 
year 2020.
31 Interview, Laddawan, CSMPC member.
32 Ibid.
33 Chamras Sudanich, Secretary General of the National Education Commission, interview note by 
NESDB officials.
34 Jintana Paksriwong, Director General of the High School Education Department, interview note 
by NESDB officials.
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departments to make decisions on their staff cuts35 Some participants saw the downsizing 
policy as inappropriate as it dealt mainly with the government’s short-term problem of rising 
personnel costs. For them, “workforce policy needed to consider the long term demands 
from the environment and the changing roles of the state”.36
Banham’s government did not last long enough for the outcomes of the national 
conference to change the way the CSMPC approved departmental requests for manpower 
increases. During his year in office the full CSMPC met only three times and the OCSC and 
the BOB jointly made most decisions on staff increases, leaving it as little more than a 
mbber stamp. Three months after the Pattaya conference, in November 1996, a political 
crisis brought down Banham’s fragile coalition government after barely a year in office. 
After a three day televised censure motion debate in parliament and threats from his 
coalition partners to defect, the prime minister dissolved parliament and called a general 
election.37
Downsizing got on the agenda of Banham’s government, despite the reluctance of 
politicians, as part of a wider civil service reform agenda. In the ‘reform battle’ between 
politicians and civil servants, politicians resisted downsizing, preferring expansion, and 
wanted to shift civil service reform to the issue of service quality, which was part of their 
political reform agenda to improve the quality of democratic governance. The appointment 
of the ISQ reflected the priorities of politicians. Gvil servants in the central co-ordinating 
agencies wanted to continue downsizing. Budgetary pressures forced the politicians continue 
downsizing measures and shifted the ‘reform battleground’ to discussion of the application 
of downsizing measures at a national conference. The short-lived nature of Banham’s 
government prevented any progress on downsizing.
35 Roong-ruang Chulachart, Director General of the Irrigation Department, interview note by 
NESDB’s officials.
36 This view was shared by many participants such as Orapin Sopchokchai of the Thailand Research 
and Development Institute, Sippanon Ketutad, chairman of the NESDB, and Apinan Pavanarit, 
director general of the Europe Affairs Department; interview notes by NESDB officials.
37 See Chapter 2.
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6.2 Downsizing and Efficiency Improvement: TheQia\aKtEia, 1996-1997
The 1996 election was won by the New Aspiration Party, a former coalition partner in the 
outgoing government and its leader, General Chavalit Yongchaiyooth, a former deputy 
prime minister in Banham’s government, became prime minister on 29 November 1996. 
Unlike most previous governments which came into office with no pre-conceived ideas 
about the issue of bureaucratic improvement, the New Aspiration Party led coalition 
government arrived with a broad idea of civil service reform. This was outlined in its 
manifesto The New Aspiration for Ciiil Seruce Reform Published in booklet form and 
distributed among politicians and senior bureaucrats, it outlined Chavalit’s ideas and placed 
particular emphasis on the need to improve the performance and efficiency of the civil 
service.
Gvil service reform is one of the most significant conditions for the 
development success of the country. Most past research and studies point to the 
same direction confirming that it was not a lack of natural resources that 
prevented the country from achieving a higher degree of developmental success, 
but the lack of good and efficient public administration. 'Without reforming the 
civil service, which is the mechanism for implementing government policy, 
political reform that aims to enhance the country's development success, to 
protect the right of citizenry, to increase the quality of people’s lives and to raise 
our country’s competitiveness internationally cannot not be achieved.38
Chavalit personally identified himself with civil service reform. His enthusiasm for 
the issue and desire to be involved in the policy and management of the Gvil Service was 
due to his legacy as an army modernizer, and pressure from the country’s deteriorating 
economy. Chavalit’s reform legacy was evident from his attempt to downsize the army in 
1986-7 when he served as Army chief and supreme commander of the Thai military. His 
reform programme was a response to cuts in the military budget by the government. 
According to Chavalit, “The army must be small, efficient and ready for combat. 
Undertaking an army modernisation programme amid scarce resources was difficult. Many 
systems within the army related to the management of military personnel, weaponry and
38 Chavalit, Gvil Service Reform Manifesto, 1996.
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technology had to be simultaneously improved.”39 As far as army downsizing was concerned, 
“The reduction of the army workforce was particularly painful. Nevertheless, I had to bear 
this pain myself and it [downsizing programme] should not be passed to my successors. 
Otherwise, the modernisation policy would not have been successful.40
Reform of the civil service was considered essential by the Chavalit government as a 
severe economic crisis loomed. When it took office in mid November 1996, the country’s 
major macroeconomic indicators were falling: the stock exchange index fell by nearly a 
quarter, imports fell by ten per cent, and business confidence fell as manufacturing output 
and private consumption rates declined. In addition the Baht came under pressure from 
speculators.41 In these difficult and worsening economic circumstances civil service reform 
became a crucial issue on the government’s agenda. Downsizing and streamlining the civil 
service would make an important contribution to fiscal policy by reducing government 
expenditure. These areas were the responsibility of the new finance minister, Amnuay 
Virawan, a member of the Banham government and deputy prime minister responsible for 
civil service reform.
6.2.1 Visioning the civil service workforce
Immediately after assuming office in November 1996 Chavalit appointed himself chairman 
of the Civil Service Commission (CSQ. hie was keen to be at the helm of the CSC, the 
central civil service policy-making mechanism, as he shared the assumption of most of his 
predecessors that leading the CSC would ensure the prime minister’s control over the 
appointment of senior bureaucrats. Chavalit’s enthusiasm for civil service reform was seen 
by the OCSC as a green light for putting forward civil service reform plans and 
improvement measures. The OCSC promptly suggested that a new Civil Service Reform 
Committee (CSRQ should be appointed to implement The New Aspiration for Cizil Sertice 
Reform On 9 January 1997, one and a half months after becoming prime minister, Chavalit 
appointed a new CSRC with himself as the chairman.42 The new CSRC was “to develop the 
strategies and measures to improve the civil service and advise the Prime Minister on civil
39 Work and Life of General Chavalit Yongchaiyooth, Pap-pim Publications 1997
40 Ibid.
41 See chapter 2.
42 Prime Ministerial Order 12/2540: 9 January 1997.
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service related matters”.43 Pokin Balakhul, a minister in the Prime Minister’s Office who held 
the same office in Banham’s government and was deputy chairman of the previous CSRQ 
was re-appointed deputy chair. The OCSC appointed one of its deputy secretary^generals, 
Suparat Chotikayam, to service the new CSRC
In late January 1997 the CSRC established three principal sub-committees to discuss 
civil service reform. They were designed by the OCSC to consider three important related 
issues to set the course of civil service reform toward a leaner and more efficient Gvil 
Service. These issues were reorganising and restructuring the civil service management 
system, improving public personnel management, and developing information technology 
and management information systems. Minister Pokin was appointed to chair the committee 
on the reorganisation and restructuring the civil service, a difficult and controversial issue, 
which normally involved legislative change. The OCSCs secretary general led the sub­
committee on improving public personnel management, its own jurisdiction. Another 
minister in the Prime Minister’s Office, Surasak Nananukul was in charge of the 
subcommittee on developing information technology. In addition, a fourth sub committee 
was established to ensure progress by monitoring and evaluating civil service reform 
initiatives. The appointment of a former chief of the OCSC as it chairman safeguarded the 
OCSCs interests.44 A fifth subcommittee on public relations to mobilise public support for 
the reform programme was also set up chaired by the head of the government’s Public 
Relations Department. The working structure and the functioning of the CSRC were 
designed and controlled by the OCSC
The CSRC spent the first half of 1997 working towards the development of its 
proposal Having seen the failure of previous reform attempts, the OCSC shifted its reform 
focus from a piecemeal and uncoordinated approach to a comprehensive one. The master 
plan, therefore, was intended to overhaul the whole system of the Gvil Service as well as 
public enterprises. The CSRC attacked the administrative philosophy characterised by 
centralised administrative authorities and expansion of administrative and monopolistic 
power bases that had governed the Gvil Service for more than a century.45 It claimed that 
“Such a governing philosophy created administrative problems that prevented government
43 Ibid.
44 He had been transferred by Anand’s administration. See Chapter 4.
45 Problem Statement, Master Plan for Reforming the Public Sector 1997-200, CSRC.
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after government from delivering better public services. These problems were specifically 
related to the obesity of the Gvil Service, manpower empire-building and the complexity of 
rules and regulations”.46
The CSRC completed its proposal, the ‘Master Plan for Reforming the Public Sector 
(1997-2001)’ within six months. It was drawn up by a small group of public administration 
academics, who were appointed technical advisors to the CSRQ and senior officials from the 
OCSC who worked quickly and effectively together.47 The plan was for the medium-term 
and built upon two important reform strategies, redefining and downsizing public 
organisations and improving civil service work systems and procedures. The plan also 
identified twentytwo methods for achieving these strategies within a time frame of one to 
five years. Before submitting its plan to the cabinet, the CSRC requested its secretariat to 
organise public hearings to gather opinion from civil servants, the private sector, academics 
and media and public opinion. Seven public hearings were then held in Bangkok and the 
provinces with selected groups of civil servants, local officials and the business community. 
The OCSC and the authors of the master plan organised the public hearings, which were 
new to the Thai context.
The ‘Master Plan for Reforming the Public Sector’ was submitted to the cabinet in 
early June and approved at its meeting on 17 June 1997. Cabinet approval was given because 
“it would lead to the downsizing of public organisations by improving the efficiency of 
government personnel and introducing information technology to improve the civil service 
work system”.48 In this regard, the cabinet agreed with the targets proposed by CSRC that 
“government personnel will be reduced by ten percent within five years (1997-2001) and by 
twenty percent within ten years. Simultaneously, the retirement system must be made be 
more flexible to simplify the employment termination process”.49 To control the structural 
diversification of government departments and units, the cabinet agreed that “central 
government should only perform core policy functions and decentralise service delivery 
functions to local authorities or privatise or outsource them to the private sector. This would
46 Ibid.
47 These included Professor Voradech Chandrasom, Professor Supachai Yavaprabhas, Chamchai 
Sawangsak, Suparat Chotikayan and Vanida Nuanboonruang.
48 Cabinet Resolution, 17 June 1997.
49 Ibid.
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make central government leaner and more strategically focused”.50 Thus, by June 1997, the 
Chavalit government had managed to form a new vision for civil service manpower policy as 
well as announce a target for staff reduction, the first of its kind in the modem democratic 
history of the Thai Civil Service.
6.2.2 Continuing Head counting Practices
In early January 1997, soon after the Chavalit government had established the CSRC to serve 
as the national committee responsible for public sector reform, the OCSC proposed that the 
Civil Service Manpower Policy Committee (CSMPC), which had previously dealt with 
controlling civil service growth, should be re-appointed. Chavalit agreed and appointed 
Sookwit Rangsitpol, one of his deputy prime ministers and education minister, to lead it. 
Sookwit had previously been chief executive of a multinational oil company before accepting 
Chavalit’s invitation to become secretary general of the New Aspiration Party. His 
experience in the private sector made him familiar with efficiency improvement techniques 
including downsizing. Most members of the CSMPC and its sub-committees remained 
largely unchanged. Representatives from the OCSC, the BOB, the CGD and the NESDB 
again served as joint secretaries.
The appointment of Sookwit as chairman of the new CSMPC ensured that issue of 
controlling civil service growth and specifically the approval of manpower requests for 
personnel increases gained the direct attention from Chavalit’s government. His 
commitment to the issue was demonstrated at the first meeting he chaired on 31 January 
1997 when he was accompanied by a deputy finance minister. The presence of two senior 
politicians at the meeting, including one from the Finance Ministry signalled how important 
the government considered downsizing. Sookwit requested that, to monitor the progress of 
the CSMPC, two meetings a week should be held. Having heard that in the past the 
CSMPCs methods of controlling increases in government manpower had often led to rows 
between ministers, senior bureaucrats and the committee, he suggested that the CSMPC 
should be more policy oriented, as it was originally intended to be. As he put it, “The 
CSMPC has the role and authority to determine the size of the civil service by setting targets 
for controlling the government workforce. So far, it has not properly performed its policy
50 Ibid.
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role of workforce planning. Its work has largely been routine”.51 Sookwit described the new 
role of the CSMPC as “making big picture policies that would lead to a reduction in the size 
of the Civil Service. Such policies involved improving work processes, outsourcing and 
contracting out public services, redeployment of the workforce, and developing information 
technology for the civil service”.52
Sookwit’s agenda for the CSMPC was similar to that of the CSRC as he believed that 
the missions of the two committees were closely related. At a meeting on 18 March 1997, he 
suggested that the CSMPC should work hand in hand with the CSRC to improve the 
management of line departments, which he described as “riddled with lack of co-ordination 
resulting from their traditional vertical management structures, division of labour and 
specialisation”.53 According to Sookwit, the result of such problems was that “no one knows 
or cares about accomplishing the overall goals and policies of their ministry, no mission 
priority is set, there is no clear responsibility and accountability because of a culture of buck 
passing; decisions are left unmade or delayed because insufficient information is available.”54 
Sookwit also made a plea for co-operation between civil servants and members of the 
CSMPG “Politicians try to solve a lot of problems including such important issues as 
education reform and of course civil service reform. But our term in office is short and 
limited. Gvil servants must co-operate and help politicians to deliver reform successfully. I 
want to emphasise the importance of horizontal management, which is addressed in the 
Prime Minister’s New A spiratknfor Ciul Service Reform55
However, during Chavalit’s year-long administration, between November 1996 and 
November 1997, the CSMPC met only five times, far less than Sookwit had wanted because 
of his busy schedule. Despite Sookwit’s wish that the committee should become a policy 
machine, much of the CSMPCs work remained routine, concerned with approving requests 
for manpower increases from line ministries and departments. The CSMPC continued to 
‘headcount’ as personnel requests kept being made. Most requests were from the Ministry of 
Education where Sookwit himself was political master as minister. The ministry requested a 
substantial increase in the number of teachers, claiming that this was in line with government
51 Minutes of CSMPC meeting, 31 January 1997.
52 Ibid.
53 Minutes of CSMPC meeting, 18 March 1997.
54 Ibid.
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policy to expand free education to nine years, which required new secondary schools and the 
employment of many thousands more teachers. However, the CSMPC only approved some 
requests arguing that the ratio of teachers and students adopted by the Ministry of Education 
was unrealistic.56 The CSMPC argued that “Teaching in Thai schools focused on lecturing 
rather than tutoring. If the ratio between teachers and students was increased, there would 
be enough teachers even though schooling years had increased”.57 It turned down many 
requests, only approving 890 more teachers in 1997, far fewer than the 4000 originally 
requested by the Ministry of Education. Despite this, the CSMPCs secretaries were 
disappointed and blamed Sookwit for not being committed to downsizing.58
Sookwit, of course, disagreed with the partial approval of manpower requests, 
arguing that ministries and departments would not be able to accomplish their missions if 
only a portion of their requests were approved. Frustration with the way the CSMPC 
approval process worked led him to suggest the imposition of a new method to control civil 
service manpower increases in April 1997.
Decisions to increase departments’ staff should be made by line departments 
within their gross budget frameworks approved by the cabinet on the advice of 
the BOB. They should make decisions on how much of their budget they want 
to spend on personnel. The CSMPC should not interfere with numbers of staff 
they wanted to employ. The job of the CSMPC was to provide a broad 
manpower framework for individual ministries and departments. The benefit of 
this approach, would be an increase in participation by ministries and 
departments in civil service manpower policy.”59
Sookwit’s suggestion required legislative change and was, as a result, not 
implemented. At the same time, the government was forced to attend to the more serious 
issue of economic crisis, which required spending cuts and retrenchment. The CSMPCs
55 Ibid.
56 The requests based their calculation on a teacher-students ratio of 1:10. If the ratio increased to 
1:50, there would be no teacher shortage.
57 Minutes of CSMPC meeting, 28 April 1997.
58 Interview, Laddawan Tantithavarangkura, CSMPC secretariat.
59 Minutes of CSMPC meeting, 28 April 1997.
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main function remained approving requests for manpower increases and it continued its 
strict ‘head counting’ practices.
6.3 Crisis Driven Downsizing: Cutting Personnel Expenditure
The government’s civil service reform and downsizing policies operated in the context of the 
country’s worsening economic situation. At the beginning of February 1997, as the CSRC 
started working on its Master Plan for Public Sector Reform, there was renewed speculation 
against the Baht and Thailand’s international debt rating was downgraded. In March and 
April the government was forced to introduce a package of measures to shore up banks and 
finance companies. During the summer of 1997 the economic crisis worsened significantly. 
By the end of May foreign currency reserves had fallen by a record US$ 4 billion, in June the 
finance minister resigned and by the end of July the Baht had depreciated by 20 per cent. 
Facing an economic crisis it could not longer manage, on 5 August 1997 Chavalit’s 
government agreed to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund. On 11 August 
1997 the Thai government and the IMF reached agreement on a rescue package.
Though the economic crisis placed huge pressure on the government it reinforced 
the downsizing and streamlining policies the central co-ordinating agencies had been 
advocating for long time. The IMF’s rescue package prescribed a stringent fiscal policy to 
reduce expenditure, which had important implications for civil service management. It 
required urgent streamlining of the Civil Service and cutting public expenditure. The package 
called for a fiscal surplus of one per cent of GDP to meet the anticipated costs of financial 
sector restructuring. To achieve this the government needed to raise revenues equivalent to 
2.8 per cent of GDP. As well as cutting expenditure, the IMF suggested the surplus could 
come from increasing value-added tax from seven per cent to ten per cent.
The BOB moved quickly to cut government expenditure. On 19 August 1997, a 
week after reaching agreement with the IMF, Chavalit’s cabinet approved its proposal to 
slash 59 billion Baht from its public expenditure for the fiscal year 1998, reducing the budget 
from 982 billion Baht to 923 billion. The OCSC was required to co-operate with the 
Ministry of Finance and the BOB to formulate a plan to improve the Civil Service by 
increasing efficiency and downsizing, increasing productivity by motivating personnel with 
improved incentives and preventing political interference in the management of the civil
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service.60 The BOB also proposed a series of further budget cuts on 14 October 1997 to 
bring down public expenditure for the fiscal year 1998 by another 100 billion Baht.
In addition to proposals to scrap infrastructure projects that were not strictly in line 
with the NESDB Plan for 1997-2001, to cancel any projects and activities whose aims and 
objectives were not congruent with the present needs and situations, and to discontinue 
projects and activities that required foreign currency, the BOB also recommended measures 
to downsize the Gvil Service. These measures included the decentralisation of functions to 
local authorities, the privatisation of some services better managed by the private sector, the 
abolition of peripheral functions and refocusing the core government businesses. Another 
BOB policy recommendation was to prevent or delay the establishment of new 
administrative units in the civil service and government public enterprises involved the 
jurisdiction of the OCSC .61 Slashing public expenditure in general and personnel costs in 
particular created greater reform awareness among civil servants and government personnel.
By the end of 1997 there was widespread public discontent at the inability of 
Chavalit’s government to tackle the country's economic problems. The loss of public 
confidence came mainly from Chavalit’s inability to manage his coalition partners and 
impose strict financial discipline on the economy. The diversity of interests of the parties in 
his coalition prevented the adoption of far-reaching and effective reforms to alleviate the 
crisis. After eleven months in office and six months of political and economic turbulence, 
Chavalit resigned. His resignation came while parliament was still revising the constitution 
and the country faced the prospect of an interim prime minister until 1998 when elections 
could be held under the new constitution. However, Chaun Leekpai, the opposition leader 
and head of the Democrat Party and prime minister from 1992 to 1995 managed to forge a 
new coalition government with a parliamentary majority and assumed his second term as 
premier in November 1997.
Gvil service reform gained an immediate place on the Chavalit government’s agenda 
because it was already part of the ruling New Aspiration Party's election manifesto. This 
focused on civil service efficiency reform in order to make the Gvil Service a better 
mechanism for implementing government policy, especially development policy. Alongside 
this downsizing continued through the routine control of requests for manpower. The 1997
60 Memo from Finance Minister to Prime Minister, 19 August 1997.
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economic crisis gave downsizing much greater urgency; substantial budget cuts required 
significant downsizing. The result was an OCSC formulated ‘Master Plan’ to streamline and 
downsize the Civil Service which set ambitious targets, a ten per cent personnel reduction in 
five years and a twenty per cent reduction in ten years.
6.4 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Civil Service Policy Making
This chapter provides a narrative of continuity and change in the civil service downsizing 
policy adopted by two governments of Thailand between 1995 and 1997, the period that led 
up to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The continuity of civil service policy in this period is 
characterised by the adoption of Chuan’s Measure to Control ihe Size c f the Cvul Serdoe by the 
Banham and Chavalit governments. The introduction of new issues, improving service 
quality to citizens by Banham’s government, and the formulation of the Master Plan for 
Reforming Public Sector in which the ambitious target for streamlining the Civil Service by 
Chavalit’s government, represent change in civil service policy. This section provides 
explanations for civil service policy change by looking at the components of the reform 
processes namely agenda setting, alternative specification and decision-making. The 
following sections elaborate on how the institutional and contextual factors affected these 
processes leading to the trajectories and outcomes of civil service policy making in both 
periods.
6.4.1 Agenda Setting
Civil service reform on Banham’s government policy agenda involved two competing issues 
‘downsizing’ and ‘improving service quality for citizens’. The latter gained more political 
attention from the government than the former. Hence its status was higher than 
downsizing, which remained on the specialised agenda of civil service policy-making 
agencies. The emergence of the two reform issues on Banham’s government agenda can be 
seen as the combined influence of the structure within which these issue were originated and 
processed, and the dynamics of the political and economic situations, as well as the legacy of 
the prime ministers themselves.
61 BOB Cabinet Submission 13 October 1997.
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The inclusion of two competing civil service reform issues on the Banham 
government’s agenda was the result of two processes of issue formulation each in different 
institutional venues. The civil service policy-making agencies, led by the OCSC, the BOB 
and the GGD, maintained the issue of controlling the size of the Civil Service inherited from 
Chaun’s government. The salience of this issue and its ‘negative impact’ on the way in which 
ministers and senior bureaucrats in line ministries and departments managed their own 
manpower attracted the attention of government politicians including prime minister 
Banham. As a result, the downsizing issue inadvertently gained government attention 
because it wanted to respond to complaints about the process of approving the employment 
of new personnel, a major hurdle imposed by the downsizing policy. Despite its salience, the 
status of the downsizing issue was not seen as high by the government because Chart Thai 
Party led government in general, and Banham, himself had a legacy of expansion of public 
services. In this sense, Banham’s government legacy of service expansion constrained the 
progress of the downsizing issue.
During the Banham period, the more strategic issue of improving and delivering 
better quality services to citizens gained considerable attention from the government. As it 
became the priority of his government’s civil service reform effort, its issue status was high. 
The issue was strategically important to the government mainly because of the imperative for 
political and constitutional reform, which was an election promise of the ruling Chart Thai 
Party. The issue was seen as part of and instrumental in achieving some political reform aims 
particularly the constitutional right of citizens to receive quality services from the state. The 
issue, which dominated Banham’s policy agenda, was fostered and processed by the PMSO, 
a political agency in the bureaucracy through the ISQC In this sense, the PMSO was the 
certified reformer of Banham’s government.
In the Chavalit period, the civil service policymaking agencies became active again as 
it control the Civil Service reform agenda on the government’s policy space. Like Banham, 
Chavalit had a policy legacy, which affected which issues reached the government agenda. In 
Chavalit’s case the legacy was his role as a strong advocate of army modernisation and 
downsizing champion. This allowed the OCSC and its allied central co-ordinating agencies 
to elevate the status of efficiency reform and downsizing the Civil Service on Chavalit’s 
government agenda. The narrative evidence for its high issue status can be seen in the
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formulation of the Master Plan for Reforming Public Sector and the ambitious target for 
reducing the number of Gvil Service personnel.
It can be concluded at this stage that the political attention and the resultant status of 
the downsizing issue in both Banham and Chavalit period was shaped largely by the 
development of political and economic contexts in the mid 1990s. The context-in-motions, 
political developments during the Banham period and the economic crisis during Chavalit’s, 
shaped the way political attention was allocated to and the progress of the downsizing issue. 
Under Banham the political demand for constitutional reform limited the government’s 
attention to the downsizing issue. Under Chavalit the deteriorating economy enabled the 
issue of downsizing and streamlining to progress quickly. The 1997 economic crisis 
contributed to the pace and depth of downsizing policy as indicated by many studies on the 
literature of crisis-driven and conditionality related civil service reform. This point will be 
illustrated more fully in the next chapter.
6.4.2 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
Like the earlier episodes in this thesis, reform alternatives were associated with issue 
definitions. Specifying reform alternatives during the Banham period was characterised by 
the process of accommodating reform alternatives in the government reform programme. 
The coexistence of both downsizing and improving service quality for citizens involved 
strategic action by a leading bureaucratic reformer, the OCSC As the narrative shows, the 
OCSCs attempted to link the issues of downsizing and improving service quality together in 
the hope that the latter would be brought under the umbrella of the downsizing policy. The 
OCSC claimed that improving and delivering service quality to citizens required improved 
efficiency within government departments and ministries. The two issues could be processed 
within the same institutional venue, the CSRC However, the issue of improving service 
quality would be difficult to realise if the bureaucratically controlled CSRC was the only 
certified reformer.
The structure of the institutional venues where reform issues were processed 
affected the pace and rate at which the reform alternatives, in this case, reform proposals, 
were developed. The Banham government’s decision to set up the ISQC not only secured 
the strategically and constitutionally important issue of service delivery, but also helped 
speed up the pace of formulating the Proposal on ‘Improving Service Quality to Gtizen,
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which was completed by within two months of the ISQCs was creation. The dynamic of 
alternative specification process was due mainly to the structure of the ISQC, which was 
composed of the government’s men and enjoyed strong political support.
Developing civil service reform proposals in the CSRC and implementing manpower 
control measures in the CSMPC, most of whose members were senior bureaucrats from 
central co-ordinating agencies, took place at a slower pace and involved dialogue with and 
pressure from cabinet ministers and their senior bureaucrats in line ministries and 
departments. The adoption of Measures to Control the Size of the Civil Service involved a 
dialogue between bureaucratic reformers and government politicians which led to the 
politicisation of the manpower management process, as seen in the attendance of prime 
minister Banham at a CSMPC meeting. The decision to adopt downsizing measures by the 
Banham government was also constrained by political pressure. As a result, the OCSC, the 
BOB, the GGD and the NESDB had to convince both the government and line ministries 
and department to accept the measures. This effort included the strategic use of policy 
dialogue through the 1996 national conference on civil service manpower policy. Both the 
government and the CSMPC utilised the conference to justify their actions. The national 
conference therefore represented symbolic action by both parties in the reform process to 
‘mobilise support’ for their own policy stance.
During the Chavalit period, the process dynamic of specifying reform alternatives 
with regard to downsizing advanced at a quicker pace with fewer constraints. The civil 
service policy-making agencies were given more autonomy by the Chavalit government than 
the Banham government. The CSRC and the CSMPC, which can be seen as the puppets of 
the central co-ordinating agencies, were able to consolidate their authority over downsizing 
policy. The issue of downsizing, which was not contested, emerged and secured high status 
on the government policy agenda. Certified by the government, the OCSC and other central 
co-ordinating agencies were encouraged to pursue measures to control civil service growth 
as their roles were effectively invoked. The invocation of role expectation, which led to the 
intensity of reform effort, not only acted as an enabling factor for progressing the 
downsizing issue, but also facilitated the emergence of a new vision for manpower policy 
and a more stringent target for staff reductions. This was the first time in modem Thai 
administrative history that staff reduction targets were publicly announced.
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Another dimension of the institutional venues that constrained and facilitated the 
process dynamics of adopting reform alternatives in both the Banham and Chavalit period 
was their common membership. As shown in the narrative, there was common membership 
of politicians and representatives of central government agencies, including the OCSQ the 
BOB, on civil service reform related committees, the CSR, the CSMPC and the ISQC. This 
allowed the downsizing issue to be addressed in different venues and hence increased the 
possibility of government action.
Another constraint within the process of adopting reform alternatives is whether the 
political heads of related reform committees belonged to the leading party of the 
government coalition. During the Banham period, the CSMPC was controlled by deputy 
prime minister Amnuay, who was member of a junior party in the governing coalition rather 
than Banham’s Chart Thai Party. Such a structure, on the one hand, attracted half-hearted 
support from the prime minister whose predisposition was against staff reduction. On the 
other hand, the structure of the CSMPC helped sustain the strict application of the criteria 
for approving requests for increasing manpower from line ministries and departments. The 
structure provided a buffer that could reject some requests from government politicians. In 
contrast, although the CSMPC during the Chavalit period was controlled by a deputy prime 
minister from Chavalit’s own party and enjoyed government support, its work was not 
effective. Its head, Sookwit, faced a conflict of interest when processing applications for 
personnel increases from line ministries. As chair of the CSMPC he sought to apply strict 
criteria to limit increases but as minister of education he made requests for large increases in 
manpower, which his committee then approved. As a result, downsizing in this period was 
dubbed insincere by the central co-ordinating agencies.
This chapter provides narrative explanations for continuity and change in civil 
service policy during two short-lived governments between 1995 and 1997. Such change and 
stability was characterised by both coexistence and competition between the issues of 
controlling the size of the Civil Service and improving service quality to citizens as well as 
the imposition of more stringent measures to cuib the size of the Civil Service. It highlights 
the impact of the dynamic contexts of political and economic development on the 
emergence of reform issues on the Banham and Chavalit government agendas. The chapter 
also provides explanations for the different paces in developing and adopting reform 
proposals in the two periods by accounting for the combined impact of the structure of
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institutional venues where the alternative specification took place, and the legacies of the 
governments and their political leaders.
Chapter 7 
Turning a crisis into an opportunity: 
Accelerating downsizing 1997-1999:
Overview
This chapter provides an account of the downsizing effort of Chaun’s second administration 
from the onset of Asian economic crisis in mid 1997 and forms the closing episode in the 
downsizing experience of the Thai civil service. This period saw continuity in downsizing 
policy, which was reinforced by subsequent streamlining measures introduced between 1998 
and 1999, but also significant change in policy effectiveness. Downsizing measures were 
more stringently applied than in previous periods and included the abolition of retirement 
vacancies and the launch of a voluntary early retirement programme. The former compelled 
line ministries and departments to delete up to eighty per cent of vacancies. The latter helped 
the government to reduce the civil service by 20,000. For the first time in its modem Thai 
administrative history, the size of the civil service fell.
It seeks to examine how the context of the economic crisis affected the process of 
downsizing and its outcome. It traces how the crisis provided an opportunity for downsizing 
and civil service reform in terms of the effectiveness of downsizing policy and the 
institutionalisation of the reform effort. The chapter also examines how the economic crisis 
also provided an opportunity for the central co-ordinating agencies to institutionalise the 
process of civil service reform through the creation of a permanent office of civil service 
reform and how they were able to consolidate their power and build their capacity to make 
and manage civil service reform.
7.1 Crisis Driven Civil Service Reform
Chaun’s second administration (1997-2001) emerged from the political and economic crisis 
that brought down the Chavalit government in November 1997. Chaun, leader of the 
opposition and head of the Democrat Party, the second largest party in parliament, managed 
to put together a new coalition and avoid calling new elections. The new government gave 
civil service reform a high priority on its agenda in order to meet the political and economic 
demands it faced. It was part of the government’s response to the severity of the economic
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crisis facing the country but also contributed to the need for improvements in governance 
required by the new 1997 constitution. Chaun set out his aims in a policy statement to 
parliament on 20 November 1997. This primarily called for co-operation by all parties in the 
country, public, private and civic, to tackle the economic crisis which had caused widespread 
social problems and falling living standards. His administrative policy addressed the 
government’s constitutional requirement to protect citizens’ rights and freedoms and to 
carry out justice in an efficient and equitable manner.
Chaun’s administrative policy invited the public to participate in the management 
and delivery of public services. In his policy statement to parliament he announced that 
“public sector organisations and state enterprises would be more open to public 
participation and administrative authorities and responsibilities would be decentralised to 
local communities”.1 The government would also reform the Gvil Service and public 
enterprises and transform them into an open system. The statement went on to say that the 
public would be encouraged to participate in the management of government businesses.
Chaun also promised to remove structural and procedural rules that prevented the 
effective delivery of public services. In this regard, the complicated rules and regulations and 
the uncoordinated, fragmented and overlapping jurisdictions of public sector organisations 
that restricted the ability of the Gvil Service to carry out government policies would be 
reformed. Chaun specifically proposed to expedite the restructuring of legal frameworks and 
work processes to increase the Gvil Service’s capacity to deliver public services to citizens in 
an efficient and fair manner. Unnecessary procedures would be eliminated.
Incorporated within Chaun’s administrative policy statement were proposals to 
redefine the role of the state. He announced that his government would “reduce state 
involvement in various public enterprises and encourage the partial or complete privatisation 
of such enterprises in a systematic and tangible manner”.2 Such a policy would serve the 
government goals of upgrading the efficiency of public service, reducing the burden of state 
investment and refraining from being monopolistic in the economy’.3 Chaun also wanted to 
transform the Gvil Service into a high performance organisation emphasizing results, quality,
1 Chaun Policy Statement to parliament 20 November 1997.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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honesty, integrity, public mindedness and neutrality in the performance of its duties”.4 He 
promised to introduce a blueprint for high quality personnel development in the Gvil 
Service and boost the morale of civil servants.
As the demand for remedying the ailing economy was pressing, Chaun’s 
administration focused on implementing policies inherited from Chavalit’s government. 
Most of these had been developed in response to the IMF’s loan conditions. In terms of 
administrative policy, Chaun uncritically adopted the reform measures that had been 
introduced by the Chavalit government. On the recommendation of the OCSQ on 9 
December 1997, Chaun reinstated the Gvil Service Reform Committee (CSRC), though he 
replaced its political leadership and appointed a new deputy prime minister, Pichai Rattakul, 
chairman of the Democrat Party, as its head. A minister in the Prime Minsiter’s Office, 
Abhisit Vejjajiva, was appointed a deputy chair. The direction of civil service reform was 
shaped by the OCSQ which drafted the prime ministerial order requiring the new CSRC 
draw up proposals “to recommend to the cabinet to redefine the state’s roles and duties in 
line with the goals of the country’s development”.5
Chaun requested the CSRC to suggest “a programme to restructure and improve 
work processes and administrative procedures of public organisations”. 6 His Prime 
Ministerial Order on 9 December 1997 instructed members of the CSRC to develop a Master 
Plan for Refoming the Chil Senioe, and oversee its implementation in line departments and 
ministries. The CSRCs other responsibilities included monitoring and evaluating of the 
implementation of the master plan, reporting problems and making policy recommendations 
to improve the effectiveness of the policy. As the previous CSRC had recently completed its 
Master Plan for Refoming the Chil Senice, Chaun’s CSRC did not waste time developing a new 
one, but adopted the existing one. As Minister Abhisit recalled, “When I attended the CSRC 
as a deputy chair, we already had the Master Plan for Refoming the Chil Senioe that had been 
developed by the committee during Chavalit’s government. We did not formulate the plan 
but focused on its execution.”7 He went on, “The adoption of the master plan was urgent 
and the government would spend time implementing till it achieved the intended results”.8
4 Ibid.
5 Prime Ministerial Order 384/2540, 9 December 1997.
6 Ibid.
7 Vejjakiva (2003)
8 Personal communication, Abhisit.
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the first half of 199.8 the CSRC worked on a limited range of interrelated 
areas of reform which it considered the most important: the redefinition of the role of public 
sector, the restructuring of government administrative units, downsizing and improving the 
efficiency of the Civil Service, and the decentralisation of administrative powers to local 
authorities. Though it did not give much attention to other important issues such as 
privatisation, in May 1998 it drew up a modest outsourcing programme. The proposal 
required “all government agencies to report their outsourcing activities as well as the 
problems they faced to the CRSC within three months” and encouraged them to expedite 
outsourcing their tasks.9 Outsourcing was intended to remove the ‘permanent employees’ 
employed by most government agencies to do their clerical and manual jobs. The proposal 
was submitted to the cabinet and approved on 26 May 1998. The cabinet also requested that 
the CSRC, the BOB and Ministry of Finance to look into possibility of outsourcing other 
tasks in addition to cleaning, driving, gardening, security guard and other seasonal jobs and 
activities, which so far had not been achieved. It was convinced that outsourcing was a way 
to reduce the size of the Civil Service because after outsourcing, significant numbers of 
permanent employees could be made redundant. To achieve this, the cabinet agreed with the 
CSRC that incentives and budget compensation should be granted to those ministries and 
departments that voluntarily reduced their staff.
The CSRC concentrated its efforts on restructuring the Civil Service, which included 
making decisions on proposals to create or diversify government administrative units. On 18 
August 1998 the CSRC convinced the cabinet that the “internal restructuring of ministries 
and departments could be only allowed if it did not lead to increases in staff and public 
personnel costs or the creation of new positions”.10 As with other CSRC proposals this was 
submitted to cabinet and formally adopted. Theerayuth Lorlertrat, the OCSC deputy 
secretary general who served as secretary of the CSRC, summed up its achievement, “we 
have convinced the cabinet that the proliferation of twenty districts and sub-districts per year, 
which had become the norm in the Civil Service, must be stopped.” To avoid the creation of 
new bureaucratic organisations, the CSRC paved the way for establishing ‘executive agency* 
style of public organisations, which would be more autonomous and not bound by Civil 
Service rules and regulations.
9 Cabinet Resolution, 26 May 1998.
10 Cabinet Resolution, 18 August 1998.
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Unlike most of previous reform committees, the CSRC opened itself to public 
participation by organising public hearings during August 1998. The aim of these public 
hearings was “to gather opinions and recommendations on Civil Service reform, its reform 
strategies and critical success factors that would contribute to their successful 
implementation”. 11 Five target groups, senior civil servants, politicians, experts and 
academics, representatives from the private sector, and the media, were invited to attend. 
The CSRC used the Master Plan for Refoming the Chil Senice as the basis for discussion. Most 
discussion focused on the issues of redefinition of the state’s role, efficiency improvement, 
downsizing, privatisation and the political commitment of the government.12 As discussion 
was largely confined to the Master Planfor Reforming the C iiil Senioe, most participants were led 
by the CSRC to agree with its reform plan adding only minor recommendations to improve 
it. According to an OCSCs official who observed the hearings, “These public hearings were 
used to promote the work of the CSRC’.13
The economic crisis provided an opportunity for the CSRC together with its main 
sponsor the OCSC to introduce two new ideas for reforming the civil service: good 
governance and the New Public Management approach to civil service reform. On 11 May 
1999 the OCSC proposed to the cabinet that all government departments and agencies 
should adopt its Frameunuk for Good Goeemanoe System to improve their management and 
operations. According to an OCSC official,
The framework was modelled on the concept of best practice which has been 
toyed with by the academic and business communities. We believed that a 
good governance system should be developed and integrated into the 
management of business and government. The economic crisis might have 
been less severe if we had more good governance. Introducing the idea of 
good governance to public sector management would be a nice gesture in our 
civil service reform effort.14
11 Public Hearings Report on Civil Service Reform, OCSQ August 1998.
12 Ibid.
13 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
14 Interview, Chalerm Sripahdoong, OCSC
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To implement the Good Governance Framework in the Gvil Service, the CSRC requested 
line ministries and departments to assess, plan and report on their management and 
operations using its “good governance criteria”. These included the rule of law, transparency, 
participation, accountability and value for money.15 The cabinet accepted the proposal which 
was issued and implemented as the Prime Minister’s Office Regulation on Good 
Governance.
At the same cabinet meeting, on 11 May 1999, the cabinet also approved the Public 
Sector Mamgment Reform Plan proposed by the CSRC The plan introduced fundamental and 
comprehensive changes, which aimed to overhaul the whole operation of the Gvil Service. 
According to the CSRC, its reform effort was “to gear the civil service management towards 
New Public Management characterised by performance orientation, measurable outputs and 
outcomes, transparency, accountability, flexibility and responsiveness”.16 Unlike the Master 
Plan for Rtfoming the Chil Senioe, the Public Sector Marwgment Reform Plan focused on the 
operations and processes of management in the Gvil Service, dealing with its structure, 
process, budget and finance and personnel. It specified five areas of reform, reform of the 
role of the state and public sector management systems and procedures, budgetary, financial 
and procurement reform, public personnel reform, legal reform and civil service culture and 
values.17
The Public Sector Managment Reform Plan, which was designed to contribute to the 
fulfilment of the conditions in the IMF’s loan agreement, required financial assistance to be 
realised. Minister Abhisit, the vice chairman of the CSRC accepted that,
We are faced with the problem that we do not have at this time of economic 
crisis the kind of resources to run [reform] schemes like buying out and paying 
compensation for those reforms. But we are hoping to overcome that by 
working closely with the World Bank to obtain a Public Sector Reform Loan 
Programme with policy conditions set...18
15 Cabinet Resolution, 11 May 1999.
16 CSRC, Public Sector Management Reform Plan.
17 Ibid.
18 Abhisit, address to Global Forum on Reinventing Government, 14 January 1999.
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As Abhisit expected, the Ministry of Finance was successful in negotiating with the World 
Bank The Thai government was granted a Public Sector Reform Loan of $US 400m. A 
condition of the loan was that the government was required to submit a Letter of 
Development Policy, providing the government’s vision for institutional change. The deal 
was agreed on 20 June 1999. The loan agreement encompassed five related reform areas that 
were already underway including poverty-based budgeting, public expenditure management, 
civil service administration, tax administration and fiscal decentralisation.
The CSRC made the restructuring of human resources management its main priority 
in civil service administration. Its programme included the modernisation of the roles and 
organisational structure and processes of line ministries and departments, the development 
modem performance-based human resource management systems for the Gvil Service, the 
development of a well motivated, politically neutral, cross-governmental senior cadre to lead 
a Gvil Service renewal programme, and the development a regulatory framework for 
autonomous public organisations.
By the summer of 1999 extensive civil service reform was underway in Thailand with 
two major reform plans drawn up and being implemented. The reform process was closely 
monitored because a progress report was required by the World Bank as a condition for its 
Public Sector Reform Loan Programme. In this period of effective and more far reaching 
reform the CSRC in conjunction with the OCSC and Ministry of Finance played the leading 
roles.
A combination of economic and political pressures put civil service reform high on 
the agenda of Chaun’s second government. The severity of the 1997 economic crisis made 
the issue urgent and reform was a condition of the IMF loan. In addition the new 1997 
Constitution required improvements in governance. A new CSRC worked quickly and in six 
months had drawn up a Public Sector Management Reform Plan to make the Gvil Service 
more efficient. At the same time the OCSC used the economic crisis to convince the 
government to adopt its Framework for Good Governance using ‘good governance criteria’.
7.2 Crisis Driven Downsizing
The Asian economic crisis was the driving force behind a series of downsizing policies 
introduced by Chaun’s government between 1997 and 1999. They comprised three measures:
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streamlining public personnel expenditure, controlling the growth of positions in the Gvil 
Service, and the introduction of an early retirement programme. Each measure entailed 
specific changes in rules and regulations and targets regarding public personnel management 
practices. As the scope of the issue of civil service downsizing was extended from the usual 
head counting to include public personnel cost cutting, the issue was then dealt with and 
processed in by many bodies, the Gvil Service Commission [CSC], the Gvil Service Reform 
Committee [CSRC], the Gvil Service Manpower Policy Committee [CSMPC], and individual 
central co-ordinating agencies with personnel and budget related jurisdictions.
7.2.1 Streamlining Public Personnel Expenditure
Chaun’s government regarded the issue of streamlining as part of the government’s 
downsizing effort, which was part of the economic renewal programme agreed with the IMF. 
The loan agreement stipulated that the government should adopt a budget surplus equivalent 
to one per cent of GDP by increasing revenue and cutting government’s expenditure. As 
revenue from taxes was expected to decline, the government needed to cut public spending. 
When Chaun arrived in office in late November 1997, the proposed budget for the Fiscal 
Year 1998 had already been adjusted three times. The original budget proposal of 982 billion 
Baht was finally reduced to 800 billion Baht, a reduction of almost fourteen per cent from 
the previous fiscal year. However, most of the budget reduction, about seventy per cent 
came from the “investment budget”, with about thirty per cent coming from cuts in the 
administrative budget. Although the overall budget for the fiscal year 1998 was substantially 
cut, public personnel expenditure, which amounted to 342.21 billion Baht, remained 
untouched. Almost eighty per cent of public personnel costs were spent on wages and 
salaries, and the remaining twenty per cent on pensions and medical services. Though the 
overall government budget for fiscal year 1998 was reduced, public personnel costs increased 
to almost forty three per cent of total government expenditure, exceeding the forty per cent 
limit the CGD had set.
The fiscal constraints faced by Qiaun’s government not only allowed the BOB to 
propose a series of overall budget cuts, but also required prompt action by other central 
government personnel and budget agencies, such as the OCSC and the CGD. The increase 
in the ratio between public personnel costs and the overall annual budget prompted the 
OCSC and the CGD to proposed measures to reduce and streamline public personnel
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expenditure. The OCSC acted quickly. At its first meeting with the new prime minister on 8 
December 1997, when Chaun presided over a meeting of the CSC, it proposed a series of 
“Action Plans for Adjusting the Gvil Service during the Period of Economic Crisis [Action 
Plans]”, to the new government.
In formulating the Action Plans the OCSQ which was designated by the cabinet to 
take the lead in improving the Gvil Service to fulfil the conditions of the IMF loan, had 
already initiated discussions with the BOB and Ministry of Finance in November 1997. The 
two organisations broadly agreed with the OCSCs proposed Action Plans, “... All line 
ministries and departments must adjust themselves quickly to help the government solve the 
economic crisis. With the limited resources and fiscal constraints, ministries and departments 
must rethink the way they manage and operate in order to add value to the Gvil Service. 
They must also improve their working systems and methods to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness”.19 Chaun agreed with the OCSCs proposal and instructed that his cabinet 
ministers needed to be informed since he intended to have the OCSCs proposed Action 
Plans, implemented across all government departments.
Chaun’s cabinet approved the OCSCs Action Plans on 30 December 1997. The 
plans included six measures that would lead to streamlining and downsizing the civil service. 
Incorporated within the Action Plans were measures suggested by the OCSC to reduce the 
role of the state in the economy that would result in a reduction of government staff. It also 
recommended improvements in bureaucratic organisation and work systems, the 
development of civil servants’ skills and competencies, the suppression and prevention of 
bureaucratic corruption and the decentralisation of administrative power to local authorities. 
To implement these measures, the OCSC drew up twenty-eight plans to help line ministries 
and departments deliver services that could be measured objectively using the criteria of 
value for money and acceptability to citizens.20 At the same meeting, the cabinet approved a 
measure to downsize government offices overseas. Ministries with overseas offices were 
encouraged to merge their functions so that resources could be pooled and used efficiently. 
As most of the plans and measures proposed by the OCSC required close co-operation 
between the BOB and the Ministry of Finance, the cabinet agreed that these agencies should 
jointly monitor their implementation.
19 OCSC Cabinet Submission 22 December 1997.
20 Ibid.
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In December 1997, the OCSC and the CGD also pursued another measure to 
streamline public personnel expenditure by jointly proposing the ‘Measure to Reduce Public 
Personnel Expenditure’. This was developed in the National Committee on the Public Sector 
Wages and Salaries (CPSWS), which was chaired by finance minister and serviced, by the 
CGD and the OCSC Representatives from the BOB, the NESDB and the central personnel 
agencies were also members. The CPSWS’s main responsibility was to review and advise the 
government on wages and salaries policy. On 24 December 1997, the CGD and the OCSC 
convinced members of the CPSWS of the need to cut public personnel expenditure: 
“Eventually the government will be pressured by the public to reduce its staff costs if 
revenue collection targets are not met”.21 Although the OCSC and the CGD wanted to 
reduce public personnel costs radically by using such measures as salary cuts and staff 
redundancies, most members of the CPSWS argued that the adoption of such measures, 
though common practice in the private sector during economic downturns, might not be 
appropriate in the Civil Service culture. They argued:
Salary cuts in particular would aggravate the civil servants’ economic hardship 
because their wages and salaries were relatively low compared with private 
sector workers. Downsizing by laying off needs more careful thinking. The 
government may end up with huge spending on severance and pension 
payments, which in the short run would make the government fiscal status 
worse. Downsizing needs careful planning and should be done as part of a 
major and comprehensive reform of the Gvil Service.22
Objections by a majority of its members led the CPSWS to adopt a less radical 
measure to streamline public personnel costs. The OCSC and the CGD agreed with the 
majority that cuts in public personnel expenditure should apply across the board to every 
occupational category of civil servants. However, any cuts should, where possible, not affect 
the majority of civil servants particularly lower ranking officials with low wages and salaries. 
They agreed that only supplementary allowances such as positional allowances, extra 
payments for particular skills, and hardship, compensation and overseas allowances, which
21 Minutes of CPSWS meeting, 24 December 1997.
22 Ibid.
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only a minority of civil servants received, should be scrapped while basic salaries should 
remain untouched. The CPSWS opted for less radical streamlining measures than that 
originally proposed by the OCSC and the BOB.
The cabinet on receiving the CPSWS proposal approved the ‘Measure to Reduce 
Public Personnel Expenditure’ on 3 February 1998. It contained streamlining measures to 
control public personnel costs and eliminating waste. To contain public personnel costs, the 
government banned changes in their remuneration structures including increases in wages, 
salaries and positional allowances. Departmental personnel costs had to be kept at the level 
of the fiscal year 1998. Departments were required to propose plans to reduce personnel 
cost, eliminate subsidiary activities and improve efficiency. The elimination of waste in the 
administrative structure, based on the OCSCs proposals, prevented the diversification of 
administrative units in ministries and departments for the years 1998 and 1999. To ensure 
this measure was carried out effectively the OCSC proposed to the prime minister at the 
CSC meeting on 9 February that line ministries and departments should be required to 
restructure their organisations. The CSC agreed that all government agencies would 
implement the following restructuring:
First, duplication and overlapping of missions must be eliminated and 
departments with main the responsibility to carryout those missions should be 
given priority to undertake them. Second, missions related to local service 
delivery must be transferred to local authorities. Third, missions that can be 
better managed by the private sector should be privatised. Fourth, new forms of 
administrative units such as executive agencies should be established to replace 
traditional bureaucratic structures. Fifth, missions not relevant to the present 
situation must be discarded.23
Five months after the ‘Measure to Reduce Public Personnel Expenditure’ had been 
implemented, the BOB proposed further cuts in public personnel costs, in addition to the 
PCSWS proposal. On 18 June 1998 it proposed to Chaun that in the fiscal year 1999, civil 
servants should received an average annual pay rise of five per cent on their basic salaries, a 
reduction of one per cent on the six per cent usually awarded. This was due to the expected
23 OCSC Cabinet Submission, 25 February 1997.
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rise in public personnel costs to forty two per cent of government expenditure in the year 
1999. According to the BOB, “this amount would leave the country with a smaller capital 
and investment budget that could further slow down an economy already in crisis. The lower 
five per cent pay rise would save 2.5 billion Baht in the fiscal year 1999. It would also 
restrain the increase in public personnel costs in subsequent years.”24 The BOB’s proposal 
adopted by Chaun’s cabinet in July 1998.
The ‘Measure to Reduce Public Personnel Expenditure’ was strictly enforced by 
government ministries and departments in the fiscal year 1998. On 12 November 1998 the 
OCSC and the CGD met the CPSWS and convinced it continue the measure until the fiscal 
year 2001. The ‘Measure’ was then sent to the cabinet in early December 1998. At its 
meeting on 29 December 1998, the cabinet endorsed it and allowed the measure to continue 
in force. The cabinet considered it an effective measure because ‘it portrayed civil servants in 
sympathy with and joining the rest of the country to fight the economic crisis by saving 
public money and increasing efficiency.’25
The OCSC believed that the ‘Measure to Reduce Public Personnel Expenditure’ was 
the first effective downsizing measure since 1980. It contained the growth of the civil service 
by reducing 500 civilian personnel from the service.26 In 1998 public personnel expenditure 
growth fell from an average annual rate of twelve per cent to just over four per cent, the first 
time that public personnel expenditure growth was below five per cent. The cabinet also 
convinced by the CPSWCs calculation that despite the effectiveness of this measure, the 
ratio of public personnel costs to the government expenditure was expected to increase from 
forty per cent in the fiscal year 1998 to forty two per cent in 1999. The projected increase 
resulted in a further five billion baht cut in public spending in the 1999 budget plan. On this 
basis the ‘Measure’ was continued for another three years until 2001.
7.2.2 Controlling the Growth of the Civil Service
Although many new streamlining and personnel cost cutting measures were initiated in 
response to government budget constraints, the policy to control the size of the civil service 
by counting heads and controlling the employment of new staff continued. The ‘Measure to
24 BOB Submission to the prime minister, 18 June 1998.
25 Cabinet Resolution, 12 November 1998
26 This figure excludes military personnel, local authorities’ officials and political appointees.
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Control the Growth of the Gvil Service’, which had been introduced by the first Chaun 
government in 1994 and survived several changes in government, was re-adopted by 
Chaun’s second government. The re-adoption of this measure, which aimed to restrict the 
replacement of vacancies on retirement, also meant the reinstatement of the Gvil Service 
Manpower Policy Committee (CSMPC). A month after assuming the office, on 17 
December 1997, Chaun re-appointed all members of the CSMPC and appointed a new 
chairman, his deputy prime minister Pichai Rattakul, chairman of the Democrat Party.
Pichai, who was also the chairman of the CSRC, met members of the CSMPC on 16 
January 1998. In his opening statement, he expressed his concern over the relative failure of 
the CSMPC stating that:
It has been four years since the measure for controlling the size of the Gvil 
Service was introduced in February 1994. The CSMPC has not been very 
successful in curbing the growth of the civil service. It has had limited success 
in delaying the recruitment of new staff and restricting the replacement of 
vacancies on retirement. However, as the government is facing fiscal and 
financial crisis, the CSMPC must be more careful about approving requests 
for manpower increases from line ministries and departments. Our ultimate 
aim is to reduce public personnel costs. Restricting the increase in 
government personnel alone will not be enough. The CSMPC must find ways 
to actually downsize the number of civil servants.27
The issue of controlling the size of the civil service was not confined to restricting 
the growth of the number of public sector employees. Nor the CSMPC was the only 
committee that dealt with the issue. The CSRC, re-appointed by Chaun on 9 December 1997, 
also set out to deal with it as part of its downsizing target announced in the Master Plan for 
Reforming the Gvil Service. Like deputy prime minister Sookwit during Chavalit period, 
Pichai chairman of the CSRC wanted the CSMPC to be a vehicle for achieving wider civil 
service reforms. Pichai emphasized that in order to realise the ‘Action Plans for Adjusting 
the Gvil Service during the Period of Economic Crisis’ approved by the cabinet on 30
27 Minutes of CSMPC meeting, 16 January 1997.
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December 1997, the CSMPC had to include wider reform measures which would “help line 
ministries and departments to cut operating costs and create savings”.28
Realising that there were few signs of economic recovery and that the economic 
crisis would continue to have a serious impact on the government’s fiscal status for several 
years, the CSMPC proposed two downsizing measures. First, an employment freeze, which 
had been used in 1991-2, would be reintroduced and enforced between fiscal years 1999 and 
2001. No government agencies would be allowed to recruit new staff for the next three years. 
Exceptions were only to be granted to departments that were legally bound to admit their 
own scholarship students. The second measure was that all vacancies caused by retirement 
should be abolished, except the posts of senior executives, technical experts and 
professionals that were difficult to recruit in the labour market. The CSMPCs proposals 
were considered at the cabinet meeting on 23 April 1998 when only freezing public 
employment was endorsed. The measure to abolish all retirement vacancies was deferred 
because it could lead to potential personnel shortages in line ministries and department 
delivering services.
After failing to get cabinet approval to scrap retirement vacancies, the OCSCs 
representative Theerayudth Lorlertrat, secretary of the CSMPC, took the issue to the CSRC 
where he served as secretary. He pointed out that if the government was to achieve its goal 
to make the Civil Service smaller, serious action including the abolition of retirement 
vacancies needed to be taken. According to Theerayuth, “The abolition of retirement 
vacancies had been attempted before and was not new. But most government ministries and 
departments continued to request replacements as if there was no such measure. Most such 
requests were allowed because of claims of serious personnel shortages, or political pressure. 
The government needed to impose strict measure on this.”29 Members of the CSRC were 
convinced of the need for strict limits but taking into account the cabinet’s rejection of the 
original CSMPC proposal suggested a lower rate of abolition, that eighty per cent of 
retirements should not be filled.
The CSRCs revised proposal on abolishing retirement vacancies was resubmitted to 
the cabinet within a week and approved on 28 April 1998. The cabinet ruled that “eighty per 
cent of vacancies on retirement in ministries and departments will be compulsorily abolished.
28 Ibid.
29 Interview, Theerayuth Lorlertrat, OCSC
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Only twenty per cent of vacancies can be replaced”.30 However, replacements at the new 
twenty per cent level would not be automatic since the CSMPC would generate a pool of 
vacancies collected across all government departments and agencies, from which posts 
would be allocated according to the essential requirements ministries and departments.”31 If 
there were any vacancies left after the allocation process, they would be abolished.
The new measure to abolish eighty percent of vacancies required the CSMPC to 
processing manpower requests in a more careful and strict manner. However, most 
government ministries and departments continued to request twenty per cent of their 
vacancies to be refilled without justifying their real needs. This put the CSMPC in a difficult 
situation and led to the adoption of an uncompromising approach to processing requests for 
personnel increases. At its meeting on 11 August 1998, the CSMPC emphasised, “The 
government had tried to control the size of the Civil Service and reduce public personnel 
costs since 1982, but it was not effective. Now the country was facing an economic crisis, 
the CSMPC would only allow the minimum number of replacement possible. There should 
not be exceptions in our consideration.32
Because the restriction on retirement vacancy replacements was seen as an important 
downsizing measure by the government, the prime minister appointed minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva, a deputy chair of the CSRC, to be a deputy head of the CSMPC on 15 September 
1998.33 Two months after Abhisit’s appointment to the CSMPC, on 4 December 1998, its 
chairman Pichai ordered that Abhisit was to head a subcommittee on scrutinising requests 
for replacing retirement vacancies.34 This subcommittee was to filter, check and analyse 
applications for increasing manpower and recommend alternative measures to downsize the 
civil service. They processed requests for replacing retirement vacancies and personnel 
increases very strictly. The secretary of the CSMPC recalled,
We strictly observed the cabinet resolution, which applied to all categories of
government personnel. We were challenged by the parliament office, which had
30 Cabinet Resolution 28 April 1998.
31 Ibid.
32 Minutes of CSMPC meeting, 11 August 1998.
33 Prime Ministerial Order 169/2541,15 September 1998.
34 Order of CSMPCs chairman, 4 December 1998.
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employed new staff without the consent of the CSMPC But in the end they had 
to give up because the CGD did not pay their salaries.35
In another important instance, when the Office of Education Commission, recently 
established in accordance with the new constitution, made a request for more staff direct to 
the prime minister, Chaun insisted that the CSMPC had to be consulted. The operation of 
the CSMPCs sub-committee was so strict that its head Minister Abhisit had to deal with 
complaints from his cabinet colleagues that it was “too strict and not flexible”.36
Like civil service reform, downsizing was high on the government agenda because of 
the economic crisis and the consequent severe fiscal constraints imposed by the IMF rescue 
package. The central co-ordinating agencies, particularly the OCSQ the BOB and the CGD, 
speedily produced Action Plans and the Measure to Reduce Public Personnel Expenditure. 
These streamlined and downsized the Civil Service putting in place an employment freeze 
and early retirement scheme.
7.2.3 Introducing An Early Retirement Programme
A successful early retirement programme was introduced in 1999 and enabled the Thai 
government to make a huge reduction in the number of the government personnel. By the 
end of 1999 20,000 had voluntarily left the civil service with equitable retirement benefits 
and ‘golden handshakes’. Downsizing the civil service by encouraging government personnel 
to leave the service voluntarily was not a new idea in the OCSC During Anand’s 
administration in 1991-2, the cabinet had also instructed that an early retirement programme 
should be devised as a mean to release excessive personnel from the civil service. Since then 
the OCSC had studied the technicalities of implementing the programme.
The cabinet decision’s on 29 June 1999 to introduce an early retirement programme 
was underlined by the need to downsize the civil service effectively and to achieve the 
reduction target of twenty per cent by 2001. The stated aim of the programme was “to create 
a small but flexible and efficient Gvil Service consistent with the ‘Master Plan for Gvil 
Service Reform’. The programme would facilitate the reduction of public personnel costs in 
the long run which would contribute to meeting the terms for improving the civil service
35 Interview, Theerayudth Lorlertat, OCSG
36 Personal communication, Abhisit.
204
agreed with the IMF”.37 The voluntary early retirement programme devised by the OCSC 
was for government personnel either aged fifty or over those with twenty-five years service 
or more.38 Since the programme aimed to downsize the civil service, replacement of 
retirement vacancies and reinstatement of retired personnel was not allowed. However, the 
government reserved the right to authorise requests to ensure there were no skill shortages 
in vital areas.
The early retirement programme was strongly endorsed by the BOB and Ministry of 
Finance who gave assurances that the government would be able to fund it. As the 
programme was to be implemented across the board, all occupational groups of civil 
servants were consulted. Most agreed in principle with the programme but expressed 
concern over the restriction of vacancy replacements. Teachers expressed concern over a 
possible shortage of teachers in rural areas. Only the judiciary decided to opt out. On 29 
June 1999, the cabinet agreed in principle to the early retirement programme but since it was 
new to the Gvil Service and might pose a political risk to the government instructed the 
OCSQ the BOB and Ministry of Finance to administer the programme jointly.
The OCSQ the BOB and the Ministry of Finance agreed that three consecutive early 
retirement programmes should be implemented for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The 
personnel reduction targets for each year were 40,000, 50,000, and 120,000 respectively. At 
the end of 2000, the OCSQ which evaluated the implementation of the programmes, 
reported that 36384 government personnel had voluntarily left the service. The figure for 
1999 was 20,702 and 15,685 left in 2000. This was the biggest staff reduction in the modem 
history of the Thai civil service.
7.3 Institutionalising civil service reform
The economic crisis not only provided an opportunity for central government agencies such 
as the OCSQ the BOB and the CGD to realise their reform programmes, it also provided a 
secure platform for the OCSC to claim that a permanent office for civil service reform 
should be established to co-ordinate the various reform efforts. The attempt to set up a
37 OCSC Cabinet Submission, 10 May 1999.
38 The golden handshake included a lump sum equivalent to seven times the final month salary and a 
supplementary sum to compensate for pension loss.
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permanent office for civil service reform was a project that politicians and civil servants, 
particularly the OCSQ had competed to establish since 1992. Control of a permanent office 
would allow them to exert influence over and steer the course of reform to their own 
direction. Chaun had set up a secretariat office for civil service reform, the State 
Administration and Development Committee, in 1992 during his first term in office but it 
was unsuccessful and did not survive his government.39
A second attempt was made by the Chavalit government acting on an OCSC 
proposal. On 23 September, just two months before Chavalit resigned, his cabinet approved 
the OCSC proposal and it was incorporated in the government’s Master Plan for Reforming 
Qvil Service. The OCSC proposed that the office should come under its umbrella and be 
headed by one of its senior officials of deputy secretary general rank and equipped with its 
own budget and personnel. However, the establishment of new government units was 
subject to the approval of the CSMPQ which rejected its request new staff. Despite this the 
OCSC managed to convince the CSRC that a new permanent office be established without 
increasing staff and drafting a prime ministerial regulation to establish an Office of the Qvil 
Service Reform (OCSR) was started but completed before Chavalit’s resignation in 
November 1997.
Progress towards establishing a new permanent office during Chaun’s second 
government was slow. This was partly because the process of drafting a constitution for the 
new office was lengthy and partly because most members of the CSRQ especially its political 
leaders, were reluctant to proceed with the setting up of a new government administrative 
unit. They argued that diversification of the structure of government at the time of economic 
crisis was inappropriate. However, the urgent need to co-ordinate multiple civil service 
reform efforts at a time of crisis reinforced the case for establishing a permanent office. On 
7 August 1998 the Prime Minister’s Office Regulation on Qvil Service Reform 1998 was 
issued. It provided the constitution for a permanent office of civil service reform and 
granted the CSRC overall responsibility to manage civil service reform with considerable 
authority to intervene in the operations of line ministries and departments. It also established 
an Office of Qvil Service Reform [OCSR] as a permanent secretariat office for the CSRQ 
which became an administrative unit in the Qvil Service with its own fulltime personnel and
39 See chapter 4.
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budget. This regulation provided continuity in the civil service reform effort by replacing the 
usual ad hoc reform committees with the permanent one. The OCSR, which had been 
proposed by the OCSQ helped institutionalise the civil service reform effort and increased 
the authority of the OCSC over the reform process.
Membership of the CSRQ which deliberately had equal numbers of political 
appointees and civil servant representatives, was the result of bargaining between the 
government and the OCSC According to the new regulation, only three politicians were 
allowed seats on the committee, the prime minister, a deputy prime minister or a minister in 
the Prime Ministers Office assigned by the prime minister, and the prime minister’s 
secretary general. However, the prime minister reserved the right to appoint up to fifteen 
experts on civil service management, public personnel management, public enterprises 
management, law, science and technology, information technology and public relations to 
the CSRC These expert members, though appointed by the prime minister, would normally 
be suggested by the OCSQ and had four-year tenure on the committee.
Permanent members of the CSRC included representatives from the central co­
ordinating agencies, the secretary general of the OCSQ the secretary general of the NESDB, 
the director general of the BOB, and the director general of the CGD. The secretary general 
and a deputy secretary general of the OCSR, appointed by the prime minister from a pool of 
senior OCSC officials, were also members. One official each from the OCSQ the BOB and 
the PMSO was also appointed as assistant secretaries. Overall, the OCSC had more of its 
own staff on the committee than any other government agency.
The OCSC was successful in establishing a permanent Office of Qvil Service 
Reform and hence consolidated its reform authority. Two of its senior officials, Theerayudth 
Lorlertrat, a deputy secretary general, and Dr Chalerm Sripadoong, a senior personnel policy 
analyst, were appointed the OCSR’s first secretary general and deputy secretary general 
respectively. However, the OCSC did not escape criticism, particularly from politicians and 
academics. When the CSRC organised public hearings on civil service reform in August 1998, 
politicians criticised its composition, complaining that it had too many civil servants. They 
wanted its membership to be more diverse an include representatives from all sectors of 
society and argued that the Office of the Qvil Service Reform should not be part of the
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OCSC because “civil servants would not reform themselves and the Qvil Service”.40 
Theerayudth, secretary general of the OCSR, defended the OCSCs position preferring “the 
reform from within approach since radical reform would never be accepted by and 
consistent with the norm and culture of the Thai Qvil Service”.41
7.4 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Qvil Service Policy Making
This chapter provides a narrative account of the second Chaun government’s effort to 
downsize the civil service from 1997 to 1999, after the onset of the Asian economic crisis. It 
also serves as the termination point of the discussion of downsizing in this thesis. 
Consideration of this period helps provide a better understanding of the civil service reform 
process in Thailand. Having traced how Chaun’s government dealt with the issue of civil 
service reform, this section elaborates the impact of institutional and contextual factors on 
the trajectory and outcome of civil service policy reform. The outcome was characterised by 
continuity in downsizing policy, which was reinforced by a concerted effort, which resulted 
in the swift introduction in 1998 and 1999 of streamlining and downsizing measures. In the 
light of an institutional and processual analysis, the following sections make sense of the 
chapter’s narrative through an examination of the process components of civil service policy 
making: agenda setting, alternative specification and decision making. Attention will also be 
paid to the process of reform capacity building.
7.4.1 Agenda Setting
The civil service reform issue was included in Qiaun’s government policy agenda as part of 
the government’s attempt to steer the country out of the economic crisis. The crisis, which 
imposed constraints on the government budget, not only gave a high status to the issue of 
fiscal austerity on Qiaun’s government agenda. It also helped elevate the status of the civil 
service reform issue as these issues had a technical link and shared the same economic 
rationale, austerity. The ‘salience’ and high ‘status’ of the Qvil Service reform issue in this 
period was mainly the result of the impact of the Asian financial crisis.
40 OCSC Public Hearings Report on Qvil Service Reform, September 1998.
41 Interview, Theerayudth Lorlertrat, OCSR secretary general.
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The period saw a more unified issue definition process, which was a result of a 
response to the demands and threats posed by the economic crisis. Both government 
politicians and bureaucratic reformers perceived such demands and threats in the same way 
and shared the same view that it was unavoidable for the country to adopt the austerity 
programme, which was supported by the international lending institutions including the IMF. 
The dynamics of the economic context helped strengthen the interpretation of the issue of 
civil service reform of the leading central government agencies with personnel and budget 
related responsibilities. In this sense, the impact of the economic crisis accentuated the need 
to downsize the Qvil Service by controlling civil service growth in both personnel and 
monetary terms, as well as reducing number of government personnel. Sustaining and 
strengthening issue definitions in this way helped secure downsizing policy on Chaun’s 
government agenda.
7.4.2 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
This episode provides insight into the dynamics of alternative specification and decision 
processes. Such processes are encapsulated by the intensity of the reform effort and a sense 
of urgency to respond to the threats and seize reform opportunity brought about by the 
economic crisis. These process characteristics led to more far reaching change in civil service 
policy in terms of its scope, depth and pace than in earlier periods.
In terms of the intensity of the reform effort, during a short period at the beginning 
of Chaun government, plan after plan to adjust the Qvil Service and measure after measure 
to cut public expenditure was proposed by the OCSC and the BOB as well as other reform 
committees such as the CPSWS and the CSMPC Most reform proposals and measures 
were adopted by the cabinet and implemented. The intensity of effort in terms of the swift 
formulation and adoption of reform measures can be explained by how the dynamics 
context of economic crisis activated the actions of the government and bureaucratic 
reformers in the central co-ordinating agencies. Such intensified reform effort and actions 
were motivated by reformers’ perception of the opportunities and threats posed by the 
economic crisis.
For Chaun’s government, the Asian financial crisis was primarily a major threat that 
caused fiscal constraints leading to the adoption of an austerity programme. For bureaucratic 
reformers in the central co-ordinating agencies, the OCSQ the BOB and the CGD, the crisis
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opened a window of opportunity for them to fulfil their mandate as head counting agencies. 
The crisis was seen as opportunity for them to propose ‘streamlining measures’ that would 
also serve the austerity purposes. In this sense, reformers from both camps shared the same 
reform ideas and choices leading their reform effort to be concerted and intensified. This 
enabled them to impose losses on the Qvil Service by adjusting, streamlining and 
downsizing the Qvil Service, which would be difficult to achieve in times of economic 
normalcy.
Related to the intensity of the reform effort is the scope of civil service reform and 
the variety of downsizing ‘choices’ adopted by Qiaun’s government. Before the economic 
crisis, the scope of downsizing was limited to ‘reforming public personnel management’ - 
attempts to control the proliferation of new government administrative units and restrictions 
on employing more staff by line ministries and departments. The financial aspects of 
personnel management such as limiting public personnel costs had not previously been a 
reform focus. Only internal targets for budget related agencies like the CGD and the BOB 
had been set and no serious action had been taken. As a result, line ministries and 
departments placed less emphasis on limiting personnel costs and more on head counting 
measures. However, the economic crisis provided an opportunity for bureaucratic reformers, 
particularly the BOB and the OGD, to address both ‘personnel’ and ‘financial’ aspects of 
civil service policy reform leading to the imposition of stringent personnel cost reduction 
measures. Consequently, line ministries and departments were forced to become more aware 
of the issue of excessive public personnel costs and had to take responsibility for reducing 
them.
The activation of mandates by a context of fiscal constraint affected the reform 
alternative specification process. This resulted in deeper downsizing and made the 
downsizing effort more enforceable and hence more effective. Downsizing measures that 
had been primarily used to “contain the size of the civil service” were transformed into 
measures that could “reduce the size of the civil service”. As the narrative shows, it was the 
first time that the number of government personnel actually declined, albeit slightly, through 
such programmes as abolishing eighty per cent of retirement vacancies and the buy-out early 
retirement programmes. The effort of bureaucratic reformers in central government agencies 
can be seen as acts of self-fulfilment leading to the successful realisation of their
210
organisational mandates and an increase in their capacity to make and manage civil service 
reform policy.
Although most reform decisions made in this period were characterised by 
agreement between government politicians and bureaucratic reformers, on ‘issue definition’, 
‘issue images’ and ‘reform choices’, such agreement operated against a background of 
competition to control the civil service reform process. A case in point is the intense 
competition to control the establishment of a permanent office for civil service reform. 
Control of a permanent secretariat office would increase reformers’ influence over the 
content, scope, pace and rate of civil service reform. This episode shows that the OCSC 
successfully seized the opportunity offered by the Asian financial crisis to put forward a 
proposal to set up the Office of Qvil Service Reform claiming that such office would help 
co-ordinate the intensified reform effort already underway.
It is appropriate now to account for the actions of bureaucratic reformers 
particularly the OCSC in moving the civil service reform programme from the onset of the 
1997 economic crisis. The OCSC successfully maintained reform momentum by exploiting 
the opportunity provided by the crisis to expand the reform issue to include the introduction 
of good governance reform, strengthen the ‘downsizing programme’, and institutionalise the 
civil service reform effort by establishing the OCSR. Such actions, which contributed to the 
content, scope and pace of civil service reform after the crisis, can be characterised as 
‘entrepreneurial acts’. Hence the OCSC can be regarded as ‘reform entrepreneur’. Such 
entrepreneurial action helped increase capacity for civil service reform.
The narrative also indicates that the context of economic crisis facilitated the process 
of building capacity for reforming the Qvil Service within the central agencies. In part, the 
IMF and World Bank’s loan agreements incorporated measures to build capacity for the 
central co-ordinating agencies to manage civil service resources— money and personnel— 
effectively. One major source of reform capacity originated from the opportunity for the 
same or complementary reform issues to be processed in different institutional venues. As 
has been seen in this episode, senior bureaucrats from the OCSC took advantage and 
proposed their reform solutions in the different institutional venues where reform choices 
were originated, proposed and processed. As Theerayudth, secretary of the CSRC observed, 
“The establishment of the permanent office provided a clear direction for future reform and 
added another stage for the OCSC to act on. In addition to the CSC, the CSMPC and the
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CPSWS it now had the OCSR and all four stages complemented one another. The CSC was 
concerned with improving public personnel management, the OCSR with civil service 
reform, the CSMPC with downsizing and the CPSWS with public sector pay.”42 In this sense 
the crisis context provided opportunities for them to consolidate their administrative powers 
in the management of the reform process.
This chapter has examined how the context of economic crisis helped accelerate the 
civil service reform effort by the Thai government by providing opportunities for reformers 
to realise their mandates and turn their long standing and relatively ineffective efforts into an 
important if limited success in downsizing the Civil Service in particular and overall civil 
service reform in general. Theerayudth and other members of the CSRC and the CSMPC 
agreed that the economic crisis had a positive impact on the reform effort saying, “We had 
been thinking about and trying to do what we are doing now. But under normal economic 
circumstances the effort was seen as swimming against the prevailing tide”.43 Minister 
Abhisit shared the same interpretation, asserting, “We had been travelling in this reform 
direction before the crisis, but at a slow pace. The task [of downsizing] would have been 
much more difficult without the economic crisis. We can pursue a more comprehensive civil 
service reform programme by ourselves. Most of our reform efforts were not part of the 
IMF’s loan agreement”.44
42 Theerayudth interview September 1999.
43 Interview, Theerayudth Lorlertrat, CSRC secretary. Chainarong Indrameesup, a member of the 
CSMPC also shared this view.
44 Personal communication, Abhisit Vejjajiva.
Part III
Reforming Civil Service Pensions
'The Kingdoms adrmnistration has gruzw and expanded more rapidly than it did in the 
woent past A s fa ll time dzil sermnts, they are supposed to devote most c f their tine and 
fo rts to the Royal Service They therefore, do not hazE time to collect some zmdth and earn 
money from other means nor saze for their lizes after retirement'.
King Rama V, Ratanakosin Year 120.
Chapter 8
The Emergence of Civil Service Pension Reform, 1991-2
Overview
In September 1996, after nearly five years effort, the Thai civil service pension system 
was reformed. There was shift from a non-contributory defined benefit system based on 
final salary to a mixed system, which allowed civil servants a choice between the existing 
non-contributory scheme and a new contributory scheme. This was a major public 
management policy change during the 1990s. Part III of this thesis, chapters 8,9 and 10, 
will trace the change process of civil service pension policy in Thailand in the period 
1991 to 1996 during which the process took place.
This chapter is concerned with the period 1991-2, the interim Anand 
administration, when civil service pension reform reached the government agenda for the 
first time. It seeks to explain how and why the issue of pension reform reached the 
government agenda and why it had a relatively low status. It also considers why the first 
reform proposal was unsuccessful despite having a government mandate. It should be 
also bome in mind that this chapter is not an economic analysis of pension reform. 
Technical aspects are not central to this thesis.
8.1 The Pre 1991 Gvil Service Pension System
Civil Service pensions were first introduced in Siam, as Thailand was then called, in 1901 
by King Chulalongkom, Rama V of the present Chakri dynasty, as part of his endeavour 
to reform and modernise the state administration. One of his most important reform 
initiatives was to promote professional career bureaucrats, and the establishment of a 
pension system for royal servants was intended to provide income security for them 
when they retired from the service so that they could live dignified lives free from 
poverty.
Rama V’s pension proposal was considered necessary since civil servants’ 
earnings were significandy lower than their counterparts in the private sector. The first 
Royal Service Pension Act was promulgated in 1901 as a result, and was widely 
considered to have served the civil service well for half a century surviving the upheavals 
of the transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy in 1932. Gvil Service 
pensions were seen as an important incentive to join the Gvil Service. Income security
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after retirement provided a source of motivation for officials. Pensions were seen as an 
income supplement for civil servants and brought their financial status on a par with 
their counterparts in the private sector. Employment in royal service was seen as superior 
to work in the private sector. The phenomenon was reflected in the Thai proverb: 
“support from ten businessmen was incomparable with being protected by the lords in 
the Royal Service”.
Almost twenty years after the establishment of democratic government in 
Thailand, the Royal Service Pension Act 1901 was replaced by the new Gvil Service 
Pension and Annuity Act in 1951. This act provided a legal framework for civil servant 
pensions. The legislation established distinct pension schemes for civil servants, judicial 
officers, public prosecutors, teachers, the military and the police. The differences in 
pension plans reflect differences in the remuneration schemes for each category of 
government official. Overall responsibility for administering civil service pensions was 
placed with the Comptroller General Department (GGD) in the ministry of finance while 
ministries keep benefit records for, and made payments to, its pensioners or former 
officials. However, there was also a decentralised administration of benefit payments and 
some record keeping. Furthermore, there was no centralised database of current and 
prospective pensioners. The GGD, though tasked with most pension operations, was not 
the only government department involved in pension administration. The Office of the 
Gvil Service Commission (OCSQ, which oversaw the overall remuneration policy for 
civil servants in which pensions were included, also shared responsibility at the policy 
level.
As the main purpose of civil service pensions was to protect the standard of 
living of retired government personnel, as King Rama V intended, the state was 
responsible for paying pensions from its own coffers. The Gvil Service pension scheme 
was financed on a Defined Benefit Pay-As-You-Go basis out of general government 
revenue. Outlay on the pension scheme is reflected in the budget line for ‘wages and 
pensions’ in the central government expenditure category. Retirement benefits according 
to the Gvil Service and Annuity Act of 1951 were paid in two forms: either a “lump sum 
pension” or “a monthly annuity”. Lump sum payments were calculated based on the last 
monthly salary and length of service. It was paid to retired officials who did not qualify 
for receiving monthly annuities and it accounted for about one half of government 
pension expenditure. The monthly annuity was equal to the final month’s salary times the 
length of service divided by 50 or 55. The denominator 55 was applied to civil servants
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with less than 25 years service. Moreover, civil servants who started their service at the 
age of 20, worked for 40 years and retired at the age of 60 received a pension equal to 80 
per cent of their last month’s salary. It was obvious that annuities were more popular 
among officials who were entided to this option of retirement benefit.1
The pension system remained virtually untouched for forty years with only minor 
changes; the basic defined benefit, Pay-As-You-Go approach to pension administration 
remained. The attempt to change civil service pensions by introducing a contributory 
pension scheme for civil servants in 1990s represented a major shift in civil service 
policies of the Thai government.
8.2 The Civil Service Pension Reform Agenda
The issue of civil service pension reform gained attention for the first time from the 
Anand government of 1991-2 as part of the solution to wider problems of civil service 
pay.2 The establishment of any new administration in Thailand usually provided an 
opportunity for central government agencies to put forward their preferred policies and 
reform proposals. Raising civil servants salaries was one of the issues usually proposed to 
incoming governments. The advent of Anand’s government was no exception and 
provided an opportunity for the issue of civil service pay to be considered. In December 
1991 the OCSC submitted a proposal to the cabinet, drawn up by its Task Force on 
Brain Drain Prevention, for salary increases as a solution to the problem of low civil 
service pay and the consequent brain drain of high calibre civil servants.
8.2.1 Formulating the Reform Issue: Low Pay and Brain Drain Problems
In 1990, just before the appointment of the Anand government, the OCSC, which 
monitored the problems of manpower losses, set up an ad hoc Task Force on Brain-Drain 
Prevention. Its members consisted of officials representing the OCSC, the Comptroller 
General’s Department (GGD), the National Economics and Social Development Board 
(NESDB), a group of experts on public personnel management and academics from 
universities. The task force was asked to investigate the problem of low and
1 Officials who qualified for annuities included: civil servants whose post was abolished or were 
dismissed without misconduct; those medically unfit; those reaching the retirement age of 60; 
those over 50 who choose to leave government service; government employees with 25 years 
service who choose to leave the service.
2 Anand’s government was an interim administration appointed after the 1991 military coup. See 
chapter 2.
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uncompetitive salaries and the consequent loss of high calibre and key staff of the civil 
service, as well as to propose measures to retain civil service personnel.
By the late 1980s the rate of manpower losses from the Thai Gvil Service 
became alarming to the OCSC and politicians. The Task Force estimated that between 
1985 and 1991 considerable numbers of key personnel left the Gvil Service through 
voluntary resignation.3 Voluntary resignations made up between forty and fifty per cent 
of the total terminating cases in which normal retirements, death and sacking were 
counted.4 These key personnel included middle-ranking officials running the day-to-day 
business of government departments, and officials whose skills and qualifications were in 
dire need, and scarce in the labour market. The statistics also showed that more than 
ninety per cent of the staff who voluntarily left the civil service went to work in the 
private sector where salaries were twice as high as those of the civil service. The Gvil 
Service was said to have lost its attraction to prospective graduates as well as its 
competitive advantage to private firms, which were enjoying a booming economy. Gvil 
service pay and remuneration especially for the front line and middle ranking officials, 
was well below that of the private sector.5 Salary gaps between the two sectors ranged 
from around eight per cent to almost 200 per cent, depending on the civil servants’ 
grades.6 As salary gaps were increasing, recruiting graduates to the Gvil Service, 
particularly highly qualified personnel and those with scarce expertise, was extremely 
difficult. It was also difficult to retain high calibre civil servants.
In late 1991 the ad hoc task, force it published its proposals. The consensus among 
its members was that increasing salaries and remuneration was vital to attract, retain and 
improve the quality of civil servants. Tlie task force was convinced that significant 
upward salary adjustments were warranted. It proposed a process of doubling civil 
servants’ salaries in five stages over a number of years, each stage matched with different 
pay scales. It also proposed that the scheduled pay rises should be used as an opportunity 
to review and reform additional allowances many of which were seen to be of a dubious 
nature intended largely to increase remuneration on a selective basis.7 In return for the 
adjustment, the task force proposed that position allowances based on rank that were 
currently outside the salary scale should be phased out.
3 See Figure 2.5 chapter 2.
4 Ibid.
5 See Table 2.6 chapter 2.
6 Ibid.
7 There are at least forty allowances, which included job-related allowances, working conditions 
allowances, and pensions-related allowances. See Table 2.8 chapter 2.
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Much though the cabinet wanted to increase the salary for ordinary civil servants 
as requested by the OCSC Task Force on Brain Drain Prevention, it could not do so. 
Despite a general sympathy towards the proposal, the cabinet had a political ‘hot potato’ 
on its hands. As one journalist reported:
The Government faced difficulties in making decisions about pay rises 
requested by all types of government officials. If the Gvil Service’s pay scales 
were approved, it would be forced to increase salaries for other powerful 
groups of government officials who had connections with the members of 
Legislative Council and the NPKG Anand’s Government could not afford to 
lose votes when the Bill was read.8
The cabinet debated the proposal at length. Increasing salaries for ordinary civil servants 
would make the government popular among 200,000 or so personnel and have long term 
effects on recruiting, maintaining and productivity. However, a pay increase designed 
only for ‘ordinary civil service’ would create unnecessary tensions with other categories 
of government officials including powerful judiciary staff, prosecutors, teachers, police 
and military personnel. Taking into account the limited budget and other fiscal reasons 
the government would not be able to afford across the board pay rises.
Having carefully weighed up the risks and problems, the cabinet, though it agreed 
in principle that the Task Force’s proposal was an urgent and necessary measure to deal 
with the loss of high calibre civil servants, only allowed the first of the five salary scales 
for ordinary civil servants to be introduced. The cabinet, in its resolution dated 30 
December 1991, also imposed the strict condition that: “adjusting to the second pay 
scale would only be possible if the civil service pension system was reformed. Moreover 
every adjustment to the new scale in the future must be resubmitted and approved by the 
Cabinet”.9
The emergence of civil service pension reform issue did not come entirely out of 
the blue. Previous democratic governments had considered but avoided the issue because 
it was politically sensitive. Reforming civil service pensions would involve changes in 
benefits and the status quo of civil service personnel as well as changes in the jurisdiction 
of the government agencies responsible for pension administration. Previous
8 Personal communication Kittipong Soonprasent, August 1999.
9 Cabinet Resolution 30 December 1991.
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administrations did not initiate a reform for fear of losing support from their 
bureaucratic subordinates.
However, in its discussion of the proposed salary increases the Anand cabinet 
accepted the widely held view in government and the civil service that it was fair for its 
pension schemes to be relatively generous because civil service pay was comparatively 
low. They also accepted the view that pensions tended to be seen by civil servants as 
compensation for comparatively low pay during pre-retirement, even though the civil 
service provided considerable job security.10
In its discussions the cabinet was aware that improving civil service salaries was 
largely dependent on the government’s ability to pay, which was determined by its fiscal 
position. One of the factors that contributed to the fiscal status of the government was 
administrative or “back office costs”, which included public personnel costs, of which 
civil service salaries and pensions were a major part. Considering the total remuneration 
perspective, the cabinet agreed, “increasing pay warranted a review of pension policy”. 
This was seen as a means to offset a surge of uncontrolled personnel expenditure caused 
by the increasing numbers of the civil sendee personnel.11 At the end of 1991 when the 
cabinet made future pay rises dependent on pension reform, the government workforce 
was made up of over 575,000 civil servants and permanent employees, 556,000 military,
520,000 teachers, 180,000 police with the rest being made up of small numbers from 
other groups such as university personnel, the judiciary and public prosecutors. Between 
1988 and 1992, numbers of civil service personnel grew from 1.2 million to 1.3 million.12
What concerned former technocrats in the cabinet, among them the prime 
minister, his deputy and the minister of finance,13 who had experience of civil service 
reform, particularly administrative cost cutting and salaries and pensions, was that salaries 
and pensions were directly related because pension benefits were calculated based on the 
final monthly salary and years of service. Any adjustments to salary scales would 
inevitably lead to an increase in pension outlay and overall central government 
expenditure. Central government budgetary outlays on wages and salaries accounted for
10 Interview, Wisoot Prositsiriwongse, OCSC
11 See Figure 2.2 chapter 2.
12 Ibid.
13 Many senior ministers were current or retired senior bureaucrats with diplomatic, financial and 
legal experience. The prime minister himself was a former ambassador and permanent secretary 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meechai Ruchubhan, Deputy Prime Minister, was a leading 
lawyer and Suthee Singsaneh, Minister of Finance, was a senior official in the Ministry of Finance 
who had served as a capable finance minister in previous administrations.
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thirty-four per cent of total expenditure, a significant and comparatively large share 
representing over five per cent of the GDP of Thailand.14 As pension costs were a 
significant part of government personnel expenditure, reducing personnel costs in 
general and reforming the civil service remuneration package specifically, as seen by 
Anand’s cabinet, could be achieved by reducing pension costs. The cabinet meeting also 
discussed how the savings made from civil service pension reform could be in turn be 
earmarked for raising civil service salaries. Pension reform was seen by the cabinet as one 
way to reduce personnel costs.15 In short, the cabinet was acutely aware of the increase in 
the long-term pension burdens that would follow a substantial salary increase.
Anand and other economic liberals in his cabinet saw civil service pension 
reform as part of the government’s wider economic liberalisation policy. Pension reform 
would provide an opportunity to reduce the role of the state and increase the role of the 
private sector. Business interests were strongly entrenched in the government. There 
were eight leading financiers and businessmen in the cabinet. While in office, between 
March 1991 and September 1992 Anand introduced several measures of economic and 
fiscal reform and an economic liberalisation programme. Important measures included 
the introduction of value-added tax, floating fuel prices and the reform of securities and 
stock exchange law.
The government saw the issue of Gvil Service pension reform as part of a wider 
efficiency improvement project, though it was a less urgent measure. According to the 
cabinet, civil service efficiency could be increased if only competent candidates were 
admitted to the Gvil Service, and the incompetent ones were easily dismissed. The 
OCSC as a central personnel agency was therefore required to improve the quality of 
civil service personnel by “imposing stricter criteria for recruiting new staff while staff 
dismissal and employment termination procedure should be shortened’.16 The pay 
increases would not be warranted and approved by the public if the civil service could 
not prove that its efficiency was improved.
This cabinet decision to allow only one salary scale increase with the attached 
pension reform condition was seen as a time buying strategy by some OCSC officials.17 
Not approving all five civil service pay scales for ordinary civil servants would help 
reduce tensions between the government and other groups of officials, and help the
14 See Figures 2.5 and 2.7 chapter 2.
15 Interview, anonymous GGD official.
16 Ibid.
17 Interview, anonymous personnel analyst, OCSC Salary Division.
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government retain some support from the Gvil Service. Most importantly, it diffused the 
demands from pay rises by shifting civil servants’ attention from the pay rise issue to the 
issue civil service pension reform. The government also made it clear to the public that 
such an important and high impact issue as further increases in civil service salaries 
would be left for the incoming elected government to decide. It also agreed in principle 
that ‘a high level committee would be established to consider matters related to civil 
service pay and remuneration in the future’.18
The government gave the issue of pension reform a low profile on its agenda by 
ensuring a limited amount of media publicity and involving a small numbers of agencies. 
It was careful in its handling of such a sensitive issue as civil service pension reform 
could trigger discontent among civil servants who always suspected that the government 
had tried to destabilise their security of tenure. Information about the pension reform 
issue, as a result, was released as part of the story of pay increase and was not the focus 
of media reports.19 All documents and minutes of meetings throughout the process of 
civil service pension reform were classified as “confidential”. Only the government 
agencies where pension issues were institutionally and administratively rooted were 
informed. These included the GGD and the OCSG The OGD, responsible for 
government accounting systems and disbursement of the budget, directly managed civil 
service pensions. It kept records of retirees, provided budgets for pension costs, and 
control and authorise the remission of pensions and annuities to entitled retirees or their 
beneficiaries. The OCSC, although it was not directly involved in pension administration, 
was in charge of government policies concerning human resource management. Its legal 
status as “the government personnel manager’’ granted it the right to make suggestions 
for changing or improving policies with regards to welfare and other benefits issues 
including pensions.
Urns, civil service pension reform reached the agenda of Anand’s government as 
part of the solution to wider civil service problems, low pay compared with the private 
sector and the consequent brain drain and loss of efficiency. It was made a condition of 
further salary increases. Pension reform also reached the government agenda because of 
rising personnel costs to which pensions based on final salaries contributed. It thereby 
also contributed to the wider civil service reform agenda of increasing efficiency by 
cutting headcounts and personnel costs, dubbed as downsizing the Gvil Service.
18 Cabinet Resolution 30 December 1991.
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8.3 Searching for and Redefining Problems: Rising Pension Costs
After the cabinet decision to reform pensions, the CGD set out to ‘find the problem’ to 
match its solution. Gvil service pension reform was seen by the CGD entirely as a 
political initiative of Anand’s cabinet. “The CGD, the only department where pension 
administration was legally and operationally based, did not have a clear idea or plan to 
reform pensions for civil servants until the cabinet resolution of 30 December 1991”.20 
This unexpected political mandate prompted the Public Finance Practice and Regulation 
Section, a sub-unit within the CGD, to review the current system of civil service 
pensions. By reflecting the cmcial point made by the cabinet, the CGD came up with the 
problem of rising pension costs, a cmcial issue, which formed part of its wider concerns 
over the surge of personnel and administrative costs.
The department’s statistics, which had recently been collected, indicated a 
projected increase in pension costs from thirteen per cent in 1989 to twenty-four per 
cent in 1993.21 This alarming figure caused concern among senior officials in the finance 
ministry and the CGD was forced to impose a limit on pension expenditure. In the early 
1990s the CGD set its own internal benchmark that annual civil service pension 
expenditure should not exceed forty per cent of total personnel costs in the Gvil Service. 
This limit was used by the CGD as a benchmark for managing and monitoring 
administrative costs.
Gosely related and contributing to the increase in pension expenditure was the 
increasing numbers of retired government personnel. The CGD recorded in 1992, when 
civil service pension reform became the subject of attention, that there were 
approximately 173,190 retired government officials receiving pensions and the number 
was expected to grow substantially. Although there was only limited growth in the 
number of government employees from 1988 to 1992, most of them, about 1.5 million 
of the 2 million government employees, were vested in the pension scheme. Given the 
age distribution of the workforce, which showed that the Gvil Service was an ageing 
organisation, this problem was going to worsen. Over the next twenty to thirty years the 
CGD projected that, there would be a substantial increase in the number of pensioners, 
and hence pension costs.
As the department responsible for managing the administrative running costs of 
the government, the CGD was able to calculate associated costs, which contributed to
19 Matichon Newspaper Database.
20 Interview, Orranuch Wainusit, CGD official.
21 See Tables 2.5 and 2.7 chapter 2.
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the ballooning of the pension expenditures. As well as their salaries, the CGD argued, 
many civil servants received additional allowances for housing, the education of their 
children, health care, hardship, and many other purposes; some occupational groups 
received extra pay.22 In some cases these allowances were equal to twenty or thirty per 
cent or more of base salary. Although many of these ceased on retirement, some of the 
most costly, such as medical care, continued and contributed to the overall total of 
pension outlays. The CGD considered the increase in pension expenditure and 
allowances for retired civil servants was an unfunded liability.
The most detrimental feature of the pre-existing scheme, according to the CGD 
was that pension calculations were based on the final month’s salary. The implications of 
this were twofold. Firstly it tended to result in pensions that were disproportionate in 
relation to the average lifetime earnings of retirees. It also created perverse incentives for 
civil servants to seek ‘end of career promotions’ to raise their pension base.23 The 
resulting higher pensions can thus be said to be unfair and to cause inefficiency. 
Secondly, the improvement in salaries was, therefore, tightly constrained by the direct 
linkage between changes in civil service pay and civil service pension outlays. A CGD 
senior official put it in the following terms:
On unchanged policies, increased Civil Service pay could result in an eventual 
ballooning of pension expenditure. As our department is responsible for 
managing the government’s cash flow and reserves, we need to control the 
disbursement of money strictly. Pension costs are indeed another cost category 
in which we see potential problems.24
Another ‘indicator’ of particular concern to the GGD’s was the problem of 
pension debt. In 1992, the CGD estimated that current pension debt was in excess of 
148 million Baht. As wages and salaries, in which pension outlays were included, 
accounted for about thirty-four per cent of total central government budget representing 
over five per cent of the country’s GDP there was little room for improving the quality 
of civil servants and the efficiency of public services without remuneration reform. This 
in turn was both affected by and impacted on pension policy. Due partly to the perceived
22 See Table 2.8 chapter 2.
23 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
24 Interview, Napong, CGD official.
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budgetary risk posed by the existing Gvil Service pension system, there was a need to 
contain Gvil Service pension expenditure.
The cabinet decision to make future salary increases dependent on pension 
reform put the issue firmly on the government agenda. But it was only a decision in 
principle. The CGD, the central co-ordinating agency mainly responsible for civil service 
pensions, had no clear plan and so set about identifying a problem, rising pension costs, 
and then looked for a solution to this problem.
8.4 Seeking Ideas: N ew  Approaches to Financing Qvil Service Pensions
From January 1992, the CGD was actively engaged in searching for a new more efficient 
way to administer civil service pensions. If personnel expenditure kept increasing, the 
CGD would not have been able to achieve its targeted control benchmark, as agreed 
with the Ministry of Finance. As the Government debated raising salaries at that time to 
make the Gvil Service more attractive, the liability would balloon in the future. The 
CGD believed that one possible way to control the level of future liability was to change 
the way civil service pensions were financed and managed by moving from the pre­
existing unfunded pension scheme to a funded scheme. To start with, the CGD and its 
staff with pensions responsibility in the Bureau of Financial and Fiscal Regulations had 
only vague ideas about how to realise this reform alternative. A novel concept to the 
Thai civil service, only a few staff were familiar with the alternative ways of financing 
civil service pensions. One of the department’s key staff who took active part in the 
pension reform process recalled how his former director general, Chatumongkol 
Sonakula advocated the funded approach to the civil service pensions: “By throwing a 
book on the practice of the Singaporean Central Provident Fund on my desk and asking 
me to study it, he encouraged me to pursue a new way of financing the civil service 
pensions.”25 However, such reform ideas had not yet been institutionalised in the CGD.
The cabinet resolution of 30 December 1991 also created a sense of urgency for 
the CGD to propose options for reforming the long established civil service pensions 
system. For the CGD any pension reform proposal would have to meet its two stated 
objectives in “refinancing pensions”. It must aim to control pension outlays and reduce, 
if not eliminate, the pension burden on the government. The reform proposal must 
enable the government to manage the budget more efficiently. To achieve these
25 Interview, Napong CGD official.
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objectives, the CGD searched for a quick solution to refinance and reorganise the civil 
service pension system from the ideas already being considered in academic circles and 
by experts and practitioners.
Previously, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, most discussion of pension 
reform focused on two alternative methods of providing pensions: Defined Benefit (DB) 
and Defined Contribution (DQ. The CGD only considered these two approaches, which 
had different strengths and weaknesses, making them more or less suitable in a particular 
context.26 A DB plan usually provided certainty with regard to the value of the pension, 
while enabling employers of the plan to manage the investment of funds and the 
scheduling of the contributions needed for the ultimate payment of pensions. While 
pensions provided by a defined benefit plan can be ‘pre-funded’, they are generally paid 
on an ongoing basis out of current receipts. A DC plan generally gives employees control 
over the investments and greater certainty of the receipt of promised pensions, since a 
fund they control has of necessity been created. However, in this scheme the final value 
of pensions was uncertain and dependent on market forces. Locking in the alternative 
strengths and weaknesses of the DB and DC plan, the CGD’s officials believed that 
“moving the civil service pensions from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution 
plan would help the government achieve its reform objectives, particularly the reduction 
of future liability and personnel costs” 27 The CGD then simultaneously explored 
pensions schemes and arrangements practised in the private sector in Thailand and those 
of neighbouring governments in South East Asia.
8.4.1 Ongoing Social Security Reform
In drawing up civil service pension reform proposals the CGD drew on previous 
government experience. Almost a decade earlier the Thai government had initiated a 
major reform of the social security system, which entailed the creation of a pension 
system in the private sector. The reforms were intended to address its concerns over 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth arising from the country’s rapid economic 
development. During the boom years of the mid 1980s and early 1990s the private sector 
grew so rapidly that income distribution and workers’ welfare became the centre of the 
government’s attention. Income growth in some segments of the population was 
apparent because of the expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors. The
26 Taken from minutes of CGD meetings, January February 1992.
27 Interviews with CGD staff involved pension reform showed they shared a consensus on what 
they were doing.
225
Government made its aspiration clear in the Seventh National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1992-1996) that the country needed a shift in public policy towards 
increased emphasis on distributional aspects of economic growth. Social security should 
be provided for those workers who contributed so much to the growth of the economy.
As a result, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) was first created in the 1980s to 
provide some retirement benefits for employees of companies, which opted to join the 
CPF. Later on the Social Security Act in 1990 led to the establishment of the Social 
Security Office and the Social Security Fund (SSF). The new act introduced a 
comprehensive social security programme with a clear implementation schedules.28 The 
SSF in particular provided some social guarantee for workers in registered companies 
and the schemes were based upon a voluntary fully funded defined contribution principle 
(FFDQ. As civil service personnel already had their own defined benefit pension system, 
they were not included in the SSF. The establishment of the SSF was seen as a success as 
the rate of participation in these schemes by private companies and public enterprises 
was high, making the SSF the biggest in the Thai capital market. For the GGD, the 
private sector social security pension scheme with its independent fund, and the tripartite 
contributions from employees, employers and the government, could be used as a model 
for civil service pensions.
8.4.2 Regional Best Practice
Another immediate solution to transform civil service pensions to a pre-funded defined 
contribution system adopted by the CGD was to look across national boundaries and see 
if ideas could be borrowed. As well as the Singaporean model of pension management, 
the GGD considered ideas came from other countries in the region, which had 
experienced pension reform. It found three other ASEAN countries, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines, were implementing defined contributions schemes 
administered separately by independent pension funds. This quick scan of neighbouring 
countries’ public service pensions provided basic information including alternative levels 
of contributions and replacement rate per basic salary, which was seen by the GGD as 
crucial making an initial reform proposal. This search for information provided some 
degree of confidence for the GGD’s staff to adopt the defined contribution approach to 
civil service pensions. The GGD was particularly “inspired by the Singapore Central
28 These included the introduction of sickness, invalidity, maternity and death benefits in March 
1991 and September 1993; voluntary insurance in September 1994; old-age pensions and child 
allowances in January 1999; and unemployment benefits in 2003.
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Provident Fund and the Malaysian Provident Fund models. The attractiveness came 
from the belief that creating a separate fund would serve the CGD’s reform objectives 
well.”29
Under pressure from the cabinet the CGD urgently needed a pension reform 
proposal. It drew on two main ‘ready made’ sources, the ongoing Thai experience of 
developing a social security system begun in the late 1980s, and regional best practice. 
From these is developed a preference for shifting from a defined benefits system to a 
defined contributions one.
8.5 Seizing and Missing the Opportunity; Proposing Gvil Service Pension Reform
After the cabinet ruling that civil service pensions must be reformed if salaries were to be 
raised, the CGD spent most of January 1992 producing a pension reform package. Its 
preference was for the Singaporean and Malaysian practices. The director general of the 
CGD worked closely with his staff to put forward a proposal because the finance 
minister Suthee Singhasaneh was committed to the cabinet resolution and wanted a 
reform proposal for early consideration by the cabinet. “The department director general 
would have been seen as incapable and unaccountable in the eyes of the finance minister, 
unless he responded quickly to his commitment.”30 The CGD saw a need to respond 
promptly to the cabinet while the issue of reforming civil service pensions was still fresh 
on the government agenda. It’s ‘strike while the iron was hot’ approach was confirmed 
by the CGD officials involved in the reform process, one of whom reported that:
We believe that an interim cabinet like this [Anand’s] would not wait for long 
since its term in office depends on how soon the general election would be 
called. If we put our proposal through, the cabinet would be likely to approve 
it. More importandy, the reform idea came from them. We didn’t think they 
would reject it.31
Despite the time constraints, the CGD managed to produce its own reform 
proposal from the jigsaw of ideas and practices it had collected. In February 1992, only 
two months after the cabinet had made pension reform as a condition for future salary
29 Interview, Napong, CGD official.
30 Interview, anonymous senior CGD official.
31 Interview, Ms Venus, CGD official..
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increases, the CGD made its first reform proposal to the finance minister. At this stage, 
the relevant agencies concerned with personnel and budget related matters were not 
consulted. The proposal was to replace over time the current unfunded defined benefit 
pension system with a defined contribution scheme that would operate through an 
autonomous public entity separate from the central government’s budget. Contributions 
by the government, as well as its civil servants and permanent employees, would 
accumulate in individual capitalisation accounts, along with interest and other capital 
earnings. The CGD also proposed that a Central Pension Fund (CPF), modelled on the 
Singaporean scheme should be set up to manage these accounts and control funds 
invested to produce earnings. The most important measure in the CGD’s proposal, 
which would transform the Thai civil service pension system, was that future pension 
payments would be based on contributions to and the earnings of the CPF. The CPF 
would therefore provide the means for the government to eliminate its open-ended 
responsibility for pension payments under the existing defined benefit pension scheme.
On receiving the reform proposal from the CGD, the finance minister, Suthee, 
adopted it and instructed that it was to be submitted to the cabinet for approval It was 
discussed at the cabinet meeting on 10 March 1992. The CGD’s reform proposal put the 
cabinet in a difficult situation.32 They saw the GCD’s proposal as a radical initiative 
which, if adopted, it would involve changing role of the government in civil service 
pension administration. Without detailed accounts comparing the pension benefits of the 
current system with the newly proposed one, the cabinet feared that civil service 
personnel would not be convinced to accept the new pension scheme. The cabinet also 
foresaw that some problems might arise from shifting state responsibility to provide 
pensions to a shared responsibility between the government and individual civil servants. 
The CGD’s initial proposal was also seen by most members of the cabinet as a threat to 
retirees’ income stability since retirement benefits would be determined solely by the 
investment rate of return of the proposed new fund. They feared that the new scheme 
would put civil servants into a risky situation and the implementation of the new scheme 
might be difficult since most civil servants are risk- averse.33
The cabinet at its meeting on 10 March 1992 rejected the CGD’s reform 
proposal and decided that a more careful and detailed analysis of the pension alternatives 
was needed.34 The CGD’s initial proposal only contained broad principles of the new
32 Interview, anonymous OCSC official, Salary and Benefit Policy Division.
33 Cabinet Resolution 10 March 1992.
34 Ibid.
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scheme and its administration. It did not provide details of how retirement benefits 
would be designed and calculated, which were seen by the cabinet as important aspects 
and vital for the implementation of the new scheme.
Despite rejecting the proposal, the cabinet provided cmcial comments and 
guidance, which set the course for the subsequent revised proposal. It wanted the CGD 
to ensure that civil servants’ retirement benefits did not deteriorate and become worse 
than the existing system. The cabinet also expressed some concern over the transition 
period. It suggested that civil servants hired after the effective date of establishment of 
the new plan would automatically be covered by the Government Pension Fund. 
Difficult issues arose with respect to the coverage of existing employees despite the 
CGD’s inclusion of several formulas in its proposal for a Central Provident Fund 
modelled on the private sector, the most notable of which related to the equivalency of 
implicit returns under the existing and proposed scheme. In effect, the cabinet ruled that 
‘existing civil servants should receive returns, under the new plan that were essentially 
equivalent to those under the defined benefit plan’.35
Although the rejection of the CGD’s proposal was due mainly to the potential 
losses to the retirement benefits of existing civil service personnel, some members of the 
cabinet, including the prime minister and some senior ministers, were concerned that it 
would not be legitimate for them to rush such a major decision on pension reform since 
their government was an interim one. The decision should be left for the new 
government after the general election scheduled for September 1992. For the interim 
government, “civil service pension reform was not really urgent, although they 
themselves initiated the reform issue in the first place. The government raised the 
pension issue only in the hope that it would be able to postpone the decision on salary 
adjustments requested not only by ordinary civil servants but also other categories of 
government employees including the judiciary, prosecutors and teachers.”36 The future 
progress of the civil service pension reform issue would therefore depend on the new 
government that emerged after the elections held in September 1992.
The CGD, anxious to take advantage of the reform opportunity provided by the 
Anand government, put forward its pension reform proposal to move from a defined 
benefits system to a defined contribution, which would reduce pension costs effectively. 
It was rejected by the cabinet because it was politically too risky and might alienate civil 
servants concerned about potential losses to their pensions. However, the issue of
35 Ibid.
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pension reform was kept alive by the cabinet’s request for a more detailed exposition of 
the proposal.
8.6 Pension Reform Hibernation: Preparing for New Windows of Opportunity
The rejection of the civil service pension reform proposal by the cabinet in March 1992 
postponed the chance of moving from the well-established defined benefit pay-as-you- 
go pension system to the defined contributions one advocated by the CGD. However, a 
new window of opportunity was expected to open when the new elected government 
came to office in September 1992. Although the reform issue seemed at least dormant if 
not off the interim government’s agenda, the CGD sought to maintain the momentum 
of the issue. A key group of its officials continued working on pension reform. Most 
comments from the cabinet meeting on 10 March 1992 were incorporated in their 
revised proposal. In the draft-revised version of its revised proposal, the CGD included 
two alternative schemes, with different degrees of departure from the current system, 
from which the cabinet could choose.
The first option for a reformed civil service pension scheme resembled the one 
recendy rejected by the cabinet. The CGD proposed that a Central Pension Fund (CPF) 
should be set up to manage retirement benefits for retired civil service personnel. One 
radical proposal, which remained in this option was that only one type of pension 
benefit, an accrual of contributions and interest in the CPF, would be allowed. It would 
not allow civil servants to choose between a “lump sum pension” and a “monthly 
annuity pension”, choices that civil servants could make in the existing system. The level 
of retirement benefits, another major departure from the current system, would be solely 
determined by accumulation through the proposed fund. The initial contribution 
reflecting the past service of existing members would be based on the formula used to 
determine the lump sum pension. This was to ensure that civil servants would not be 
worse off if the new system was to be adopted.
The CGD’s second option provided for a Central Provident Fund in which the 
government would make an initial notional investment covering a portion of members 
accrued benefits, supply the remainder in stages and contribute over the period of service 
of the beneficiary a certain percentage of salaries, supplemented by the beneficiary’s own 
contributions. The CGD proposed that pension and retirement benefit payment for 
existing civil servants would be a combination of defined benefits and contributions.
36 Interview, anonymous OCSC official, Wage and Salary Policy Section.
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The defined benefit would be calculated on the basis of salaries frozen on the date of 
change to the scheme. The provident fund benefit would be based on contributions and 
interest in the future. Existing civil servants would receive both but new entrants would 
receive only the defined contribution benefit.
In July 1992, almost four months after the cabinet’s rejection of its initial 
proposal, the CGD presented the draft-revised proposal to the permanent secretary of 
the ministry of finance for future consideration by the new incoming elected 
government. The director general of the CGD also considered that technical advice from 
experts on civil service pension reform was needed in order to strengthen and legitimise 
its revised proposal. Hie proposed that a consultative session with experts from the 
World Bank should be held, to which the permanent secretary of the ministry of finance 
agreed. However, the proposed visit should not be arranged until the advent of the new 
government as it would not difficult for them to be certain about the stance of the new 
administration.
8.7 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Civil Service Policy Making
This chapter provides a narrative of the genesis of civil service pension reform in 
Thailand in the early 1990s. The concluding section primarily provides explanations for 
the emergence of civil service pension issue on Anand’s government agenda and the 
failure to maintain the momentum of the issue by the reformers inability to use a window 
of opportunity for reform. In effect, this section explains the agenda setting and 
alternative specification processes in the light of an institutional and processual analysis.
8.7.1 Agenda Setting
The issue of the civil service pension reform emerged unexpectedly from the Anand’s 
cabinet meeting as a means of avoiding a decision on the pay increase requested by the 
‘ordinary category of civil servants.37 As refusing to double civil service pay scales could 
lead to unpopularity among government personnel and hence declining support from the 
civil service, Anand created a causal story (Stone, 1989) linking the increasing pension 
costs with ballooning personnel costs making the government’s fiscal management 
difficult. By doing so, Anand’s cabinet could alleviate the possible hostile response from 
the Gvil Service by considering salary increases as part of the wider context of managing
37 The occupational groups of the Thai Gvil Service are set out in chapter 2.
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costs and improving civil service efficiency. If anything could be blamed for not being 
able to authorise civil service pay rises, it was the surge of pension costs. This kind of 
cabinet causal story and the resultant civil service pension reform solution helped 
Anand’s government “avoid blame” (Weaver 1986) for not increasing civil service 
salaries.
Not only could the political strategy to delay salary increases avert political 
pressures and demands for pay increases from other categories of civil service personnel, 
it also gave rise to a new issue, civil service pension reform on Anand’s government 
agenda. However, Anand’s government did not raise the profile of the pension issue 
leading to its low issue status. Consequently, the issue neither gained much political nor 
attracted wider public interest, since it was considered politically sensitive. Despite this, 
the civil service pension reform issue was high on the specialised civil service policy­
making subsystems. These included the government departments and agencies 
responsible for policy and administration of the civil service salaries and pensions, 
namely the CGD and the OCSG The low issue status of pension reform and issue 
processing in the closed policy subsystems was evident in the lack of reports in the 
newspapers on the issue during 1991-1992, when the issue emerged, was being discussed, 
and went back and forth between the CGD and the cabinet.
The way in which the issue of civil service pension reform emerged in the cabinet 
meeting led to a doctrinal search - finding a problem to a given solution. The formulation 
of the civil service pension reform issue can be characterised as an attempt to search for 
problems, which would justify the political reform solution. At this stage, the problems 
to which this Anand’s cabinet resolution could be attached were not readily identified, 
and the cabinet no clear understanding of the problems of the pension system apart from 
the prospect of rising pension costs. In formulating the issue, the CGD became the 
principal reformer since its jurisdiction direcdy involved the administration of civil 
service pensions. The ‘solution for pension reform’ was therefore looking for problems 
embedded in the venue of the CGD, which was seen by the cabinet as its certified 
reformer.
In defining problems to match the political mandate of pension reform, 
institutional rules, routines and practices regarding the management and control of the 
government administrative ‘running costs’ overwhelmingly led the CGD’s officials to 
pinpoint the pressing problem as the rising personnel costs they faced. The issues of 
salary increases and civil service pensions were interpreted by the CGD as belonging to
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the same category of ‘civil service remuneration’ as appeared in central government 
expenditure. These two issues were seen as technically linked. They therefore justified 
civil service pension reform as a measure to contain personnel costs in the Gvil Service. 
Using Kingdon’s term (1995), although the window of opportunity for pay rises was 
closed at least for the period of Anand’s administration, its appearance for the pay rise 
issue increased the probability that another window would open for similar or related 
subject, in this case, civil service pensions.
8.7.2 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
Being the only certified reformer, the civil service pension reform solution the CGD 
subsequently proposed was geared toward the achievement of its missions, reflecting the 
organisational process of matching the department identity of the CGD to the fiscal and 
financial management problems they had. Viewing the issue from a new perspective 
([ones, 1994; Donovan, 1993) relevant to its identified problem, the issue of pension 
reform originally initiated as a condition for pay increase as an instrument for preventing 
and solving brain drain problems became legitimate on its own, while the latter subsided. 
This is because the CGD considered itself having full ownership of the pension issue, 
whereas it was only a marginal key player in the issue of brain drain problems and pay 
rises.
The episode reveals a sense of urgency and time constraints in the alternative 
specification process resulting from the brief window of opportunity opened by Anand’s 
interim government. The constraints and the commitment to complete the reform 
proposal by quickly seizing the opportunity forced the CGD to adopt a ‘go it alone 
strategy* which limited the alternative specification process to what has been called the 
‘inside initiative model’ (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976). This involved bypassing the usual 
concurrent process normally participated in by government agencies with stakes and 
jurisdiction in the issue. The CGD’s proposal did not have the support of other central 
co-ordinating agencies, particularly the OCSC which also had jurisdiction over 
government remuneration policy The OCSC could not yet claim, as the CGD could, that 
it was certified by the cabinet. The role of the OCSC will be more prominent in the next 
episode.
The fast pace of developing a civil service pension reform proposal by the CGD 
was also due to the adoption of a reform idea and ‘ready made* reform solution from 
elsewhere. Under time constraints and with a sense of urgency, the CGD adopted the
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quickest approach, to produce a workable reform proposal from existing reform ideas, 
and looking across national boundaries to see if ideas could be borrowed (Wolman 
1992). In fact, a few officials, who played an active part in formulating a reform proposal, 
were already familiarised with the idea of introducing a contributory approach to civil 
service pensions. The window of opportunity opened by Anand’s cabinet allowed these 
ideas to surface and be realised. Although officials claimed that reform ideas and best 
practices had been sought from the Singaporean model and elsewhere, it is difficult, from 
the narrative evidence in this chapter, to establish that ‘intensive search’ or ‘vicarious 
learning’ took place. In short, the intensity of reform effort of the CGD’s officials 
contributed to the progress of the proposal to and on the government’s decisional 
agenda.
Although a speedy response to a brief window of opportunity was achieved, the 
CGD’s first reform proposal was not carefully formulated and was criticised by the 
cabinet as ‘too radical’. Its rejection by Anand’s cabinet reflects a situation where 
knowledge of the problem and solutions for civil service pension reform within the 
CGD were limited as the issue of civil service pension reform was new to them. By the 
end of January 1992, the issue of civil service pension reform was off Anand’s policy 
agenda as the reform proposal needed to be reformulated. The failure of coupling within 
the brief window of opportunity is similar to Kingdon’s observation: If the solution or 
problem is not available or is not sufficiently compelling, or support is not forthcoming 
from the political stream, then the subject’s place on the agenda is fleeting (Kingdon, 
1984).
This chapter provides narrative explanations for the emergence of the issue of 
civil service pension reform, which emerged unexpectedly from Anand’s cabinet as a 
political strategy to avoid a political decision on pay rises. Despite its low political 
support and its resultant issue status, the reform issue occupied a high status on the 
agenda of the specialised civil service policy-making subsystem, the GGD. The episode 
also shows how the agenda setting and alternative specification processes were shaped by 
the institutional and processual factors. Although this episode tells a story of institutional 
and processual constraints leading to failure to seize the reform opportunity, it is 
significant in the sense that it established the issue of civil service pension reform on the 
agenda of both the government and specialised civil service policy sub-system. The next 
two chapters will trace how the issue progressed.
Chapter 9
The Development of Civil Service Pension Reform Proposals:
A Policy Stalemate 1992-94
Overview
This chapter examines the progress of the civil service pension reform issue during 
Chaun’s administration from its re-emergence in 1992 to the stalemate reached by June 
1994. Despite the fall off in political attention of Anand’s government towards the issue 
of civil service pension reform, the commitment of officials in the Comptroller General’s 
Department [CGD] to the issue did not wane. Instead, they continued working to 
improve their earlier proposal, which had been rejected by the Anand cabinet, to 
strengthen it and to make it ready for the new administration, which they hoped, would 
open a new window of opportunity for civil service pension reform. Although the new 
government was attracted to the issue, it was not entirely convinced by, and did not agree 
with the reform options proposed by the CGD. This led to the inclusion of other 
government departments and agencies in the process of specifying reform alternatives. 
As a result, several different reform options were proposed by different actors. Stalemate 
was reached when no unified reform proposal could be agreed.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to explain why the issue of Gvil 
Service pension reform re-emerged and was taken up and pursued by Chaun’s 
government. Second, it explains how and why different proposals for civil service 
pension reform came about and how it was not possible to reach agreement on a single 
reform option. Essentially, its focus is on the process of specifying competitive civil 
service pension reform options; how the relevant government central agencies and 
external organisations made sense of their pension reform choices and influenced the 
process of formulating Gvil Service pension reform options.
9.1 Strengthening the Pension Reform Proposal
The parliamentary elections of September 1992 led to the formation of a new coalition 
government led by Chaun Leekpai, leader of the Democrat Party. His cabinet included 
some well known and reputable professionals who were non-MPs, a reflecting the 
Democrat Party’s long standing good relations with the banking and financial sectors.
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Among the cabinet members who played an important part in the government’s 
economic policy and management were Supachai Panijabakdi, a well- known technocrat 
and banker, and Tharin Nimmanhemindra, former CEO of the Siam Commercial Bank 
The former won a seat in a Bangkok constituency and was appointed a deputy prime 
minister. The latter, a non-elected member of parliament, became finance minister and 
played an important role in civil service pension reform.
After the election, the director general of the CGD and the permanent secretary 
of the ministry of finance agreed that the draft revised proposal for reforming the civil 
service pension needed to be legitimised on technical grounds if it was to be taken up by 
the new government. They agreed that the advice of the experts on pensions from the 
World Bank should be sought. As the CGD argued part of the World Bank’s mandate 
was to assist countries to develop pension schemes that would strengthen their fiscal 
management and hence reduce poverty.1 The World Bank approach was consistent with 
the model that the CGD proposed. In particular, the Bank’s recommendation that 
fundamental pension reform should contain some elements of ‘individual pensions 
financed by pre-retirement savings, which are privately managed’ was inline with its 
initial proposal.
The CGD invited experts on pension reform from the World Bank who then 
agreed to make a week long visit to Bangkok from 25 January to 1 February 1993 to 
meet and discuss the draft reform proposal with the GGD’s officials. Both sides made 
explicit in the terms of the Technical Assistance Mission that:
[T]he World Bank would assess with officials of the CGD the feasibility of various 
options outlining the Government of Thailand’s plan to move from the defined 
benefit (pension promise) plan to a defined contribution plan (i.e. provident fund); 
the mission findings and recommendations are based solely on the discussion with 
the CGD officials and a number of fund managers.2
During the mission the CGD and World Bank experts discussed two reform 
options included in the CGD’s draft revised proposal. The first was a complete overhaul 
of the pension system by introducing a central provident fund while the second was a 
combination of the central provident fund and some elements of the existing system. 
The CGD asserted that either option would have to satisfy the goal of reducing
1 See Holzmann, 1998.
2 Unpublished World Bank Mission Memorandum, 1993.
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budgetary outlays on pensions while treating current and future civil servants equitably. 
The Bank’s staff suggested that three criteria should be considered in order to evaluate 
the CGD’s pension reform options. These criteria were the cost of the plan to the 
government, equity for civil servants under the existing scheme and the new plan, and 
simplicity as a means of making the scheme attractive for current civil servants. 
However, the World Bank’s experts also suggested that the impact of establishing a new 
government pension fund, an issue that had not yet been addressed by the CGD, should 
be taken into consideration. They postulated that the new civil service pension scheme 
would provide a critical mass for the development of capital markets, as a pension 
management industry could be sprung up along the line.3
The World Bank set out its recommendations in a detailed memorandum. It 
advised that “the second option proposed by the CGD would be the most appropriate 
for the Thai situation”.-4 Its report, which applied a variety of “economic simulations” 
based on different assumptions and conditions such as civil servants’ service years, set 
out six principle reasons for this. First, the Thai Government would be able to move 
from an unfunded to a funded pension scheme. Second, it would share investment risks 
with civil servants. Third, by freezing salaries and years of service in the calculation of 
pension benefit accruing from the pre-existing plan, with adjustments for inflation, the 
purchasing power of the CGD’s second option would be preserved. The experts also 
asserted that, by such calculation, no group would be disadvantaged if inflation were to 
go up or down. Fourth, as far as the forms of retirement benefits were concerned, the 
CGD’s proposed second scheme would continue to honour pension contracts with pre­
existing civil servants by providing a lump sum or monthly annuity. Fifth, new entrants 
could expect to receive the same real level of pension benefits as the old scheme given a 
similar category of staff and service profiles. Lastly, the scheme would be easy to sell to 
pre-existing as well as new entrants since their interests in the final amount of pension 
are preserved.
9.2 Regaining Political Attention
After the Work Bank mission left Thailand, the CGD incorporated the opinions and 
comments of its experts into its revised-draft reform proposal and in May 1993
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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presented its reform proposal with the Bank’s assessment to the permanent secretary of 
the ministry of finance.
Before making its submission the GCD consulted the Office of the Civil Service 
Commission (OCSQ in February 1993 and subsequendy claimed that its revised 
proposal was supported by the OCSG This was part of the CGD’s go-it-alone strategy 
bypassing other central government agencies when it thought it had monopolistic 
jurisdiction over the civil service pension issue. As the department with direct jurisdiction 
over civil service pension administration and relevant knowledge and information about 
the pre-existing pension system, the CGD saw other central government agencies 
including the OCSC as outer players. Aware that the OCSC also claimed the right to 
contribute to and be consulted about civil service remuneration policies, the CGD 
decided to invite the OCSC to attend a meeting on 11 February 1993 after it had revised 
its civil service pension reform proposal in line with comments from Anand’s cabinet 
and the World Bank mission.
The meeting on 11 February 1993 was referred to by the CGD as the 
consultative session. In the formal invitation letter, the CGD clearly stated “The OCSC 
could give opinions about the civil service pension reform programme developed by the 
CGD before the CGD concluded its proposal”.5 The OCSC sent its Deputy Secretary 
General, Tipavidi, whose responsibility was to oversee the overall civil service 
remuneration policy to attend the meeting on its behalf.6 At the meeting, the CGD’s 
director gave Tipavadi a brief presentation of its proposal, as it was the first time that the 
OCSCs representative was invited to participate in the CGD’s process of formulating 
civil service pension reform options. Without much knowledge and expertise on the 
technicalities of the pension system, Tipavidi could only provide a broad opinion about 
the sustainability of pension rights of the civil service personnel, arguing, “The right of 
civil servants to the same forms and level of pension benefits must be protected.”7 
Although the meeting on 11 February 1993 was the only time when the OCSC was 
consulted with regard to the issue of civil service pension reform, the CGD claimed in its 
draft-reformulated proposal that “the OCSC had already been consulted”.8
The CGD believed that if the civil service pension reform proposal was to gain 
cabinet approval, it must be immediately endorsed by the finance minister. As a result,
5 CGD Letter of Invitation to OCSQ 2 February 1993.
6 The Bureau of Personnel Research and Development, an office within the OCSC was 
responsible for the development of civil service remuneration policy.
7 Minutes of CGD meeting, 11 February 1993.
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the permanent secretary signed the proposal and passed it to Finance Minister Tharin on 
28 May 1993. Since assuming his post in October 1992, Tharin had been fully briefed by 
the GGD’s director general about the development of civil service pension reform and 
the recent visit of World Bank’s experts. Upon receiving the revised civil service pension 
reform proposal, Tharin invited senior officials in the CGD and finance ministry for 
discussions. After several briefings given by senior finance officials, Tharin expressed 
interest in and understood well the key issues related to the reform proposal and the 
ongoing debate and disagreement about the details of the proposed pension schemes. He 
regarded the issue as a politically and economically important one but he wanted the 
CGD’s officials to reconsider their revised proposal. Politically, he was convinced by the 
previous Anand government’s cabinet resolution reemphasizing that the CGD’s proposal 
could pose some potential risks if accepted.
Radical civil service pension reform as outlined in the CGD’s first submission, 
would be politically difficult because parliament would not endorse the new 
Pension Reform Bill if it proposed to cut civil servants’ right to receive a lump­
sum annuity. As a non-elected member himself, he could not be sure about 
parliamentary support.9
For Tharin reforming civil service pensions was not simply a condition for raising 
the civil service salaries as argued by Anand’s cabinet, but had macro-economic 
importance. As a former banker with considerable experience in financial and capital 
markets, he was interested in the wider issue of pension reform and its implications for 
his economic policy, rather than introducing a measure that could earmark pension 
savings for increasing the civil service salaries. Fie was attracted by the World Bank’ 
suggestions included in the CGD’s proposal. In particular, he expected the impact of the 
new central pension fund on the development of capital markets would be substantial. 
Tharin anticipated that any civil service pension reform proposal needed to address its 
contribution to fiscal as well as macro-economic policy and management of the 
government.
For almost four months between May and September 1993, the finance minister 
and the GGD’s senior officials engaged in periodic discussions of the reform proposal.10
8 GGD Submission to the Finance Minister, 28 May 1993.
9 Interview, Director of PFAS.
10 Interview, anonymous GGD official.
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These discussions helped bring to the fore that Tharin’s interest in pension reform was 
motivated by and reflected wider macro economic policy issues. His emphasis on the 
macro economic aspects of civil service pension reform rather than the attempt to 
reduce the government’s pension burden sent a strong signal to the CGD that their 
responsibility for the civil service pension reform issue might be reduced and no longer 
confined to their jurisdiction. Considering itself as the sole owner of pension 
administration, the CGD wanted to get its reform proposal approved without 
modification as quickly as possible in order to insulate itself from outside agencies’ 
influences. “We needed to convince the finance minister to agree with our reform option 
and send to the cabinet before he turned to involve other departments particularly our 
neighbour agency, the Fiscal Policy Office (FPO), which might provide him with 
different approaches to civil service pensions.”11
The rigorous and “continuing push” through discussions of the reform proposal 
by the CGD helped secure a place for the issue on the finance minister’s agenda. Tharin 
accepted the CGD’s May 1993 proposal as it was, but he would not present it to the 
cabinet until the contribution of the proposed new pension fund to macro-economic 
policy and management could be realised.
At this stage, he [Tharin] did not show any disagreement with our proposal 
despite his wish to see the establishment of a new central pension fund as a 
means to promote the pension fund industry and fund management businesses 
to develop the capital markets. His stated aims for pension reform remained 
the same as that originally proposed by the GGD, to reduce the civil service 
pension costs and the future liability of government pensions.12
Though the CGD was able to bring the issue of civil service pension reform to 
the attention of the finance minister it faced difficulty taking it further. Discussions with 
finance minister revealed that the CGD’s exclusive responsibility for carrying out the civil 
service pension reform project might be constrained and the involvement of other 
government departments and agencies might be unavoidable. Tharin also realised that his 
aspiration to take advantage of the reform proposal as a means of developing the capital 
markets could not be achieved through the CGD alone. Its limited jurisdiction over 
macro-economic policy, strict observance of its departmental mandates, and its
11 Interview, former director of PFPRB.
12 Interview, anonymous CGD official.
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wholehearted commitment to its ultimate reform objectives to reduce civil service 
pension costs and improve civil service remuneration, made it unsuitable. Tharin wanted 
to add new dimensions to civil service pension reform and told the CGD to look further 
into economic policy and management.
Thus pension reform re-emerged on the agenda of Chuan’s government for two 
reasons. First, the new finance minister, Tharin, was interested in it as a vehicle for his 
macro-economic policies. Secondly the CGD continued to work on its reform proposal 
in the light of the comments of the Anand government. The CGD presented a revised 
proposal to the new finance minister, which he took up.
9.3 Expanding Civil Service Pension Reform Issues
9.3.1 The Macro-Economic Issue: The Fiscal Policy Office
In May 1993, after receiving the CGD’s proposal, Tharin wanted to expand the issue of 
civil service pension reform to include the macro-economic impact of the reform 
programme. He turned to the Fiscal Policy Office (FPO) as a potential source to 
orientate pension reform in his direction. The FPO was seen by the government and 
public as the ‘brain’ of the Ministry of Finance. In their discussions, Tharin informed its 
director general that the FPO was to look into the possibility of extending the reform 
issue reform beyond the CGD’s original proposal. Specifically, the FPO was required to 
propose how to design a new pension fund that would contribute to the country’s wider 
economy. Unlike CGD, which was unfamiliar with economic policy, the FPO did not 
have any difficulty in accommodating Tharin’s idea, which was consistent with its 
mandate to develop and oversee the country’s overall fiscal and macro-economic 
policies. It was therefore easy to mesh Tharin’s reform idea with its mission. As one 
official described it:
One of the FPO’s missions is to research, study, suggest and oversee economic 
policy regarding capitalisation in the economy’’. The accumulation of savings as 
proportion of investment is an area we keep an eye on closely since the ratio 
between the two affects our economic fundamentals and the country’s 
potential economic growth.13
13 Interview, anonymous FPO official.
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The issue of civil service pension reform was familiar to FPO officials. They had 
experienced a similar reform programme that resulted in the establishment of the Central 
Provident Fund in 1980, the first of its kind in Thailand: “We have encouraged the 
establishment of saving funds, as well as the recently formed Central Provident Fund for 
private sector workers”.14
After the finance minister brought the FPO in the civil service pension reform 
process, it spent four months, from May to September 1993, preparing its policy 
recommendations. Two divisions in the FPO, the Savings and Investment Policy Unit 
and Capital Market Development Policy Unit, had direct responsibilities, which would 
gear the civil service reform proposal towards Tharin’s aims. Not only did officials in 
these units share Tharin’s idea that setting up a new civil service pension fund would 
encourage the development of capital markets in the country, they also anticipated that 
the intended fund would help solve the FPO’s growing concern over the increasing gap 
between savings and investment. The FPO’s officials’ claim was substantiated by 
statistics indicating that “The country’s Gross National Saving was in alarming and 
unsatisfactory state”.15
The FPO’s research showed that in 1993 gross national saving accounted for 
only thirty-four per cent of Thailand’s GDP, while the growth of domestic investment 
went up to almost forty per cent.16 The numbers caused concern to the FPO as they 
indicated a potential gap between domestic savings and investment. If the gap continued 
and widened as they projected, the FPO feared that the economic basis of growth would 
deteriorate and international debt would increase. The FPO convinced the finance 
minister of the magnitude and seriousness of the increasing saving and investment gap: 
“the [finance] minister paid great attention to this problem because the increasing 
magnitude of the problem. If we can solve it, our dependence on foreign currencies and 
the risks from exchange rate fluctuations would be substantially decreased.”17 The 
establishment of a civil service pension fund would address this problem by increasing 
savings.18
In the short term, when the immediate impact of the proposed new civil service 
pension fund could easily be seen, the FPO and the finance minister shared the same 
idea that capital markets in Thailand would gready benefit. They believed wholeheartedly
14 Interview, Kanigar, FPO official.
15 Ibid.
16 See chapter 2 Table 2.6.
17 Interview, Kanigar, FPO official.
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that the establishment of a new civil service pension fund would serve as an instrument 
to develop the country's fledgling capital markets since it would inject a tremendous sum 
of money into the market.
The experience of providing policies for establishing the Central Provident Fund 
in 1980 and the recent Social Security Fund in 1990 reinforced the FPO’s beliefs. In 
particular, the successful introduction of the Central Provident Fund (CPF) had been 
highly praised by politicians, academics and international advisors. Since its establishment 
in 1980, the CPF had grown substantially in terms of the number of the companies 
registered, the numbers of workers covered and the amount of capital accumulated. By 
1991, within a decade of its foundation, the number of private companies registered 
increased from 159 to 3094 resulting in an increase in workers covered from 28,413 to 
641,023. The amount of capital increased from 561 million baht in 1980 to 50,742 
million baht in 1991.19
Moreover, at the time when it was brought into the civil service pension reform 
process, the FPO had already been engaged in the development of a policy to extend 
social security benefits to the old, and a programme to develop old age pensions. The 
programme was part of the comprehensive Social Security Act of 1990 which included a 
commitment that “the state would provide old age pensions by 1999”. As groundwork 
for this the FPO started conducting a feasibility study in 1993. Many experts, including 
those from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were invited to workshops “to 
provide technical assistance in regard to social security in general and to the expansion of 
the system to old-age pensions in particular.”20 With these responsibilities and 
experience, therefore, the FPO had established itself as an influential advocate of social 
security reform for private sector workers.
Even though it became interested in accommodating the issue of civil service 
pension reform into its departmental jurisdiction and the potential impact of the 
proposed new pension fund on the economy could mesh well with its policy targets, the 
FPO did not formulate its own comprehensive reform package:
The FPO did not possess the knowledge of either pre-existing civil service 
pensions or the problems associated with public personnel administration. 
Pensions were not our main priority. So we had to rely on the GGD draft
18 See chapter 2 Table 2.6.
19 Figures supplied by Thai Farmers Bank Research Centre.
20 IMF Letter to Ministry of Finance, 15 August 1993.
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proposal to start with. Our job was to use the economic models to assess the 
impact of various alternative pension schemes. We prepared information for 
the finance minister.21
Overall, the FPO’s statutory responsibility as well as its previous successful experience 
dealing with the establishment of the CPF provided good reasons for the finance 
minister to involve it in the civil service pension reform issue.
9.3.2 The Pension Rights Issue: The OCSC’s Parallel Attempt
The discussion of the issue of civil service pension reform was not confined to officials 
in the ministry of finance. It was also regarded as a matter of serious concern by the 
Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSQ.22 Being formally excluded from the 
finance ministry’s Joint Working Committee on Civil Service Pension Reform did not 
prevent the OCSC from pursuing its own pension reform agenda, which it had begun to 
before the JWC was established. The progress of the finance ministry’s reform was 
followed and monitored in order that the OCSC would not be left behind the reform 
process. Deputy secretary general Tipavadi requested her close aide in the Salary and 
Remuneration Section to monitor the MOF’s progress via media coverage. Newspaper 
cuttings were gathered and analysed and regular informal discussions took place between 
Tipavidi and staff in the Remuneration Policy Section. Having good personal 
relationships with some officials in the CGD, which had developed over years of 
working together, on some occasions Tipavadi and her staff could manage to obtain 
discussion papers or minutes of meetings of the JWC23 She even received a copy of the 
CGD’s May 1993 revised proposal. Tipavadi and her staff to managed to keep informed 
throughout the reform process.
Alerted by the brief consultation by the CGD in February 1993 and concerned 
about the future direction of pension reform, especially annuity benefits, at the beginning 
of March 1993 Tipavadi, set up the OCSC’s own internal task force on civil service 
pension reform, which she headed. An OCSC personnel analyst working with Tipavidi 
justified its parallel task force arguing that the OCSC had a right to be properly 
consulted. “As the Civil Service Act 1992 provides us [the OCSC] with the authority to
21 Interview, Somkid, FPO official.
22 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
23 Formally, the two agencies worked closely at both policy and operational levels on Civil Service 
personnel administration. Tipavidi also had an informal network with senior bureaucrats in the 
CGD.
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deal with Gvil Service remuneration policy, it would be legitimate for us to raise the issue 
within the Gvil Service G)mmission. This Commission was chaired by the prime 
minister and the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Finance is an ex-officio member 
of the Commission.”24 Even if the CGD took advantage by rushing to submit its 
proposal to the cabinet, other agencies particularly the OCSC would be required in the 
concurrent process because it was a personnel management related issue. “But we don’t 
want to wait until then, although this was a standard and formal procedure for filtering 
issues for cabinet meetings.”25
Unlike the finance ministry task force, which exclusively comprised of senior 
officials from the CGD and FPO, the OCSCs Task Force was more diverse in its 
membership. The eight members of this task force were drawn from the OCSQ the 
ministry of commerce, and the private sector26 The four representatives from the OCSC 
included two heads of sections directly involved with remuneration policy for civil 
servants: the Remuneration and Welfare Section and the Salary and Remuneration 
Section. Tipavadi also included another OCSC personnel analyst aide as a member. As 
the pension system was highly technical and required specialised knowledge, which the 
OCSC did not possess, Tipavidi invited two middle-ranking officials specialising in 
insurance and actuarial science the Insurance Department of the ministry of commerce 
to join. The other two members were a consultant and a senior officer from the financial 
and insurance sectors. Many other OCSC public personnel analysts and representatives 
from other financial companies were also invited to contribute to discussions in meetings 
as observers.
As the aim of the OCSCs task force was to scrutinise the CGD’s proposal, as 
well as to make further recommendations to improve civil service pensions, its members 
used the CGD’s proposal as a starting point for developing alternative pension schemes. 
The OCSC Task Force met four times between March and May 1993 and its agenda was 
dominated by issues concerning the design of the new scheme. It paid most attention to 
the issue of benefit design. OCSC representatives stressed the importance of civil 
servants’ right to receive the same forms and levels of retirement benefit in any new 
scheme and that they must not be worse off in any new scheme. Discussions focused on 
the calculation of different forms of retirement benefits, replacement rates and 
contribution rates. The task force paid less attention to the organisation and management
24 Interview, Visoot Prasitririvong, OCSC official.
25 Ibid.
26 Compiled from minutes of OCSC Task Force meetings.
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of the new central pension fund, as they agreed with the CGD proposal, and hardly 
discussed the economic and fiscal impact of civil service pension reform.
As the preservation of the civil servants’ pension rights was a major concern of 
the OCSCs task force, many insurance and pension simulation models were tried out to 
develop the right scheme. These technical exercises were chiefly done by representatives 
from financial companies and officials from the Department of Insurance.27 As for the 
management of the new fund, the task force agreed that a member from a private 
consultancy firm was to work out the management system because they were familiar 
with how private pension funds and insurance companies operated. Representatives 
from the OCSC helped, providing broad assumptions and information about current 
benefits and pay increases to be applied as part of the calculations.
Following four intensive meetings over two and half months from the middle of 
March to the end of May 1993, the OCSC task force formed a clearer view of the civil 
service pension reform issue and developed its own policy stance. It shared the CGD’s 
reform aim to reduce government pension expenditure particularly in the long term. It 
also agreed with the CGD proposal that a new pension fund needed to be established. 
The stark differences came from the design of retirement benefits. The OCSC insisted 
that the right to receive a lump sum annuity must be preserved and by any calculations 
civil servants’ retirement benefits must not be worse off in the long term. It was on this 
ground that the OCSC could not agree with the CGD’s proposal, arguing that “the 
longer civil servants were members of the CPF, the less benefit they would get. There 
was a flaw within the CGD’s proposal and retirees’ pension benefits would be eroded.”28
Like the FPO, the OCSC did not produce a comprehensive civil service pension 
reform proposal. Instead, it prepared a paper outlining its stance ready for further 
discussions. It argued that any civil service pension reform proposal would be only 
acceptable if agreement could be reached on three principal issues. First, existing 
employees must receive retirement benefits under the new plans that were essentially 
equivalent to those under the pre-existing defined benefit plan. Second, civil servants 
must be allowed to choose between a ‘lump-sum-pension’ and a ‘monthly annuity. The 
status quo on this must not change because “the monthly annuity was the most attractive 
option for the majority of civil servants. More than ninety-five per cent of retired civil
27 They were asked to provide proposals for the form of pensions and retirement benefits, 
replacement rates as percentage of base salaries, contribution rates for civil servants and the 
government and investment rates of return to ensure the new fund remained solvent, and 
membership of the new scheme.
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servants choose a monthly annuity.”29 Third, the OCSC advocated the involvement of 
the private sector in the management of the civil service pension fund. This reflected the 
influence of representatives from the insurance and financial companies on the OCSC 
task force. The OCSC proposed that financial companies should play an important role 
in managing the new funds. It also supported the establishment of a fund similar to the 
Central Provident Fund.
The scope of pension reform expanded from the CGD’s priority to cut pensions 
costs as part its attempt to limit overall government personnel costs as the FPO and the 
OCSC became involved in the issue. The FPO took a macro-economic stance and 
wanted to use the proposed pension fund to strengthen savings and develop the financial 
markets. The OCSC was primarily concerned about protecting the pension rights of civil 
servants and developed its own policy stance.
9.4 Getting Agencies to Work Together
On October 11 1993, finance minister Tharin established an ad hoc Joint Working 
Committee on Civil Service Pension Reform (JWQ, in order to ensure the different 
agencies involved in pension reform worked together. This principally involved getting 
the CGD to work with the FPO. Aware of the equal status of the two agencies and the 
different approaches they might advocate, Tharin appointed Kovit Posayanon, a chief 
economist responsible for economic and public finance from the Ministry of Finance’s 
Permanent Secretary’s Office, to head this task force and act as a rapporteur. Senior 
officials from both the CGD and the FPO were appointed as working members of the 
committee and it was balanced in both numbers and levels of seniority. They included 
the Director General of the CGD, the Director General of the FPO, the director of the 
CGD’s Public Finance and Accounting System Section and the director of the FPO’s 
Capital Market Policy Section. The last two members acted as co-secretaries to the task 
force.
Tharin asked the Joint Working Committee to develop a comprehensive civil 
service pension reform proposal.30 The Finance Ministerial Order of October 1993 
required it to produce a single coherent reform proposal and provide policy 
recommendations for cabinet approval. Tharin also set a clear deadline. He wanted a
28 Minutes of OCSC Task Force meeting 15 March 1993.
29 Gvil Service Commission Survey, 1994.
30 MOF Order N o 105/1993, dated 11 October 1993.
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draft bill ready to introduce in parliament by September 1994. The committee was asked 
to consider five related areas. The most important issue remained the same: the direction 
of reform and any innovations in pension funds. He also instructed the JWC to look into 
the structure and operating system of the proposed funds: whether the funds should be 
part of the bureaucracy or independent. As reforming the civil service pensions would 
involve legislative change, this committee was required to draft a new Civil Service 
Pension Bill and/or amend existing pension and pension related laws. Tharin emphasised 
that the reform proposal had to address the impact of the proposed new central pension 
fund on the economy as a whole and on the financial and capital markets specifically. 
Should there be any other issues relating to the establishment of the central pension 
fund, it needed to be included in the Joint Working Committee’s proposal.31
Initially the JWC consisted of the CGD and the FPO and excluded the OCSC 
but in December 1993 the OCSC was formally invited to join to represent the interests 
of civil servants. As early as July 1993 it was clear that the finance ministry’s work on 
pension reform could no longer be shielded from outside comment and criticism. The 
issue of civil service pension reform started to appear in domestic news coverage, 
particularly in national newspapers. The focus of media attention was the potential 
change of retirement benefit designs and the general progress of reform, issues that 
reflected the concerns of the OCSC These points were amplified by academics in 
universities and experts on social welfare and social security programmes, whose 
conservative views went against the “private style of civil service management” for fear 
of uncertain retirement benefits in the future. Equally serious criticism came from the 
Gvil Servants Association, whose membership consisted mainly of senior civil servants, 
which reflected the opinion of the civil service as a whole. The association provided a 
socialising forum for members to raise matters of their concerns over the unfair 
treatments in the government departments to ensure that civil servants’ rights were not 
abused.32 Khajad-pai Burootpat, the association’s president reminded relevant 
government departments that:
Given that pensions, both lump sum and annuity, were extremely important to
civil servants, any reform project should not affect pre-existing civil servants.
Besides any decision on the pension reform issue should be made transparent
Ibid.
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and open and all government agencies should be consulted and allowed to 
express their opinions. This would result in the right approach to reform and 
fairness for all.33
Though well insulated from scrutiny, the JWC perceived criticism from relevant 
agencies such as the OCSC and outside bodies, particularly the Civil Servants’ 
Association, as a threat. The head of the JWC was worried that its civil service reform 
programme would be jeopardised. Should there be any objections to or constraints on 
the reform process, their aims for civil service pension reform might not be successfully 
achieved within the lifetime of Chaun’s government even though they had strong 
support from the finance minister. Recent governments had been short lived and one 
attempt at reform during the Anand administration had already failed. Members of the 
JWC agreed to invite the OCSC to attend its meetings in an attempt to prevent the 
OCSC raising its own version of civil service pension reform in any other high profile 
committee such as the Civil Service Commission and the cabinet. The JWC hoped to 
keep the reform process short and to achieve its reform objectives without much delay. 
Officials in the finance ministry saw a further advantage in bringing in the OCSC 
because it had the capacity to mobilise support from the other central public personnel 
agencies and civil servants who would be affected by the reform programme. They 
believed the implementation of the new pension scheme would be difficult without the 
co-operation of the OCSC
On 27 December 1993, two months after the JWC was set up, the OCSCs 
deputy secretary general, Tipavadi and her personnel analyst aide attended their first JWC 
meeting. Their active participation and the new initiatives they contributed were so 
impressive that Tharin demanded their regular attendance at all future meetings. 
Attaining a place in the decisional venue for civil service pension reform opened up an 
opportunity for the OCSCs stance and its concerns and ideas to be considered and 
adopted. By the end of 1993, the CGD, the FPO and the OCSC had become the 
spearhead of civil service pension reform. However, there were substantial differences in 
their stances, objectives and approaches, which remained to be resolved.
32 The Gvil Servants Association was comparable to a trade union but did not negotiate
employment conditions or personnel management issues. Trade unions are not allowed in the 
Thai Gvil Service.
33 Matichon Newspaper, 12 July 1993.
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9.5 Seeking Expertise and Best Practice
For six months, from January to June 1994, the CGD, FPO and OCSC worked together 
in the JWC at the finance minister’s request to produce a pension reform proposal that 
would be mutually acceptable to the members of the JWC and the finance minister. In 
the course of this they drew on a range of domestic expertise, the experience of the FPO 
in establishing the Central Provident Fund, the Insurance Department of the ministry of 
commerce and the public sector. International experience was also collected in overseas 
study visits and the IMF was consulted.
During this period, when it met at least once a month, eight meetings took place. 
Despite rigorous examination of the issues it was not possible to reconcile the often wide 
differences between departments. In their discussions the JWC came to the view that 
more information, particularly knowledge and expertise not available from the 
participating central agencies, was needed to design a new civil service pension system 
As a result, they decided to consult and to seek pension related information, domestically 
and from overseas, from organisations and individuals from both within and outside 
government bureaucracies.
9.5.1 Seeking Domestic Expertise
From within the Civil Service, the JWC acquired information about life expectancy, 
which was fundamentally necessary for dealing with insurance, from the Insurance 
Department. The civil servants’ household survey, which was essential for calculating and 
determining the savings and contribution rates in the new pension scheme, was obtained 
from the National Statistics Office. Representatives from these agencies only provided 
the information requested and did not attend the meetings on a regular basis.
From outside the civil service the JWC invited experts from the private sector 
including senior officers of the major finance company on the OCSC task force. Their 
contribution was confined to the design of the retirement benefit package. Their 
proposal was similar to that offered by the Central Provident Fund for the private sector 
workers. Expertise from the private sector was needed because they had superior 
specialised knowledge of fund management businesses and technological tools:
First, they [representatives from the private sector] were experts in the field
[insurance and fund management] since they had experience managing the
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Central Provident Funds and other funds in the private sector. We [the OGD] 
only knew about our current system. More importantly, the work involved 
simulating and processing huge and complicated actuarial statistics and we did 
not have the instruments such as computers and software to undertake these 
very tiresome calculations.34
Representatives from private companies injected best practice from the private 
sector to the JWC even though they did not regularly attend meetings, attending only 
when invited or their assignment on retirement benefit design was discussed. The idea of 
bringing in the private sector to design the new civil service pension system was widely 
accepted by members of the committee. Even though no specific benefit design package 
from a private company was adopted, their input and involvement reinforced and 
convinced members of the JWC that private sector style of pension fund management 
could be a potential solution for reforming the civil service pension system.
9.5.2 Seeking International Best Practice
Members of the Joint Working Committee claimed that reforming civil service pensions, 
like many new policy issues adopted by past Thai governments, “required careful study 
of how other countries did and what problems those countries had”.35 With the approval 
of the finance minister, the JWC planned three short study visits to countries, which had 
experienced civil service pension reforms. The three countries chosen had a long 
tradition of a welfare state and a legacy of reform successes. The United Kingdom and 
Germany matched these criteria and Singapore was added because the CGD’s original 
proposal was influenced by its Central Pension Fund and successful defined contribution 
pension system
The visits were rapidly organised and took place between March and May 1994. 
The JWC, conscious of the instability of recent Thai governments was anxious to make 
its proposal to Tharin as quickly as possible. It visited the U.K. Cabinet Office in March 
and went to Germany in April and Singapore in May. Its members, who were 
sympathetic to the compulsory defined contribution pension system, wanted to leam 
how civil service pensions in these countries were designed, financed and managed.
On their return to Thailand in May 1994, the director of the Capital Market 
Policy Division of the FPO, a member of the JWC study party, reported back to the
34 Interview, Head of Public Finance and Accounting System, CGD.
35 Interview, Ms Venus, GGD official.
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finance minister. His report was seen simply as a necessary requirement of any overseas 
visit and did not generate any particular interest. It contained a description of the multi­
tier pension systems in the U.K., Germany and Singapore but also included the new issue 
of providing supplementary income benefits in addition to standard pensions. “Public 
sector employees in England and Germany had a basic pension from the state as 
guaranteed retirement benefits, in addition to the savings from defined benefit schemes”. 
However, this issue was largely ignored by members of the Joint Working Committee 
because:
We already had a solution in mind. Most of them [members] agreed in principle 
that the compulsory defined benefit provident fund option was likely a reform 
solution for adoption. The remaining points of disagreement were mosdy 
confined to technical matters such as who and how much money to contribute 
to the new pension fund.36
The new idea of providing supplementary income did not seem to fit with the JWCs 
reform intentions. This issue and the report itself was not closely considered and sent to 
the finance minister in accordance with standard civil service procedures for overseas 
study visits.
In an attempt to find a reform solution that could be successfully implemented 
and reconcile differences between members of the JWC, the FPO suggested that the 
IMF should be invited to examine the draft reform proposal. The FPO had already been 
in the consultation with the IMF on the development of old age pensions. Despite the 
fact that no pension reform proposal had yet been agreed for the IMF to scrutinise, the 
JWC accepted the FPO’s suggestion and IMF officials visited Bangkok on 22-24 April 
1994. Their stated aim was to assess the proposal for reforming civil service pensions 
developed by the Thai Finance Ministry.
The IMF’s experts were critical of the economic implications of the proposal. 
After reviewing the JWCs proposal to shift to a defined contribution system from the 
defined benefit scheme, the IMF officials shared the view of the JWC that the proposal 
had contrasting implications for the government on the one hand and civil servants on 
the other. They also pointed out that after a transition period, the government budget 
would bear a fixed cost in relation to wage bills. Although the reform would guarantee 
future retired officials’ pensions from politically or fiscally motivated reductions, this 
latter risk would be replaced by inevitable uncertainty about the level of pensions under a
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defined contribution plan. In effect, the level of future pensions would depend 
significantly on the rate of return from investments. They concluded that: “The proposal 
nevertheless creates risks and uncertainties that might reduce its acceptability and, hence, 
the ability of the government to implement reform effectively’.37
Instead the IMF mission proposed a “two-tier alternative civil service pension 
scheme”, which, as they claimed, “could achieve many of the same goals but with fewer 
uncertainties for the government and its officials.”38 Their proposed two-tier system was 
a combination of redesigning the existing defined benefit plan with partial funding and 
the introduction of a voluntary defined contribution with matching contributions. 
According to the IMF’s officials, their alternative proposal would achieve three economic 
objectives of major concern to the JWC, the introduction of a substantial element of 
funding, stimulating savings, and removing pensions from salary constraints. However, 
they made a reservation that their version of the proposal was “based on incomplete data 
and a full specification of the parameters would require considerable empirical work, 
which was not possible with the currently available data.”39
To address the need for reducing government fiscal burden, the IMF urged the 
JWC to redesign carefully the existing defined benefit pay-as-you-go plan to make it 
more efficient and equitable while lowering its overall cost and provided technical 
suggestions.40 The IMF shared the JWCs view that a government pension fund should 
be created to pre-fund the benefits already earned by civil servants under the existing 
plan. They suggested the government should capitalise its proposed government pension 
fund by transferring reserves from the Bank of Thailand. This would benefit civil 
servants by securing their future retirement benefits and pension payments with assets. 
Capitalising the proposed new pension fund would help removing some risks that 
government fiscal constraints could pre-empt expected pensions in future, a risk that 
concerned the JWC However, the IMF had different view on the management and 
investment of the proposed fund recommending that it should be managed and invested
36 Interview, Somkid, FPO official.
37 Unpublished IMF Report to the Ministry of Finance, April 1994.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 This could be done by “(a) basing pensions on an average of the last five years of salary, 
instead of last month salary as calculated by the existing system, (b) introducing explicit, albeit 
not necessarily full, indexing which would raise the real value of pensions, and (c) replacing the 
system of extra-credits with early retirement penalties and add-on credits for delayed retirement” 
(ibid).
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decisions by government representatives. The IMF also made detailed recommendations 
on the government’s contribution rate, which had to be sustainable in the long term.41
The most important aspect of civil service pension reform that the IMF’s experts 
and the JWC agreed on in principle, but not in detail, was the introduction of a defined 
contribution tier. The IMF suggested of a new voluntary tier, which would provide an 
incentive for savings by civil servants and allow them to top up their income in 
retirement. This tier was similar to the existing employer-provided provident funds 
developed for private sector workers in the 1980s by the FPO with the technical 
assistance of the IMF. However, the IMF introduced alternative methods, which had not 
been fully applied by the provident funds in the private sector.42
Embedded within the IMF’s technical advice were implications for the capital 
market, which were in line with Tharin’s aspirations and the mandate of the FPO to 
develop savings. The IMF proposed that the government pension fund should allow civil 
servants to direct the investment of their individual accounts and the fund could offer a 
range of alternatives with varying risks. This was practiced in countries with well- 
developed capital markets, where employees were often given five, ten or more options.
Overall the IMF’s representatives argued that their two-tier civil service pension 
system would provide more secure defined benefit pension to civil servants and 
encourage savings via voluntary participation in the defined contribution tier. They
41 It should be set by taking into account overall budgetary and fiscal considerations. The amount 
of the contribution would depend on the amount of the initial transfer and projections of 
earnings on the transferred amount over a period of some 20 or 30 years. As the control of 
investment of these funds would remain with the government, it should provide investment 
options and portfolios that could balance risks and rewards. The government needed to decide 
whether the funds should be held in secure fixed income investments such as bank deposits, 
money market instruments, or bonds or used for investing in infrastructure that might produce 
higher rate of social return. The IMF’s officials also endorsed the ideas of the finance minister 
and FPO officials that some or all of the government pension fund should be privately managed 
to earn true market returns and produce a competitive yardstick to measure the performance of 
the fund. However, they warned that strict financial oversight would be needed as it was for the 
employer-sponsored provident funds that were emerging in Thailand (ibid.).
42 One example of these methods was matching contributions. This would require the 
government to make a fixed two per cent contribution to an individual account in the 
government pension fund for each official. Thus all civil servants would have an individual 
retirement account established whether or not they elected to contribute themselves. The 
government would then allow them to choose annually to contribute up to three per cent of their 
salary and matched by the government with up to an additional three per cent. Gvil servants 
contributing three per cent would have an additional five per cent contributed by the 
government, a total of eight per cent of their salary. Gvil servants could contribute further with 
government matching. Another example given was a government contribution of up to five per 
cent with a matching five per cent civil servant contribution. In this case, establishment of civil 
servants’ individual retirement account would be dependent on their decision to contribute 
(ibid.).
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claimed that their proposal would help reducing pension expenditure in the long run and 
could minimise more risks for future pensions than the proposal being discussed in the 
JWC
Many of the technical mechanisms and alternative reform options proposed by 
the IMF were familiar to the JWC As an FPO official recalled:
We had already considered and discussed the possibility of changing the 
calculation of the formula of existing defined benefit pensions using the 
average last five years of salary and establishing a Singaporean style central 
pension fund long before the IMF came. We were quite clear, even if the IMF 
had not come, that our reform proposal would follow this path. The IMF 
recommendations only reassured us that we were in the right track.43
As a result the IMF’s proposals were only selectively incorporated in the JWC proposal.
9.6 Reaching Stalemate
Despite six months effort the JWC was unable to agree on a unanimous reform proposal. 
Under pressure from Tharin, who still intended to introduce a bill in parliament in 
September 1994, and its chairman, Kovit, the JWC submitted an incomplete reform 
proposal to the finance minister on 15 June 1994. It consisted mainly of broad principles 
and a range of alternative options and lacked detailed recommendations on key issues. 
Only two issues had been agreed in detail, the retention of monthly annuity pensions and 
membership of the scheme, and even these had only been resolved by the intervention 
of the finance minister after deadlock in the JWC44 Two other key issues, benefit design 
and capitalisation of the proposed fund, remained unresolved in the proposal and 
awaited a decision by the finance minister.
The details of many issues agreed on in principle still remained unresolved. One 
such issue was contribution rates. The chairman, Kovit, disagreed with the IMF 
recommendation of equal matching of contribution rates insisting “the government 
should contribute more than officials”.45 The Joint Working Committee did not make a
43 Interview, Somkid, FPO official. Similar views were expressed by almost all those interviewed 
who insisted that the influence of the IMF was minimal.
44 The decision making process on these two issues is discussed in chapter 10.
45 Poo-Chatkam Newspaper, 3 May 1994.
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decision on the IMF’s recommendation for equal contributions, which it regarded as a 
new dimension of civil service pension reform. Other IMF recommendations caused 
disagreement, the establishment of a voluntary defined contribution tier with matching 
contributions by the government and civil servants, and the right of pension fund 
members to direct the investment of their individual accounts. Rather than putting 
forward a single agreed proposal the JWC decided to put forward alternative options:
We would put forward our proposal, which advocated the defined 
contribution, Central Provident Fund style, to the finance minister since we 
had been working towards this end from the outset. However, we would also 
inform him about the IMF’s opinion on the establishment of a two-tier 
scheme, which combined defined benefits with a defined contribution scheme.
If the finance minister preferred the IMF’s, then we would incorporate it and 
adjust our proposal.46
Thus by June 1994 the JWC had reached stalemate in formulating a pension 
reform proposal.
9.7 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Civil Service Policy Making
This chapter provides a narrative account of the progression of the civil service pension 
reform issue. The episode recounts why the issue of civil service pension reform, which 
had fallen off Anand’s government policy agenda, re-emerged and was taken up by 
Chaun’s administration. It also provides a detailed narrative of a long “softening up 
period” of specifying alternative pension reform options, which led to nothing but a 
reform stalemate. In the light of an ‘institutional processualist’ framework, this 
concluding section addresses two themes: the re-emergence of civil service pension 
reform issue on the Chaun administration’s agenda and the process of developing civil 
service pension reform proposals leading to a reform stalemate.
9.7.1 Agenda Setting
The issue of civil service pension reform, despite being put on hold by Anand’s cabinet, 
regained political attention during the Chaun’s administration, an elected government.
46 Minutes of JWC meeting 8 June 1994.
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The survival of the pension reform issue rests on the coupling of factors in the politics 
and policy streams (Kingdon, 1995).
The coupling of the policy and political streams contributed to secure a place for 
the civil service pension issue on the Chaun’s government agenda, albeit at ministerial 
level when the issue revived. With regard to the political stream, the new government 
brought a new finance minister, Tharin, a banker and financier-cum-politician. Tharin 
was interested in the issue of reforming civil service pensions and saw it as a potential 
instrument to accomplish his macro-economic policy. Independently in the policy 
stream, the CGD, whose civil service pension reform proposal was turned down by the 
previous Anand government, continued its commitment to put forward a reform 
proposal. The original proposal was made ready for the new administration by 
incorporating the comments of Anand’s cabinet, eliminating the perceived weakness of 
the proposal, as well as legitimizing it by using supporting comments from the World 
Bank. The new interest in the politics stream coupled with the ready-made solution in the 
policy stream accelerated by a commitment and drive to fulfil the CGD’s jurisdictional 
and Tharin’s policy aspiration, together opened a new policy window for the issue of civil 
service pension reform. The issue status was also high in the Ministry of Finance, which 
was an institutional venue for making the reform proposal.
9.7.2 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
This episode provides an account of how and why a unified civil service pension reform 
proposal was not achieved resulting in a “reform stalemate”, representing a long 
‘softening up’ in the policy stream (Kingdon, 1995). The long gestation period resulted in 
a slow pace developing a consensus on the reform approach and proposals, despite the 
intense effort of reformers. This slow pace can be explained by a combination of 
situational and institutional factors.
Although civil service pension reform attracted the political attention of the 
finance ministry, the issue was expanded beyond the jurisdiction of the CGD resulting in 
the incorporation of new reformers in the alternative specification process. These new 
actors included the FPO whose role was invoked by finance minister, and the OCSC 
who claimed jurisdiction over civil service pension policy. The participation of these 
actors created competing venues for developing reform proposals in line with the 
‘reform images’ conceived by reformers in those venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
The case evidence shows that incongruence between images of civil service pension
257
reform led to irreconcilable reform choices -  aims and means - advocated by different 
reformers.
Alternative specification for civil service pension reform involved the re­
interpretation of the reform issue by reformers within different institutional venues. This 
involved examining different dimensions of the civil service pension reform in the 
context of the department’s jurisdiction, ideology and experience. The issue dimension 
that mainly concerned the CGD, as well as Anand’s cabinet, was the budgetary 
implications of changing the existing pension arrangement; changes could alleviate 
budgetary pressures. The CGD translated the Anand cabinet resolution in the context of 
their departmental jurisdiction as many CGD officials involved in the reform process 
reiterated the need to achieving their internal constraint to limit salaries, including 
pensions, to forty per cent of central government expenditure. Civil service pensions 
were regarded exclusively by the CGD as its legal domain.
The civil service pension reform alternative advocated by the FPO was based on 
a different issue re-interpretation. Being activated by the finance minister, the FPO could 
align its department’s remit with the finance minister’s policy aspiration related to the 
achievement of his macro-economic policy. In this case, the FPO brought the new 
dimension of macro-economic policy by accommodating finance minister’s policy aim 
with its own remit: the development of capital markets via fostering economically sound 
domestic savings and investment ratios. Not only was its role invoked and certified as 
one of the main reformers, its legacy of successful social security reform in the private 
sector, made the FPO an effective venue for the issue of civil service pension reform 
proposal to be developed.
The expansion of the issue of civil service pension reform was also due to 
pension domain overlapping in the Thai Gvil Service, which allowed both the CGD and 
the OCSC to claim responsibility for the civil service pension reform issue. The adoption 
of a go-it-alone strategy by the CGD and the setting up of the OCSCs internal task force 
to investigate the CGD’s reform proposal and develop its own reform version are clear 
examples of these competing venues. Domain overlapping among different institutional 
venues resulted in differences of reform image, means and ends, which made it difficult 
for the CGD to retain and exploit its monopoly over the reform issue. The issue image 
depicted by the OCSQ although not completely different from the CGD, focused more 
on the implications of pension reform as a condition for salary adjustment and on 
securing the pension rights of civil servants.
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As the alternative specification process was constrained by different reform 
stances, the pace of developing a unified proposal for civil service pension reform was 
slow. Attempts to harmonise proposals and speed up the process led to the 
establishment of the finance ministry's Joint Working Committee for Gvil Service 
Pension Reform (JWQ. The influence of the finance minister in the alternative 
specification process can be counted as entrepreneurial act. This consisted of drawing the 
CGD, the FPO and the OCSC together around either a long term common strategic 
agenda including the realisation of departmental missions and jurisdictions or a short­
term common strategic initiative such as the fulfilment of the finance minister’s 
aspiration.
Getting departments and agencies to work together reveals that Tharin had the 
skills needed for managing networks of departments. Hie was able to steer interaction 
processes aimed at developing a unified civil service pension reform in general and 
channel the interests and attentions of participating departments and agencies towards 
the economic dimensions of pension reform in particular. This involved activating the 
departments and agencies involved to tackle particular problems or issues, establishing ad 
hoc organisational arrangements, bringing together solutions, problems and parties, 
promoting conditions for joint action, and conflict management (Kickert and Kooenjan, 
1997). Unlike exchange networks, where agencies voluntarily interact with each other in 
order to realise their individual or mutual goals, the GGD, the FPO and the OCSC were 
obliged and motivated by their mandates to participate in reform of civil service 
pensions.47 In short, joining the civil service pension reform process would help these 
central agencies to achieve their departmental and functional mandates.
Whether or not Tharin could be considered as a policy entrepreneur, however, 
remains to be seen, as many reform elements were not resolved successfully by members 
of the Joint Working Committee. At this stage, although members of the JWC shared the 
broad idea of and favoured shifting the defined benefit pension system toward the 
defined contribution one, a unified civil service proposal was not achieved and a 
stalemate was reached. Much of the work of this committee therefore involved trying to 
reconcile differences over the technicalities of the previously mentioned issues.
The final point of discussion that has emerged from this episode is the role of 
policy transfer in shaping civil service pension reform proposal in the policy stream.
47 Raelin (1980) and Hall, Clark, Giordano, Johnson and Van Roekel (1977) have called this kind 
of inter-organisation relation a ‘mandated network’ since the mandate itself is an incentive for 
them to interact.
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During the time Thailand was reforming its civil service pensions, reform options were 
already floating around. Referring to other countries’ practices was a routine process in 
developing policies in Thailand. This can be clearly seen from the reference made by 
some members of the JWC to the Singaporean central provident fund as a potential 
model for reforming the Thai Gvil Service pension system Another example is the study 
trips to the U.K. and Germany in order to learn from their reform experiences. 
However, these activities might not be judged as ‘real policy transfer’ in the narrowest 
meaning, imitating or copying the design of pension system without thorough 
consideration. Most of the agencies’ representatives also cast doubt on the impact of 
these study visits abroad because “by the time the study trips took place, most members 
of the JWC had already agreed on the broad principle of turning civil service pensions to 
the system of defined contribution pensions”.48 A junior official who serviced the 
committee rightly reflected that study trips abroad, which have become institutionalised 
for senior officials developing new policies, made a pitiful contribution and were “an 
excuse to travel abroad by senior members of the JWG”49 Another middle ranking 
economist sarcastically said, “the trips were wasteful and served as rewards for members 
to go on holidays abroad.”50 As the idea of a defined contribution pension system was 
already floating around and easy to grasp, it is difficult to assess if a real learning process 
or lesson drawing took place in the case of civil service pension reform in Thailand.
Nor did the transfer of civil service pension reform take place through the 
injection of reform ideas from supra-national organisation. Unlike most countries in 
Latin America or Eastern Europe, Thailand’s civil service pension reform project was 
not part of the World Bank’s structural adjustment or Investment Lending Programme. 
Despite the engagement of experts and officials from the World Bank and the IMF in 
this episode, neither the CGD nor the Joint Working Committee included or adopted 
recommendations made by those international organisations in their proposals. However, 
the involvement of international experts served as both political and technical tools for 
the JWG Politically, it helped sustain the life of the civil service reform issue as well as to 
strengthen its reform position since Thai governments generally accepted advice from 
supra national organisations uncritically. Technically, their involvement supplied the JWC 
with broader and new aspects of pension reform that members of the committee had not
48 To assess the influence of foreign expertise, members of the JWC interviewed were asked ‘to 
what extent foreign expertise affected Gvil Service pension reform policy7. Minutes of JWC 
meetings and consultation papers submitted by the JWC also provide evidence on this matter.
49 Interview, anonymous CGD official.
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paid sufficient attention to. In this case, international institutions served as commentators 
and assessors on their own proposal, which in turn help strengthen their reform 
proposals and hence the reform status and credibility of the programme on the 
government agenda.
This chapter explains the re-emergence of civil service pension reform issue on 
the Chaun government’s specialised agenda taking into account the interest in the issue 
of finance minister and the ability of the CGD to seize the opportunity to put forward its 
revised proposal. The emergence of the issue came with the expansion of the reform 
issue as new reformers were brought in. As a result, the issue underwent reinterpretations 
in competing institutional venues where their roles and mandates were activated by the 
issue. The pace of the reform in this episode was therefore constrained by the 
incongruence of reform goals and means, as well as the search process including seeking 
expertise and best practice that might be applied. This episode is in fact characterised by 
a long gestation process leading to the intervention of finance ministry to establish a 
mediating working committee, the JWG Despite all the efforts of participants in the 
reform process, a unified proposal was not achieved creating a stalemate and delaying the 
progress of the reform issue to the government’s decisional agenda. "Whether or not this 
stalemate would be broken is the subject of the next chapter.
50 Interview, anonymous economist, FPO.
Chapter 10 
Civil Service Pension Reform:
Breaking the Logjam and Decision Making 1994-96
Overview
In August 1994 the Chaun cabinet approved a proposal to reform civil service pensions. 
This was the culmination of a lengthy but inconclusive process of deliberation by the 
Joint Working Committee (JWQ, which had resulted in a stalemate, which was only 
broken by the intervention of the finance minister. Nine months intensive discussion 
within the JWC between October 1993 and June 1994 had failed to produce a single 
unified proposal. But with the active intervention of the finance minister a reform 
proposal was agreed and presented to the cabinet in August 1994. The proposal 
consisted of “the introduction of defined contribution pension schemes and individual 
retirement accounts into the existing defined benefit pension systems.” Two years later, 
in September 1996, the reform proposal endorsed by the cabinet was translated into 
legislation in the Government Pension Fund Act.
This chapter focuses primarily on the decision making process, particularly how 
the “civil service pension reform stalemate” reached in the previous chapter was broken. 
It tracks how the participating departments and agencies of the JWQ the Comptroller 
General’s Department (GGD), the Fiscal Policy Office (FPO), the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission (OCSQ as well as the finance minister agreed on a unified civil 
service pension reform proposal. To unpack how the reform proposal was decided, the 
process of reconciling differences on four key issues, benefits, membership, 
contributions and capitalisation will be examined. Each will be narrated separately. To a 
lesser extent, this chapter will also track the career of the reform proposal in the 
legislative process since changes in the civil service pension system required the 
amendment of the Gvil Service Pensions and Annuities Act 1951. Examining such 
changes made in the legislative process will provide an overall picture of the civil service 
pension reform process. This will also help us to understand better the efforts of relevant 
central government departments and agencies in their reform endeavours, which 
continued during this stage of the reform process.
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10.1 Joint Problem Solving: A Protracted Process
Before tracking the process of breaking “the civil service pension reform logjam” a brief 
review of reform goals of the participating departments and agencies of the JWC and the 
committee’s progress to June 1994 will be provided. Each of the departments 
represented in the JWC had their own goals, which they wanted secure in any new civil 
service pension system. While the GGD’s reform aim was to reduce the current fiscal 
burden and the future role of government in providing civil service pensions and 
retirement benefits, the OCSC wanted to improve the overall level of civil service welfare 
and benefits including salary increases. The FPO, whose aim was shared by the finance 
minister, expected pension reform to contribute to macro-economic policy by promoting 
the accumulation of savings in general and more specifically to the development of the 
capital market by promoting pension fund businesses.
Though members of the JWC reported that their individual goals could coexist 
and be achieved and the CGD’s director general claimed that “members of the 
committee generally agreed on the basic principle of civil service pension reform”, 
developing a single coherent reform proposal was a protracted process.1 By June 1994, 
after six months work, stalemate had been reached. On 8 June JWC submitted an 
incomplete proposal to the finance minister. Instead of a unified single proposal, a 
required by the finance minister, it contained broad principles and put forward 
alternative proposals. Only two issues had been agreed in detail, benefits and 
membership and agreement on these issues had only been reached after the intervention 
of the finance minister.
Although the finance minister, the CGD, the FPO and the OCSC shared the 
same view that civil service pensions needed to be changed, they did not agree on the 
specific details of the reform approach. The most difficult issues to resolve included 
benefits, membership, financing and capitalisation. The technical elements of designing a 
new civil service pension system required not only a detailed knowledge of the pre­
existing pension system and its associated problems, but also specialised technical 
knowledge and information that was not available in the departments and agencies 
participating in the JWC Rather than jointly develop a single reform proposal each 
agency proposed its own individual solution based on the information available to it 
using its own methods and frameworks and shaped by its own thinking, problems and
1 The author’s analysis of the minutes of JWC meetings reveals no evidence that any participating 
department or agency tried to make their own goals more important than those of others;
Minute of JWC Meeting 24 November 1993.
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conditions.2 Other members of the JWC then challenged and criticised these initial 
proposals because they were based on incomplete data and information. The more 
technical issues, such as financing the new civil service pension schemes, required more 
complex information than individual agencies had access to, which resulted in a lengthy 
discussion process.
The work of the JWC became a self-perpetuating process as problems and 
unresolved issues were repeatedly raised for further discussion.3 Members often called 
for more information, research and in depth analysis to inform their decisions. 
Representatives from each agency were asked to provide detailed analysis and 
information related to their respective departments and present it to the JWC Proposed 
solutions were debated, tested and substantiated with new data and conditions, but left 
undecided, leading to the reworking and revising of solutions. The process was 
necessarily lengthy and repetitive because members of the JWC needed to “seek reform 
solutions from all participating departments and agencies”.4
The involvement of the finance minister speeded up the process of decision­
making. He wanted to speed up the process so that draft legislation could be introduced 
in parliament in September 1994. Deciding on a civil service pension reform proposal 
would have taken much longer if the Finance Ministerial Order of October 1993 had not 
set a deadline and required a single coherent reform proposal for cabinet approval. This 
requirement led members of the JWC to co-operate. They were committed to achieving a 
single agreed reform proposal, a point emphasised by a member of the JWG
Every agency wanted reform. We were under the same banner of civil service 
pension reform As our responsibilities (for pension reform) were determined 
by related laws in general and by the MOF’s ministerial order specifically, what 
we had to do was to work together to reach the best solutions.5
Members of the JWC were also required by the finance minister to regularly inform him 
of reform progress. This close political monitoring often led the chairman of the JWQ 
Kovit, to push members of the JWC to reconcile their differences. He would often ask,
2 Analysis of minutes of JWC meetings.
3 Ibid.
4 Interview, anonymous official, FPO.
5 Interview, Kanikar, FPO official.
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“When are we going to report progress to the finance minister?”6 These progress report 
meetings became another forum where reform issues that had not been agreed on by 
members of the JWC were raised and scrutinised. As a GGD official recalled:
He was a hands-on minister who got into the details. We also had long meetings 
with him in his office over several hours, sometimes until late at night. We can 
see that he committed himself so much to Gvil Service pension reform. Meeting 
with him usually took a long time, maybe until late evening. In such case, he 
sometimes treated us to dinner.7
However, these progress report meetings unintentionally contributed to the protracted 
nature of the reform process since Tharin always wanted all the alternatives 
reinvestigated or other reform possibilities explored before reaching decisions:
After meeting with him we always had more homework to do. This homework 
was the examinations of different aspects of the reform proposal that we had 
not properly considered, or information that we had not come across before.
We [representatives from the finance ministry and the OCSC] were asked to 
work jointly to find the best solution for particular concerns that he [the 
finance minister] raised. We conducted a range of simulations based on 
different assumptions and conditions hypothesised by him.8
The October 1993 Finance Ministerial Order led to a high level of commitment 
to pension reform in participating departments and agencies. Large numbers of staff 
were directly engaged on the issue, especially in the Public Finance and Accounting 
Standard System Section of the CGD and in the FPO, where up to eighty per cent of 
staff in the Capital Market Policy Unit worked on pension reform.9 Between December 
1993 and June 1994 pension reform became the dominant project in agencies and staff 
worked hard. At their meetings as well as the six members of the JWC, who formed an 
“inner circle”, there were many other staff in attendance, who formed an “outer circle”. 
These “outer circle” staff included mainly finance-related officials such as accountants
6 Interview, anonymous official, FPO. See also minutes of meetings, which usually recorded the 
chairman’s deadline for reporting progress to the finance minister.
7 Interview, Ms Venus, CGD official.
8 Interview, anonymous official, GGD.
9 Interviews, GGD and FPO officials. The involvement of the OCSC staff is mentioned in 
Giapter 8.
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and fiscal analysts from the CGD and economists from the FPO, though there was only 
one from the OCSC10 Legal officers from the OGD and FPO were also present. Almost 
twenty “outer-circle” officials not only attended meetings but also gathered and analysed 
information and drafted reform proposals that were fed into meetings. They were 
encouraged to contribute to discussions, but decision-making remained with “inner- 
circle” members.
Resolving differences among participating departments and agencies was a 
lengthy process lasting from December 1993 to August 1994, when the JWC met almost 
twice a month. Unresolved issues were passed over to the finance minister for his 
consideration at progress report meetings. The involvement and commitment of the 
finance minister in the development of the civil service reform proposal was praised by 
members of the JWC because “he was an arbitrator who broke deadlock and 
disagreement within the JWC’.11 To understand how disagreements were resolved, the 
following sections will track four key decisional events related to the design of the new 
pension scheme, benefit forms, contributions, membership and capitalisation.
10.1.1 Preserving Pension Choices: Monthly Annuity Pensions
The issue of benefit forms, the retention of monthly annuity pensions, was one of the 
first to be decided and was one of the few concrete measures in the incomplete JWC 
reform proposal of June 1994. In January 1994, at a meeting of the JWQ Finance 
Minister Tharin ruled that they should be retained. The right to continue receiving the 
retirement benefits of the existing scheme was a crucial issue for large numbers of civil 
servants. After extensive discussion between the JWC and the finance minister and 
despite the determination of the CGD to introduce a defined-benefit system giving civil 
servants a one off lump sum retirement benefit, the final reform proposal retained civil 
servants’ right to choose between a lump sum and annuity pensions.
Annuity pensions were a controversial issue from the beginning of the reform 
process. In 1992, when the CGD first started working on the development of civil 
service pension reform proposals, rumours abounded in the Gvil Service that the 
monthly annuity pension would be scrapped. Instead a lump sum gratuity would be paid 
out of the new proposed central pension fund to civil servants on their retirement and
10 These officials were said to be the real policy makers. They actually worked out the details of 
pension reform options, prepared minutes of meetings, and worked on assignments or problems 
arising from meetings.
11 Interview, anonymous official, FPO.
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the amount of benefit would be contingent on the uncertain rates of the return of the 
investment fund.
The CGD’s attempts to end civil servants’ choice to receive either form of 
retirement benefit not only created tension with the OCSC but also with civil servants in 
general. As seen in the previous chapter, the OCSC at its first meeting with the CGD on 
11 February 1993 asserted that the civil service pension reform should leave the right to 
the monthly annuity intact because a monthly annuity was a more popular form of 
retirement benefits than a lump sum gratuity.12 Its survey showed that seventy per cent 
of government personnel chose to receive a monthly annuity since it provided a 
guaranteed income for the rest of their lives. The OCSC also argued that the preservation 
of the monthly annuity would avoid breaking employment contracts and thereby enable 
the government to manage its human resources effectively. It believed that this form of 
pension was an incentive to work in the civil service, making it attractive at a time when 
it was not the first choice for new graduates, and the brain drain problem remained 
unresolved.
In contrast, the CGD wanted to redesign retirement benefits in order to contain 
of central government administrative costs. Monthly annuities were part of the 
employment contracts between the government and retired officials and their families 
because in some cases associated-pension benefits could pass to their descendants. 
Moreover, some pension- associated costs including medical care did not end at the 
point of civil servants’ retirement. Retirees continued to be entitled to these welfare 
benefits creating a long-term fiscal bind. Estimating from the pre-existing pension 
formula, the GGD pointed out that the total annuity pension expenditure was 1.6-2.0 
times higher than that of lump-sum pensions. Accordingly, it argued that monthly 
annuity pensions, which contributed most the growth of central government personnel 
expenditure, should be terminated.
In response the OCSC had little choice but to show that reforming civil service 
pensions could be done without abandoning monthly annuity pensions and the 
consequent potential hostility of civil servants. On 20 April 1993 the OCSCs civil service 
pension reform task force, set up as a parallel effort to the finance ministry’s JWQ 
strongly determined to keep this popular form of pension: “According to the reform 
proposal developed by finance ministry, civil servants would not be provided with 
monthly annuity benefits. Our proposal must demonstrate that even though pensions
12 Minutes of GGD meeting 11 February 1993.
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would be administered by the proposed new pension fund, such a fund would be able to 
provide choices of retirement benefits including a monthly annuity and a lump sum 
gratuity.”13 Working closely with representatives from finance and insurance companies 
invited to join the task force, the OCSC produced a feasibility report showing that such 
choices could be provided by the new central pension fund and other financial 
institutions in partnership with the fund.14
The controversy over the GGD’s proposal to abolish monthly annuity benefits 
was not confined to central departments and agencies. On 1 July 1993, the chair of the 
Gvil Service Association voiced its concern through the national media, echoing the 
concerns of the OCSC15 He reminded reformers that abandoning monthly annuity 
pensions needed more careful consideration and called for the government to spell out 
its intentions clearly. Widespread concern from civil servants, the remarks of the chair of 
the Gvil Service Association and the opposition of the OCSC led the CGD to reconsider 
its proposal and look at the possibility of the new fund providing monthly annuity 
pensions. Despite this, no solution was reached, and on 15 August 1993, the finance 
ministry issued a press release to calm civil servants* concerns, reassuring them that “the 
rights of existing civil servants to choose monthly annuity pensions would be 
maintained”.16 However it asserted “new civil servants who entered the Gvil Service 
after the effective date will be obliged to join the new system”.17
Having been successful in brushing away most of the allegations that the JWC 
tried to cancel the monthly annuity benefits, its chairman asked the CGD and the FPO 
to examine how monthly annuity pensions could possibly be provided, given that a new 
pension system was in place. The two departments were asked to examine specifically “to 
what extent the new civil service pension system would be able to provide monthly 
annuity pensions as well as lump sum retirement benefits accumulated from the 
contributions of the government and civil servants and the investment returns of the 
fund”.18 They were asked to look into the possibility of “financial institutions including 
provident funds and insurance companies in the private sector could be involved in 
managing annuity pensions”.19 The issue was discussed several times in JWC meetings 
between November 1993 and January 1994 but not decided until it was brought to the
13 Minutes of OCSC Task Force meeting 20 April 1993.
14 Ibid.
15 See Giapter 8 for his remarks.
16 Finance ministry press release 15 August 1993.
17 Ibid.
18 Minutes of JWC meeting 27 December 1993.
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consideration of the finance minister. At the progress report meeting on 17 January 1994 
Tharin decided to keep annuity pensions. Having heard all the concerns and criticism of 
civil servants and the OCSC, he expressed his sympathy with the preservation of the 
‘annuity pension’ form of benefit to avoid unnecessary political problems and persuade 
civil servants to accept the new scheme.
Allowing monthly annuities to continue served Tharin well both in economic and 
political terms. Economically, Tharin expected that the provident funds, pension funds, 
and insurance companies, which formed one of core businesses in the financial market, 
would be stimulated, especially if the management of civil service monthly annuity was 
privatised in the future. At the meeting on 17 January 1994, Tharin was informed by 
representatives of the CGD and the FPO, who had been looking into the possibility 
since December 1993 and had consulted the Department of Insurance, insurance 
companies and provident funds, that financial institutions in the private sector could 
manage the provision of civil service pensions including monthly annuities. However, 
they warned that the administrative cost would be as high as five per cent of the monthly 
annuity. They successfully convinced Tharin to let the CGD and its network of fiscal and 
financial units across the country to manage them out of the funds accumulated in the 
proposed new pension fund to lower administrative costs.
In political terms, keeping popular monthly annuity pensions was advantageous 
for the passage of the reform proposal, which required cabinet approval. As the secretary 
to the JWC reported:
Gvil Service pensions were a delicate issue and it was the last life- line after 
retirement. Abolishing the ‘annuity pension’ would affect the feelings of civil 
servants as well as the general- public. As a non-elected MP, he was not sure 
that such radical reform would gain enough support from parliament. Besides, 
the government could not afford to let the bill fail.20
Tharin’s decision to maintain the choice of annuity pensions for civil servants 
came at a price. The JWQ particularly the CGD, was concerned that the government 
would have to continue financing annuity pensions. This was in conflict with the overall 
aspiration to reduce pension costs and personnel expenditure, the original goal of the 
JWC and the CGD. However, this problem had been anticipated by the JWG To offset
19 Ibid.
20 Interview, Ms Venus, former head of the PFAS, CGD.
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the future pension liability that could balloon because of the continued financing of 
annuity pensions, the JWC returned to the IMF’s suggestions on improving and 
streamlining the existing defined benefit tier. A consensus was reached within the JWC 
and with the finance minister that future annuity pensions would not be as generous as 
those calculated by the existing system As an “outer-circle” official recounted, “We 
decided to reduce pension costs by changing the formula for annuity pensions from the 
last month’s salary to an average of the last five years* salary.21 The JWC hoped this 
would help, “Although pension expenditure so far would remain at the same level it 
would hopefully fall in the long run since the pension formula had been changed”.22
However, recalculating annuity pensions using an average of sixty months salary 
rather than the final month would reduce the retirement benefits of civil servants by 
between twelve and fifteen per cent.23 The JWC suggested that the equity of the new 
system would depend on the second pillar, the defined contribution, and compensation 
from the government for current civil servants who opted for the new system According 
to the JWC, “the amount of retirement benefits gained from the two tiers and 
government compensation should account for a replacement rate of almost seventy per 
cent, which was about the same level as that of the existing system” 24
10.1.2 Deciding Membership Issues
The second issue to be decided was membership of the new pension scheme. It was also 
agreed at the January 1994 meeting of the JWC Disagreements between the CGD and 
the OCSC on the issue of membership of the new proposed fund were settled at the 
meeting between the JWC and Finance Minister Tharin on 17 January 1994. As a result, 
the proposal extended membership of the scheme to cover all categories of government 
officials. Apart from ‘civil servants’ the scheme was intended to cover teachers and 
university personnel, the police, military, judiciary, and public prosecutors. However, 
politicians and elected local government employees were excluded. The new scheme was
21 The formula was then: Annuity Pension = Average final 60 monthly salaries X Service Year /  
50”. However, if civil servants choose to receive a lump sum pension, the level of benefit is still 
determined by the following formula: Lump Sum Pension = (Final Monthly Salary X Service 
Years) + Savings and Government contributions including interest. If officials choose to receive 
an annuity pension, the total amount of pension would not be greater than 60 per cent of the 
average value of the final 60 months salary.
22 Cabinet submission 11 August 1994.
23 Minutes of JWC meeting 17 January 1994.
24 Ibid.
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to be compulsory for all new recruits, but current officials would be given the choice of 
staying with the pre-existing defined benefit scheme or subscribing to the new scheme.
Since February 1993, before the JWC was established, the CGD and OCSC had 
been engaged in long discussions about membership of the new pension fund. The most 
important issues were which occupational groups of civil servants should be included in 
the new pension scheme and whether or not the new scheme should be compulsory for 
all existing civil servants. The OCSC, one of whose responsibilities was to oversee 
remuneration policy for ordinary civil servants in central government departments, 
proposed that the new scheme be applied to this group and suggested that the CGD 
should extend the coverage of the new proposed pension fund to include “permanent 
government employees” making the new scheme consistent and easily managed.25
The CGD disagreed and suggested wider coverage for the new pension scheme 
to include all categories of occupational groups in the Thai civil service including civil 
servants in central government departments, teachers, judges, state attorneys and 
university personnel. Based on its legal mandate in the Civil Service Pension Act of 1951 
the CGD insisted that applying the new pension system to all categories of civil servants 
was the fulfilment of its responsibility to control pension payments. It also dismissed the 
OCSCs request to include only permanent government employees in the new scheme 
suggesting that at the introductory stage of the new pension fund only those who had 
civil servants status, not permanent government employees, should be first enforced. As 
for whether or not the new scheme should be compulsory for all existing civil servants, 
the CGD proposed that the new pension system should only be applied to those who 
entered the civil service after the effective date of the new system.
At the third JWC meeting, on 27 December 1993, when the OCSC was invited to 
attend for the first time, its deputy secretary general, Tipavadi, put forward the OCSCs 
argument in the following terms:
The new civil service pension system, which was in the design process, should 
apply to all existing civil servants and permanent government employees, as 
well as new personnel who would be recruited to the civil service after the 
introduction of the new system. All civil servants should be provided with the 
same uniform pension system. As pension reform was a condition for possible
25 See Chapter 2 for types of Thai government personnel.
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future pay rises, creating different tiers of pensions for different groups of 
government personnel would make salary increases more complicated.26
A senior fiscal economist, Kovit, who chaired the JWC responded to Tipavadi 
that it was the policy of the finance ministry to make the new pension system 
compulsory for new civil servants.
This was to ward off a furore by existing civil servants over the new pension 
system. However, the finance ministry would encourage existing civil servants 
to voluntarily participate in the proposed new pension fund by designing 
pension and benefit schemes that would be equitable to existing retirement 
benefits.27
Kovit also made clear to Tipavadi at the December meeting that establishing the 
new pension fund was not seen by finance ministry as a form of welfare benefit for civil 
servants and therefore the issue of future pay rises should be considered separately.28 
Although the OCSCs secretary general was convinced that the voluntary approach 
should be applied to existing civil servants, she also wanted to see as many existing civil 
servants as possible join the new scheme. The new system would not lead to the 
achievement of any aims shared by members of the JWC if only new civil servants joined 
because from the OCSCs estimate, some 3,600 new personnel were recruited annually. 
This number would not enable the government either to reduce pension expenditure or 
increase savings. She called for an intensive public relations programme to convince as 
many as civil servants as possible to opt for the new programme because the higher rate 
of participation would lessen the difficulty of managing two different pension systems in 
the transitional period.
The long argument over membership of the new pension fund was settled on 17 
January 1994 when the JWC met the finance minister to report its progress on the 
reform proposals. Tharin agreed in general with the CGD’s proposal that the new 
scheme should cover all occupational categories of government civil servants except 
political appointees whose tenure in the civil service was uncertain. Getting all categories 
of officials into the new scheme would generate a huge fund that could have positive 
contributions to the wider economy and promote fund management businesses.
26 Minutes of JWC meeting 27 December 1993.
27 Ibid.
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However, he supported the CGD’s proposal that permanent government employees 
should be excluded at this stage and suggested that separate central provident funds for 
them should be established modelled on the private sector. According to the finance 
minister, forcing existing civil servants to join the new scheme could break their 
employment contracts and destroy the long established expectation of generous civil 
service pensions. As a result, the new civil service pension scheme would be compulsory 
only for new civil servants who were admitted to the civil service after the effective date 
of the new system while existing civil servants should be allowed to choose whether or 
not to join the new pension scheme.
While endorsing most of the CGD’s proposal, the finance minister also 
acknowledged the OCSCs argument that without across the board enforcement, the new 
civil service pension system would not enable the government and participating 
departments and agencies in the JWC to achieve their aims, particularly the promotion of 
savings and the development of financial markets. “His main concern was that the new 
pension scheme should be acceptable to civil servants. He wanted the new scheme to 
attract the majority of government officials, which would consequently promote 
domestic saving. He believed that the more officials joined the new scheme, the bigger 
the impact of the Pension Fund on the economy would be”.29 To offset the possibility of 
a low level of participation because of the voluntary approach, Tharin was convinced by 
the OCSC that an intensive public relations programme was necessary to provide 
understanding of the new system and encourage existing civil servants to join it. Tharin 
with the consent of members of the JWC, agreed that the target for participation in the 
new scheme should be a minimum of sixty per cent of existing civil servants. Although 
the target was an internal working milestone for members of the JWQ which was never 
officially published, it was later on used as a yardstick for assessing the success of the 
new scheme.
One important issue that recurred in the discussion of incentives for joining the 
new government pension fund was the link between pension reform and salary increases 
made by the Anand government in 1992, particularly salary adjustments up to the second 
scale. The OCSC argued that the original motive for reforming civil servant pensions was 
as a condition for improving civil service salaries. A representative from the OCSC 
emphasised, “People [and civil servants] learned that the two things [reforming civil
28 Ibid.
29 Interview, FPO economist.
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service pension and salary increases] were related and they expected it”.30 Indeed, some 
newspapers between July and August 1994 had already published stories speculating that 
civil service pension reform would be followed by salary increases. The focus of the 
press coverage was on the fiscal constraints, however. Another incentive also discussed 
and well received by the JWC was that the ministry of finance should provide incentive 
mechanisms such as a tax privilege regime for the fund and its members’ earnings. 
Moreover, the defined contribution part of the scheme could allow borrowing by civil 
servants for specified purposes such as housing or education related spending.
To encourage high participation in the new fund, the JWC did not completely 
rule out the possibility of using salary increases as an incentive. Its members agreed with 
the undisputable fact that a reduction of civil servants’ income would discourage 
participation. The issue of pay increases also arose from the finance minister’s interest in 
how public enterprises, which had shifted their pensions from a defined benefit to a 
defined contribution system in the provident fund reform in the private sector, managed 
the transitional period. The secretaries of the JWC were assigned to consult the human 
resources directors of these public enterprises on how they maintained harmonious 
industrial relations. One of the methods used was “timely increases in employees* salaries 
to compensate for the amounts they would be deducted from their payslips”.31 Other 
measures included effective communication. However, no decision on civil service pay 
rises was made at this time.
10.1.3 Choosing a Pre-Funded Combined System
The issue of funding the new civil service pension was finally settled in July 1994 when 
finance minister Tharin ruled that the new system would consist of two tiers comprising 
the existing defined benefit pensions and a new defined contribution pension. Moreover, 
the new pension system would be pre-funded. This was the most important change in 
civil service pensions in 1996. It was one of the last and most difficult issues to be 
resolved in the reform process because of its technical complexity and far reaching 
financial consequences.
At the outset of its discussions, in October 1993, members of the JWC had been 
convinced by the CGD that securing retirement benefits for civil servants would be 
dependent on securing future finances for pensions. Under the existing civil service 
pension system, pension oudays were paid from the government’s annual budget without
30 Interview, OCSC personnel analyst.
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proper planning. Given the projected growth of pension expenditure, the CGD and 
other members of the JWC were concerned about the risk posed to civil servants’ 
retirement benefits of a fiscal crisis in which the government was unable to pay pensions. 
The CGD put forward a proposal that the new civil service pension scheme should be 
pre-funded and financed by contributions from the government as employer and civil 
servants as employees and follow the defined benefit central provident fund system as 
practised in the private sector and by some foreign governments such as Singapore. 
Although the defined contribution pension scheme had gained a lot of attention in the 
JWQ most members, except the CGD’s representatives, were undecided about whether 
to replace the defined benefits scheme with the defined contributions scheme. As a 
result, the issue remained on the agenda of JWC meetings for many months without any 
decisive solution.32
This indecision was a result of the concerns of some members of JWC who 
regarded the CGD’s proposal as too radical. Representatives from the OCSC in 
particular argued that “moving the current pension system to the defined contribution 
one would impose a financial burden on civil servants, though it would help reduce the 
Government’s fiscal burden on increasing pension expenditure in the long run”.33 The 
OCSC explicitly opposed a complete overhaul of civil service finance arguing, “The 
proposal would destroy civil servants’ morale since their take home income would be 
reduced. Civil servants’ retirement benefits would be at risk because of uncertainty about 
the level of retirement benefits that in future would be determined by the investment rate 
of returns of the newly proposed central provident fund”.34 The OCSC also raised its 
concern over the potential problems that might occur if civil servants opposed the new 
scheme.
Concern over a complete overhaul of the civil service pension system increased 
after the assessment of the finance ministry’s pension reform proposal by the IMF 
experts who visited Thailand between 22-4 April 1994. Their assessment report, which 
recommended the Thai Government should modify its proposal by introducing a two 
pillar pension system combining the existing defined benefit pensions with the new 
defined contribution system,35 reinforced the concerns of representatives from the 
OCSC and the FPO and led to a split between the CGD and other members of the JWC
31 Minutes of JWC meeting 2 July 1994.
32 Survey of JWCs agendas and minutes of meetings.
33 Interview, Wisoot, OCSC
34 Ibid.
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FPO officials, who had been working closely with the IMF officials on the ongoing 
project of social security reform, shared the OCSCs view on this issue. Leaving the issue 
undecided until the beginning of June 1994, the chairman of the JWC was pressed by the 
finance minister to conclude the JWCs reform proposal. He then decided that the 
current proposal, in which the CGD’s radical pension redesign was the main policy 
recommendation, would be presented to the finance minister in its current form. 
Changing the proposal would be too time-consuming. As a result, the IMF suggestions 
were not incorporated in JWC proposal. Nevertheless, a separate report on the IMF 
recommendation was produced to inform the finance minister.
On receiving the proposal and IMF report, Tharin responded quickly to the 
JWCs reform proposal since the design issue lay at the heart of the civil service pension 
reform process and a speedy decision was needed in order to meet his legislative deadline 
in September. On 2 July 1994, he called a meeting to discuss the issue with members of 
the JWG He expressed concern over the new scheme’s acceptability among civil servants 
and its political implications. As a senior member of the JWC stated, “He believed that 
such radical change in the civil service pension system would not be endorsed by the 
cabinet or parliament, and its implementation would fail if civil servants did not join the 
new scheme”.36 Tharin shared much of the OCSCs concern over the political risk of the 
proposal. During the course of discussion, a multi-pillar system combining defined 
benefit and defined contribution schemes, as proposed by the IMF, was raised again by 
OCSC and FPO representatives of the JWG They drew on the report on study visits to 
the U.K., Germany and Singapore, which entailed international experience of 
transforming pensions to a multiple layer pension systems and had previously largely 
ignored, to support their argument. They saw that a combined system, a compromise 
between the CGD’s proposal and their choice of combined design, would be the most 
practical solution. At the end of the meeting on 2 July 1994, Tharin ruled that the new 
civil service pension system would be pre-funded as suggested by the CGD. However, it 
should be built on the combined system preserving the existing defined benefit pillar and 
introducing the new defined contribution element.
10.14 Capitalising and Financing Civil Service Pensions
The last element of the pension reform proposal to be decided, capitalisation, was 
decided in August 1994. Sufficient start-up capital was essential to guarantee future
35 See Chapter 9 for the IMF recommendations.
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pensions and retirement benefits regardless of the government’s fiscal status, and to 
make the new civil service pension system acceptable to civil servants, both of which 
were major objectives of civil service pension reform. The JWC estimated that if all 
officials chose to be members of the new scheme, the value of the new Fund would 
reach 80,000 million Baht.37
Throughout its existence the JWC was engaged in determining sources of 
funding and sufficient initial capital for the new pension fund. Its members were 
unanimously that: “It would be compulsory for the government to capitalise the reserve 
account of the government pension fund. Our estimates suggest that the government 
remit twenty five per cent of its budget for pensions to the proposed fund until it reaches 
three times total government pension expenditure”.38 They also proposed, bearing in 
mind the security of the new fund, that the government should be obliged to maintain a 
similar level of reserve money. The JWC believed this capitalisation would be of 
substantial benefit to civil servants since it would secure assets for their future pension 
payments, which were presendy subject to the risk of government fiscal constraints.
The launch of the new pension fund had two further fiscal burdens, 
compensation and incentives to ensure that existing civil servants as well as the new 
comers would not be worse off in the new scheme. The JWC proposed that the 
government pay “initial capital” and “compensation money” to civil servants who 
subscribed to the fund. For the former, the JWC proposed an obligation on the 
government to transfer money from government coffers to members “individual 
accounts”. The amount of this initial capital was to be two per cent of the total salaries of 
all the years they were in service, and would be paid out only when members retired or 
resigned from the civil service. For the latter, the government will remit to the proposed 
government pension fund at the rate of two per cent of their monthly salaries. 
Compensation would be paid on the termination of membership and if the monthly 
annuity was chosen. The JWC also suggested that new civil servants who entered the civil 
service after the enactment of the new legislation should also be compensated for the 
reduction in annuity pensions due to the adjustment of its formula. The government
36 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
37The JWC estimated that in the first year of the implementation, the government would have to 
transfer 63,679 million Baht from the Bank of Thailand to capitalise the Fund. In addition, 3,000
million Baht for the Fund’s block account, and another 7,715 million Baht as part of the 
government’s contribution in the first year, would be required.
38 JWC Report 1994.
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would need to remit to the fund every month a sum equal to two per cent of new civil 
servants’ salaries.
Contribution rates for the government and civil servants were another important 
issue. The JWC and finance ministry both agreed that contribution rates had to be made 
attractive to civil servants but the actual rates were not decided until August 1994. The 
JWC strongly believed that the attractiveness of the defined contribution scheme 
depended on low contribution rates for civil servants. This belief was shared by the 
OCSCs representatives who felt that civil servants would not be able to contribute to the 
new fund at high rate since their salaries were already low. The JWC had spent almost a 
year, from October 1993 to August 1994, working out appropriate contribution rates, 
using a series of mathematical simulations and analyses of actuarial information. It 
favoured an average basic rate of three per cent for civil servants and a much higher rate 
of ten per cent for the government.39 Any suggestions for higher rates were set aside. As 
has been seen in chapter 9, the chairman of the JWC dismissively rejected the IMF’s 
recommendation of equal matching contributions without realising that the JWC would 
need to reconsider the equal matching contribution option again only a month later.40
While the JWC positioned itself as a passionate defender of civil servants’ 
interests trying to keep the contribution rate affordably low, the finance minister feared 
that the unequal lower contribution rate would increase the government’s burden in 
mobilising the huge sum needed to capitalise, compensate civil servants and contribute to 
the new pension fund. If the government was unable to do this, the civil service pension 
reform programme would have to be shelved. Tharin believed that the only way the 
government could meet its fiscal obligations was for it to make an equal matching 
contribution to civil servants despite their preference for a much higher government rate. 
On 10 August 1994 Tharin and the JWC agreed that the government would contribute 
three per cent to match civil servant’s contribution, and that this was reasonable given 
that the government would also provide the initial capital and compensation to ensure 
that “by all calculations the retirement benefits of the new system would be comparable 
or even better than that of the existing system” 41
Considering all the expenditure involved, the government would still bear a huge 
fiscal burden. If all existing civil servants joined the new pension fund, its value would be 
almost eighty billion baht, and the government would bear costs of almost seventy five
39 Summarised from JWC simulations.
40 Poo-Chatkam Newspaper, 3 May 1994. See also the IMF suggestions in chapter 9.
41 Minutes of JWC meeting, 15 August 1994.
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billion baht.42 This huge amount would put a serious fiscal burden on the government 
and how to meet it had been under continuous discussion by the JWC and the finance 
minister for several months. Back in May 1994, Tharin had suggested that channelling 
national reserves from the Bank of Thailand, the central bank, which remained at
100,000 million baht, might be a solution as the government would not have large 
enough annual budgets to capitalise the new pension fund. However, using national 
reserves would create legal and political problems. The legal obstacle stemmed from the 
law governing national reserves, which prevented the use of reserves outside its 
regulations. Capitalising the civil service pension fund was not within the regulations. 
Tharin realised that any attempt to channel the national reserves would lead to political 
criticism When in opposition his party, the Democrats, had frequently attacked the 
previous government for ignoring legislation and he wished to avoid being accused of 
double standards. Careful drafting of the proposed legislation could provide a solution to 
both problems. Tharin realised that if the new Government Pension Fund Act had a 
clause that allowed the new pension fund to use the national reserves, the use of national 
reserves would therefore be lawful.
Tharin’s idea of transferring national reserve money to capitalise the government 
pension fund was supported by the CGD and the OCSC on the grounds that this would 
secure future pension payments. For them security of the Fund was one of the most 
important incentives for current officials to join the new scheme. But they were cautious 
about how the fund would spend such a large amount of transferred capital. They 
wanted to set very tight conditions for the use of this money for fear that ‘it could be 
taken out and used wrongly by politicians which would destabilise the Fund and future 
retirement benefits*. However, representatives from the FPO did not share this view. 
They argued that since the amount of reserve money would be tremendous, it would not 
be economically useful if the money were kept inactive. Such a large capital sum could 
increase liquidity and stimulate the economy. They wanted the conditions for the use of 
the pension fund reserve money to be flexible.
Although the CGD and the OCSC were not convinced by the FPO’s argument 
the finance minister was. On 15 August 1994 the issue was setded when the he accepted 
the FPO’s suggestion. The FPO then bypassed the JWC by sending Tharin with “a 
personal note and reminder” providing him with information and arguments to defend 
the conditions for the use of the transferred national reserve money. The message
42 Cabinet submission from Finance Ministry, 11 August 1994.
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insisted, “The new government pension fund should be allowed to spend their 
transferred reserves if there was an urgent need that was consistent with the long term 
plans of the finance ministry to replace the unfunded and partially funded pension 
system with a fully funded one.”43 The term “urgent” was deliberately left ambiguous to 
provide discretion for the Finance Minister to reinterpret it in the implementation phase 
of reform.
Decision making on pension reform came only after a protracted stalemate in the 
JWC caused by inefficient working methods and rivalry between the central co­
ordinating agencies. A key role was taken by the finance minister in breaking the logjam 
and making decisions. The result was moderate rather than radical reform and in August 
1994 there was an agreed proposal to submit to the cabinet. The proposal had four key 
elements, a two tier system containing the existing defined benefits and the new defined 
contribution schemes, the retention of monthly annuity pension, a pension fund 
capitalised from Bank of Thailand reserves and wide membership open to all 
government employees on a voluntary basis for existing employees.
10.2 Securing Cabinet Support
By early August 1994 virtually all the important issues had been decided and on 11 
August the finance ministry formally submitted the pension reform proposal to the 
cabinet; the final details of capitalisation were agreed between the finance minister and 
the FPO a few days later, on 15 August. The reform proposal consisted of: a hybrid form 
of defined contribution and defined benefit system, the retention of civil servants* choice 
to receive a lump sum gratuity or a monthly annuity pension, funding and capitalising the 
new government pension fund in an autonomous agency using Bank of Thailand 
reserves, and voluntary membership for existing civil servants and compulsory 
membership for new civil servants. The proposal was discussed by the cabinet on 16 
August 1994 and endorsed without amendment.
Securing the passage of the proposal through cabinet had begun earlier, in July 
1994, before the final technical details of the capitalisation had been settled, with the 
writing of the cabinet submission. This was a routine process in which the owner of the 
issue was identified and would sometimes influence the content of the submission. 
Writing the submission on the civil service pension reform was intended to be jointly 
conducted by members of the JWC namely the CGD and the FPO. However, the FPO
43 FPO Memo to finance ministry, 15 August 1994.
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rushed the process writing its own cabinet submission, which it passed to the finance 
minister because “it mainly involved economic issues on which the FPO had been 
advising him.”44 Even though reforming civil service pensions had been its pet project 
from the beginning a representative from the CGD called this “opportunistic and 
unacceptablyrude behaviour.”45
In writing the cabinet submission the FPO re-prioritised pension reform 
objectives. In the submission the most important objective, representing the FPO’s aims, 
was to achieve good fiscal management by means of pre-funding civil service pension 
expenditure, rather than applying a crude estimate to allocate pension budgets on an 
annual basis. Good fiscal management was accompanied by two other objectives, one of 
which was an emphasis on the need to provide safeguards for future retirement benefits 
regardless of the fiscal status of the government. The last objective, which reflected the 
policy aspiration of the FPO, was to promote domestic savings and to encourage 
investment in and the development of the capital markets. Neither the CGD’s strongly 
advocated aim to reduce pension expenditure nor the OCSCs plan to improve civil 
service remuneration was explicitly stated in the submission. This shift in and re­
prioritisation of the aims of civil service pension reform was noticed by representatives 
from the GGD and the OCSC but it was not seen as an important enough issue for them 
to disown the proposal since they had already agreed on the content of the reform.46
To secure the smooth passage of the reform proposal through cabinet, the JWC 
agreed with the OCSCs suggestion to submit its proposal to the prior scrutiny of the 
Public Personnel Management Review Committee. This ad hoc committee, set up by the 
prime minister, chaired by deputy prime minister Banyat Bantadthan, and serviced by the 
secretary of the OCSC, was responsible for filtering all human resource management 
related submissions before consideration by the Civil Service Commission or the cabinet. 
Review committee met on 26 July 1994 and approved the proposal.
Taking the civil service pension reform proposal for consideration in different 
venue opened up another opportunity for the issue of salary increase to re-emerge on the 
government agenda after further pay rises had been blocked by Anand’s government in 
1992. On 26 July 1994, the same day the Public Personnel Management Committee 
approved the pension reform proposal, the OCSC also requested this committee to 
approve its proposal for increasing civil service salaries. It argued that increasing civil
44 Interview, Somkid, FPO.
45 Interview, anonymous senior official CGD.
46 Interview summary personal note.
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service salaries not only satisfied the condition set by Anand’s cabinet in 1992 that future 
pay rises would only be allowed if the civil service pension system was reformed to bring 
down its costs, it would also help offsetting a possible backlash from civil servants. The 
likely negative impact that world be stirred by the decrease in their take home incomes 
because of the contribution schemes could be mitigated be means of salaries increase. 
This point was supported by the JWC insisting that public enterprises whose pension 
systems had been transformed into the defined contribution systems, adopted the same 
strategy successfully.
At the meeting, the OCSC proposed an average fifteen per cent increase in civil 
service salaries. It principally aimed to improve the salary scales of junior officials who 
made up of seventy-five per cent of total government personnel. “By doing so, the 
ceiling of their salaries would be broadened and advancement through salary scales 
would be enhanced”.47 The OCSC also proposed to standardise salary scales of across 
different occupational groups in the civil service by setting up the National Salary and 
Remuneration Committee. The committee whose members composed mainly of 
representatives from central government agencies including the OCSC, the CGD, the 
BOB and the NESDB would be chaired by the finance minister, “who would help clear 
the way to and convince the cabinet to approve future pay rises.”48 In defending the civil 
service salary increase, the OCSC also invited Khajadpai, president of the Gvil Service 
Association to give his opinion. He supported the OCSC, “Although it could have been 
more, the proposed pay increase of fifteen per cent was appropriate taking into account 
the limited budget and the government’s fiscal constraints. We do expect further pay 
rises in the future. The Association absolutely agreed that civil servants’ efficiency must 
be improved in line with salary increases. The Association is ready to support this 
scheme”.49
On 26 July 1994, the Public Personnel Management Review Committee 
approved both the civil service pension reform proposal jointly developed by the JWC 
and the OCSC, and the OCSCs proposal for increasing civil service salaries. The 
approval process was facilitated and secured by the OCSCs and the CGD’s senior 
officials, a servicing secretary and members of this review committee. As a result, no 
amendment to either proposal was made. Having the green light from what was seen as 
“the cabinet’s gate keeper”, the JWC and the OCSC confidently submitted these
47 OCSC cabinet submission 16 August 1994.
48 Interview, Visoot, OCSC official.
49 OCSC cabinet submission 16 August 1994.
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proposals to the cabinet. The cabinet scheduled the civil service pension reform proposal 
to be first considered by mid August 1994, followed by the salary increase proposal.
On 16 August 1994 the cabinet approved the civil service pension reform 
proposal presented by the finance minister and agreed that the draft legislation on the 
Government Pension Fund should be deliberated in parliament in the next session in 
September 1994, in less than a month time. It instructed that finance ministry and the 
Office of the Counsel of State to draft a new Government Pension Fund Act, and 
propose amendments to the 1951 Gvil Service Pension Act, which would continue in 
force for those civil servants who decided to remain with the old pension scheme. The 
cabinet also acknowledged “the finance ministry and the OCSC were co-owners of the 
reform and that they must jointly conduct a public relations campaign to mobilise 
support for the legislation in the civil service”.50 As implementation of the reform would 
involve the injection of many billion Baht into the economy, the Bank of Thailand was 
also asked to evaluate its fiscal impact to prevent inflation.
Two weeks after approving the civil service pension reform proposal, on 30 
August 1994 the cabinet approved the OCSCs proposal for increasing civil service 
salaries by fifteen per cent. The new pay scaled was to be implemented on 1 October 
1994. However, the cabinet demanded “the OCSC and central personnel agencies reduce 
civil service personnel since this salary increase brought the ratio of personnel costs and 
total public expenditure close to forty per cent, the upper ceiling allowed by the 
government.”51 The OCSC was also required by the cabinet “to effectively downsize the 
civil service pursuing existing measures and introducing positive measures such as the 
transfer of government personnel to the private sector”.52 One of the many goals of civil 
service pension reform that had been out of the JWCs agenda for almost two years was 
attained, while the fate of the pension reform proposal would depend on the approval of 
parliament.
An agreed proposal for submission to the cabinet was not the end of decision­
making in pension reform In the process of submission the proposal was reprioritised by 
the FPO to reflect its concerns. At the cabinet submission stage salary increases and 
downsizing re-emerged on the reform agenda and were linked to pension reform The 
cabinet agreed to civil service salary increases, as originally proposed by the Anand
50 Cabinet Resolution 16 August 1994.
51 Cabinet Resolution 30 August 1994.
52 Ibid.
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government in 1992, but only on condition there was effective downsizing. The cabinet 
also approved the pension reform proposal without amendment.
10.3 Enacting the Government Pension Fund Act of 1996
Gvil service pension reform required legislative change and the legislative process was a 
further opportunity to influence the decision making process. In late September 1996, 
almost two years after the draft civil service pension reform bill was sent to parliament, 
the new Government Pension Fund Act of 1996 was passed. The act, which reflected the 
compromise reform proposal suggested by the JWQ brought only moderate change. The 
pension schemes provided by the Gvil Service Act 1951 survived alongside the new 
Government Pension Fund Act of 1996, which brought in the new defined contributions 
elements and some technical changes creating a compromise two-tier pension scheme.
The length of the process of turning the reform proposal agreed by the Giaun 
cabinet into new legislation was due to detailed scrutiny by the select committees of both 
houses of parliament, and the interruption of the parliamentary session caused by the 
unexpected collapse of the Chaun’s government in May 1995.53 A new coalition 
government led Banham Silapa-Archa was formed in September 1995. The civil service 
pension reform bill survived the change of government.
10.3.1 Drafting the new Government Pension Fund Act
Preparation for the passage of the civil service pension reform programme through 
parliament began while the JWC was still deciding the design elements of the new 
pension system. On 30 March 1994 Tharin appointed a committee to drafting the 
Government Pension Fund Act and the CGD’s director general was appointed 
chairman. Members of the drafting committee were drawn from eight middle ranking 
“outer circle” officials: five from the CGD, two from the FPO and one from the OCSC 
Their task was to reform the Gvil Service Pension Act 1951 which gave pension 
jurisdiction to the CGD.54 Working parallel to but in co-operation with the JWQ this 
drafting committee turned what had been agreed in the JWC into draft legislation.
After Chaun’s cabinet endorsed the JWCs reform proposal in August 1994, the 
formal process of drafting the Government Pension Fund Bill had to be completed 
within a month, as the cabinet wanted it ready for the next parliamentary session starting
53 See chapter 2 for political developments during this period.
54 Finance Ministerial Order, 30 March 1994.
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in September 1994. The draft bill was sent to the Office of the Council of State, a 
government body attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, for detailed scrutiny. The 
JWC realised that their draft reform bill would not be ready for the forthcoming session 
if they followed the routine procedure of vetting by the Council of State Drafting 
Committee. They requested the cabinet to set up a Special Drafting Committee. Of the 
eight members, four were experts in economics and public finance from the finance 
ministry including the JWCs chairman and the rest were legal experts from the Council 
of State itself.
The Council of State Special Drafting Committee, dominated by finance ministry 
officials, not only provided a safe passage for its draft reform bill but also a chance to 
amend the reform proposal. During the course of three scrutiny sessions, seventeen 
amendments were made.55 Most of them were minor such as the clarification of legal and 
technical terms. However, some major adjustments were also made including the form 
and control of the new government pension fund, and its financial security. These were 
the result of a struggle between politicians, particularly the finance minister, and civil 
servants, members of the JWQ to control the new fund.
Decisions over the form and control over the new government pension fund 
caused controversy between finance minister and the JWG The finance minister wanted 
close control of financing and supervision and wanted the new pension fund had to be 
part of the government structure. The JWQ however, wanted to make the new fund 
autonomous and, more importantly, free from politics. They realised that if it was part of 
the government apparatus it would be less efficient and flexible, and less able to compete 
effectively in a business environment and competitive financial market. Members of the 
committee were convinced by the chairman of the JWC that the fund needed to be 
autonomous and independent from the government apparatus. To overcoming the 
technicalities of the Government Organisation and State Administration Act, a clause 
■was added giving the fund autonomy and independent status.
The chairman of JWC was also successful in reducing political influence over the 
new government pension fund by preventing politicians from becoming secretary 
general, the chief executive officer of the fund. The legislation prevented members of 
parliament, executive members or advisors to political parties from being secretary 
general. The right to appoint the secretary general belonged to the Fund’s Board of 
Management with the approval of the cabinet. The role of the Finance Minister was
55 Review of the Council of State Special Drafting Committee.
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limited to oversight functions: appointing an authority to investigate an abnormality 
within the Fund and requesting the fund’s board of management to suspend or terminate 
the employment contract of the fund’s secretary general.
The fund’s financial security was the cause of further disagreement between the 
finance minister and the FPO and the rest of the JWC Although the finance minister 
agreed to deposit reserve money from the Government’s coffers in the Fund’s reserve 
account he also expressed a desire that the government should be allowed to appropriate 
that money if the need arose .56 This was seen by the majority of JWC as a threat to civil 
servants* retirement benefits. Members of the Special Drafting Committee were 
convinced by the JWC chairman that conditions for reimbursing reserve money in the 
fund had to be clear and precise, not simply the finance minister’s definition of “urgent 
government need”. They agreed that the reserve money would be “paid out from the 
fund as pensions for civil servants and only when the country faces financial crisis”.57 
This money was to be invested in secure financial transactions such as government and 
public enterprise bonds.58
10.3.2 Seeking Parliamentary Approval
Although the Special Drafting Committee of the Council of State had completed its 
vetting process and Chaun’s government had sent the bill to parliament by September 
1994, it was not immediately read because there was a backlog of bills. The Government 
Pension Fund Act had to wait in a queue for parliamentary scrutiny. However, the 
process was suddenly interrupted by the unexpected collapse of the Chaun’s government 
in May 1995.59 A new coalition government was formed after a general election in 
September 1995 and Banham Silapa-Archa, leader of Chart-Thai Party, became prime 
minister. Despite its short-lived fifteen months in office and three different finance 
ministers in quick succession the civil service pension reform bill survived largely intact 
and the major design components, the combined defined benefits and defined 
contributions and Government Pension Fund, were not affected.
Banham’s government did not try to withdraw or change the draft legislation on 
the Government Pension Fund. Instead, it adopted the bill and reinstated it on the 
parliamentary agenda on 20 September 1995 during its first month in office. Despite the
56 To secure the fund financially, the cabinet agreed to provide 20 per cent of Gvil Service 
pension expenditure until the Fund’s reserve account reached three times pension expenditure.
57 Article 72 of the Government Pension Fund Act.
58 Ibid.
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fact that Banham’s government in general and its finance ministers in particular were 
widely thought to lack financial expertise and as a senior member of the JWC noted, 
“Banham’s finance ministers were preoccupied with the worsening economic situation” 
which developed in the Asian economic crisis of 1997, progress was made on pension 
reform legislation.60 The legislative process took a year, parliament passed the 
Government Pension Fund Act on 27 September 1996. After five years effort to the 
legal basis for changing the civil service pension scheme was in place.
Like the drafting process, the legislative process, which depended the scrutiny on 
the select committees appointed by the House of Representatives and the Senate, was 
open to another round of influencing the bill. Members of the JWC continued 
competing to influence the content of the bill for their own ends. However, most of the 
changes made by parliament were limited and did not erode the core proposal of a pre­
funded combined defined benefits, and defined contributions scheme with the 
preservation of a choice of retirement benefits.
The attention of both politicians in the House of Representatives Select 
Committee and members of the JWC was focused on the finance and management of 
the new government pension fund. The House Select Committee was concerned over 
the use of public money to capitalise the fund. It believed it would not be beneficial to 
the economy as a whole economy if a huge amount of money were left inactive in the 
reserve account with limited use, as suggested by the JWC, to secure the fund financially. 
“The less the government had to remit money to the Fund, the more the budget could 
be allocated to their ministries, projects or constituencies”61. As a result, it ruled that the 
total amount of public money that the government would be obliged to transfer to and 
capitalise the new pension fund should be equivalent to three times pension expenditure, 
and no more.
Another example of a small change made by the House Select Committee was 
the calculation of contribution rates. Its members claimed that it would not be fair to 
base civil servants’ contribution rates on civil servants’ gross income consisting of basic 
monthly salary plus other allowances. The change aimed to make the scheme equitable to 
civil servants who did not receive any allowances nor had allowances that were not paid 
on a regular basis.
59 See chapter 2 for political developments during this period.
60 Interview, anonymous CGD official
61 Interview, Ms Venus, CGD.
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It was not only politicians in the House Select Committee who wanted to amend 
the bill for their own ends. Members of the JWC also tried to change those clauses in the 
bill, which they had only reluctantly agreed with in the earlier stages of reform. The 
CGD, for example, successfully persuaded the House Select Committee to extend the 
subscription period for membership of existing civil servants from the six months 
originally proposed by the JWC to a year. The CGD did so because it expected that the 
workload during the transition period, which they had to undertake, would be 
tremendous. A six-month extension would provide time to lay down the managerial 
foundations of the fund.
The CGD also exercised influence over the control of the management of the 
proposed fund. As an OCSC personnel analyst noted, “The MOF, especially the CGD, 
never gave up attempting to reduce the role and influence of other agencies in the 
reform process”62. The JWC had initially proposed that the OCSCs secretary, who was 
an ex-officio member of the Fund’s Board of Management, would chair the Membership 
Sub-Committee of the fund, but this was changed because the CGD convinced members 
of the House Select Committee at first reading of the bill that issues concerning 
membership should be undertaken by the fund’s executive team. However, the OCSC 
fought back at second reading, persuading the Select Committee that its secretary general 
should head the fund’s membership subcommittee because no other members of the 
fund’s management board specialised in civil service welfare and benefits. Keeping this 
sub-committee, the OCSCs representative argued, would facilitate the work of the 
Office of the Government Pension Fund. Consequently, the Select Committee agreed to 
re-instate this clause and the OCSC retained its role in the new fund.
A similar process of scrutiny and amendment took place in the unelected upper 
house, the Senate, about half of whose members were former senior civil servants, 
military officers and police officers. The upper house was therefore controlled by 
senators representing retired bureaucrats. The issues that interested senators most 
involved their own turfs. The Senate Select Committee was particularly concerned about 
the calculation of benefits for ex-officials who were re-appointed after resigning from the 
civil service. They rejected the JWCs proposal to exclude previous service years from the 
calculation and also ruled that the definition of “service years” was to be altered to 
include any “extra years” that were normally given as rewards for service to certain 
groups of officials, particularly the military and police.
62 Interview, Visoot, OCSC
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The Senate select committee also changed the components of the government 
pension fund’s board of management. They considered that the board was too 
dominated by ordinary civil servants in central government and ruled that the fund’s 
board of management had to have equal numbers of representatives from other 
occupational groups of government personnel including the military and police. 
Consequently, the number of officials’ representatives increased from six to eight. The 
Senate also increased the number of ex-officio members on the board in response to the 
increase in the number of occupational representatives. The secretary general of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board and the secretary general of the 
Stock Market Regulations Board, were added increasing the total number of the fund’s 
Board members to twenty-one.
Decision-making continued during the legislative process in the course of 
drafting and parliamentary scrutiny. JWC members, notably the CGD and the OCSC, 
continued to compete for influence over the pension reform proposal. There was also 
rivalry between civil servants and politicians for control of the new pension fund. 
Despite this competition, parliamentary scrutiny and a change of government the original 
proposal approved by the cabinet was passed in September 1996 with only minor 
changes.
10.4 Epilogue: Post Decision Making
Six months after the passage of the legislation, on 27 March 1997 the Government 
Pension Fund started its formal operations. This was regarded by the JWC as a success in 
terms of its accumulation of assets and membership.63 The huge endowment of nearly
70,000 million baht transferred from the government budget and the national reserve 
made the Government Pension Fund second only in size to the Social Security Fund and 
attractive to many banks and financial institutions.64
The involvement of the JWC should have ceased with the passing of the 1996 
Act. As one official recalled, “Our job, according to the 1993 Finance Ministerial Order 
was to develop a civil service reform proposal. We did the research and provided 
information for the cabinet to decide. Our job was done when parliament passed the
63 Personal notes from interviews. See Appendix 3.
64 It was reported that 40 financial institutions were bidding to manage its funds (See Thurakij 
Newspaper 28 Jan 1997).
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new act”.65 However, the influence of the JWC and the OCSC did not wane after the 
GPF was set up because the new act, which they had designed, provided them with a 
legal basis to manage the GPF in the start-up period. For them, the success of the new 
Government Pension Fund depended on a good management system and infrastructure 
during the start-up period, as well as the GPF’s relations with its members.
10.4.1 Managing the transition
Successful management of the transition from a defined benefit system to a combined 
defined benefit and defined contributions scheme relied very much on the control of the 
new Government Pension Fund and recruiting the right chief executive. The CGD, the 
FPO and the OCSC were well aware of this and saw that the new act was gave them the 
authority to ensure this. The heads of these central government agencies took control the 
GPF’s board of management. The permanent secretary of the MOF was an ex-officio 
member and chairman, while the secretary general of the OCSC, the director general of 
the CGD, and the director general of the FPO also had permanent seats on the board. 
According to the new act, the board of management’s responsibility was to formulate 
and prescribe policies, rules, and regulations related to the operations of the GPF. These 
included managing and supervising the GPF on such important matters as setting 
investment policy, selecting and employing the chief executive of the GPF, and 
approving the budget for running the GPF.66
Former members of the JWC were particularly influential in two core activities of 
the GPF investment and membership. The policies related to these activities were 
decided by the Investment Sub-Committee and the Membership Sub-Committee, which 
were headed by the chiefs of the FPO and the OCSC respectively. The powers of the 
Investment Sub-Committee and the Membership Sub-Committee included advisory and 
insight functions.67 The Investment Sub-Committee advised the GPF’s board of 
management on all matters related to the investments of pension funds including the 
formulation of criteria for the selection of financial institutions to manage them-68 Its 
insight functions included monitoring the operations of the financial institutions chosen 
to manage the Fund’s capital, and reporting on the performance and outcome of
65 Interview, Kanikat, FPO.
66 Section 26, Government Pension Fund Act 1996.
67 Section 32, The Government Pension Fund Act of 1996
68 The FPO issued investment guidelines for the GPF. The ministry of finance required “The 
GPF [to] spend at least 60 per cent of its assets in low risk investments. Investment in high risk 
schemes must not exceed 40 per cent” (MOF’s order No. 4 /1997).
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investment operations. The Membership Sub-Committee acted as a media between the 
GPF and its members. This included the membership relations schemes to provide 
better understanding of the new system by disseminating information and news. Another 
important function involved making recommendations to the board of management for 
the provision of other welfare benefits.
The CGD was intensively involved in the operation of the GPF. Its director 
general was appointed to head the GPF in the start-up period until the new GPF’s chief 
executive was appointed. The CGD played a greater role than other former members of 
the JWC because some of its pension related work was to be transferred to the GPF. To 
ensure a smooth transitional period, the CGD and the FPO agreed to supply the GPF 
with their own staff on secondment many of whom later became permanent GPF staff. 
These staff contributed to laying the groundwork of the GPF in many areas.
Controlling the GPF’s board of management provided some assurance for the 
FPO and the OCSC that civil service pension reform would develop as they wished. As 
the GPF was, according to the new pension act, to be managed by a professional 
executive, officials in the finance ministry wanted to select the right person who would 
ensure their management policies were continued. The recruitment of the new chief 
executive was a classic example of providing “jobs for the boys”. The appointment was 
made by a recruitment committee whose members consisted mainly of former members 
of the JWG the GGD’s director general served as chairman and the director general of 
the FPO and the assistant secretary general of the OCSC, were members. The selection 
process was “informal”. Using networks in the Capital Market Development Trust Fund 
where he also presided, the GGD’s director general nominated an experienced banker 
and former member of staff of the Bank of Thailand, Ms Navapom Reungsakul, for the 
job. Navapom was in fact the only nominee and was appointed.
10.4.2 Managing civil servants’ participation
During the first year of the GPF’s operation membership reached 1,079,335, about 71 
per cent of total number of government officials. This was considered successful, as the 
secretary of the JWC commented, “What we had in mind was that about 60 per cent of 
Government officials would join the new pension scheme. In fact, 70 or more per cent 
did which was beyond our expectation and it was a success”.69 Overall membership 
increased gradually every year except 1999 when the government adopted an early
69 Interview, Ms Venus, CGD.
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retirement programme to downsize the Gvil Service. This was, as the director general of 
the CGD claimed, “the result of intensive campaigning by the Ministry of Finance”.
The OCSC also claimed some credit for the high participation rate. Mobilising 
support from civil servants began before the cabinet decision in August 1994 to launch a 
campaign. In 1993 the OCSC planned a survey of civil servants’ opinions on pension 
reform to be carried out by the National Office of Statistics. Though there was some 
discussion of the design of the questionnaire in JWC meetings the survey was never 
conducted.
The campaign to encourage civil servants to join the new scheme relied on 
members of the JWC It was done quickly because the legislation allowed only 180 days 
to put the new pension scheme in place and complete the admission process. Central 
government departments and agencies co-operated to meet the deadline. The CGD 
posted senior officials to the country’s seventy-four provinces, to communicate with 
officials at regional level. The OCSC appointed communication teams of personnel 
analysts and the FPO also provided staff to support the campaign.
The campaign organised lectures by members of the JWC to government officials 
in central and regional administration. It was not a consultation campaign. The aim was 
to provide information for civil servants to decide whether to join the new scheme. It 
provided straightforward and frank recommendations pointing out “Those who would 
be losers if new scheme was adopted, who could choose not to join, and encouraging the 
majority who would be better off, to join in. They had two choices: take it or leave it.”70 
The JWC through the CGD also communicated through newspapers and radio stations. 
The frank and intensive nature of the campaign increased civil servants’ confidence in 
the new scheme and contributed to the high participation rate of seventy-one per cent. 
Former members of the JWC are still proud of their success today.
10.5 Conclusion: The Dynamics of Civil Service Policy Making
This chapter primarily provides understanding of the process dynamics of decision­
making that led to the adoption of a single unified civil service pension reform proposal 
by the Thai government. This proposal later became the new Government Pension Fund 
Act 1996 that introduced elements of a defined contribution pension design to a half­
70 Ibid.
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century old defined benefit civil sendee pension system. In this respect, the Thai civil 
service pension system became a two tier scheme consisting of defined benefits as 
provided by the surviving Gvil Service Pension Act of 1951 and defined contribution 
pensions provided by the Government Pension Fund Act 1996. The new combined 
system therefore represented a moderate change in the civil service pension system and 
its administrative processes 71
This section grounds explanations for the successful development of a unified 
civil service pension reform proposal on the key decisional events leading to the design 
of the new pre-funded pension system, the preservation of pension choices, the 
capitalising and financing of pensions, and membership issues. It deals exclusively with 
the processes of alternative specification, which culminated cabinet approval the 
proposal in August 1994. Although the narrative touches upon the legislative process 
after the cabinet decision, it is not central to the discussion in this concluding section.
10.5.1 Alternative Specification and Decision Making
This section provides explanations for the intensity of the reform effort by members of 
the JWC, the pace of reform in reaching a unified proposal, as well as the actions of 
reform entrepreneurs in shaping the content, direction and pace of the reform process. 
These will be viewed in the light of an institutional processual framework.
The intense effort to reform civil service pensions lasted almost six years with the 
issue both active and dormant and both on and off the government agenda. Agreement 
on the design of the reform programme was not reached until August 1994. The 
protracted nature of the decision-making process can be conceived of an endeavour by 
participating civil service pension reformers to craft the reform proposal within the 
dynamic situation around them
Working within the interdepartmental JWC provided both a constraining and an 
enabling context for pension reform decision-making. The JWC also provided a site for 
bureaucratic politics to operate. Lying at the heart of the decisional site was co-operation, 
conflict and competition between the goals and means of civil service pension reform 
proposals advocated by the CGD, the FPO, the OCSC and the finance minister. The 
institutional context of JWC enabled the alternative specification and decision-making 
process by promoting a co-operative environment. Such an environment was structured 
by the 1993 Finance Ministerial Order to formulate a unified civil service pension reform
71 But it can be seen as far reaching change if compared to other outcomes of civil service reform
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proposal. The JWC context also compelled participants to find a common solution 
leading to the co-existence of different but reprioritised reform aims and the avoidance 
of conflict. In this sense, the JWC provided opportunity for participants to realise their 
mandates and jurisdictions in a win-win situation.
The context of working within the JWCs “rules of the game” also constrained 
the decision making process and the pace of reform It contributed to the length of the 
process in which sometimes difficult and contentious issues were left unresolved. 
Accommodating the take-it-for granted different departmental goals in the pension 
reform programme created ambiguity in the decision making process. Gonsequendy, 
participating agencies competed to dominate the decision-making by convincing other 
members of their own reform alternatives. Although it was hard for any participating 
agency to claim to be a “champion” of the whole process of decision-making, some 
room was available for them to declare themselves a “local hero”. TTie CGD, for 
example, claimed to be the reform owner, asserting, “Information available in our 
department was enough to do the job.”72 Such claims and attempted claims, in return, 
prevented a consensus in developing a coherent civil service pension reform proposal 
and led to piecemeal solutions.
Attempts to unify and reconcile competing piecemeal solutions created a 
“repeated cycle of information processing” resulting in a self-peipetuating process and 
slow pace of alternative specification. In all decisional events related to the design of the 
new civil service pension system, participating central government departments 
“compared notes rather than shared information”. They provided and presented their 
own departmental related information, which was then discussed, debated, and 
challenged by new information from other members of the JWC, finally leading to 
modification, rejection, and calls for more and new information. Officials who 
participated in JWC meetings described the way in which disagreements were resolved: 
“They compared their solutions for particular problems in the joint meetings. The JWC 
would first joindy decide whose solution was sound or best. If they could not decide 
unanimously, then the agencies in conflict would be asked to work together and report to 
the committee in subsequent meetings.”73
The technical and interconnected nature of information on civil service pension 
issues aggravated the “repeated cycle of information processing”. Participants in the JWC
in different issue areas including downsizing.
72 Interview, Napong and Ms Venus, CGD.
73 Interview, anonymous official, CGD.
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meetings recalled, “In some cases, a particular issue needed to be agreed on first, another 
issue would be then discussed. In another case, information about one issue was used as 
a basis for working on other related issues. If a change had been made to one agency’s 
information, the whole process needed to be reworked.”74 This kind of problem was 
present during all eleven meetings of the Joint Working Committee.75 As a result, most 
design issues were not decided by the JWC Stalemate was reached on most of the 
important design issues of the new pension system. This required the intervention of the 
finance minister.
The institutional context of the JWC also constrained the pace of alternative 
specification and decision-making as participants in the process possessed a Veto 
power*76. To stretch Tsebelis’s concept (1995) to explain the behaviour of reformers in a 
civil service policy subsystem, actors who can be classified as having veto powers 
included the CGD, the FPO, the OCSC, the minister of finance, the Public Personnel 
Review Committee and the cabinet itself. The number of veto actors reflected the 
fragmentation of and overlapping jurisdictions in the management and provision of civil 
service pensions. The narrative shows that the number of “veto actors” contributed not 
only to the lengthy decision making process, but also moderate change in the civil service 
pension system, as participating central government departments and agencies could not 
exercise their strategies to attain their reform goals without constraints from others.
The institutional constraint was mediated by the action of the finance minister 
who can be clearly identified as policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995). The narrative 
evidence in this chapter contains many entrepreneurial acts which justify this assessment. 
Such acts, which enabled members of the JWC to agree on a unified reform proposal, 
included the expansion of the reform issue to accommodate his economic policy aims, 
the reorganisation of institutional venues for developing a unified proposal for pension 
reform, and investing his time in the reform programme. More conventional forms of 
entrepreneurial strategy can be seen from his commitment to the reform issue and his 
mediating and brokerage roles.
74 Ibid.
75 “repeated cycle of information processing”.
76 The role of actors with “veto power”, especially at the macro-political level, has been 
increasingly been popular in studies of decision-making processes on pension reform in both 
developed and transitional economies. As Tsebelis (1995) noted, the number of actors may have 
an impact on policy outcomes if there are many veto actors and the distance between them is 
great.
295
Seen as a hands-on minister, Tharin utilised ‘process mechanisms’ to enable the 
reform proposal to be accomplished, progressed and finally approved in the decisional 
venue, the cabinet. These mechanisms include performance monitoring, mediating and 
brokering conflicts within the JWC, as well as mobilising support from the Public 
Personnel Review Committee and the prime minister. As the narrative evidence shows, 
he invested his time in meetings and monitoring the progress of the JWC The progress 
report meetings between him and the JWC provided opportunities for him to influence 
the content of reform proposals and to break reform impasses by brokering between 
conflicting agencies within the JWC He also speeded up the reform process imposing a 
sense of urgency by aiming to move the issue to the decisional venue, the cabinet in 
1994. In short, Tharin undertook two overlapping roles simultaneously, as a promoter of 
civil service pension reform and the problem solver for the JWC
In conclusion, the narrative presented in this chapter reveals that decision­
making processes account for the more moderate change that occurred in civil service 
pension system than originally proposed by the CGD’s reformers. Such processes 
operated within the institutional and processual contexts, and were mediated by the role 
of a policy entrepreneur. The institutional factors such as the institutional context of the 
JWC both constrained and enabled the alternative specification and decision-making 
process. They structured the environment within which alternative specification and 
decision making processes operated, shaped the content of civil service pension reform 
proposal and progress to the decisional agenda leading to change in the civil service 
pension system. Such change, however moderate it was, represents a major shift the sub- 
domain of the Thai civil service policy.
Part IV
Managing Civil Service
Chapter 11
Managing Gvil Service Reform in Thailand: Conclusions
Overview
Having provided analytic narratives of the two cases studies of civil service policy change 
namely downsizing the Gvil Service and reforming civil service pensions, it is now 
appropriate to elaborate on the thesis arguments. The aim of this chapter is to develop 
general explanations for public management policy change in Thailand by addressing the 
principal thesis questions: What explains stability and change in Thai civil service policy? and 
what explains the variation of trajectories and outcomes of civil service policy change across 
the period or 1980 and 1999, as well as across cases of civil service downsizing and 
reforming civil service pension? By grounding explanations in the two case studies, this 
chapter develops ‘limited historical generalisations’ (Ragin, 1987). Using an ‘institutional 
processualist’ conceptual framework, which guides the main research questions, this chapter 
brings to the fore the effects of differences in institutional arrangements and the process 
factors on public management policy change. These institutional and processual influences 
will be woven into a coherent explanation using a common thread, ‘reform capacity7, the 
opportunity and risk, for public management policy change. Where appropriate, this chapter 
compares, albeit implicitly, some aspects of the two cases.
This chapter first provides a summary of the outcomes of civil service policy reform 
drawn from the narratives in Part II and Part III. From an institutional and processualist 
perspective, it then provides explanations for limited, piecemeal change in Thai Gvil Service 
policy in general and variations within the reform trajectories and outcomes over time and 
across the two case studies.1 In line with the literature that influences this thesis, as well as 
standard arguments presented in the narrative chapters, this chapter sheds light on the 
analytic components of public policy process with particular emphasis on agenda setting, 
alternative specification and decision making.
1 As Yin (1994) suggests, [modest] generalisation can emerge from comparing two cases from which 
insight into the question of what explains the variation of outcomes between two different reforms in 
the domain of public management policy can be derived.
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As a major argument of this thesis bases civil service policy change on ‘reform 
capacity, this chapter argues, based on evidence drawn from the narrative chapters, that 
reform capacity is emergent and fluid rather than static as presumed by the institutionalists. 
It argues that Knill’s static notion of national administrative reform capacity needs to be re­
conceptualised in the light of institutional and processual analysis. The chapter also relates 
the pattern of civil service reform in Thailand to the wider scholarly discussion and argues 
that reform capacity and its resultant public management policy change is influenced but not 
necessarily determined by what I call dualities of approach in public management evident in 
the Thai case: a techno-bureaucratic approach and a political approach. The dualities lie 
within the principal reform actors, reform issues, reform process and mechanisms, and the 
tensions between these elements as well as the reform contexts that affect the trajectories 
and outcomes of public management reform. This chapter ends with a discussion of some of 
the thesis’ limitations and future research opportunities in this area.
11.1 Summary of Outcomes: Change in Thai Gvil Service Policy
This section will summarise the outcomes of Thai Gvil Service policy change and the 
routinisation of the process of change. Gvil service policy in Thailand in the period of study 
can be in general characterised by ‘limited change’ although there are some variations 
between different periods as well as between downsizing and pension reform. This pattern 
of change and variation can be described by referring to changes in the principal reform 
outcomes, goals and targets, instruments and measures, as well as relevant reform 
committees (Hall, 1993).2 Table 11.1 summarises the outcomes of the policy on downsizing
2 Defining the outcomes of public management reform this way, the Thai case can be conceptually 
meaningful as an object of academic study if it is comparable to other reform experiences across 
countries. Scholars of public management and organisational theories have classified reform or 
change trajectories and outcomes in many ways. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) conventionally 
distinguish between the ‘what trajectory and the ‘how trajectory of administrative reform. The ‘what 
trajectory includes the main components or substance of reform such as finance, personnel, 
organisation and performance management. The ‘how trajectory includes organisational and 
administrative choices made during the public management policy making and implementation 
process and is characterised by top down versus bottom up, legal dimensions, organisational 
processes and so on. Painter (2004) has developed a reform typology for Southeast Asian countries 
focusing on the ‘how trajectory shaped by the interaction between demands for administrative 
reform and the bureaucratic capacity. These interactions created reform outcomes that would result 
in one or overlapping typological forms: gridlock/negotiated reform, mandated reform, status
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the Gvil Service between 1980 and 1999. Table 11.2 provides overall outcomes of the Gvil 
Service pension reforms between 1991 and 1996.
As shown in Table 11.3, the outcomes of downsizing policy are limited and 
piecemeal. During the twenty years of this study, the goals of civil service reform were 
stabilised as ‘downsizing and rationalising’ the Gvil Service with additional and often equally 
important goals of democratising, ‘responsibilitising’ and improving service quality and 
delivery which emerged in the early 1990s. Thai Gvil Service downsizing policy reform in 
the 1980s can be classified by a Hall’s typology (1993) as ‘first order administrative reform’ 
in which reform goals and scope were slightly expanded but policy images, instruments and 
driving ideas were stable. A shift from first order to ‘second order administrative reform’ can 
be seen from the mid 1990s onwards when wide-ranging reform goals and scope were added 
and the underlying reform ideas were different from the beginning of the decade. These 
changes were introduced while the existing ones continued to operate.
Gvil Service pension reform presents a slightly different picture of civil service 
policy change. Reformers successfully introduced a defined contribution pension scheme 
and individual retirement accounts into the existing defined benefit pension system leading 
to the establishment of a two-tier pension system. Such an outcome can be classified as 
moderate change, which falls between second and third order administrative reform using 
Hall’s terminology. The goals, instruments and ideas behind the provision and management 
of civil service pensions substantially departed from the existing pension scheme.
The reform instruments chosen by reformers were mainly public personnel 
management tools and organisation and method techniques. The former aimed to increase 
civil service efficiency by maximising the utility of existing manpower and controlling 
numbers of staff and personnel costs. Such instruments ranged from conventional head
quo/incremental adaptation and status quo/continuous self-improvement. The reform trajectory 
explains the shift from one typological form to another. Another approach to classify outcomes is to 
consider the degree of change and innovation brought about by reform programmes or 
‘organisational interventions’. This approach is common among organisational theorists and public 
policy scholars. Hall (1993) explains changes in the outcomes of Britain’s macro-economic policy 
making based on changes in the policy goals, policy instruments and policy paradigm. Based on these 
policy change parameters, Hall has developed a three level typology of policy change that can be 
applied across different policy issues. His first order reform involves only changes in policy goals 
and targets. The second order change is characterised by both changes in policy goals and 
instruments, while the third order can be seen as a paradigm shift since policy goals, instruments and 
underlying ideas charge.
300
counting, imposing a manpower growth ceiling and restricting the replacement of vacancies 
from retirement, to the implementation of an early retirement scheme. The latter included 
the introduction of manpower planning, work process improvement and restructuring civil 
service organisations.
The relatively stable goals and instruments correspond to the reform scope of 
reformers. Table 11.3 shows that civil service reform in Thailand during the 1980s and early 
1990s was confined to the area of human resource management leading to limited reform 
scope. However, from the early 1990s the reform scope was expanded from the public 
personnel arena to other areas including quality and service delivery, deregulation, 
privatisation and democratisation. Although, with the onset of the Asian financial crisis, civil 
service policy in Thailand became more comprehensive in the sense that reform efforts 
included wide ranging issues to overhaul the operation and management of the public sector 
as a whole and the Gvil Service specifically, public personnel reform issues were stable and 
in some cases strengthened.
Related to the outcomes of civil service policy reform is the emerging pattern of 
routinised reform cycle.3 The cycle began as soon as the government took office. All 
governments appointed reform committees during their honeymoon period to carry out the 
process of making and, if the governments were in power long enough, implementing public 
management policy. These reform committees were ad hoc but high profile since senior 
politicians such as deputy prime ministers were usually assigned by the prime minister to be 
chairmen of the committees. The committees drew up reform proposals, often based on 
existing proposals, which were then sent to the cabinet for approval, which was invariably 
given. But before the measures can be implemented the coalition government collapsed,, 
often after less than two years in office. When a new coalition government came to power 
the reform cycle started again. Borwomwattana (2000) found the same pattern, which he has 
described as a ‘vicious cycle* of civil service reform in Thailand.
3 The routinised cycle of civil service reform involved the certification of individuals and institutions 
responsible for making administrative reform projects. Certified reformers could control the reform 
process by recruiting members of reform committees and sub-committees, and setting their reform 
agendas. The process of establishing reform committees usually involved assembling a team of 
officials and experts in public administration, and getting approval for members and mandates from 
the prime minister in the form of a prime ministerial order.
Table 11.1 Summary of the outcomes of the Civil Service reform effort in Thailand: 1980-1999
Administrations Principal Reform 
Outcomes
Reformers’ Specific 
Reform Goals
Reform Instruments/ 
Measures
Specific Targets Reform
Committees
Prem Tinsulanond Proposal for 
Reforming Civil 
Service Organisation 
and Staffing
To rationalise and 
downsize the Gvil 
Service
Controlling numbers of Gvil 
Service personnel (headcounts)
Restricting the proliferation of 
administrative units
Two per cent limit for 
manpower increases 
(Manpower ceiling)
CSARC
Chatchai
Choonhawan
Proposal for 
Improving Service 
Quality for Citizens
To restructure the Gvil 
Service and deregulate 
its rules to enable 
better public service 
provision.
Reviewing and assessing 
performance of departmental 
service delivery
Settling the citizens’ complaints
No specific targets CCSD
CRMD
AdcptingPropasalfor 
ifforrringCiuL Senioe 
organisation and staffing
To downsize the Ckil 
Senice
Contmdirg numbers cf Ckil Serdae 
personnel (headcounts) and restricting 
bureaucratic expansion
Two per aent limit for 
manpower increases
CSARC
Anand Punyarachun Proposal for the Civil 
Service Reform and 
Development Projects
Proposal for 
Improving the Civil 
Service System and 
Public Personnel 
Management
Combating corruption
To modernise and 
improve the Gvil 
Service
To rationalise and 
downsize the Gvil 
Service
To promote 
transparency in the 
government and Gvil 
Service
Freezing Gvil Service 
employment and redeploying 
staff
Privatising public services and 
utilities
Amending the Gvil Service Act 
and related administrative Acts
Public relations, disciplinary 
investigations and legal 
procedures
Recruitment freezing 
between 1991-1992
Encouraging the public 
services outsourcing
Gianging appointing 
powers of government 
ministers.
No specific target
CSRC
No
committee
established.
Table 11.1 Summary of the outcomes of the Civil Service reform effort in Thailand: 1980-1999 (continued)
Administrations Principal Reform 
Outcomes
Reformers’ Specific 
Reform Goals
Reform Instruments/ 
Measures
Specific Targets Reform
Committees
Chaun Leekpai Reform package for 
democratising the State 
Administration
Democratising the Gvil 
Service administration
Improving Gvil Service 
performance and service quality 
Decentralising administrative 
powers
No specific target SADC
Measure to Contrd the Size 
cf the Ckil Senioe
To dounsize the CkU 
Senice
Controlling Ckil Senioe reendtment and 
vacancy replacement
No specific tar^t CSMPC
Banham
Silapa-Archa
Proposal for Improving 
Service Quality to 
Citizens
To expand and improve 
public service quality to 
citizens
Improving administrative process 
involving public service provision 
and delivery
No specific target ISQC
Prime Ministerial Order 
on Administrative 
Reform
To downsize and 
rationalise the Gvil 
Service
Downsizing, restructuring 
and redefining the roles of the 
Gvil Service
No specific target CSRC
Adopting Measure to 
Contrd the Size ef the Ckil 
Senioe1
To downsize the Ckil 
Senice
Ckntrdlingnunhers cf Ckil Senioe 
personnel
No specific target CSMPC
Chavalit
Yongchaiyudth
Master Plan for 
Reforming the Public 
Sector, 1997-2001.
To rationalise and 
downsize the Gvil 
Service
To streamline public 
personnel costs
Controlling numbers of Gvil 
Service personnel
Cutting personnel expenditure.
Targeting staff 
cuts in Gvil 
Service personnel 
by 10% by 2001, 
and by 20% by 
2010.
CSRC
Adopting Measure to 
Contrd the Size cf the Ckil 
Senice\
To dcrunsizc the Ckil 
Senice.
Controlling mnixrs f  Ckil Senioe 
personnel
No specific Target CSMPC
Table 11.1 Summary of the outcomes of the Gvil Service reform effort in Thailand: 1980-1999 (Continued)
Administrations Principal Reform 
Outcomes
Reformers’ Specific 
Reform Goals
Reform Instruments/ 
Measures
Specific Targets Reform
Committees
Chaun Leekpai Public Sector Management 
Reform Plan
To introduce comprehensive 
Gvil Service reform.
Improving the structure, 
process, budget, finance 
and personnel system in 
the Gvil Service
No specific target CSRC
Framework for Good 
Governance
To provide guidelines for 
improving departmental 
performance
Assessing departments’ 
management operations 
using ‘good governance 
criteria.
OCSC
Measures to Reduce Public 
Personnel Expenditure
To streamline public 
personnel costs
Removing supplementary 
allowances and freezing the 
Gvil Service salary 
structure
No specific target CSRC
CSMPC
A doptingMaster Planfor 
Rfonring the Public Sector*
To rationalise and domsize the 
Ckil Senice
Implementing early 
retirement programme
More than 200,000 
personnel were 
expected to leave the 
Gvil Service
CSRC 
CMS PC
A dopting ‘Measure to Contrd 
the Size cf the Ckil Sendee
To domsize the Ckil Senice Controlling nimbers cf Ckil 
Senioe personnel
Freezing Gvil Service 
employment
80% of vacant posts to 
be scraped.
CSMPC
Table 11.2 Summary of the outcomes of the Gvil Service Pension reform effort in Thailand: 1991-1996
Administrations Principal Reform 
Issues /  Outcomes
Reformers’ Specific 
Reform Goals
Specific Reform 
Targets/Measures/Instruments
Issue Images Actors/Venues
Aland PurTyarachun Cabinet Resolution 
on Reforming Gvil 
Service Salary Scale 
making civil service 
pension reform a 
condition for further 
pay rises.
Proposal for Gvil 
Service Pension 
Reform
To reduce 
government public 
personnel costs
To reduce public 
personnel costs and 
pension burdens on 
the government
No specific targets
Overhauling the Gvil Service 
pension system by setting up the 
Central Provident Fund to manage 
retirement benefits for 
government personnel
Excessive personnel 
costs
Efficiency in managing 
civil service pensions 
and reducing public 
personnel costs
CGD and 
OCSC
CGD
Chaun Leekpai Proposal for 
Reforming Gvil 
Service pensions
Proposal for 
Comprehensive Gvil 
Service pension 
reform
To reduce public 
personnel costs and 
pension burdens on 
the government
To reduce public 
personnel costs and 
pension burdens on 
the government
To make the civil 
service pensions 
contribute to tbeocuntr}^  
macrc>ecanciiyby 
mnuvvirg the saving and 
investment gap.
Reforming pension system by 
replacing unfunded defined 
benefits with funded defined 
contribution system operated 
through proposed new Central 
Provident Fund
Introducing pre-funded defined 
contribution pension benefits to 
the existing defined benefit 
pensions which is joindy managed 
by the new Government Pension 
Fund and the CGD
Efficiency in managing 
civil service pensions 
and reducing public 
personnel costs
Efficiency in managing 
civil service pensions
Improving the macro­
economy
CGD
CGD and 
OCSC
Finance 
Minister and 
FPO
Table 11.2 Summary of the outcomes of the Civil Service Pension reform effort in Thailand: 1991-1996 (Continued)
Administrations Principal Reform 
Issues /  Outcomes
Reformers’ Specific 
Reform Goals
Specific Reform 
Targets/Meas ures/Instruments
Issue Images Actors/Venues
BanhamSilpaAicha Draft Bill on 
Government 
Pension Fund Act
Reprioritised Goals: 
To achieve good 
fiscal management by 
pre- funding civil 
service pensions.
To provide 
safeguards for future 
retirement benefits 
for government 
personnel
To promote domestic 
saving and 
encouraging the 
pension fund 
management 
businesses.
Introducing pre-funded defined 
contribution pension benefits to 
the existing defined benefit 
pensions which is joindy managed 
by the new Government Pension 
Fund and the OGD
Multiple images of 
good practice of 
pension
management, and 
safeguarding future 
retirement benefits as 
well as improving 
macro-economy
Finance minister 
FPO, GGD and 
OCSC
Table 11.3 Stability and Change in the Thai Public Management Policy, 1980-1999
Regime Types Is sues /Goals Instruments Scope Images Venues
Semi democracy 
(Prem)
Stabilised as downsizing Personnel 
management and 
organisation and 
method tools
Limited to public personnel 
management
Efficiency Single Venue
Democracy
(Chatchai)
Promoting service delivery 
improvement while allowing 
downsizing to continue
Organisation and 
methods and 
personnel 
management tools
Limited to public personnel 
management with 
emergence issue of 
improving service delivery
Responsiveness
VS
Efficiency
Multiple Venues
(3)
Authoritarianism
(Anand)
Improving efficiency through 
downsizing, rationalisation 
and deregulation with a mandate 
of transparency reform
Personnel 
management and 
organisation and 
method tools
Limited to public personnel 
management and 
rationalisation with a focus 
on privatisation
Efficiency and 
Deregulation
Single Venue
Democracy
(Chaim)
Democratising the Civil Service 
administration while allowing 
downsizing and civil service 
pension reform to continue
Personnel 
management and 
organisation and 
method tools
Expanded from public 
personnel management to 
democratic governance 
reform in the Gvil Service
Responsiveness
VS
Efficiency
Multiple Venues 
(2)
Democracy
(Banham)
Improving service quality to 
citizens while allowing 
downsizing and civil service 
pension reform to continue
Personnel 
management and 
organisation and 
method tools
Expanded from public 
personnel management to 
service quality improvement
Responsiveness
VS
Efficiency
Multiple Venues
(3)
Democracy
(Chavalit)
Stabilised as downsizing with 
added emphasis on overall 
improvement in public 
management functions
Personnel 
management and 
organisation and 
method tools
Wide Ranging from public 
personnel management to 
include financial and budget, 
procurements, structure and 
process (G)mprehensive)
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Responsiveness
Multiple Venues 
(2)
Democracy
(Chaun)
Downsizing with added 
emphasis on overall 
improvement in public 
management functions and 
good governance
Personnel 
management and 
organisation and 
method tools
Wide Ranging from public 
personnel management to 
include financial and budget, 
procurements, structure and 
process to good governance
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Responsiveness
Accountability
Multiple Venues
(3)
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The case of civil service pension reform was similar in the sense that the reform 
effort was sustained over a five-year period between 1991 and 1996. Despite the change 
from Anand’s authoritarian government to democratic governments of Chaun and finally 
Banham, bureaucratic reformers in the central co-ordinating agencies continued to be 
committed to reforming the existing Gvil Service pension system as part of their attempts to 
realise and fulfil their political mandates and agencies’ jurisdictions. Such commitment can 
be seen from repeated cycles of formulating and reformulating reform proposals in which 
reform goals, instruments and solutions were defined, refined and redefined. The technical 
nature of the civil service pension issue and the fragmented civil service policy making 
structure within which pension reform process took place led to a lengthy and self- 
perpetuating process, and a decision to produce a single unified reform proposal was 
difficult to reach. This issue will be dealt with more fully when discussing the decision 
making process.
In short, reforming civil service policy in Thailand in the 1980s and the 1990s only 
achieved limited change. It mainly involved what might be called ‘managerial reform’ 
(Borwomwattana 1994, 2000) with particular focus on civil service human resource issues. 
Incremental changes in civil service policy can be classified by Hall’s typology as falling 
somewhere between ‘the first-order and second order reform’ in the case of downsizing, and 
between second and third order reform in the case of civil service pensions. Having briefly 
reviewed the outcomes of civil service policy change in Thailand, it is appropriate to recall 
the principal thesis question: what explains such outcomes and their variations across time 
and cases? Attempts to provide answers for these questions can be found in the following 
sections.
11.2 Institutional Processualist Explanations for Civil Service Policy 
Change in Thailand
This section elaborates the explanations for stability and change in the Thai Gvil Service 
policy drawing on the narrative evidence in both case studies and the institutional processual 
theoretical compass that guides this thesis. It argues that the components of civil service 
policy making process namely agenda setting, alternative specification and decision making
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which operated within the institutional contexts and the dynamics of situations faced by 
reformers, shaped the variations in the trajectories and outcomes of civil service reform.
However, as has been seen in the narratives, civil service policy formulation is not 
neatly deconstructed in to ‘stages’ as each stage has some overlapping points of reference.1 
They are characterised by a multiple and sometimes repeated self-perpetuating cycles in 
which component parts are not linked in a linear fashion, where agenda setting precedes 
alternative specification which is followed by decision making. The counterfactual evidence 
found in the narratives illustrates these messy processes when ‘civil service reform solutions’ 
were first specified and then followed by the search for their ‘problems* or rationales, as 
problems cannot be well defined until solutions become available.
This thesis treats alternative specification and decision-making process as one large 
process of making reform choices. Such treatment is justified by the fact that the boundary 
between the two processes in the Thai context is not clearly identified and sometimes formal 
decision making in the cabinet, which was the executive decision arena, was only a 
certification of a decision already implicit in the specification of the reform alternative. As 
Painter (2004) has noted, the Thai cabinet is a “highly formalised, legalistic rubber stamp for 
decisions taken elsewhere”,2 when agreement on alternative specification could not be 
reached the cabinet acted as arbitrator and made the decision (Wilson, 1962). The cabinet 
decisional venue was also a place where consensus on public management reform was 
confirmed, and the interests of those involved and affected by the proposed reform 
programme were not jeopardised.
In order to overcome this ‘stage heuristic’ and to retain a broad picture of the civil 
service policy making process by acknowledging its interconnectedness, the analysis in this 
section treats the component parts of agenda setting, alternative specification and decision 
making as a unified process in which the boundaries between stages are not and cannot be 
clearly drawn. As Zahariadis (2003) has agued, the benefit of ‘non-distinction* is the ‘ability 
to develop concepts and processes that are internally consistent and meaningful across 
stages’. Treating the civil service policy decision making process in a non-stage distinction 
way promotes theoretical links between stages, provides a better and clearer view of the
1 Sabatier (1999) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that ‘stage heuristic’ is not a causal theory 
but a taxonomy that can mislead researchers because each stage proceeds without reference to work in 
other stages. Accordingly each stage is often affected by others.
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larger process and elaborates on causal mechanisms that give rise to theoretical coherence. 
This thesis therefore identifies two interactive analytic components that provide insight into 
a process understanding of public management reform: the emergence and retention of 
reform issues, and the making of civil service reform choices. The first encompasses the 
traditional agenda building process, and the second combines the interrelated and 
overlapping processes of alternative specification and decision-making. The end result of 
establishing non-distinctive but interrelated process components as a field for processual 
analysis is ‘the ability to explain more with less’ (Zahariadis, 2003). These two elements and 
their explanatory characteristics will be now discussed in turn.
11.2.1 Agenda Setting: The Emergence and Retention of Reform Issues
To obtain process understanding of civil service reform in Thailand, the process by which 
the reform issue reach the governments’ agenda needs to be explained because agenda 
building is the prelude for civil service policy decision- making (Dutton, 1988, 2002; 
Kingdon, 1995; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Down, 1972). Table 11.4 summarises the attributes 
of the civil service reform issue on Thai governments’ agendas. Reviewing the profile of civil 
service reform issues raises two major analytical questions instrumental in explaining stability 
and change in Thai civil service policy. First, how the issues of efficiency driven downsizing 
and rationalisation and other wider issues of democratising and improving public service 
quality got selected and included on the government agenda? Second, why downsizing and 
efficiency improvement were sustained on the government agenda throughout the period of 
study?
In answering these questions, I consider two sub-processes that together explain 
placement of an issue on the government agenda, namely ‘issue selection and inclusion’ and 
‘issue retention’. The former involves the process of getting or including the issue on 
government agendas, the latter refers to the process by which issues of civil service reform 
were retained on the government agenda and sustained over time. These are characteristics 
of process components that explain the civil service reform trajectories and outcomes. From 
an institutional processualist perspective, these sub-processes need to be considered within 
the institutional and wider political and economic contexts.
2 See Chapter 2
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Table 11.4 Attributes of Agenda Setting Processes and their Contexts
Administrations Reform Issues Issue
Salience
Issue Sponsors Issue
Status
Prem Downsizing High Politically and knranafinaDy backed 
CSARC
High
Chatchai Service delivery High Politically backed GCSD and 
CRMD
High
Downsizing Low Bureaucratically backed CSARC Low
Anand Rationalisation
Downsizing
High
High
Pditically and bureaucratically backad 
CSRC
Politically and bureaucratically 
backed CSRC
High
Hi&
Gvil Service 
Pensions Reform
High CGD 'with weak political 
support
Low
Chaun Democratisation High Politically backed SADC High
Downsizing Higfc Bweaucratically backed CSMPC Low
Gvil Service 
Pension Reform
High MdstiycfliaaDmdomuaBdpXC High
Banham Service delivery High Politically backed ISQC High
Downsizing Low Bureaucratically backed CSMPC Hi&
Gvil Service 
Pension Reform High Mfaktycf finance dcmnatedJVGC High
Chavalit Rationalisation High Politically backed CSRC High
Streamlining High Politically backed CSRC High
Downsizing Higfo Bureaucratically backed CSMPC Hi&
Chaun Rationalisation High Politically backed CSRC High
Streamlining High Politically backed CSRC High
Good gjiemanoe Higf} OCSC Hig>
Downsizing High Bureaucratically backed CSMPC Hi&
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A. Issue Salience, Issue Sponsorship and Issue Status
Understanding the ‘issue inclusion* process involves explaining why the issue is seen by 
reformers as salient and who provides the political foundation for reform issues. Issue 
salience’ and ‘issue sponsorship’, which can be seen as ‘process factors’ for public 
management policy change, operate within the institutional and wider context in which civil 
service reform took place. It is clear from the narrative evidence summarised in Table 11.5 
that two set of issues, downsizing, rationalisation and streamlining on the one hand, and 
wider issues of democratisation and service quality improvement on the other hand, have 
occupied the civil service reform agenda of Thai governments since the 1980s. Under 
authoritarian regimes and semi-democratic regimes issues of downsizing and rationalisation 
almost exclusively dominated the government agenda for civil service reform. However, a 
dichotomy of reform issues always occurred under democratic governments.
The salience of the ‘downsizing and rationalisation issue’ us-a-iis the ‘democratising’ 
and ‘improving service quality issue’ can be high or low depending on ‘issue sponsorship’ 
which in most cases is closely related to the government regime. As summarised in Table 
11.5, issue salience was relatively high when reform issues were sponsored by both 
government politicians and bureaucratic reformers or at least political support for reform 
issues was evident. The salience of downsizing, and other efficiency driven reform issues, 
and their resultant status were high under Prem’s semi-democratic and Anand’s authoritarian 
regimes, and also during governments experiencing the Asian financial crisis. The issue 
enjoyed political as well as bureaucratic support as can be seen from its sponsorship such as 
the CSARC and the CSRC. The CSARC was the only reform committee certified by Prem’s 
administration while, the CSRC under Anand’s enjoyed similar status.
In most democratic regimes, the salience and status of the downsizing issue was 
lower than other wider issues of democratising civil service administration to make it more 
responsive and accountable in terms of improving service delivery. These periods saw the 
supremacy of politically backed reform committees over the bureaucratic reform machine. 
The GCSD and CRMD during Chatchai’s administration toned down the issue of 
downsizing by promoting the issue of improving public service quality and administrative 
deregulation. Like Chatchai, Banham preferred improving service quality to downsizing. By
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politicizing the downsizing issue, the existing bureaucratically backed policy, ‘Measures to 
Control the Size of the Civil Service’ was undermined.
However, the salience and high status of reform issue is also dependent on the 
political and economic situations faced by the government of the day. The high status of 
downsizing and related reform issues during the Chavalit and Chaun administrations in the 
late 1990s can be explained by the wider economic imperatives that required these 
governments to introduce more comprehensive reform to streamline, downsize, and 
rationalise as well as improve wider issues of democratic governance. In the same vein, 
Banham’s promotion of public service quality and delivery, and the advocacy of Chaun’s 
first government of democratisation of the Civil Service can be explained by the dynamics of 
the wider political situation. Both administrations were under political pressure to reform the 
macro-politics of the country by amending the constitution. Both sought administrative 
reform as an alternative to political reform. Though it proved ineffective in the long run 
when both governments were forced to support the democratic reform movement in the 
mid 1990s, the ‘buying time strategy7 worked in their honeymoon periods as the reform issue 
was attended to by politicians and its status was high on the governments* policy agenda.
The situation-in-motion is also better suited for explaining the emergence and status 
of the civil service pension reform issue. The civil service pension reform issue, which 
emerged in Anand’s period, can be seen as salient because it was used by Anand’s cabinet to 
diffuse the pressure for Civil Service pay rises. However, its status during a short-lived 
government was low since it lacked sufficient real political support. During Chaun’s 
democratic regime, the issue of civil service pension reform gained support from the finance 
minister who saw its potential contribution to the macro economy. The JWC supported by 
Tharin, the finance minister, was entrenched and played important part in maintaining the 
momentum of the issue. Accordingly, the status of the issue was elevated on Chaun’s 
government agenda and continued on the agenda of his successor Banham, whose 
government allowed Chaun’s proposal to become law in 1996.
B. Issue Image and formulation
The civil service reform issue during the last two decades of the twentieth century was 
formulated in terms of reducing costs and improving civil service management, as well as 
democratising civil service management making it more accountable and responsive to the
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public. The image of the civil service reform issue is closely linked to the reform sponsorship 
mentioned above. As shown in Table 11.3, during almost all periods of the study, the reform 
images are dualistic -  the co-existence between what might be termed ‘efficiency image* and 
‘responsiveness image*. These images were advocated by different reform sponsors who 
tended to operate in different venues for making civil service policy. In this sense, the 
existing ‘reform venues’ and their operation in different periods shaped the images of civil 
service reform. Under the semi-democratic and authoritarian governments of Prem and 
Anand, the reform image was exclusively ‘efficiency* and operated in a single venue. Under 
democratic governments, the twin images of efficiency and responsiveness existed as a result 
of multiple venues sponsored by different reform actors.
The image of the civil service pension reform issue, although it can be classified as 
‘efficiency*, reinforces the argument that issue sponsorship influences ‘issue image 
formulation*. The image of civil service pension reform created by Anand’s cabinet was 
excessive public personnel cost (See Table 11.2). However, the image evolved and expanded 
from a single image of efficiency in managing civil service pensions and reducing public 
personnel costs, to improving the macro economy and ended up with the multiple images 
including best practice pension management and safeguarding future retirement benefits. In 
this case, reform actors -  the finance minister, the FPO, the GGD and the OCSC - with 
different reform aims, interests and ideas competed to shape the image of the civil service 
pension reform issue.
This section has examined the prelude to the civil service policy change process and 
provided explanations for the emergence of civil service reform issues on government policy 
agendas drawn from the narrative evidence. The following section seeks to explain how the 
momentum of the reform issue was sustained which increased the possibility of reform to be 
moved onto the governments* decisional agenda.
C  Issue Retention
The second question of empirical and analytical importance is: why was downsizing and the 
related efficiency driven reform issue retained on government agendas over a twenty year 
period while other issues emerged as ‘topics of the day* and faded away when the sponsoring 
governments left office? Why did the issue of civil service pension reform remain on the 
agendas of three different governments over a five-year period?
314
An explanation for issue retention can be seen in committed action by issue sponsors, 
which in the case of downsizing were reform committees such as the CSARC under Prem, 
the CSRC under Anand and the long-lived CSMPG These committees were the brainchild 
of the central co-ordinating agencies with personnel and finance related jurisdictions. The 
committed action of these agencies can be explained by mandate-induced actions and how 
bureaucratic reformers appropriated their roles and organisational jurisdictions and 
responsibility. This explanation can also be applied to pension reform where the ministry of 
finance dominated JWC and the OCSC were given leverage and support by the finance 
minister.
Another explanation for issue retention, especially downsizing, on successive 
government agendas involves the institutionalisation of the issue into an organisational unit’s 
practices or goals (Dutton, 1988). As well as the routinised reform cycle discussed above, 
bureaucrat reformers had tried and finally succeeded in institutionalising their reform efforts 
by sustaining the CSMPC as a vehicle for ‘incubating’ and processing the downsizing issue, 
and setting up a permanent secretariat office for civil service reform during Chavalit’s 
government. These institutionalised the effort to downsize the Gvil Service by creating an 
‘agenda structure’ which facilitated it and similar efficiency driven reform initiatives but 
constrained the ability of new reform issues to get on government agendas. In this sense, the 
structure of the reform agenda also entailed what Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) term ‘carrying 
capacity*.3
It can be concluded that the dichotomous issues of downsizing and other reform 
issues competed to reach and remain on governments’ civil service reform agendas. 
Variations in the salience and status of civil service reform issues are shaped by both 
institutional arrangements, namely the strategic location of issue sponsorship which varied 
across government regimes, and the wider political and economic situation faced by the 
government, which can be seen as contexts-in-motion. The retention of the downsizing 
issue on the government agenda is mainly the result of committed action by central co­
ordinating agencies, which were framed by their own routinised mandate and practices, and 
the institutionalisation of the civil service reform effort. Analysis of agenda setting helps 
provide explanations for the institutionalised civil service reform efforts and limited change
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in reform outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the agenda setting process, as many 
scholars have argued, has an important effect on decisional outcomes. These are the subject 
of the following sections.
11.2.2 Alternative Specification and Making decision on Gvil Service Reform Choices
The reform outcomes reviewed in section 11.1 pose analytic questions of why various 
measures of ‘downsizing’ and ‘responsibilitising’ the Gvil Service became potential 
alternatives for civil service reform and received considerable attention from both 
government politicians and bureaucratic reformers. A similar question can also be asked with 
regard to the civil service pension reform case: why were elements of the defined 
contribution pension added making Thai Gvil Service pensions a two tier system? Overall, 
why was the reform choice in the case of downsizing limited and piecemeal and in the case 
of pension reform moderate? This section therefore focuses on the process of making and 
adopting reform choices by those involved in the reform processes, namely government 
politicians and bureaucratic reformers. This is in line with Kingdon (1995) who proposes 
that understanding the alternative specification process requires the examination of ‘policy 
stream* and hidden participants in particular policy areas.
In the light of an institutional and processualist conceptual guide, this section 
demonstrates how the choice making process and institutional contexts affect ‘choices’ of 
measures for civil service reform selected by government politicians and/or bureaucratic 
reformers. From the analytic narratives it can be argued that the ‘pace and rate’ at which the 
civil service policy reform was decided was influenced by the combined impact of the 
institutional structure of civil service policymaking, the softening-up and coupling processes, 
and the dynamic of the economic and political contexts. The following subsections 
demonstrate how these explanatory factors, which support the findings of Kingdon (1995), 
Zahariadis (2003), Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and Durant and Diehl (1989), affect the 
specification of reform content, the adoption of certain measures, and the pace of civil 
service reform in Thailand.
3 Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) argue that different social arenas have different carrying capacities that 
“limit the number of social problems that they can entertain during a given period”.
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A. Specifying and Adopting Reform Alternatives
This thesis supports existing literature in the sense that alternatives for civil service reform 
were specified in specialised policy communities; in this study the civil service policymaking 
institutions. The main argument of this thesis is that the institutional arrangements of civil 
service policy making influence the process cf making rtform dodoes ? However, the institutional 
structure within which downsizing and pension reform operated are different both across 
policy issues and time. The variation does not necessarily mean that the civil service policy 
making institutions completely changed. But such structures or issues could be more volatile 
in one period than another depending on the wider context-in-motion within which civil 
service policy-making institutions operated.
In authoritarian and democratic regimes, as clearly seen in the case of downsizing, 
the civil service policy-making institutions are quite stable and characterised by a close-knit 
and highly integrated group of central co-ordinating agencies with personnel and financial 
jurisdictions. In democratic regimes where government politicians attempted to increase 
their influence over the Gvil Service, the structure of civil service policy making was more 
volatile due to the leverage and access politicians had and the degree of political involvement, 
the ‘politicisation’, in formulating and implementing civil service policies. In pension reform, 
the structure of the JWC was tight as it was dominated by bureaucrats from the Finance 
Ministry. In this sense the structure of pension reform was cohesive and less fragmented 
than that of downsizing where actors were drawn from government politicians, and 
representatives from the OCSQ the OGD, the BOB, the NESDB, university academics and 
representatives from the private sector.
The different institutional and structural arrangements for civil service reform affect 
the adoption of particular reform approaches and measures in both cases. In the downsizing 
case choices for civil service reform were normally specified as ‘downsizing’ reflecting the 
close ties between personnel and budget related central coordinating agencies with a ‘purse 
string mentality*. These tight networks also specified narrow reform goals, measures and 
instruments, exclusively related to human resource management. But when the structure of 
civil service policy-making was more volatile, as in democratic periods, additional issues of
4 Kingdon (1995) argues that alternatives and proposals are generated in communities of specialists 
such as budget or staff related agencies. Some communities are tight, some are close knit.
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‘responsibilitising’ the Gvil Service were usually added with expanded and sometimes 
different scope, goals, measures and instruments. In the pension reform case, the monopoly 
of the GGD over the policy and management of the civil service pensions was broken as the 
FPO, which was activated by the finance minister, and the OCSC were brought in. Although 
the community of the JWC was stable throughout the period of study, the different goals 
and reform approaches advocated by its members led to the production of a moderate 
reform outcome, the adoption of a combined two tier pension system. Had the GGD 
retained a monopoly over pension policy and management it had in the Anand period, the 
reform outcome could have been more radical because the GGD wholeheartedly supported 
a complete overhaul of the pension system, a point confirmed by a key participant in the 
pension reform process. It can be concluded that the communities of civil service policy 
making in both cases affected the generation and adoption of reform alternatives for 
downsizing and pension reform. These communities contributed to the piecemeal and 
moderate change in both policy areas.
B. The Reform Pace: The Softening-Up Process
The pace of civil service reform in Thailand, particularly downsizing and pension reform, 
was affected by the gestation or ‘softening-up’ period (Kingdon, 1995) and the coupling 
modes (Zahariadis, 2003). According to Kingdon (1995), “a long softening up process is 
critical to policy change. Windows of opportunity pass quickly and are missed if the proposal 
has not already gone through a long gestation process before the window opens. The work 
of floating and refining is not wasted if it does not bear fruit in a short run”.
The case of downsizing reflects a long gestation period over twenty years during 
which Thai governments attended to the issue of civil service expansion and manpower 
overgrowth. This lengthy period of softening-up not only familiarised members of the 
socially and professionally tight knit personnel and budget related central co-ordinating 
agencies, it also made downsizing a legitimate issue within the civil service policy making 
institutions.5 The gestation period bore fruit when bureaucratic reformers could promptly
Community members share one thing: ‘specialisations’ and ‘acquaintance with the issue’ in particular 
policy areas.
5 Interview evidence shows OCSC, GGD, BOB and NESDB officials spoke the same language 
regarding problems, rationales, solutions and techniques for downsizing the civil service.
Table 11.5 Examples of Civil Service Pension reform choices situations: Making Reform Choices
Reform
Dimensions
The CGD The OCSC The FPO Finance Minister Agreement/
Mechanism
Choices of letnemert 
benefits
Providing only lump 
sum benefits paid on 
the retirement
Maintaining choices 
between monthly 
annuity and lump sum 
benefits.
No specific interest Maintaining choice 
between monthly 
annuity and lump sum 
benefits but looking 
for alternative benefits 
administration Le. 
through private 
pension funds
Choice of retirement 
benefits maintained as 
a result of the Finance 
Minister’s mediation. 
He doubted the 
acceptability of civil 
servants if the existing 
choices were 
eliminated (July 1994).
Financing Gvil Service 
pensions
Pre-funded. Pre-funded. Pre-funded. Pre-funded. Consensus was reached 
at the beginning of the 
reform process
Design ofBenefits 
Gwtdbudon Rates
Replacing existing 
defined benefit pay as 
you go pension system 
with defined 
contributions.
Government 
contributed more than 
civil servants.
Two tier system mixing 
existing defined benefit 
pay as you go pension 
system with defined 
contributions to avoid 
political risk of being 
rejected by civil 
servants
Government 
contributed more than 
civil servants.
Two tier system mixing 
existing defined benefit 
pay as you go pension 
system with defined 
contributions
Government 
contributed more than 
civil servants.
Two tier system mixing 
existing defined benefit 
pay as you go pension 
system with defined 
contributions
Equal contributions 
between government 
and civil servants.
Mediated by the 
Finance Minister who 
took the compromise 
path suggested by the 
IMF Quly 1994).
Finance Minister ruling 
in favour of his own 
alternative due to the 
possible fiscal impact
Table 11.5 Examples of Civil Service Pension reform choices situations: Making Reform Choices (Continue)
Reform
Dimensions
The GGD The OCSC The FPO Finance Minister Agreement/
Mechanism
Pensions
Administration
Singaporean style of 
Central Provident 
Fund responsible for 
all aspects of Gvil 
Service pension 
administration
Independent 
Government Pension 
Fund not part of the 
government 
bureaucracy
Independent 
Government Pension 
Fund like the 
Provident Fund for 
private sectors workers 
not part of the 
government 
bureaucracy
Independent 
Government Pension 
Fund like the 
Provident Fund for 
private sectors workers 
not part of the 
government 
bureaucracy
Consensus was reached 
at the beginning of the 
reform process.
Membership:
Tjpes of Gvil Servants
All occupational 
groups of civil servants 
but excluding 
permanent employees 
whose separate 
pension funds would 
be established
Only ‘ordinary civil 
servants’ including 
permanent employees
No specific interest All occupational 
groups of civil servants 
but excluding 
permanent employees 
whose separate 
pension funds would 
be established
Finance Minister’s 
intervention (January 
1994)
Membership: Retrospective approach 
for all civil servants
Compulsory for only 
newly recruited civil 
servants, the existing 
personnel were allowed 
to stay with the old 
system
No specific interest Compulsory for only 
newly recruited civil 
servants, the existing 
personnel were allowed 
to stay with the old 
system
But public relation 
campaign needed to 
ensure high 
participation rate.
Finance Minister’s 
intervention (January 
1994)
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propose their long-standing reform solution when windows of opportunity opened during 
the honeymoon periods of most incoming governments. This ability to seize an opportunity 
helped sustain the leading role of the civil service policy-making institutions, and hence place 
the issue of downsizing on governments’ agendas.
A long softening-up period did not occur in the pension reform case, however. This 
resulted in the CGD’s failure to seize the opportunity to put forward its not yet 
institutionalised radical ideas of replacing defined benefit pay-as-you-go pensions for civil 
servants with the wholly new idea of a defined contribution pensions systems. Despite the 
failure of the GGD to seize an opportunity to put forward its own radical proposal, it 
formed part of the single unified proposal adopted in 1994 and made law in 1996, which 
represented a more significant shift in civil service policy than any produced by the 
downsizing policy. Using Kingdon’s proposition, one might argue that the JWCs reform 
proposal later went through a softening up period during the three years of Chaun’s 
administration before it was deliberated in parliament in 1996. But it can also be argued, in 
line with Durant and Diehl (1989) that significant civil service policy change may not 
necessarily need a lengthy process of softening up as happened in the case of downsizing. 
Building a typology to characterise trajectories of ‘alternatives’ based on mode and tempo, 
Durant and Diehl propose that policy change can fall into one of four categories: the 
gradualist, the emergent, the convergent and the quantum.
Based on the narrative, this thesis agrees with Kingdon that a softening up period 
does contribute to the adoption of reform choices and the length of the reform choice 
making process, as evident in the case of downsizing. But Kingdon’s stance on a long 
softening up process in the policy community tending to produce piecemeal change cannot 
be substantiated by the fact that the shorter gestation period in pension reform produced 
more far reaching change in the Thai civil service pension system. The pension case 
conforms more with Durant and Diehl’s typology pointing out that reform solutions that 
were made in the policy stream or ‘policy community* need not be incremental.
C  The Intensity of Reform Efforts: The Coupling Process and Specifying Reform 
Alternatives
Related and possibly contributing to the adoption of civil service reform choices is the 
intensity of the reform effort. This intensity of effort, as has been seen in the narrative
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chapters, largely involved the intervention and effort of principal reformers to influence the 
decision making process and the adoption of particular reform choices. The intensity of the 
reform effort usually leads to the coupling of problems, policy and politics in a particular 
area of reform. As commentary has already been made on individual episodes with regard to 
the actions of reformers in influencing the civil service policymaking process, this section 
examines the ‘coupling mode’, which amounts to how choices of civil service reform are 
adopted. The way in which coupling take places also contributes to the pace and rate of the 
reform process.
Extending Kingdon’s multiple streams model, Zahariadis (2003) identifies two types 
of couplings, doctrinal and consequential, depending on where the window of opportunity 
opens. Doctrinal coupling takes place when windows open in political streams. As the 
political stream is receptive to solutions but the problem is missing, it promotes searching 
and inventing a problem to an already existing solution: the policy is in search of rationales.1 
In contrast, when windows open in the problems stream, coupling is likely to be 
consequential finding a solution to a given problem.
The coupling modes that emerge from the two narrative cases, which fit well with 
Zahariadis’ propositions, contributed to the adoption of civil service reform alternatives by 
government politicians and bureaucratic reformers, as well as the pace of civil service reform 
in Thailand. Gvil service reform is characterised by both the doctrinal and consequential 
coupling modes. The domination of one mode over another depends on the political 
regimes within with the reform effort took place. When bureaucratic reformers gained 
relatively high autonomy in formulating civil service policy reform proposals, the coupling 
mode tends to be consequential as reformers sought solutions for their perceived long 
standing civil service problems including bureaucratic inefficiency, excessive manpower and 
high personnel costs. Reform committee after reform committee was set up to develop 
‘reform measures’ that would match their interpretation of bureaucratic problems. As a 
result, efficiency driven reform solutions were introduced, adopted and reintroduced and 
readopted by subsequent governments leading to a protracted reform process, despite the
1 Hirschman and Lindblom (1962) argue that in policy making, ‘ends [problems] are chosen that are 
appropriate to available or nearly available means [solutions] rather than the other way round. It is 
easier to scan for solutions than for problems. There are too many problems for policy makers to 
solve. Raising problems first can also be costlier than focusing on solutions. Technological change 
and spillover effects also support the argument for doctrinal search and coupling (Zahariadis, 2003).
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‘acceptance in principle’ of most of their reform proposals by governments during their 
honeymoon periods.
Although bureaucratic reformers tried to maintain the consequential mode of 
alternative specification during democratic regimes, the doctrinal mode of coupling was 
more visible. Most democratically elected governments came to office with their own reform 
agendas, which were normally wider than those of bureaucratic reformers. Government 
politicians* reform agenda, which was normally characterised as ‘responsibilitising’ the Gvil 
Service to carry out election campaign promises, can be seen in Chaun’s democratising the 
civil service project, and Banham’s improving service quality to citizens. By adopting 
doctrinal mode coupling, reform proposals were quickly developed and reform committees 
were swifdy established to find rationales for the political pet projects and promises.
Election campaign promises were seen as approval for enacting promised policy as 
demanded by the public. The downsizing case provides the same insight into doctrinal mode 
couplings as Zahariadis found in his case studies of the choice to sell British Rail in the mid 
1980s. Enacting election promises as Chaun and Banham did is a visible way to show that 
the promise is delivered and policy change is taking place. It is politically more important 
than actually solving any problems. Doctrinal coupling exemplifies the broad picture of 
making reform choice in the situation which government politicians and bureaucratic 
reformers competed to represent their interests in and tried to exert control over the 
ownership of the reform process without paying much attention to the detailed technical 
quality of reform choices and or their availability. The doctrinal coupling process contributes 
to the pace of civil service reforms despite the fact that such efforts were usually short lived 
due to the instability of Thai coalition governments.
The doctrinal mode of coupling also operated in the case of civil service pension 
reform when Anand’s cabinet proposed the improvement of the pension system as a ‘reform 
solution’ for future pay increases. However, the civil service pension reform issue is more 
complicated than downsizing in the sense that specifying and adopting reform options was 
left to the discretion of bureaucrats in the ministry of finance and the OCSC When the issue 
of pension reform arrived at the community of bureaucratic reformers, they started to 
redefine the problem and search for solutions to technical details of the new Gvil Service 
pension system. In short, there was a switch from doctrinal mode to consequential mode of 
alternative specification.
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Unlike downsizing, pension reform provides a close-up view by illustrating the 
reform choice making process in more detail. As shown in Table 11.5, it typifies how the 
new pension design was specified and decided in a very tight network of civil service 
policymaking institutions. The consequential mode of making choices for pension reform is 
characterised by a self-perpetuating process with repeated cycles of information processing. 
As the participating actors in the reform process did not have complete information on the 
new design of the pension systems due to partial and fragmented jurisdiction over the civil 
service pension administration, decisions on significant issues of pension choices and rights, 
membership, finance and capitalisation were not made as one short discreet event but in a 
series of events over a period.
The slow pace of making civil service pension reform choice was due partly to the 
interconnection of pensions’ issue dimensions (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Making a 
choice on one issue affected the adoption of choices on other issues. For example, the 
decision to allow a choice of a lump sum pension or monthly annuity, which was not 
conducive to the fulfilment of the OGD’s aim to reduce pension costs. Maintaining choices 
of retirement benefits affected the way the pension benefits would be calculated by changing 
the pension formula from the final month salary to a five-year average. Changing the way 
pensions were calculated unavoidably led to a reduction of pension benefits. To maintain 
equitable benefits, the JWC reconsidered the IMF’s recommendation to create a two-tier 
system in which in the second contributory tier would make the pension benefit remain the 
same. However, the introduction of the second tier pension system would take away money 
from civil servants’ to contribute to the fund. This might affect the acceptability of the new 
system and ‘impose losses’ on civil servants. It was at this point that the issue of increasing 
civil service pay, which was the genesis of pension reform issue but had been replaced by 
other goals, re-emerged. In this sense, the Civil Service salary was adjusted as a 
compensatory mechanism to increase the acceptability of pension reform among civil 
servants.
Another aspect of decision-making involves how conflicts and disagreements on the 
new pension design were resolved. The case of pension reform reveals that decision-making 
was achieved by two mechanisms: mutual adjustment brokered by the finance minister and 
mobilisation of support. The issue of maintaining the monthly annuity pension advocated by 
the OCSC was decided on the grounds that this form of retirement benefit was highly
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popular among government personnel since it provided a stable income in retirement. The 
mobilisation of support involved forming an alliance between the OCSC and the Civil 
Service Association, whose opinion was conveyed to the JWC by the OCSC As a result, the 
finance minister decided not to adopt the CGD’s proposal to provide only sump sum 
pension benefits.
A similar decision mechanism can be seen in the negotiation over membership issues 
between the OCSC and the GGD. In this case the finance minister adopted the CDG’s 
proposal to include all occupational groups of civil servants into the new pension design, 
which would only be compulsory for new entrants; existing civil servants could remain in the 
existing if they wished. Unlike the OCSCs proposal, the CGD’s proposal, which excluded 
‘permanent employees’, was well received by the finance minister since he saw an 
opportunity to achieve his macro economic policy aims in the establishment of more 
separate pensions funds for ‘permanent employees’.
11.2.3 Attribution of Reform Opportunity: The Contextual Pressures
The narrative reveals that reform processes in both downsizing and pension reform operated 
within the contexts of changing demands of economic and political developments. Some 
scholars such as Pollitt and Summa (1997) argue that political and economic pressures are 
the ‘starting point’ for public management reform. As the thesis has adopted an ‘institutional 
processualist’ view, it would be more analytically interesting to inquire if economic and 
political pressure helped shape the content, scope, pace and timing of civil service reform. 
Keeler (1993) who extends Kingdon’s concept of windows of opportunity to explain the 
‘pattern of extraordinary policy making’ conceives such economic and political pressures as 
‘mandate* and ‘crisis’ which serve to open a window for reform and link to reform choices. 
Mandates affect reform choices through three mechanisms: authorisation, empowerment, 
and party pressure mechanism, while crisis operates through the urgency mechanism (Keeler, 
1993). His ‘macro window* opens as a result of a combined effect of the severity of the crisis 
and the size of mandate.
A  Political Mandate: the Content and Pace of Civil Service Reform
The political mandate and crisis can be seen as providing a macro window for civil service
reform. The Anand’s government, which was appointed by the NPKC after a military coup
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in 1991, bore the most significant mandate to make the Gvil Service clean and transparent to 
fulfil the coup’s rationale. Applying Keeler’s authorisation mechanism, Anand was 
authorised with ‘transparency reform’ to combat political and bureaucratic corruption, as 
narrated in chapter four. Giuan’s government after the resumption of democracy in 1992 
was also authorised to carry out constitutional reform. Reluctantly it adopted a 
‘democratising the Gvil Service’ reform programme as a time buying strategy. Nonetheless, 
such political authorisation had a spillover effect to the area of administrative reform. 
Likewise, both authorisation and party pressure mechanism operated in the process of 
specifying alternatives for civil service reform leading to the politicisation of civil service 
policy making institutions by setting up reform committees whose work was in line with the 
government’s election campaign promise to further amend the country’s constitution. 
Through these mechanisms, Banham’s civil service reform proposals, like those of Giaun, 
were geared toward the democratisation of civil service management focusing on the 
improvement of public service provision. In short, the adoption of these reform proposals 
was fast paced during the governments’ honeymoon periods and can be characterised by 
Keeler’s ‘mandate driven civil service reforms’.
B. Economic Crisis: the Content and Pace of Civil Service Reform 
Economic crisis can affect the content and pace of civil service reform. Crises can be what 
Kingdon (1995) calls ‘focusing events’, like the 1997 Asian economic crisis, or changes in 
some economic and social indicators that are perceived by policy makers as serious problems, 
which need to be fixed. Economic crises can have immediate impact on reform proposals as 
Pollitt and Summa (1997) argue in their comparative study of two Westminster style 
administrations -  the ILK. and New Zealand, and two Nordic countries -  Finland and 
Sweden, there is little doubt that a perceived need to restrain the rate of growth of public 
spending was a significant influence on reform programmes in these countries. Pollitt and 
Summa share with Keeler the focus on how economic pressure shapes the timing of policy 
reform. Keeler in particular proposes that windows for reform opportunity open when 
economic crisis strikes creating a sense of urgency for reformers based on the assumption 
that the identified problems will be exacerbated if appropriate actions are not promptly taken.
The narrative cases of downsizing and civil service pension reform reveal that the 
economic crises helped identify alternatives for civil service reform and accelerated the pace
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of reform through Keeler’s urgency mechanism. In downsizing it is clear that the demands 
from the bust and boom economic situations were reflected in the governments’ civil service 
programme. The economic crisis and the subsequent structural adjustments during Prcm’s 
administration in the early 1980s gave birth to the issue of downsizing and improving civil 
service management reflecting the stringent measures which the government pursued with 
the recommendation of international lending institutions. The Asian financial crisis in the 
mid 1990s also shaped the content and scope of civil service reform as can be seen from the 
development of more comprehensive public sector reform proposals under Chavalit and 
Chaun’s second government. The content of these reform proposals not only reflected the 
need to alleviate the fiscal and financial constraints on the government, but also aimed to 
overhaul the overall operation of the Civil Service.
"While economic crisis tends to affect the content of civil service reforms which were 
normally driven by the general concept of ‘efficiency, the economic boom of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s shifted the attention of government politicians from ‘cost cutting and 
streamlining issues* to reform issues that would make the civil service more responsive and 
accountable to the citizens they served. In the Chatchai and Banham administrations 
government politicians paid more attention to measures for improving the public service and 
service quality as well as the way the Gvil Service operated in providing services to citizens 
particularly businesses, which were seen as one of the most important drivers behind the 
boom.
In the case of pension reform the content of the new pension design also reflected 
the economic problems that governments faced. Reducing public personnel costs and the 
pension burdens on the government provided rationales for the GGD and the OCSC to 
commit themselves to the pension reform programme, while the widening gap between 
savings and investments, one of the most important indicators of the country’s economic 
sustainability, provided a platform for the FPO to affect the content of the reform proposal.
The impact of economic crisis or boom which is regarded by Kingdon (1995) as 
‘focusing events’ or ‘changes in indicators’, and by Keeler (1993) as crisis, not only affects 
the content but also the pace of development of reform proposals. The fast reform pace can 
be seen as a result of urgency to deal with the crisis.2 Crisis can accelerate the reform pace
2 However, how well the reformers respond to the crisis may be dependent on the institutional 
contexts within with reformers operate. MacIntyre (2003) analyses the impact of institutions, namely
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because it helps reformers identify problem worth examination, as attention is scarce among 
reformers and hence generate a prompt response because the window of opportunity 
opened by the crisis is brief.
So far, this concluding chapter has provided institutional processualist explanations 
for civil service policy change and stability in Thailand elaborating how and why the 
analytical elements of the civil service policy making process -  agenda setting, alternative 
specification and decision making -  operate. The next section recalls the intellectual puzzle 
identified in Chapter One regarding the impact of ‘reform capacity* as an explanatory factor 
for public management policy change. The next section demonstrates how public 
management reform capacity might be re-conceptualised in the light of institutional and 
processaul analysis.
11.3 Re-conceptualising Public Management Reform Capacity
The narrative case evidence presented in Part II and III of this thesis provides a more 
complex and sometimes contradictory view of reform capacity than the traditional 
institutionalist concept of reform capacity, of which Knill’s ideal configuration is part. As 
seen in Table 11.6, this thesis shares the institutionalist view that high ‘reform capacity* 
usually produces more far-reaching public management policy change than low reform 
capacity. But ‘reform capacity* can be conceptualised differently in the light of an 
institutional processualist framework.
Public management reform capacity, which is defined in this thesis as opportunities 
and risks for formulating and enacting civil service policy change by imposing losses on, and 
innovating in civil service management, can be seen as emerging from the institutional and 
processual factors, the dynamic relationship between them, and the dynamic relationship 
between them the wider socio-politico-economic context. Conceiving ‘public management 
reform capacity* this way can overcome the rigidity of the ‘structural possibility thesis’ that 
has been advocated by institutionalists. In effect, my thesis argues that it is pivotal for 
understanding reform capacity to consider it as an ‘ability* of governments and therefore 
emergent and fluid, and not a ‘fixed structural entity* which is pre-conditioned and rigid.
the degree of dispersal of decision-making powers, on the ability of Southeast Asian governments to
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This re-conceptualised public management reform capacity maintains that although 
i the institutional structure tends to have certain potential for enabling and promoting public 
management policy change, such potential is always constrained by the actions of reformers 
; and their dynamics relationship to the contexts within with the reform process takes place. 
’ Therefore, reform capacity should not be viewed as being a product of the configuration of 
: national administrative structures as Knill and other institutionalists conceive it.
Table 11.6 Re-Conceptualising Reform Capacity
Governments 
(Types/Regim e)
Strength
of
Executive
Leadership
Entrenchment
of
Administrative
arrangement
Political 
Influence of 
the
Bureaucracy
Dynamics
Of
Contexts/
Situation
Reform
Capacity
Civil
Service
Policy
Change
Prerru 
Semi-Democracy
High Entrenched High Crisis High Moderate
Chatchai: 
Elected democracy
Low Fragmented Low Stable Low Piecemeal
Anand:
Authoritarian
Higher Entrenched High Crisis Higher Far
reaching
Chaun I:
F.W tprl rtam nrrary
Low Fragmented Low Stable Low Piecemeal 
Far reachingTharin H ifji Entrenched H Stable H $
Banham: 
Elected democracy
Low Fragmented Low Stable Low Piecemeal
Chavalit 
Elected democracy
Low Fragmented High Crisis Medium Moderate
Chaun II: 
Elected democracy
Low Fragmented High Crisis Medium Moderate
' Note: 1. Cizil Senias Pension Rtform in italic
2. Degree of high medium and low, as well as piecemeal, moderate and far reaching 
change represents a rough comparison between governments.
: respond to the Asian financial crisis.
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To be conceptually useful, this thesis re-interprets Knill’s components of 
administrative reform capacity by incorporating both institutional and processual elements. 
Table 11.6 shows how his components of reform capacity -  the strength of executive 
leadership, the entrenchment of administrative arrangement, and the political influence of 
the bureaucracy -  operate in dialectical ways within the dynamics of political and economic 
developments. From this the degree of ‘reform capacity* as well as its corresponding public 
management policy change can be identified. The following paragraphs reinterpret elements 
of Knill’s framework drawing on the narrative evidence presented in this thesis.
11.3.1 Strength of Executive Leadership
This thesis argues, with most scholars, that the strength of executive leadership rests on the 
concentration of power in the executive at both the macro and micro level. The 
concentration of power at the macro level is embedded in the government regime type, and 
at the micro level involves the influence of political leadership and certified politician 
reformers. At the macro level, the case evidence shows that power concentration or dispersal 
depends on the government regime. The authoritarian government of Anand and semi- 
democratic government of Prem both had concentrated power, while all the democratic 
regimes had less concentrated power due to the nature of coalition government, where 
power was always shared among several ruling political parties. These coalition parties in 
practice acted as veto points both in the cabinet where most civil service reform proposals 
were decided and in parliament if legislative change was needed. At a more micro level, the 
concentration of power can be seen in how much influence the political leadership or 
certified politician reformers have on the trajectory and outcomes of civil service reform. 
Examples can be seen in the roles of Anand in promoting efficiency issues, and Tharin’s in 
processing the narrower issue of pension reform. By identifying different levels of power 
concentration as determinants of the strength of executive leadership, variations in reform 
capacity and its consequent public management policy change in different issue areas can be 
clearly explained.
11.3.2 Entrenchment of Administrative Arrangement
The strength of executive leadership can affect the entrenchment of administrative 
arrangements. Rather than viewing the administrative structure of the Thai bureaucracy as a
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unified configuration organised around rigid bureaucratic rules, this thesis looks particularly 
at the level of administrative policy subsystems. These subsystems include the civil service 
policy-making agencies such as the central co-ordinating agencies and other institutional 
venues for civil service policy making. The justification for considering these policy 
subsystems is two fold. First, most civil service reform proposals were made in these 
subsystems. Second, these policy subsystems can change and often did leading to the public 
management policy change and stability.
A high degree of administrative entrenchment can be seen as the domination of civil 
service policy by a single policy venue. A low degree of administrative entrenchment can be 
seen in the fragmentation of and competition among reformers in multiple institutional 
venues. In this sense, the entrenchment of administrative arrangements is inevitably affected 
by different government regime types, which can rearrange and reorganise civil service policy 
subsystems and certify particular reformers or institutional venues to be in charge of the 
reform programme.
11.3.3 The Political Influence of the Bureaucracy
The third characteristic of Knill’s ideal types of administrative reform capacity that needs to 
be re-interpreted is the political influence of the bureaucracy, how far bureaucrat reformers 
are able to shape the outcome of public management policy change. Bureaucratic influence 
over civil service policy making depends on the degree of autonomy which they are granted 
by different government regimes. In this sense, bureaucratic autonomy is mainly a result of 
the nature of the poHtico-administrative relationships in any given government regime. The 
narratives provide a good basis to argue that regimes types affect the nature of the politico- 
administrative relationships or ‘public service bargain’, defined in this thesis as the specific 
pattern of relationship and relative power sharing between government politicians and senior 
bureaucrats in the central co-ordinating agencies to make and implement public management 
policy.3 The political influence of the bureaucracy determines its discretion and autonomy in 
shaping the civil service reform process, as well as reform process ownership.
3 See Chapter 1.
Table 11.7 Regime Types, Nature of Politico-Administrative Relationship, Autonomy and Reform Ownership
Administrations Regime Types Nature of Politico-Administrative 
Relationships
Lead Reform 
Committees
Sponsoring 
Actors /  Organis ations
General Prem Tinsulanond 
(Khr.1980-Apr.1988)
Semi-democracy High level of involvement by Central 
coordinating agencies
CSARC OCSC and other central 
coordinating agencies
Chatchai Choonhawan Democracy High level of involvement by the Prime Minister’s 
Advisory Team
Low level of involvement in Civil Service policy 
making by central coordinating agencies.
CCSD
CRMD
CSARC
Prime Minister’s advisory 
teams with the PMSO as 
an administrative device.
OCSC and other central 
coordinating agencies
Anand Punyarachun Authoritarian Exclusive high level of involvement by military 
and civilian bureaucrats and technocrats
CSRC OCSC became the lead 
agency with some 
involvement from other 
central coordinating 
agencies.
Chaun Leekpai Democracy High level of government politician involvement 
Central coordinating agencies played subordinate 
roles.
Low level of involvement in Gvil Service policy 
making by central coordinating agencies.
SADC
CSMPC
Government’s politicians 
with the PMSO certified 
as an administrative 
device
OCSC and other central 
coordinating agencies
Tabie 11.7 Regime Types, Nature of Politico- Administrative Relationship, Autonomy and Reform Ownership
Administrations Regime Types Nature of Politico-Administrative 
Relationship
Lead Reform 
Committees
Sponsoring Actors/ 
Organisation
Banham Silapa-Archa Democracy High level of government politicians 
involvements and intervention in public 
management policy
ISQC Government’s politicians 
with the PMSO was 
certified as an 
administrative device
High level of involvement by central 
coordinating agencies in public management 
policymaking and implementation
CSMPC OCSC and other central 
coordinating agencies
Chavalit Yongchaiyudth Democracy High level of central coordinating agencies in 
making and implementing public 
management policy
High level involvement of government 
politicians in initiating and intervening public 
management policy
CSRC
CSMPC
CSRC
CSMPC
Central coordinating 
agencies received high 
level of support from the 
government politicians, 
which was accompanied 
by high degree of 
politicisation.
Chaun Leekpai Democracy High level of involvement in making and 
implementing public management policy 
central coordinating agencies and the 
government politicians
CSRC
CSMPC
Central coordinating 
agencies received high 
level of support from the 
government politicians
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A  The Autonomy of Bureaucrat Reformers
The impact of different government regime types on the autonomy of bureaucrats in civil 
service policy reform is shown in Table 11.7. From this it can be argued that bureaucratic 
reformers under authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes gained much more autonomy in 
formulating reform proposals than their counterparts under democratically elected regimes. 
In  authoritarian regimes like Anand’s and in the semi-democratic regime of Prem, there was 
a fusion between government politicians and bureaucrats as some ministers were themselves 
civil servants appointed to political office. Prem and Anand allowed ‘bureaucratic 
technocrats’ to influence executive decisions, resulting in autonomous central co-ordinating 
agencies. Prem, who was not an elected member of parliament, relied on expertise and 
technocratic advice from economic policy making institutions, particularly the NESDB, as 
an effective way to mediate possible conflicts among coalition parties. Like Prem’s 
government, Anand’s administration, which was backed the NPKC, appointed by the leaders 
of the 1991 military coup, also provided more autonomy to the Gvil Service as both present 
and retired civilian and military bureaucrats formed the majority of his cabinet. This in effect 
accentuated the superior role of senior civil servants in public policy decisions.
In contrast, in democratically elected regimes like those of Giatchai, Giaun, Banham, 
and Chavalit, government politicians tried to exert control and influence over the Gvil 
Service and its senior bureaucrats. Bureaucratic influence over executive decisions was 
attenuated since government politicians might not share the same views, interests and 
approaches to civil service reform as senior bureaucrats from the central co-ordinating 
agencies. As a result, bureaucrats’ autonomy and their reform capacity were constrained by 
the actions of government politicians. This led to the emergence of new competing reform 
issues originated by politicians. However, the relative autonomy of government politicians 
and bureaucratic reformers in the central co-ordinating agencies was also mediated by 
political leadership. For example, Giaun’s rule based decision-making style required 
bureaucratic advice, which resulted in decisions that were ‘programmed’ by bureaucratic 
rules, routines and regulations. Giavalit, whose background was in the military bureaucracy 
also tended to rely on ‘programmed’ bureaucratic decisions.
In short, semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes provided more autonomy for 
bureaucratic reformers than democratic regimes. The autonomy of bureaucratic reformers 
generated reform capacity allowing bureaucrats to pursue their reform interests. The
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narrative indicates that such autonomy brought about effective change in the area of human 
resource management policy while other issues were excluded resulting in the limited scope 
of the civil service reform as a whole.
B. Ownership of Civil Service Policy Reform
The politico- administrative pattern in different government regimes affects civil service 
reform owners, who would control the civil service reform process. Controlling the 
formulation of civil service policy is an intensely political subject since the rules of public 
personnel administration can have a significant impact on the nature of political leadership, 
political parties, and participation, and on the status quo of participants and affected parties, 
particularly government politicians, civil servants and citizens as well as other social groups. 
Thus, public personnel policy entails a dispute over the values that should be incorporated in 
public administration generally.1
Under authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes, the bureaucrat reformers were 
successful in taking control of the ownership of civil service reform. The CSARC under 
Prem’s administration and the CSRC under Anand’s interim government represent the sole 
institutional venues where bureaucrats in the central co-ordinating agencies controlled civil 
service policy making and implementation with the consent of unelected governments. 
These two reform committees reinforced the existing tight networks of civil service policy 
making institutions and allowed Prem’s government to launch a reform programme to limit 
the growth of the Civil Service, ‘downsizing’, for the first time in modem Thai administrative 
history, while the bureaucratically controlled CSRC under Anand could pursue a far reaching 
reform programme as has been seen in Chapter Four.2
Similar observations can be made to the case of civil service pension reform. 
Although the issue of improving the pension system emerged as a cabinet decision to set
1 Perspectives on the normative qualities of public administration can be considered under three 
•categories. Those who view public administration as management seek to maximise the value of
efficiency, economy and managerial effectiveness, which include the structural arrangement, the 
promotion of specialisation, formalisation and hierarchy. Those who look at public administration as 
•essentially a political and policy-making endeavour tend to argue for political representativeness, 
responsiveness, and accountability through elected officials and ultimately to the citizenry. Those 
who emphasise the legalistic or judicial nature of public administration tend to support the 
maximization of value pertaining to individual civil rights and liberties, equality protection, equity and 
procedural fairness.
2 See Chapter Two.
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•conditions for future Gvil Service pay rises, Anand’s regime gave full autonomy to the GGD 
to  develop a reform proposal as pension administration was the CGD’s direct jurisdiction.
The certification of principal reform actors to whom reform ownership would be 
granted is a political decision. Competition to influence and control the reform process was 
•evident in both cases, downsizing and civil service pension reform. The evidence suggests a 
‘two front battlefield’ of competition, between government politicians and bureaucratic 
reformers in the central co-ordinating agencies on the one hand, and between central 
coordinating agencies on the other. Competition between government politicians and 
bureaucratic reformers can be clearly seen in the case of downsizing. The pension reform 
case was typified by the competition between central co-ordinating agencies.
In the downsizing case government politicians can be seen as ‘outsiders* to the Gvil 
-Service and bureaucratic reformers the ‘insiders’. Control of the reform process by either 
group tends to result in one of two reform trajectories: ‘reform from within’ or ‘reform from 
•outside’. Different reform approaches gave different emphasis to the ‘reform venues* where 
reform ownership would reside. Political ‘outsiders’, who are rich in political resources but 
lack administrative capacity, usually employ their own administrative arm, the PMSO as a 
'vehicle to achieve their reform goals. Bureaucratic reformers, in most cases, are from the 
jpublic management policy-making institutions represented by the central co-ordinating 
agencies such as the OCSC, the GGD, the BOB and the NESDB.
In the pension reform case, competition between representatives from central co- 
•ordinating agencies including those which were civil service policymaking institutions was 
.more visible than competition between government politicians and bureaucratic reformers. 
Politician-bureaucrat competition in this case was on the inclusion of ‘interests’ in the reform 
proposals. Competition involved the invocation and certification of the FPO whose role in 
ithe civil service pension reform issue required political certification. The FPO became one 
•of the principal actors in the process of pension reform. Through the FPO, government 
politicians’ interest in the contribution of pensions to the macro economy was represented. 
'However, the content and scope of pension reform as well as the nuts and bolts of reform 
proposals were largely determined by interaction among bureaucratic reformers from the 
•central co-ordinating agencies.
The ownership of civil service reform creates degrees of ‘policy monopoly* 
i(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The structure of certified institutional venues limits who can
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participate in the civil service policy decision-making process. The narrative reveals that the 
number of institutional venues where civil service policies were made varies across the 
period of study. Reforms under democratically elected governments took place in multiple 
-venues while in the semi democratic regime of Prem and authoritarian regime of Anand, civil 
service downsizing policies were made in a single venue, or in a single government 
department, the OGD in the case of pension reform at its outset.
The multiple venues reflect the number of sponsors of reform programmes as these 
‘reform sponsors’ created venues for their reform ideas to be ‘incubated’ and reform issues 
to be processed. Where only one institutional venue was certified as the leading civil service 
policy decision site as in the semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes, civil service policy 
reform tended to be stabilised as ‘piecemeal’ improvement of Civil Service human resource 
management. But the stability of civil service policy was usually disturbed and their 
monopoly over civil service policy making was usually broken under democratic regimes 
where politically backed ad hoc institutional venues were established as part of the civil 
service policy making institutions. The destabilisation of civil service policy-making 
institutions affected the content and scope of civil service reform.
In sum, drawing on the narrative chapters, the degree of political influence of the 
bureaucracy is dependent on the types of government regime. Different governments 
provide different degrees of bureaucratic autonomy and hence allow reformers who have 
more autonomy for reform, particularly those who are certified as leading reform agents, to 
•control the Gvil Service reform process. As discussed earlier, the recurrent battleground 
•over ownership of the civil service reform process created a routinised cycle of civil service 
:reform in Thailand in the 1980s and 1990s, which helped sustain the issue on the agenda of 
most governments.
This section has re-conceptualised Knill’s ideal types of administrative reform 
•capacity by redefining the elements of the strength of executive leadership, the entrenchment 
•of administrative arrangement and the political influence of the bureaucracy. These 
•elements, which are both institutional and processual, are interrelated and operate within the 
•dynamics of wider political and economic contexts. As a result, the redefined framework can 
account for both stability and change in public management policy, as well as the variation in 
the outcomes of public management policy change and across administrative system. Related 
to the analytical theme of reform capacity, the next section places the pattern of Gvil Service
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policy change in Thailand within a wider scholarly discussion arguing that reform capacity 
and its resultant public management policy change can be associated with but not necessarily 
determined by what I call the dual approaches of public management change: a techno- 
bureaucratic approach and a political approach.
11.4 Managing Dualities of Gvil Service Reform in Thailand
Using an institutional processualist approach, the previous sections provide explanations for 
stability and change in Thai Gvil Service policy in the 1980s and 1990s. This section 
develops a general pattern of Gvil Service reform, bringing together those explanations of 
historical specificity, and integrating them into the wider discussion of public management 
reform. As shown in Table 11.8, civil service reform in Thailand is characterised by what 
might be called ‘reform dualities’ embedded in reform actors, issues, process and contexts 
leading to the adoption of two reform approaches: the techno-bureaucratic and the political.3 
The two approaches are fundamentally different in terms of principal reformers and their 
goals and motives. The techno-bureaucratic approach is ‘reform from within’ as bureaucrat 
reformers play the dominant part in formulating and implementing public management 
reform. The political approach, on the contrary, is essentially ‘reform from outside’, where 
politicians or actors who are certified as reform agents dominate the reform process.
Actions of principal reformers in both approaches which are constrained and 
facilitated by the institutional and processual factors and contexts, affect reform trajectories 
and outcomes. Different reform approaches attend to different reform issues or similar 
issues but with different reform perspectives, images, ideas, rhetoric and strategies. The 
reform efforts of most Thai governments over the last two decades were constrained by a 
duality of reform goals, the coexistence of ‘downsizing’ that aimed to make the Gvil Service 
more efficient with other goals of making civil service more responsive to the public. These 
often competing goals (Cyert and March,1992) are the manifestation of the dualistic
3 The term is borrowed from Halligan (2002).
Table 11.8 Dualities of Civil Service Reform in Thailand: The Reform Approaches
Reform
Characteristics
Reform components Techno-Bureaucratic Approach Political Approach
Reform Actors • Principal Reformers
• Reform Goals
• Bureaucrats in central coordinating 
agencies
•  To make the Gvil Service more 
efficient
• Government Politicians
• To make the Gvil Service more 
responsible to citizens
Reform Issues • Specific Reform Issues
• Reform Images
• Reform Rhetoric
• Reform Ideas and 
strategies
• Downsizing, rationalising, cost 
cutting and streamlining
•  Efficiency
• Orthodox administrative theories
• Economic efficiency and market 
driven strategy
• Democratising the Gvil Service and 
improving provision and delivery of 
service quality
• Responsibility and accountability
• Real Politik
• Non-market driven strategy
Reform Process 
and 
Mechanisms
• Reform agenda building
• Reform choice making
• Routines
• Consequential
• In touch with identity Logic of 
appropriateness
• Negative Feedback
• Mobilisation
• Doctrinal
• In touch with reality Logic of 
consequentiality
• Positive Feedback
Reform
Contexts
• Political and Economic 
Contexts
• Institutional contexts
• Crisis and changes in indicators
•  Administrative autonomy High 
degree of autonomy within Gvil 
Service policymaking institutions
• Reform from within (internal 
adaptation)
• Mandates and promises
• Political Supremacy High degree of 
politicisation within Gvil Service 
policymaking institutions
• Reform from outside (mandated 
instrumental)
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character of reform ideas, which were expressed through reform (polic)) images 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) rhetoric and strategies.1 Such dualistic goals also limited the 
choice of reform instruments to personnel management tools and organisation and method 
improvement techniques, which were usually adopted.
The dualities of Gvil Service reform approaches are shaped by the duality of the 
guiding reform ideas that drove different reform initiatives. These reform ideas were echoed 
in early explanations in which ‘economic rationalism’ and ‘managerialism’ (Aucoin, 1990; 
Hood, 1994; and Barzelay, 2001) were claimed to be the driving forces behind public 
management reform in the 1980s and 1990s. The ‘efficiency image’ which represents 
bureaucratic inefficiency was framed by economics driven reform ideas of maximising the 
utility of public resources, while other images of responsiveness, accountability and in the 
later period, good governance, represent ‘non-market forces’ for public management reform.
The reform ideas adopted by different sets of principal reformers also reflect the 
tensions between March and Olsen’s (1989) reform rhetoric: ‘orthodox administrative 
theories’ and ‘realpolitik’. The former was normally applied by bureaucratic reformers and 
the latter by government politicians. The dualities of actors and ideas led to the identification 
of two approaches of public management reform, the techno-bureaucratic and the political. 
The former is derived from orthodox administrative theory involving administrative design 
structure and procedures to facilitate bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness. The latter 
regards administrative structure as a product of interests and reform as a political issue.
Moving to the realm of processual analysis, the two approaches to civil service 
reform are characterised by different ways of organising processes, which in turn tends to 
lead to different trajectories and outcomes of civil service reform. The two approaches 
explain the impact of agenda building and reform choice making processes on reform 
trajectories and outcomes through different ‘process mechanisms’. These mechanisms which 
are dualistic in their nature include ‘routine versus mobilisation’, ‘consequential versus 
doctrinal’, ‘in touch with identity logic versus in touch with reality logic*, and ‘negative versus 
positive feedback’.
1 Reform images are associated with the guiding reform ideas because they frame how civil service 
policy is understood and discussed by strategically portraying causal stories (Stone, 1989) which can 
be constructed from a mixture of empirical information and emotive and paradigmatic appeals.
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The duality of ‘mobilisation and routinisation mechanisms’ explains the emergence 
and retention of reform issues on the government agenda. The mobilisation strategy which 
emphasises actions of government politicians or reformers who are certified by the 
government in agenda building and setting processes is similar to the entrepreneurial actions 
described by Kingdon (1984) and champions’ behaviour in innovative research (Burgleman, 
1983; Chakrabardi, 1974). The routinisation strategy views agenda setting as routines, arguing 
that institutional rules and routines determine scarce ‘attentional resources* (Dosi, Nelson 
and Winter 2000; Feldman 1989b; March and Olsen, 1989). Both perspectives recognise the 
role of individual agency in the process of issue formation, selection, and inclusion but in 
different degrees. The mobilisation strategy perspective gives more importance to reformers’ 
motives for manipulating and interpreting reform issues than the perspective which sees 
agenda setting as part of organisational routines.
In the techno-bureaucratic approach, bureaucratic reformers in the central 
coordinating agencies appropriated their jurisdictions, roles and responsibilities under 
conditions and pressures mainly administrative, fiscal and economic crisis. In contrast the 
political approach to Gvil Service reform was adopted by government politicians as a way to 
fulfil their political mandates and pressures, and to deliver election promises (Kingdon, 1995; 
Zahariadis, 2003; Keeler, 1993). The first approach allows the logic of appropriateness while 
tthe second approach involves the logic of consequentially. In the reform choice making 
process, a lengthy process of specifying and deciding on reform choices is usually associated 
with consequential coupling where a rational search for optimal solutions for highly technical 
reform problems is pursued. A swift, but not necessarily sustained process, is a characteristic 
of the doctrinal mode of coupling and searching for rationales and legitimate problems for 
politicians’ reform solutions.
Reform outcomes, stability and change in public management policy, can also be 
(explained by the tensions between negative and positive feedback (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993). The techno-bureaucratic approach allows the negative feedback mechanism to 
(operate through the ‘homeostatic or self correcting process’ within a closed and mutually 
adjusting policy community that reflects competing ideas and interests and the relative 
strengths of principal reform actors concerned, as clearly seen in the case of civil service 
pension reform and downsizing policies under less democratic governments. The negative 
feed back and self correcting mechanism, which often reinforces ‘policy monopoly* results in
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the limited change in public management policy as the old policy images, ideas, rhetoric and 
strategies mentioned in previous paragraphs are maintained and strengthened. In contrast, in 
the political approach to Gvil Service reform the positive feedback mechanism tends to play 
an important role. As Baumgartner and Jones (2002) argue, ‘a positive feedback mechanism 
include a self reinforcing process that accentuate rather than counterbalances a trend’, and 
‘self reinforcing processes can be explosive’ compared with self correcting processes which 
by their nature inhibit dramatic [public management] policy change’. This is what Jones 
(1994) calls the ‘serial shift’ when principal reformers like government politicians shift 
attention from a long established human resource management policy of the public sector, 
to another reform issue of their own interest, or other dimensions of civil service reform. 
The narrative evidence shows that such shifts of attention in periods of democratic 
government usually expanded the reform scope.
A dualist classification of reform approaches reinforces a major argument of the 
thesis that Gvil Service reform is a form of public service bargain over the control of reform 
ownership, which in turn affects the trajectory and outcomes of public management reform. 
Based on Hood’s (2004) concept, this thesis asserts that shifting the nature of the bargain 
leads to the tendency to adopt one reform approach and not the other, generating a reversal 
of public management policy. In less radical, less comprehensive reform where a complete 
switch form one approach to another does not take place, reformers tend to be constrained 
by the tensions between the two approaches leading to the adoption of more elements from 
one approach than from the other approach.2
To summarise, routinisation mechanisms, consequential mode coupling, logic of 
appropriateness and negative feed back operated within the techno-bureaucratic approach 
tend to constrain the reform trajectories leading to stability in public management policy. In 
contrast the mobilisation, doctrinal mode of coupling, logic of consequentiality and positive 
feedback, which operate within the political approach, tend to produce public management 
policy change, sometimes radical change. In the light of institutional processualism, the
2 Painter (2004) in his study of the politics of administrative reform in Thailand adopts the same 
explanation for civil service reform in Thailand arguing that the reform approach has moved from 
the techno-bureaucratic approach of incremental adaptation towards gridlock or negotiated reform 
representing a battle over the ownership of civil service reform specifically and control of the 
bureaucracy in general. Hie has also mapped out a growing trend that the reform approach taken by
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tensions between these two approaches influence ‘reform capacity* -  the opportunity or risk 
for public management reform -  which, in turn, is also shaped by the institutional ‘public 
service bargain* and reform opportunities and risks posed by mandates and crisis within 
environments. This thesis argues that these tensions need to be effectively and 
■complementarity managed if ‘reform dualities’ are to produce synergy leading to desirable 
policy change and innovations. It joins management academics, in arguing that dualities, 
trade off, paradoxes, and dilemmas are present in the choice of public management reform.3
Within the scant work on dualities and complementarities in the filed of public 
management reform, some authors treat dualistic characteristics of public management as a 
constraint on the reform effort (Pollitt and Bouchaert (2000). This thesis argues that the 
duality of public management reform need not be constraining forces as it can provide 
‘reform capacity*, defined in chapter one as opportunities and risks for making reform policy. 
The narrative evidence in this thesis shows that in most periods, two reform issues could 
and did coexist. In some periods where demands from political and economic pressures, 
crisis and mandate were high, the scope of civil service reforms was expanded. Defining 
•comprehensive reform as the breadth and depth of reform measures, it can be argued that 
•dualistic characteristics of public management reform can lead to comprehensive reform 
where the reform scope is expanded and more new or recurrent reform elements and issues 
are incorporated. In this sense reform duality and its resulting complementarities can 
increase ‘reform capacity* by generating reform synergy from two or more elements of 
reform content and process.4 This argument is similar to that of Evan and Doz (1992) who 
argue, ‘dualities should be view not as threats to consistency and coherence, but as 
opportunities to creative organisation development, learning and renewal’. Tracking the 
dualities of public management reform therefore puts another analytic focus on the 
institutional processualist approach to the study of public management policy change. This
Thai reformers is increasingly the political approach, which he calls the ‘mandate reform’. His 
argument is built from Knill’s concept of instrumental bureaucracy. See chapter one.
3 Many management scholars refer to different characteristics of dualities and the need to balance 
competing or contradictory ideas. Some characterise them as tensions of paradoxes (Quinn and 
Cameron, 1988; Handy, 1994); dilemmas (Hampden-Turner, 1990); competing goals and values 
(Cyert and March, 1992) and dualities (Evans and Genadry, 1990).
4 Milgrom and Roberts (1995) define complementarities as existing when doing more of one thing 
increase the return of doing more of another. This creates ‘synergy*. The concept has been extended 
and extensively applied to strategic management. Porter (1996) explains complementarities by 
visualising nets of interrelationships and defines it in terms of ‘interconnected activities systems’.
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argument raises the question of how  these dualities can be managed in such a way that 
reform opportunity and capacity can be expanded and reform risks minimised. These 
questions deserve their own detailed inquiry into the duality of content and process in public 
management reform in future research.
11.5 Concluding Remarks
For more than half a century successive Thai governments have battled against a rising tide 
of bureaucracy and bureaucratic inefficiency but only limited change has been achieved. 
From the narrative case studies of Gvil Service downsizing and reforming Gvil Service 
pensions that took place during the 1980s and 1990s, this thesis provides explanations in the 
light of an ‘institutional processualist’ analysis, for overall limited change in Gvil Service 
policy and the variations in trajectories and outcomes of reform efforts within the period of 
study and across cases. Underlying these explanations is the argument that different reform 
capacity promotes different trajectories and outcomes of Gvil Service policy reform. The 
•evidence form reform narratives allows the thesis to re-conceptualise ‘reform capacity7 which 
;is a major analytical concept making Knill’s framework more fluid taking into account the 
•dynamics relationship between institutional and preocessual factors.
This thesis has some limitations but also presents opportunities for future research. 
.Although it is carefully designed, research into complex reform experiences over twenty 
years has some limitations. First, it deals mainly with the pie-decision and decisional stage of 
•civil service reform but accepts that public management policy change requires the 
•examination of both ‘reform formulation’ and ‘reform implementation’ processes. Tracking 
the implementation of downsizing policy over a long historical period would enable the 
;assessment of ‘policy legacy and feedback’ from earlier periods to the civil service policy 
:making processes of subsequent governments. This thesis has tried to mitigate the absence 
•of the implementation process by referring to anecdotal and interview evidence and statistics, 
which indicate continuing, rises in Gvil Service personnel despite downsizing and justifies 
ithe assessment of downsizing as a ‘chronic failure’. Future research on public management 
policy change should incorporate the ‘implementation’ phase of reform.
Secondly, as civil service reform is a continuous process rather than a one off 
•episode, and there was a major structural change in the Thai Gvil Service in 2002, the civil
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service policy change process -  both policy formulation and implementation -  from 2000 
onwards should be studied to ascertain whether later public management reform has similar 
or different reform trajectories and outcomes compared with the long period studied in this 
thesis. Such a study would also enable researchers to critically assess the impact of economic 
and political developments after the Asian economic crisis on the pace of reform 
implementation.
This thesis provides an opportunity for researchers to pursue their interests in Thai 
public management specifically and the ‘institutional processualist’ view of public 
management reform in general. First, in a country like Thailand where politicians’ 
personalities are more important than party ideologies, it would be intellectually interesting 
to examine how the personalities of political and bureaucratic reformers affected the 
trajectories and outcomes of civil service reform and compare them with ‘reform champions* 
or ‘reform entrepreneurs* in countries with strong executives. Secondly, as this thesis has 
noted, though dualities, trade off, paradoxes and dilemmas in public management reform 
have been observed by academics for some time, no systematic study of how the ‘duality* of 
reform can be effectively managed and under what circumstances dualities can produce 
synergy for positive change and innovation in the public sector. Can reformers identify the 
optimal mix of these dualities that would lead to complementary policy change and 
innovation? Complementarities in public management policy deserve more serious attention.
In conclusion, this thesis has made modest empirical, theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the study of public management reform in Thailand in particular, and 
academic research on public management change and innovation in general. Empirically, the 
use of unexploited and relatively inaccessible archival evidence and the analysis of these ‘new 
facts’ not only provide access for further study of public management reform, but also 
provide more insight into public management in a developing country in the emerging 
market. Theoretically, it provides explanations for public management policy change by 
weaving two strands of literature, namely institutionalism and processualism that have 
underlined the arguments about policy and organisational change for decades. This 
combined ‘institutional processulist’ argument enables the community of public management 
scholars to move the discussion about public management policy change and innovation 
forwards by developing comprehensive explanations in a robust, systematic and coherent 
way. Methodologically, this thesis has applied an ‘analytic narrative instrumental case study*
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which provides a theoretical compass which helps researchers overcome hurdles when 
researching a large process like public management policy change.
Appendices
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Appendix I 
List of Historical Documents
The following documents, all in Thai, are cited and their references are made in the 
footnotes of the chapters.
1. Minutes of the Meetings -  Joint Working Committee on Gvil Service Pension Reform
2. Minutes of the Meetings -  The Gvil Service Manpower Policy Committee
3. Minutes of the Meetings -  The Working Group on Gvil Service Pension Reform, 
Office of the Gvil Service Commission
4. Minutes of the Meeting -  The National Pay and Compensation Committee
5. Cabinet Resolutions relevant to civil service reform, downsizing, civil service pension 
reform as specified in the chapters, in which reference is made at the footnotes of 
relevant chapters.
6. Orders issued by relevant agencies such as Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of 
Finance, Office of the Gvil Service Commission, and other civil service related reform 
committees.
7. Internal Memos and Communications within relevant government departments and 
central coordinating agencies.
8. Related papers and documents produced by relevant government departments and 
central coordinating agencies including various reform proposals, Cabinet submissions, 
concept papers, discussion papers, and research publications.
9. Thai Newspapers -  Gather mainly from the Matichon Newspapers’ Information. This 
centre, which is a paid service data bank, develops a computerised database from the 
Thai newspapers clippings.
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Appendix II 
List of Interviewees and Informants: Downsizing
1.1 Duration:
August -  December 1999, each face- to- face interview lasted one to two hours.
1.2 Interview with the joint secretaries
Represented in the CSMPC by
Director, Bureau of Management 
and Personnel System 
Development
Bureau of the Budget Ms Sirmsook Chonvanij
Director, Bureau of Structure and 
Position Classification
Office of the Gvil Service 
Commission
Ms Benjawan Srang-Nitom
Director, Bureau of Public 
Expenditure Control and 
Administration
Comptroller General’s 
Department, Ministry of Finance
Ms Sutheepom Daung-To
Director, Bureau of Human 
Resource Planning
Office of the National Economic 
and Social Development Board
Mr Chet Boonpratuang
1.3 Interview with other relevant officials and Personal Communication
Name Position Roles
Mr Theerayudth Lorlertrat
Dr Chalerm Sri-Padoong
Ms Darumee Boonsing 
Ms Benjawan Srang-nitom
Ms Laddawan Tantithavarangkura 
Ms Jarinee Iam-Sa-ad
Ms Jantanee Popaijit
Deputy Secretary General, and 
the Deputy secretary general of 
the OCSR
Former Deputy Secretary 
General, OCSC
Deputy Secretary General
Director of the Bureau of 
Manpower Audit, OCSC
Senior Public Personnel Analyst
Head of Manpower Planning 
Unit, OCSC
Personnel analyst
Secretary general of the Office 
of Gvil Service Reform 
Secretary of the CSMPC
Secretariat Staff for the CSMPC 
Secretariat Staff for the CSMPC
Secretariat Staff for the CSMPC
Secretariat Staff for the CSMPC
Outer seat official -  provider of 
manpower planning information 
in the macro-level 
Outer seat official -  facilitating 
the CSMPC secretariat
Mr Chet Boonpratuang Director of Human Resource 
Planning Division, NESDB
Member of the CSMPC and 
other CSC sub-committees
Ms Sirmsook Chonvanij Director of Management and 
Personnel System Development 
Division, BOB
Member of the CSMPC and 
other CSC sub-committees
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Ms Mutita Akoosuwan Budget analyst Outer seat official -  preparing 
and providing budget 
information
Dr Bhidya Bowomwattana Professor of Public 
Administration
Former SADC secretary general
Dr Supachai Yavaprabhas Professor of Public 
Administration
Former member of various 
administrative reform committee
Dr Anusom Limmanee Professor of Political Science
Mr Chai Narong Indra-meesap Management consultant Member of various 
administrative reform committee 
and CSC sub-committees
Mr Abhisit Vejjajiva Minister, Prime Minister’s Office Vice chairman of the CSMPC 
and the CSRC in Chaun’s 
government
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Appendix III 
List of Interviewees and Informants: Gvil Service Pension Reform
1.1 Duration:
August -  December 1999, each interview lasted one to two hours.
1.2 Interview with the Joint Secretaries
Positions Organisations Represented or be available for 
the interview by
Director, Bureau of Capital 
Market Development
Fiscal Policy Office. Ministry of 
Finance
Ms Kanikar Eak-paopan
Director, Bureau of Accounting 
System and Fiscal Standard 
Development
Comptroller General’s 
Department, Ministry of Finance
Ms Venus Ketkakomon
Head, Civil Service Pay and 
Compensation Unit
Office of the Gvil Service 
Commission
Mr Wisoot Prasitsiriwong
1.3 Interview with other relevant officials presenting/attending the meetings
Positions Organisations Represented or be available for 
the interview by
Director, Bureau of Capital 
Market Development
Technical Assistance Corporation
Fiscal Policy Office. Ministry of 
Finance
Ms Somldd Pata-kawong
Comptroller General’s 
Department, Ministry of Finance
Mr Napong Sirikhanyayakul 
(Accounting System Specialist)
Ms. Oranuch Wainusit (Fiscal 
Accounting Officer)
Head, Civil Service Pay and 
Compensation Unit
Office of the Gvil Service 
Commission
Mr. Visoot Prasitsiriwong
1.4 Personal Communications
Ms Sri-Bhanom Bunnak, a Senior Public Personnel Advisor specialising in Gvil Service 
Pay and Compensations, Office of the Gvil Service commission
Mr Visoot Prasitsiriwong, Head, the Gvil Service Pay and Compensation, Office of the 
Gvil Service Commission.
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Appendix IV 
Manpower Management Processes
Gvil service manpower management is fragmented as no single agency has a direct 
mandate or jurisdiction over the determination of the size of the Gvil Service. The 
process involves many of the central government agencies responsible for managing 
personnel and financial resources including the NESDB, the OCSC, the BOB, and a 
dozen personnel agencies. When government agencies want to increase their staff they 
need to fulfil statutory requirements in relation to the nature of the increased task and 
job burden. Increasing staff can take several different forms, the creation of new 
positions in the same administrative units, the establishment of new administrative units 
within departments, the creation of new administrative units within ministries, and the 
creation of new projects within ministries or department. In the last case, projects have 
first to be approved by the NESDB. Upon receiving a work plan from departments, the 
NESDB considers if the department's work plan or project are in line with the 
development guidelines of the NESDB Plan.
All requests for creating new positions resulting in an increase in civil service 
personnel are processed jointly by the OCSC and the BOB. The OCSC analyses requests 
and classifies and assigns appropriate grades for new positions to ensure increases in 
personnel match the increasing job burden as prescribed in the position classification 
system. The creation of new positions is also subject to the availability of financial 
resources in the prospective annual budget since all positions in the Gvil Service are 
financed by the government budget, a decision resting with the BOB. The manpower 
management process consequently put the OCSC and the BOB into a ‘lead position’. 
New positions or administrative units are only created when requests are approved by 
both. Disapproval by one results in the rejection of deferment, a frequent occurrence.
Approving requests for manpower increases is time consuming and involves a 
lengthy process of job evaluation. Job evaluation is carried out by analysts in the OCSC 
and the BOB requires job descriptions which have not yet been made for all Gvil Service 
positions. It is difficult for analysts to evaluate whether requests from line departments 
are realistic and based on job requirements. Requests are not always stricdy scrutinised. 
The OCSCs major concern is position classification rather than whether requests should 
be approved, whereas the BOB’s only concern is whether the government has enough 
budget resources for its public spending priorities and approves requests on this basis.
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In most cases, requests are approved resulting in uncontrolled civil service 
expansion. OCSC and the BOB officials acknowledge that the crude scrutiny of 
manpower requests also stems from their own lack of operational capacity. A personnel 
analyst in the Bureau of Organisation and Position Classification Development admitted, 
“Although my job was to ensure that the proposed positions were correctly classified 
using scientific techniques of job evaluation and classification crating equal pay for equal 
work and equal grades, we could not spend much time scrutinising requests.” She 
continued,
We were inundated with requests for creating new positions. Our desks were 
usually covered with requests. What we normally did was to approve requests 
with carefully assigned grade levels for them. We hardly ever said “no.., you 
can’t set up new positions or employ more personnel.”1
A member of the Manpower Planning Unit of the OCSC emphasised the 
OCSCs workload dealing with the requests, “Since almost half of the OCSCs staff were 
allocated to job evaluation for position classification, it was difficult for us to perform 
innovative functions.”2 Like the OCSC, the BOB’s heavy workload prevents budget 
analysts processing requests thoroughly. The director of the Systems Development 
Bureau of the BOB reported that budget analysts concentrated on their main routine 
jobs rather than scrutinising requests for personnel increases,
Our budget analysts were overloaded by their routine jobs. I couldn’t imagine 
how we could carry out the approval process effectively. We were busy with 
budget allocation and administration, which took up most of our time. If you 
look at the budget calendar, we are active throughout the year. Performing 
tasks following the budget cycle and calendar kept us fully occupied. It was 
worse during the budget debate in parliament. Many of us had to stay 
overnight in our offices.3
The lack of operational capacity for processing requests for manpower increases 
results in compromises between line ministries and departments and central co­
ordinating agencies. An official from the Bureau of Organisation and Classification
1 Interview, senior personnel analyst, OCSC
2 Interview, Head of Manpower Planning Unit, OCSC
3 Interview, Sermsook, BOB.
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Development (BOCD), frustrated by the ineffective manpower management process and 
what he calls a vicious circle of approving manpower requests, commented:
If the BOCD evaluated requests strictly, the rejection rate would be high. In 
return, in subsequent years, line departments would come up with even more 
requests for new staff than they had in previous years. This was a negotiating 
tactic. We knew about this but all we could do was keep an eye on the growth 
statistics with some apprehension.
Because the NESDB, the OCSC and the BOB, each with their own different 
clearly defined purposes based on their professional and legal standards, process request 
for manpower increases separately, the manpower management process is 
uncoordinated. The use of a non-sequential approval procedure which allows line 
ministries and departments to choose which agency they submit their requests to first, 
adds further confusion to the process. It creates bureaucratic red tape and an agency 
which has approved a manpower increase can put pressure on the others to conform, 
and not reverse its decision. This contributes to ineffective control over civil service 
expansion. Furthermore, it is a common experience for line ministries and departments 
to have decisions to allow manpower increases reversed by either the OCSC or the BOB. 
This lack of co-ordination paralyses the manpower management process and the OCSC 
and the BOB have been criticised by line ministries for generating red tape. They also 
mock their officials in the ‘tractor story, a classic tale in the Thai Civil Service.
In principle, the NESDB considers if new projects are in line with its Plan, 
and the OCSC is in charge of approving new positions, the BOB approves 
the budgets. There has been some attempt to co-ordinate and integrate 'work 
plans', 'people plans' and 'money plans', but I felt that little had been 
achieved. This is illustrated by the ‘tractor story, widely told in the civil 
service, when the BOB agreed to fund a new tractor for a particular unit, but 
the OCSC did not approve the employment of the driver. So it was parked 
outside the unit because there was no new driver and no one could drive this 
tractor.4
4 Interview, Sermsook, Director of Systems Development, BOB.
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The “tractor tale” not only reflects the co-ordination problems between the 
OCSC and the BOB, but also leads to bypassing the manpower management process 
making civil service expansion more uncontrolled. The voice of line ministries and 
departments whose manpower requests were rejected is often echoed by their political 
masters, ministers. For political reasons politicians prefer expansion to cuts and they 
compete for the budget to be allocated to their ministries and constituencies. As officials 
from both the OCSC and the BOB put it, “There are special requests from influential 
politicians or those who held important positions in the government. They either make 
requests directly to us, or in many cases, to the cabinet.”5 Most of the time requests for 
more personnel and larger budgets are made with strong political support. As one 
advisor of the OCSQ later a member of Gvil Service Reform Committee, explained:
This was because politicians (ministers) did not have good enough 
information about the departments they oversaw. As a result, they always 
‘signed off’ the requests their senior civil servants made. Forty-eight per cent 
of requests for establishing new ‘divisions’ within departments went through 
a political channel direct from ministers to the cabinet for approval, without 
the opinions of the relevant central agencies. Only fifty-two per cent were 
considered through usual the channels, where requests started off from line 
departments to ministers, then to the BOB and the OCSC before being 
decided by the cabinet.6
The way ‘special requests’ are approved by line ministers reflects a loophole in 
the process of approving requests for increasing personnel. By operating in this way, 
politicians and bureaucrats are better off. Gvil servants get more posts and larger 
budgets, while their political masters use the resources to achieve their political aims.
5 Interview, anonymous BOB official, corroborated by OCSC officials.
6 Interview, anonymous OCSC official.
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